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Abstract  
This doctoral thesis investigates the complex and multi-faceted process of the cultural 
sovietisation of Ukraine. The study argues that different political and cultural projects of a 
Soviet Ukraine were put to the test during the 1920s. These projects were developed and 
executed by representatives of two ideological factions within the Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks of Ukraine: one originating in the pre-war Ukrainian socialist and communist 
movements, and another with a clear centripetal orientation towards Moscow. The 
representatives of these two ideological horizons endorsed different approaches to defining 
Soviet culture. The unified Soviet canon in Ukraine was an amalgamation of at least two 
different Soviet cultural projects: Soviet Ukrainian culture and Soviet culture in the Ukrainian 
language. These two visions of Soviet culture are examined through a biographical study of two 
literary protagonists: the Ukrainian poet Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967) and the writer Mykola 
Khvyl'ovyi (1893-1933). Overall, three equally important components, contributing to 
Ukraine’s sovietisation, are discussed: the power struggle among the Ukrainian communist 
elites; the manipulation of the tastes and expectations of the audience; and the ideological and 
aesthetic evolution of Ukraine’s writers in view of the first two components. At the same time, 
the study explores those cultural, and often political, alternatives which Soviet Ukraine had lost 
once the interaction between local political actors and art creators was constrained by a strictly 
defined channel, fully determined by a centralist cultural strategy. It also examines the rationale 
for the Soviet nationalities policy and identifies the determinant role of the Ukrainian 
communists in implementing and adjusting all-Soviet policies within the republic. Ultimately, 
this study of cultural sovietisation significantly enhances our understanding of the complex 
process of establishing and consolidating the Soviet regime in Ukraine.  
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Matthias Neumann and Dr Francis 
King, for their intellectual advice, guidance and feedback on my work as well as for always 
providing constant reassurance and unfailing encouragement. I am truly indebted to them for 
the support they have provided during the course of my PhD and particularly during the final 
year. I must also thank Dr Tony Kemp-Welch, who co-supervised me for the first year and 
Professor Cathie Carmichael without whom I would not have had the opportunity to start my 
PhD in the first place. I would also like to thank Professor Peter Waldron and Professor 
Matthew Pauly for their comments and advice. In addition, I would also like to thank Dr Sonia 
Combe, my advisor in Berlin during my stay at the Centre Marc Bloch, for her invaluable 
advice, and Dr Béatrice von Hirschhausen for her help, feedback and support during perhaps 
the hardest period of my life.  
My PhD would not have been possible without the generous financial support I have 
received from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the School of History at 
the University of East Anglia, the Studienstiftung des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin, the 
Open Society Foundation (OSF) and Mr James Temerty, a chairman of Northland Power Inc. 
(Canada). I am also extremely thankful for timely advice and feedback to Prof Evgeny 
Dobrenko from the University of Sheffield, Professor Yuri Slezkine from the University of 
California, and Professor Myroslav Shkandrij from the University of Manitoba.  
There are a number of people I would like to thank on a personal level for their support, 
encouragement and assistance, especially Graham Harris, Sam Foster, Mark Vincent, Charles 
Beacroft and Charlotte Galpin. Special thanks must go to Borja Perez-Viana and Dr Nada Ali, 
who have been a continual source of inspiration and support. Finally, I would like to thank my 
family for their constant support, encouragement and, most importantly, for their unconditional 
belief in my abilities. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my father, who passed away before 
seeing this thesis completed.  
  
4 
 
Note on Transliteration and Translation 
In this thesis, I follow the Library of Congress system of transliterating Ukrainian and 
Russian texts and proper names, except for the cases where a commonly accepted English 
translation exists (for example, Gorky and Mayakovsky). I have used the Ukrainian 
transliteration of Ukrainian names and geographical places (e.g., Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa and 
Donbas) for the sake of consistency. 
I have given quotations in the English translation. I have used the Michael M. 
Naydan’s translations of the poems by Tychyna (Pavlo Tychyna, The Complete Early 
Poetry Collections of Pavlo Tychyna. (Lviv: Litopys, 2002). The translations of the poems 
not included in this collection are my own. The English translation is followed by the 
original Ukrainian in the footnotes. As for Khvyl'ovyi’s prose, all the quotes are from  
- Mykola Khvylovy, The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine. Translated by 
Myroslav Shkandrij (Edmonton: CIUS, 1986);  
- Mykola Khvylovy, Stories From the Ukraine. Translated by George S. N. 
Luckyj (New York: Philosophical library, 1960);  
- Mykola Khvylovy, “Woodcocks.” Translated by Yuri Tkacz in Before the 
Storm: Soviet Ukrainian Fiction of the 1920s (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1986).  
The quotations of the short stories not included in these collections are my own.  
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Introduction 
The whole question is — who will overtake whom? 
Lenin, 1921 
Should I, too, kiss the slipper of the Pope? 
Tychyna, Instead of Sonnets and Octaves, 1920 
But how must Dmytrii Karamazov have felt when, finding himself in 
the so-called ‘socialist’ environment, he saw that nothing had emerged 
from that stage and that very quietly and gradually his Communist 
Party was being transformed into an ordinary ‘gatherer of the Russian 
land’. 
Khvyl'ovyi, Val'dshnepy, 1927 
 
 
Context of the Study 
The February Revolution marked the starting point in the process of the complicated social, 
political and economic transformation of the former Russian Empire. The subsequent 
October Revolution and the civil wars put to the test different projects of national state-
building. On the territory of Ukraine, the rivalry between different forms of statehood 
became especially severe. Until 1921, constant political and military reversals brought a 
succession of governments: the Ukrainian Central Rada (March 1917 to April 1918); The 
Provisional Workers-Peasant Government of Ukraine (formed in November 1918; later the 
Bolshevik Council of People’s Commissars); the Ukrainian State (April to December 
1918); the Directory (December 1918 to November 1919); the Whites and the anarchists. 
Some of these governments acted in parallel and claimed authority over the same territory. 
The first post-revolutionary years were defined by the rivalry between the Ukrainian 
People’s Republic (Ukraїns'ka Narodna Respublika, UNR), formed on 20 November 1917 
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and proclaimed independent on 22 January 1918, and the Soviet Republic in Ukraine, 
which existed under various names from December 1917.1 The opposition between these 
two forms of statehood, known as the Ukrainian-Soviet Wars, lasted with varied success 
until November 1921, when the Red Army succeeded in occupying almost the entire 
territory of Ukraine, where the Soviet regime was established.2 Their defeated political 
opponents were forced either to emigrate or to come to terms with the Soviet regime and 
support the Bolshevik state-building project. 
The retreat of the Ukrainian People’s Republic did not, however, mean the 
ideological victory of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. The Communist Party of Bolsheviks of 
Ukraine (Komunistychna Partiia Bil'shovykiv Ukraїny, KP(b)U) simply did not possess the 
monopoly in representing the republic’s working class, in whose name the party claimed to 
exercise its dictatorship.3 The Ukrainian communists (members of the non-Bolshevik 
communist parties) claimed their right to represent the Ukraine’s toiling masses, composed 
of the republic’s proletariat and the peasantry, and sought an independent communist 
Ukraine. In the first post-revolutionary years, the communist camp in Ukraine, besides the 
Bolsheviks, was represented by the Borot'bysty (the former left-wing members of the 
Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR); the Nezalezhnyky (the left-wing 
                                                 
1 The name of the Soviet Republic in Ukraine changed from Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets (adopted 
by the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in December 1917), Ukrainian Soviet Republic, proclaimed on 
19 March 1918 and Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, declared on 10 March 1919. 
2 On the Ukrainian-Soviet War: O. Udovychenko, Ukraïna u Viini za Derzhavnist' (Kyiv: Lybid', 1995); 
Pavlo Mirchuk, Ukraïns'ko-Moskovs'ka Viina 1917-1919 (Toronto: Liha Vyzvolennia Ukraїny, 1957); 
Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, Komunism v Ukraїni; Pershe Desiatylittia (1919-1928) (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1996); I. 
Mazepa, “Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule,” The Slavonic and East European Review, 12, 35 (1934): 323-346; 
Jurij Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: a Study in the Communist 
Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1960); Arthur Adams, The Bolsheviks in 
the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919 (New Haven: Yale UP, 1963). 
3 On the history of the KP(b)U see: Vsevolod Holubnychy, “Outline History of the Communist Party of 
Ukraine,” in Soviet Regional Economics. Selected works of Vsevolod Holubnychy, ed. Iwan S. Koropeckyj 
(Edmonton: CIUS, 1982); Moisei Ravich-Cherkasskii, Istoria Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bov) Ukrainy 
(Kharkov: Gosizdat Ukrainy, 1923); Ivan Maistrenko, Istoriia Komunistychnoї Partiї Ukraїny (Munich: 
Suchasnist', 1979); Mykola Popov, Narys Istoriї Komunistychnoiї Partiї (Bil'shovykiv) Ukraїny (Kharkiv: 
DVU, 1928). 
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members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (USDRP); the Bor'bisty (the 
members of the Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (UPLSR) and the 
Ukapisty (the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, UKP).4 These ideological and 
political rivals were mostly neutralised by 1920, when the merger of the above mentioned 
parties with the KP(b)U was orchestrated.5 After the merger, the former members of these 
communist parties played an important part in adjusting and implementing the all-Soviet 
policies in Ukraine, especially the nationalities policy of korenizatsiia, launched in 1923. 
Victory in the civil wars presented the Bolshevik leadership with a number of 
challenges. The economic and political system of War Communism, a set of radical 
measures introduced between 1918 and 1921 in order to, among other things, aid the Red 
Army, led to overall economic degradation, the famine of 1921-22, urban depopulation and 
frequent social disturbances. As a result, the Bolsheviks found themselves in complete 
social isolation, when neither the old-line intelligentsia, nor peasantry and scant proletariat 
provided the Bolsheviks with their fully-fledged support.6 In view of all these 
predicaments, the Tenth RKP(b) Congress, held in March 1921, introduced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). The adoption of this economic policy, considered by many as a 
retreat from revolutionary goals, initiated drastic changes in political, social, and economic 
domains. Similarly, crucial changes occurred in the cultural sphere.  
                                                 
4 On Ukrainian national communism see: James Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983); Valerii Soldatenko, U Poshukah Sotsial'noї ta Natsional'noї Garmoniї: 
Eskizy do Istoriї Ukraїns'koho Komunizmu (Kyiv: IPiEND, 2006); Olena Liubovets', Ukraїns'ki Partiї i 
Politychni Al'ternatyvy, 1917-1920 (Kyiv, Osnovy, 2005); Stephen Velychenko, Painting Imperialism And 
Nationalism Red: The Ukrainian Marxist Critique of Russian Communist Rule In Ukraine, 1918-1925 
(Toronto: Toronto UP, 2015); Olena Palko, “Ukrainian National Communism: Challenging History, Journal 
of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 22:1 (2014): 27-48. 
5 The Ukrainian Communist Party voted its self-dissolution only in 1925. 
6 Moshe Lewin, “The Social Background of Stalinism,” in Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation, ed. 
R. Tucker (New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 112; Kul'chyts'kyi, Komunizm v Ukraїni, 
21-161. 
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The importance of culture (the arts), erroneously neglected by the Bolsheviks during 
the civil war years, became obvious, when alternative cultural projects, promoted by the 
Proletkult (in the all-Soviet scope) and the Borot'bysty (in Ukraine), gained strength and 
came into direct opposition with the centralist tendencies of the Communist party. To 
compensate, the Bolsheviks initiated the implementation of a unified mainstream cultural 
strategy, aimed at sovietisation of intellectual, social and cultural life. Katerina Clark 
dubbed this latent state interference as a ‘quiet revolution’.7 Thus, in 1921 the Bolsheviks 
took culture under their direct control, admitting it as a ‘third front,’ a locus of struggle, “an 
arena in which power (hegemony) could be won or lost.”8 In this way, from the early 
1920s, culture and art become weapons of class struggle. 
To overcome the social and political alienation in the peripheries, the leadership 
centrally initiated a preferential nationalities policy, known as korenizatsiia. Adopted at the 
Twelfth RKP(b) Congress in April 1923, korenizatsiia called for reorganising the Soviet 
Union “in such a way as fully to reflect not only the common needs and requirements of all 
the nationalities of the Union, but also the special needs and requirements of each 
individual nationality.”9 The rationale behind the new nationalities policy was that by (1) 
engaging and promoting national cadres into local party organs (party entrenchment) and 
(2) facilitating the development of national cultures and languages, the Communist party 
would be able to curb any manifestation of ‘bourgeois’ local nationalism and transform 
those national sentiments into a state-controlled principle of all-Union integration. 
                                                 
7 Katerina Clark, “The ‘Quiet Revolution’ in Soviet Intellectual Life,” in Russia in the Era of NEP, ed. Sheila 
Fitzpatrick et al. (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991), 211. 
8 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front. Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca; London: Cornell 
UP, 1992), 2. 
9 J. Stalin, “National Factors in Party and State Affairs: Theses for the Twelfth Congress of the Russian 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks),” in J. Stalin, Works, Vol.5 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1953), 193. 
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Subsequently, the Bolsheviks helped create preconditions for the fully-fledged 
cultural flourishing in Soviet Ukraine by means of linguistic and cultural korenizatsiia. For 
the first time, the Ukrainian intelligentsia gained direct access to a large Ukrainian-
speaking audience (or audience with the necessary command of the language), which, in 
turn, gained the right to be heard and taken into account. However, what was the product of 
this cultural revival? According to conventional narratives, the Ukrainian twenties became 
known as the “executed renaissance” (rozstriliane vidroshennia).10 This paradigm rests on 
the view that the decade was marked by a unique period of cultural flowering in Ukraine, 
which was violently interrupted by Stalin’s terror. Seen from this perspective, the 
generation of the 1920s is defined by its inherently anti-Soviet stand and strong national 
orientation. Not undermining the determinant role of this artistic milieu in establishing 
Ukrainian culture, this study argues that during the 1920s the same artists in large part 
contributed to another important current, Soviet culture. This culture was Soviet, created by 
artists with a strong ideological position and in accordance with the party line; Ukrainian, 
to embrace the korenizatsiia objectives; and mass-oriented, tasked to reach the republic’s 
working class and engage it in cultural production. 
In this thesis, three equally important components, contributing to Ukraine’s cultural 
sovietisation are examined: (1) the Ukrainian communist elites, developing a separatist 
vision of a Soviet Ukraine; (2) the manipulation of the tastes and expectations of the 
audience; and (3) ideological and aesthetic evolution of Ukraine’s writers in view of the 
first two components. It will be argued that the precursors to cultural sovietisation in 
Ukraine were gradually developing throughout the 1920s. Hence, the evolution of socialist 
                                                 
10 The paradigm was introduced by the survivors of the Stalin purges who ended up in the emigration after the 
World War Two. See: Iu. Lavrinenko Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia. Antolohiia 1917-1933. (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 
2007); Halyna Hryn, “The ‘Executed Renaissance’ Paradigm Revisited,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 27 
(2004–5): 67-96. 
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realism, the quintessence of cultural sovietisation, was a complex process, which was 
accomplished by a single party decree in 1932 centrally and endorsed by the creation of the 
Union of Soviet Writers in 1934. The study of cultural sovietisation inevitably leads to 
better understanding of the complex process of establishing and consolidating the Soviet 
regime in Ukraine. 
 
Focus of the Study 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the complex and multi-faceted process of the 
cultural sovietisation of Ukraine. During the 1920s different political projects of a Soviet 
Ukraine were put to the test. The first one was developed and executed by the Ukrainian 
communist movement, especially the Borot'bysty, who after their merger with the KP(b)U 
in 1920 had contributed greatly to strengthening a separatist political culture and Ukraine’s 
autonomy in political, economic and cultural matters. Another project was executed by the 
KP(b)U members with a clear centripetal orientation towards Moscow, advocating in 
favour of preserving the historically established relations between centre and periphery and 
constructing the all-Russian (all-Soviet) political and cultural space. Consequently, these 
two political cultures, or ideological horizons in the KP(b)U endorsed different cultural 
projects in Soviet Ukraine. Firstly, there was a distinct project of Soviet Ukrainian culture 
curated from Kharkiv by the cultural wing of the Borot'bysty and Ukraine-minded 
communists in the KP(b)U. Secondly, the project of all-Union Soviet culture was 
promoted, to which Ukraine’s cultural figures would contribute equally with the 
representatives from other Soviet republics. The main difference between the two visions of 
Soviet culture was the way the artistic map of the Soviet Union was perceived. Whereas the 
first group aimed at a decentralised artistic map with numerous cultural centres in the 
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peripheries, the second approach saw Moscow as the only centre and the peripheries as 
provincial.  
This thesis supports the view that until the end of the 1920s, the artistic map of Soviet 
culture remained relatively decentralised, when Moscow, Kharkiv or Tiflis could each 
boast opportunities for artists and new elites.11 In Ukraine, however, the two Soviet cultural 
projects, developed in parallel in Kharkiv and Moscow, were often implemented 
simultaneously by different interest groups and came into direct confrontation with each 
other. In addition, their promoters and creators similarly used the Ukrainian language as 
their medium. There was a difference, however. Whereas the first group saw the Ukrainian 
language as a prerequisite for creating a modern urban Ukrainian culture with equal 
appreciation of the traditional social structure (Ukrainian-speaking peasantry) and the 
nineteenth-century cultural trends, the second group used the Ukrainian language (the 
language of the largest ethnic group in the republic) as a necessary concession in order to 
achieve certain strategic goals. Linguistic Ukrainizatsiia was the key component of 
korenizatsiia, the party entrenchment in Ukraine. The use of Ukrainian also possessed a 
strong ideological value. The creation of Soviet culture in the Ukrainian language was seen 
as a method to weaken the appeal of the national emigration and dissent groups in the 
KP(b)U. In 1925, the key Soviet Ukrainian party ideologist Volodymyr Koriak explicitly 
stated that Ukraine’s Soviet writers were tasked with putting an end to “Ukrainian 
                                                 
11 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001); 
Michael Hamm, Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993); Serhiy Bilenky, Imperial 
Urbanism in The Borderlands: Kyiv, 1800 – 1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017); Donald 
Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London, Reaktion Books, 2012); Tönu Parming and Elmar 
Järvesoo (eds.). A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: the Estonian SSR. (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1978). 
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literature” and “Ukrainian poets” and to create a universal “proletarian culture in the 
Ukrainian language.”12 
Hence, the unified Soviet canon in Ukraine, finally cemented in the early 1930s, was 
an amalgamation of at least two different Soviet cultural projects: Soviet Ukrainian culture 
and Soviet culture in the Ukrainian language. The on-going debates and negotiations 
between the two political and cultural orientations in the KP(b)U, among public 
intellectuals and artists are the focus of this thesis. At the same time, the thesis explores 
those cultural, and often political, alternatives which Soviet Ukraine had lost once the 
interaction between local political actors and art creators was squeezed into a strictly 
defined channel, fully determined by a centralist cultural strategy. 
In the 1920s, the framework of Soviet Ukrainian culture exposed the potential of the 
young artistic generation to produce high-class cultural products. The five masters of the 
decade included Mykola Khvyl'ovyi in prose, Pavlo Tychyna in poetry, Mykola Kulish in 
drama, Les' (Oleksandr) Kurbas in theatre and Oleksandr Dovzhenko in film. The 
unprecedented cultural flowering of the 1920s was the result of a fusion of the modernist 
tradition of the past and the new revolutionary ethos of the present, promoted by the strong 
Ukrainian establishment both in the KP(b)U and in the cultural management. The eventual 
merger of the two cultural projects occurred both “naturally”, through the weakening and 
diffusion of the Soviet Ukrainian cultural strategy and “unnaturally”, due to external 
pressure. The centralisation drive of the first Five-Year Plan changed the cultural 
topography of the Soviet Union; the “axe of cultural exchange”13 had shifted to Moscow 
                                                 
12 V. Koriak, “Ukraїns'ka Literature za P'iat' Rokiv Proletars'koї Revoliutsiї,” in Koriak, Orhanizatsiia 
Zhovtnevoї Literatury (Kharkiv: DVU, 1925), 65. 
13 Philipp Ther, “The Transnational Paradigm of Historiography and Its Potential for Ukrainian History,” in 
Ukraine: Laboratory of Transnational History, Georgiy Kasianov and Ther (eds.) (Budapest: CEU Press, 
2009), 100. 
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and the all-Soviet cultural project was imposed on the Soviet republics. As a result, 
Ukraine’s provincial status was cemented. So, the 1920s became a transitional period of 
realigning the centre-periphery relationship in the Soviet Union. 
The separate Soviet Ukrainian cultural project was enabled by many internal and 
external factors. First of all, young writers and artists embraced the potential of the 
revolutions, which took place in Russia and in Ukraine. The revolutionary years exposed 
the urgency of both national and social questions, which often coexisted in the programs of 
different political actors of the time. Amidst revolutionary upheavals, a new generation of 
artists and writers was born, whose orientation towards the future and critical attitude 
towards the past initiated a new chapter of revolutionary and proletarian culture. This new 
artistic and literary corpus in the first post-revolutionary decade existed side by side with 
the old-line intellectuals, trying to adapt to the new realities. The wealth of the national 
literature of the decade resulted mainly from the creative cooperation between these two 
groups: young utopians and ‘old’ classics. 
Secondly, accelerated modernisation created conditions for developing urban culture. 
Combined with broad education campaigns and a programme for tackling illiteracy, it had 
provided writers with the audience for new proletarian literature. The potency of Soviet 
Ukrainian culture was attributed in large part to korenizatsiia, and Ukrainizatsiia as its local 
variant. Ukrainizatsiia triggered publishing in the Ukrainian language, producing art works 
national in their content and form; contributed to the creation of a total Ukrainian urban 
environment. Besides, during the 1920s, this central Bolshevik policy led to constructing 
ethnic and national identities in Ukraine, contributing to the wealth of cultural flowering in 
the republic. Overall, Kharkiv, the former provincial city and the new capital of Soviet 
Ukraine, attracted many young artists from all over Ukraine. Like Moscow, the Ukrainian 
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capital experienced its own cultural renaissance, producing innovative, modern, original 
cultural products.14 
In addition, a separatist vision of Soviet culture was enabled by relative pluralism in 
the political sphere. During the 1920s, there were on-going negotiations between central 
and local elites about the sovereignty of Soviet Ukraine, and the status of the KP(b)U. Not 
surprisingly, it led to separatist claims in the cultural sphere, when the new generation of 
artists, inspired by the revolution and emboldened by the strong Ukrainian voices in the 
party leadership, provocatively demanded to break the eternal dependency on Russian 
cultural patterns. Many public intellectuals and party leaders, who were both Ukrainians 
and communists, in the mid-1920s voiced their objections towards the “colonial status” of 
Ukraine, either in political, economic, or cultural matters. 
Last but not least, the existence and strength of the separate project of Soviet 
Ukrainian culture was enabled by the ambiguity and the confusion of the Soviet policies 
centrally. While the Soviet Ukrainian cultural project was gradually developing by trial and 
error, so was the Soviet one. The prominence of the all-Soviet cultural canon in the 1930s 
onwards can be explained by an enormous centralisation drive in the Soviet Union, initiated 
with the Stalin “Great Break” and completed during the first Five-Year Plan. The 
dominance of Soviet culture was achieved by centralising cultural management and 
relocating cultural and promotion opportunities to Moscow. In the 1930s, Ukraine, despite 
all the previous attempts, became provincial: with the decline of the Ukrainian fraction in 
the KP(b)U, numerous artists moved to Moscow in search for better opportunities and 
many of those who remained, were purged in 1937-38. 
                                                 
14 Myroslav Shkandrij, “U Poshukakh Novoho: Revoliutsiia v Ukraїns'komu Mystetstvi 1920-kh,” Suchasnist' 
25.1 (1986): 41-51; 25.2 (1986): 42-58. 
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Having defined Soviet Ukrainian culture as the focus of the study, this thesis 
concentrates mainly on literature. Primarily this choice is dependent on the role of literature 
as an ideological premium, originating in the great tradition of the so-called Russian (same 
as Ukrainian) ‘literature-centrism’ (literaturotsentrizm). In this tradition, deeply rooted in 
the Russian Empire, literature was seen as a medium, a communicator of the vox populi to 
the authorities and vice versa. In the Russian Empire, where opportunities for political 
expression and opposition were limited, literature enjoyed great social prominence and 
became the only channel for shaping, voicing and delivering political messages.15 The 
value of literature during the Soviet times had changed little since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Indeed, in the 1920s there were other channels for expressing dissent, including a 
relative degree of political opposition in the KP(b)U. Nonetheless, literature preserved its 
role in delivering political messages due to the activist position of Ukrainian writers, which 
they occupied throughout the 1920s as public speakers, opinion makers, political activists 
and party functionaries. The Literary Discussion of 1925-1928 became the best example of 
how politics and literature were intertwined at the time. This last free debate in Soviet 
Ukraine, which had started as a discussion of mere cultural issues, developed into a 
political declaration against the republic’s “colonial status” and calls for independence. 
The role of literature was, however, not strictly about representing voices of dissent, 
or about writers and creative intellectuals assuming social responsibility. The Bolsheviks 
from very early on discerned the great potential of engaging prominent literary figures for 
                                                 
15 On the social role of intelligentsia in Russia in the nineteenth century see: I. Berlin, Russian Thinkers 
(London: Hogarth, 1979); N. Berdyaev, “The Power and Psychology of the Intelligentsia,” in Berdyaev, 
Collected Works, Vol. IV (Paris: YMCA Press, 1990): 198-206; Richard Pipes (ed.) The Russian 
Intelligentsia (New York: Columbia UP, 1961); Inna Kochetkova, The Myth of the Russian Intelligentsia: Old 
Intellectuals in the New Russia (London, New York: Routlege, 2010); Robert V. Daniels, “Intellectuals and 
the Russian Revolution,” American Slavic and East European Review 20, 2 (1961): 270-278. On Ukrainian 
intelligentsia Georhii Kasianov, Ukraїns'ka Intelihentsiia na Rubezhi XIX-XX Stolit': Sotsial'no-Politychnyi 
Portret (Kyiv: Lybid', 1993); Nadezhda Shyp, Intelligentsiia na Ukraine (XIX vek): Istoriko-Sotsiologicheskii 
Ocherk (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1991). 
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their benefit. A writer as a mouthpiece of political propaganda was cherished by the 
Bolshevik authorities. In the precarious situation that the Bolsheviks found themselves after 
the revolution, expedient methods to mould popular values, to reach audiences and to 
censure alien ideals were needed. Literature became the best means for “internalising 
Socialism”.16 Apart from the possibility of promoting politically correct messages on the 
Party’s behalf, the engagement of authoritative figures was encouraged for their value in 
gaining public support and creating a positive outlook of the new authorities. So, during the 
1920s, two parallel processes occurred simultaneously: while one group of writers 
struggled to defend the autonomy of the cultural sphere, another contributed significantly to 
the state appropriation of literature. It is noteworthy, moreover, that some artists were 
equally engaged in both projects. 
It must be highlighted that during the 1920s, there was hardly any unified view on 
what Soviet Ukrainian literature should comprise of. As the following chapters will show, 
there were different literary currents in Soviet Ukraine, which, despite their acknowledged 
adherence to the revolution and/or proletarian orientation, differed in their views on artistic 
orientation, the purpose of literature, the question of audience, engagement with current 
affairs, and the limits of party intervention. All these differences were reflected in the 
institutional diversity of the letters in Ukraine. In addition, the vision of Soviet Ukrainian 
literature varied depending on the generation, ideological preferences, language and ethnic 
origin of its contributors. Hence, the formation of Soviet Ukrainian literature required 
compromises and assimilation, achieved during the decade-long intensive debates. Not 
surprisingly, many of the cultural alternatives were lost in the process of these negotiations. 
                                                 
16 See: Introduction in James von Geldern, and Richard Stites (eds.) Mass Culture in Soviet Russia: Tales, 
Poems, Songs, Movies, Plays, and Folklore, 1917-1953 (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995). 
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In the following chapters two different aspects of the developing Soviet Ukrainian 
literature are examined. Firstly, with the Bolshevik victory in Ukraine, the previous 
national projects of Ukrainian culture needed to be assimilated. Here, I am interested in the 
ways the so-called fellow-travellers (pre-revolutionary intelligentsia who stopped openly 
opposing the Soviet regime and tacitly accepted it) adopted the Soviet paradigm. In other 
words, the first aspect deals with the trajectory of Ukrainian writers becoming Soviet 
writers (the self-sovietisation17). Secondly, the Bolshevik regime in Ukraine, as will be 
shown in Section One, had two manifestations: communists oriented towards Moscow and 
those Ukraine-centred. So, the second aspect of the debate concerns the process of 
negotiating and reconciling the two horizons within the communist camp in literature. In 
other words, I will examine a vision of Soviet Ukrainian literature, anticipated by the 
Ukrainian communists, as opposed to Soviet literature in Ukrainian language, the one 
promoted by the Moscow-oriented literary forces. 
 
Methodology 
Theoretical framework 
Most studies of Soviet culture assume a model of diffusion, according to which Moscow 
was the centre of cultural trends, which were copied by, or brought down to other Soviet 
republics.18 This model cements the centre-periphery vision, according to which the 
Russian cultural trends were superior and political decisions centrally determined cultural 
                                                 
17 The distinction between sovietisation and self-sovietisation is borrowed from Balázs Apor, Péter Apor 
(eds.) The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period (Washington, DC: New 
Academia Publishing, 2008). 
18 E.g., Katerina Clark, Moscow the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet 
Culture, 1931–1941 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2011); Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution 
(Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard UP, 1995); Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: a Cultural History of 
Russia (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2002). 
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development in the periphery. However, Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s experienced an 
extraordinary cultural flowering in its own right, when numerous artists voiced the need to 
abandon artistic orientation towards Moscow. Hence, the present study challenges this 
diffusion model and emphasises the separate trajectory of Soviet Ukrainian cultural 
development, which ran parallel to the Russian one, centred in Moscow. At the same time, 
the study challenges the Ukraine-centred model, according to which the artistic flowering 
of the 1920s was crushed solely by the Moscow centralisation drive. This Ukraine-centred 
perspective leads to a partial assessment of the 1920s and rejects those internal 
developments in Soviet Ukraine, which eventually contributed to artistic and institutional 
unification of the 1930s. 
The study builds on the paradigm of internal transnationalism, introduced by Mayhill 
S. Fowler.19 The scholar applied this model to studying different manifestations of Soviet 
culture in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, there were different, yet interrelated cultural 
processes unfolding simultaneously in different regions of the Soviet Union. Hence, the 
cultural development in Soviet Ukraine, at least until the introduction of the first Five-Year 
Plan, occurred parallel to the one in Moscow. This thesis argues, however, that throughout 
the 1920s there was hardly a single unified view on what the Soviet Ukrainian cultural 
project was about. In addition, during the decade the Soviet cultural project was putting 
down roots in Ukraine. The two cultural projects were therefore interrelated not only 
transnationally, but also within the borders of Soviet Ukraine. The contradictions and 
opposing visions of Soviet culture (Soviet Ukrainian culture and Soviet culture in the 
Ukrainian language) are at the centre of the thesis. 
                                                 
19 Mayhill Fowler, “Mikhail Bulgakov, Mykola Kulish, and Soviet Theater: How Internal Transnationalism 
Remade Center and Periphery,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 16, 2 (2015): 263-
290; Mayhill C. Fowler, Beau Monde on Empire’s Edge: State and Stage in Soviet Ukraine (Toronto, Toronto 
UP, 2017). 
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In general, the same conventional framework used to study the Bolshevik decade-
long project of radical social transformation in the 1920s, aiming at ultimate ‘cultural 
revolution’,20 can be applied to Ukraine. Along the continuum of the Bolshevik cultural 
project, several successive periods in the relationship between power and art can be 
distinguished: the civil war enabling contestant projects of revolutionary culture; the NEP 
years launching the process of the sovietisation of intellectual life; and the period of the 
first Five-Year Plan, waging class war in cultural affairs.21 This periodisation helps to see 
how gradual the party intervention in the cultural sphere was. In Ukraine, however, this 
process was mitigated by a significant Ukrainian faction in the party and the specifics of the 
korenizatsiia policy, which did not apply to Russia. This is why the course towards the 
centralisation of power, launched alongside industrialisation and collectivisation 
campaigns, was more tangible in Ukraine; it started to be implemented earlier (as early as 
1926) and with much more rigour, than in Russia.22 
This study takes a bottom-up perspective to examining the process of sovietisation of 
Ukraine. It focuses on the internal factors that eventually enabled the dominance of the all-
Soviet cultural canon (socialist realism) in Ukraine. The victory of the centralist perspective 
on culture was enabled by a combination of, firstly, the decade-long manipulation with the 
republic’s social structure; and, secondly, various artistic pursuits, which promoted an 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Stefan Plaggenborg, Revolutionskultur: Menschenbilder und Kulturelle Praxis in Sowjetrussland 
zwischen Oktoberrevolution und Stalinismus (Köln: Böhlau, 1996); William G. Rosenberg, “Introduction,” in 
Russia in the Era of NEP, 1-12; David Joravsky, “Cultural Revolution and the Fortress Mentality,” in 
Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution, ed. Abbott Gleason et al. (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1985), 93-113; Clark, Petersburg; Michael David-Fox, “What Is Cultural Revolution?,” Russian 
Review, 58, 2 (1999): 181-201. 
21 E. Brown, The Proletarian Episode in Russian Literature, 1928-1932 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Cultural Revolution of the First Five Year Plan,” in Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-
1931, ed. S. Fitzpatrick (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1978); Sheila Fitzpatrick et al. Russia in the Era of NEP; 
Gleason, et al. Bolshevik Culture. 
22 Iurii Shapoval, “‘On Ukrainian Separatism’ A GPU Circular of 1926,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, XVIII, 
3/4 (1994): 275-302; Bertelsen, Olga, and Myroslav Shkandrij. “The Secret Police and the Campaign against 
Galicians in Soviet Ukraine, 1929–34.” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 42.1 
(2014): 37–62. 
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instrumentalist vision of the arts (an approach which regarded socialist realism as a 
continuation and pinnacle of modernism, especially of the avant-garde23). In this thesis, this 
bottom-up perspective is enhanced by bringing into the discussion different visions of 
Soviet culture, competing in Ukraine at the time. 
The study of the internal contradictions within the cultural sphere in Soviet Ukraine 
builds upon the conclusions of the Russian art historian Vladimir Paperny, drawn from his 
study of early Soviet architecture.24 The scholar made an attempt to explain the cultural 
transformation at the turn of the 1920s by investigating the relationship between two ideal 
types: kul'tura odin (culture one) and kul'tura dva (culture two). According to Paperny, the 
radical change in artistic style and method occurred not due to a causa prima (often seen as 
an evil Soviet Leviathan or Stalin’s caprice), but as a result of the decisive triumph of 
kul'tura dva over kul'tura odin. In this approach, kul'tura odin corresponds to the avant-
garde and revolutionary romanticism of the early 1920s and is characterised by its 
horizontality (when values of the periphery prevail over the centre; and artists are 
dispersed), and activism (a conscious drive away from the centre with its regulations). In 
contrast, kul'tura dva is defined by its centripetal value system, moving from the margins 
towards a single unified centre of power; this is a passive culture with a solidified and 
obedient society, fully exemplified by socialist realism. Paperny presented these two 
distinct cultural types as constantly in opposition, replacing each other in a cyclical fashion. 
In this thesis, Paperny’s model is modified, however: it is believed that during the 1920s-
early 1930s, kul'tura nol' (culture zero) or pre-revolutionary culture retained its importance 
in society and cultural life. Secondly, the model is challenged to emphasise the difficult 
                                                 
23 Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond (Princeton, N.J.; 
Oxford: Princeton UP, 1992); P. Petrov, Automatic for the Masses: Authorship and Agency in Early Soviet 
Culture (Toronto UP, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2015). 
24 Vladimir Paperny, Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004). 
  
27 
 
internal adjustments in each of the cultural types, leading consequently not to the 
replacement but rather to the transformation of kul'tura odin into kul'tura dva. Overall, 
Paperny’s approach is applied to investigate the complex evolution towards socialist 
realism of the two Ukrainian writers, Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967) and Mykola Khvyl'ovyi 
(1893-1933), and is utilised in the study of the biographies of these two protagonists. 
 
Case studies and biographical approach 
In this thesis, two different aspects of developing Soviet Ukrainian culture are examined. 
Firstly, I examine the position of fellow-travellers in Soviet Ukraine and the possible ways 
for them to accept Soviet culture. As it will be shown through the case study of the 
Ukrainian poet Tychyna, the tangled process of their self-sovietisation did not live up to the 
expectations of the Soviet Ukrainian cultural managers. Some fellow-travellers settled for 
Soviet Ukrainian culture, whereas others from the very beginning oriented towards the 
Moscow project and contributed to the all-Soviet cultural canon. Secondly, the process of 
defining the category of “Soviet Ukrainian culture” among the communist faction of 
Ukraine’s literary corpus will be explored. The case study of the prose writer and the public 
intellectual Khvyl'ovyi exposes the heterogeneity of the proletarian front in the republic and 
suggests the reasons for the eventual decline of the separatist Ukrainian project. These two 
men of letters have been chosen due to their high creative merit and importance for 
Ukrainian literature and cultural politics of the time. Through the study of their literary and 
public activity, the entangled relationship between the arts and politics as well as between 
the centre and provinces is examined. 
The cases of Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna present different examples of artistic pursuits 
and forms of political engagement. Khvyl'ovyi was a communist by conviction. A card-
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carrying Communist since 1919, he fully embodied revolutionary literature in Ukraine and 
elaborated the artistic current of revolutionary romanticism. In his early prose, he 
developed a glorious myth of the revolution and the civil wars. Later on, however, he went 
through a painful process of negotiating his ‘revolutionary romanticism’ with the 
centralising tendencies of the RKP(b) and KP(b)U. In his pamphlets, written during the 
Literary Discussion of 1925-28, Khvyl'ovyi elaborated the autonomist cultural position, 
which soon assumed a clear political aspect. On the other hand, Tychyna had established 
himself as a poet of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and fully represented Ukrainian 
Modernism. During the civil war years, the poet occasionally supported different sides, and 
eventually agreed to side with the Soviet cultural paradigm, became a Party eulogist and 
held a number of important state offices (including the Minister of Education, the Chairman 
of the Ukrainian Parliament etc.). The year 1933 was decisive for both protagonists: on 
May, 13 Khvyl'ovyi committed suicide to dissociate himself from the policies of the 
Communist party, whereas Tychyna on November, 21 ascended to the heights of Soviet 
literature and politics with his eulogy “Partiia Vede” [The Party Leads], published in 
Moscow Pravda on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the October Revolution. 
Although different, the study of the two protagonists offers insights into the process 
of developing Soviet Ukrainian culture and its inner contradictions. To a certain extent 
Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi exemplify Paperny’s binary of ideal cultural types. As will be 
proven, the relationship between kul'tura odin and kul'tura dva cannot be seen as a mere 
replacement of one model by another. Kul'tura odin, represented by Khvyl'ovyi and his 
revolutionary romanticism, was trying to adapt and fit into the newly-emerging state-
oriented culture during the 1920s. He became a symbol of Soviet Ukrainian culture and 
could not accept its total subjugation to the Soviet canon. In turn, Tychyna with his post-
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1933 poetic contributions embodied kul'tura dva. His complicated and painful evolution 
towards socialist realism demonstrates how much this model was rooted in and dependent 
upon the entire experience of the 1920s. 
This study uses a biographical approach to discuss the process of the cultural 
sovietisation in Ukraine. The thesis is not, however, intended as a historical portrayal of the 
individual lives of the two protagonists. While recognising the limitations of the 
biographical perspective (especially the impossibility of examining a life of an individual 
as a coherent thread unrolling in logical and chronological order, defined by Pierre 
Bourdieu as a “biographical illusion”25), this approach is used as a window to examine the 
complex problem of reciprocal accommodation and negotiation between local intellectuals 
and the party officials, literature and politics. Rather than offering a personal account of the 
ideological and artistic evolution of the writers, the study provides a starting point for 
considering the larger questions of interrelation of the Soviet Ukrainian and Soviet cultural 
projects. More broadly, it suggests how the interaction between literature and politics 
influenced the consolidation of the Soviet regime and its legitimation in Ukraine. 
Chronologically, the study focuses on the period between 1917 (the year of both national 
and Bolshevik revolutions in Ukraine) and 1933, the key year for both protagonists, 
symbolising the ultimate loss of cultural alternatives and adoption of socialist realism as a 
single artistic method. Their life stories beyond this time frame are sketched to provide the 
background to their ideological evolution or to explore legacy of these intellectuals in 
Soviet and independent Ukraine. 
 
                                                 
25 Pierre Bourdieu. L`Illusion Biographique. In: Actes de la Recherche en Science Sociales. 62/62 (1986) 69-
72; In Russian: Biograficheskaia Illiusiia, Inter, 2002, 1, 75-83. 
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Use of Primary Sources 
There are a number of challenges regarding the use of primary sources for this biographical 
study. The most important obstacle or constraint is the restricted access to primary sources 
in the archives, and their overall objectivity. On 9 April 2015 the Ukrainian Parliament 
passed the so-called “package of bills on decommunisation”. One of the laws (No 2540 
“On access to Archives of Repressive Agencies of Totalitarian Communist Regime of 1917-
1991”) envisaged open access to all archives of the Soviet repressive organs, designated 
digitising and online access to the archive documents and provided for the creation of a 
consolidated archive of all the repressive organs.26 Nonetheless, this law promised more 
than it delivered for historians interested in the Soviet past in Ukraine. The fact that these 
archives are open, however, does not necessarily mean that their collections are accessible. 
For instance, the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (Haluzevyi 
derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukraїny, SBU Archive), a former KGB archive, has 
been open to public since the early 1990s. But the SBU archive has no comprehensive 
catalogue of its holdings, which makes researchers almost entirely dependent on the good 
will and diligence of the archivists, responsible for responding to requests and selecting 
relevant materials. Research on important political and cultural figures at the SBU Archive 
is also impeded by nepotism and favouritism, a selective approach in being granted access 
to its holdings. 
 
Sources for the Biographical Study 
Personal Collections and Correspondence 
                                                 
26 “On access to Archives of Repressive Agencies of Totalitarian Communist Regime of 1917-1991” 
http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-access-archives-repressive-agencies-totalitarian-communist-
regime-1917-1991 (Accessed 16 November 2016). 
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The biographical approach, chosen to answer the main research question, defines the focus 
on sources regarding individual lives of the two protagonists. However, there is a lack of 
trustworthy documents in the archives. The question of objectivity of those documents 
available in the archives arises due to the pointed policy of the regime to eliminate the 
name of Khvyl'ovyi from public remembrance after 1933 and to erase/modify Tychyna’s 
pre-1933 activities. The way the protagonists were evaluated during the Soviet times also 
defines the amount of available documents. For example, in the Central State Archive of 
Literature and Arts of Ukraine (Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv-Musei Literatury i 
Mystetstva Ukraїny, TsDAMLM) there is only one file, consisting of 21 arkushy on 
Khvyl'ovyi, which includes several copies from newspapers, photographs and documents, 
mainly connected to the writers’ suicide and his funeral in May 1933. In comparison, the 
Archive holds the multivolume personal collection of Tychyna, consisting of autographs of 
his verses and poems, personal and official correspondence, diaries, drafts of his speeches 
and papers, photographs etc. (148,000 documents in total). Despite the abundance of 
sources, there is little of interest (due to censorship and self-censorship) on the period under 
study. 
The personal correspondence of Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi is another important source 
for the thesis. The letters, often preserved in the personal collections of their addressees, 
shed light on the writers’ genuine beliefs, doubts, concerns and attitudes. Of great value for 
this study were the private collections of Mykola Zerov and Mykola Mohylians'kyi, held at 
the Institute of Manuscripts (Instytut Rukopysu) of the Vernads'kyi National Library of 
Ukraine. Many archival sources have been published in various document collections. The 
most comprehensive selection of personal documents, diaries and correspondence by 
Tychyna is presented in the twelve-volume set of his selected works (published in 1983-
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1990).27 Valuable documents on Khvyl'ovyi can be found in the five-volume collection of 
his selected works (published in 1978-1986)28 and in the two-volume collection (published 
in 1990-1991).29 
 
Autobiographical Writings 
Autobiographical writings, including those produced for job applications or party 
membership, regular party inspections, and purges of party ranks; party questionnaires 
(ankety), and diaries, constitute another valuable group of primary sources. The overarching 
characteristic of these documents is defined by their intentional character. These pieces 
contributed to creating an unblemished image of a revolutionary, a Bolshevik, and a state 
official, and were composed, arguably, to fit one’s life story to this ‘ideal’ image. Most 
autobiographical writings of the period represented a gradual process of shaping the 
protagonists’ revolutionary personas, and were used to excuse any possible ‘defects’ in 
their pre-Bolshevik/Soviet lives.30 There are two frequently cited documents on 
Khvyl'ovyi’s early revolutionary years: a fragment from an autobiography and a short 
autobiographical note written for a troika during a regular KP(b)U purge in 1924.31 These 
sources reflect the process of fashioning Khvyl'ovyi’s Bolshevik persona and the struggle 
with his ideological inconsistences. As for Tychyna, the archives abound in numerous 
autobiographical writings, prepared mostly for party membership applications or career 
promotions. These official accounts of Tychyna’s life present a polished image of a 
                                                 
27 Tychyna Pavlo, Tvory u Dvokh Tomakh (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1983-1990). 
28 Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, Tvory u P'iat'okh Tomakh (New York-Baltimore-Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1978-1986). 
29 Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, Tvory u Dvokh Tomakh (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1990-1991). 
30 Based on works of Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on my Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 2006); Igal Halfin, Terror in My Soul. Communist Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 2003). 
31 TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.1852, ark.73-80; Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, “Uryvok z avtobiohrafii,” Vitchyzna, 12 
(1987): 106-108; ‘Kratkaia Biografiia Chlena KP(b)U Nikolaia Grigor'ievicha Fitileva,’ in Khvyl'ovyi, Tvory 
u Dvokh Tomakh, vol. 2, 830-837. 
  
33 
 
spotless state functionary and a Communist party member.32 The main challenge in using 
autobiographies is the question of how to regard these sources: do they present the true 
‘inside’ and aspirations of their authors or, conversely, do they tell us more about the power 
and ideology, which compel a person to write with a censor in mind?33 
 
Creative writing 
This research embraces ‘the linguistic turn,’ paying attention to the role of language (and 
literature) in shaping the mentality of the period.34 It focuses on the fiction, imaginative 
narratives, political and social essays, and poetry from the 1920s to explain what their 
authors believed or felt about the society they lived in and contributed towards. Using 
works of fiction and poetry as a primary source allows to build upon and to particularise the 
meaning of non-fictional sources. Besides, imaginative literature can be used to trace the 
ideological evolution of the writers towards the Communist regime. In this respect, 
Tychyna’s intimate poetry and poetry with social content (hromadians'ka liryka) and 
Khvyl'ovyi’s self-referential, ‘autothematic’35 creative writings are used to fill the blank 
spots in the writers’ biographies. Tychyna’s early poetry in full reflected the perturbations 
of the civil war years, whereas Khvyl'ovyi’s prose (especially “Vstupna Novela” [The 
Introductory Novel] (1927), “Redaktor Kark” [Editor Kark] (1923), “Na Ozera” [To the 
Lakes] (1926), and “Arabesky” [Arabesques] (1927)) recounted the writer’s negative 
attitude towards the ideological shifts of the post-revolutionary years. Nonetheless, prose 
                                                 
32 M. Zhulyn'skyi (ed.) Z Arkhivu P. Tychyny (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1990). 
33 E. Naiman, “On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars Who Make Them,” Russian Review 60, 3 (2001), 307-
315. 
34 E.g., V. Depkat, The ‘Cultural Turn’ in German and American Historiography, Amerikastudien /American 
Studies, 54, 3 (2009), 425-450; Naiman, On Soviet Subjects. 
35 The term is borrowed from Grabowicz. See: George Grabowicz, “Symbolic Autobiography in the Prose of 
Mykola Khvyl'ovyi (Some Preliminary Observations),” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 22 (1998): 165-180. 
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and poetry as a primary source are used with caution to avoid speculations around the lives 
of their authors. They complement and help to verify the existing sources and enrich our 
understanding of the protagonists. 
 
Party documents 
Party documents constitute another important group of primary sources for the biographical 
study. This includes interrogation and surveillance files, svodki, speeches, and official 
correspondence. Of the greatest importance for the biographical part of the thesis is a 
recently declassified collection of documents on Khvyl'ovyi, published in 2009.36 This 
collection contains secret service reports and informers’ messages to the State Political 
Directorate (GPU) of the Ukrainian SSR, anonymous evaluations emphasising the alleged 
nationalistic and anti-Soviet content of Khvyl'ovyi’s writings, evidence from 
contemporaries and close acquaintances, messages reporting the death of the author, etc. 
gathered between 1930 and 1933. This document collection can be set alongside other 
recently published documents on the relationship between the central party leadership and 
the Ukrainian SSR. Another recently declassified collection “Ukrainian Intellectuals and 
the Authorities: Summaries of the Secret Department of the State Political Administration 
of Ukrainian SSR for 1927-1929,”37 features weekly top secret reports (svodki) to the GPU, 
based on the operative sources and informers’ reports collected during 1927 and 1929.  
These collections, whose value for scholarship on Ukrainian intelligentsia is beyond 
doubt, nonetheless bring up the question of the veracity of primary sources compiled by the 
secret services. The main question is how reliable and objective those sources are for 
                                                 
36 Iurii Shapoval and Volodymyr Panchenko (eds.) Poliuvannia na “Val'dshnepa”. Rozsekrechenyi Mykola 
Khvyl'ovyi (Kyiv: Tempora, 2010). 
37 Vasyl' Danylenko, ed. Ukraїns'ka Inteligentsia i Vlada: Zvedennia Sekretnoho Viddilu DPU USRR 1927-
1929 rr. (Kyiv: Tempora, 2012). 
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researchers. As with the autobiographical writings, the very nature of svodki, which, 
according to Andrea Graziosi, are compilations of compilations with all sorts of distortions 
and biases,38 casts doubts on the accuracy of information included as well as the events and 
people reported. The overall question here is whether the party documents tell us more 
about the intelligentsia or about the intention of the party instigating the compiling, 
selecting and filing these primary sources in order to create and cement a required image of 
those under surveillance. One may agree with István Rév in that the documents in the 
archives are “largely fabrications: misinformation, blatant lies, overdramatization, or their 
opposite: trivialisations of dramatic events”.39 Using these sources uncritically makes a 
historian a ‘collaborator’ of those untrustworthy secret agents and results in “reading 
totalitarianism the way totalitarianism, itself, would “want” to be read?”40 In view of their 
limitations, all the above types of the primary sources are used and checked against other 
sources. 
 
Methods of Social History and Sociology of Reading 
Soviet Ukrainian literature was undoubtedly created with the reader in mind. However, the 
“ideal” reader of the authorities and writers often did not correspond to the “real” reader, 
studied by sociologists in Soviet Ukraine. Section Three of the thesis is dedicated to the 
study of readership in Soviet Ukraine and its evolution during the decade. It is based on the 
reports of the regional and national library surveys undertaken in the second half of the 
1920s. There were a number of surveys conducted in the second half of the 1920s. Regional 
library surveys were undertaken by the central bureau of political education in Odessa 
                                                 
38 A. Graziosi, “The New Soviet Archival Sources. Hypotheses for a Critical Assessment,” Cahiers du Monde 
Russe 40 (1999), 56. 
39 István Rév, Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism (Redwood City: Stanford UP, 2005) 1-3. 
40 Naiman, On Soviet Subjects, 311 
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(October 1926-February 1927)41 and Kharkiv (in 1928 focusing on the working youth in 
Kharkiv, Mariupol', Luhansk, Odessa, Kremenchuh, Mykolaiv42). Separate studies took 
place in Kyiv libraries of political education (1926-27),43 in the National Library of 
Ukraine (1927)44, in Kharkiv Korolenko Central State Library, 1928-29, and in Kyiv 
libraries (three months in 1929).45 Also, there were two major all-Ukrainian studies. In 
January-April 1928 (a sample of 6 days throughout the period), a study of all the republic’s 
libraries was conducted by the special Department of Reading and Readership Studies 
[Kabinet vyvchennia knyhy i chytacha] of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of Book Studies 
[Ukraїns'kyi naukovyi instytut knyhoznavstva]. The report of the Department was based on 
the data from 22 okruha46 libraries, which constituted 54 per cent of all the okruhy in the 
republic, with broad all-republican representation.47 Similarly, in March-April 1928 the 
Central Bureau of Political and Educational Work under the Narkompros [Tsentral'nyi 
Kabinet Politrosvitroboty] carried its own survey of the peasant readers in 58 libraries in 12 
okruhy.48 The library reports are used to evaluate the working class readership in Soviet 
Ukraine and their reading appetites: language in which literary works were preferably read, 
origin of the authors and types of books requested, topics and themes of fiction books most 
liked. 
 
 
                                                 
41 L. Kogan, “Shcho Chytaiut' Seliany,” Politosvita, 2-3 (1927), 59-66; “Chto Chitaiut Zhenshchiny,” Krasnyi 
Bibliotekar', 6 (1927), 18-28; “Robitnychyi Chytach i Khudozhnia Literatura,” Politosvita, 4 (1927), 59-68. 
42 In the archive, results for Mykolaiv only can be found. 
43 N. Frid'ieva, “Tsentral'ni i Okruhovi Biblioteky Ukraїny,” in Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni (Kharkiv; 
Kyiv: DVU, 1930), 61-82; Dovgan', “Ukraїns'ka Literatura i Masovyi Chytach,” Krytyka, 8 (1928), 35-46. 
44 D. Balyka, O. Karpins'ka, “Interesy Chytachiv-Ukraїntsiv Zahal'noi Chytal’ni VBU,” Zhyttia i Revoliutsiia, 
3 (1927): 334-344. 
45 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 74, od. zv. 214.: “Ia. Kerekez, Robitnycha Molod' i Khudozhnia Literatura”. 
46 Administrative division in 1923-1930 
47 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od. zb. 210; 291; Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni. 
48 TsDAHO, F. 166, op. 8, spr. 81; spr. 352, 344, 345. 
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Historiography 
The study of the Soviet Union for a long time has been restricted by a dominant “top-down 
approach”, paying little attention to the complex local-level developments in the border 
Soviet republics.49 1991 brought about a major shift, when the Soviet republics entered the 
limelight of Western scholarship on the Soviet Union.50 Soviet Ukraine represents one of 
the most fruitful cases due to the central role it occupied in the evolution of the Soviet 
nationalities policy. The Ukrainians were the largest national minority in the Soviet Union, 
comprising in 1926 45.6% of the entire Soviet non-Russian population. Secondly, the 
republic was a crucial agricultural and industrial region. Most importantly, Ukraine’s 
contiguous border with Poland made the republic an outpost of Soviet foreign policy.51 All 
these factors made the success of the Bolshevik party in Ukraine crucial for the central 
party leadership and every means was used in order to secure Soviet rule. This study 
contributes to the scholarship that looks at the influence of local actors in the process of 
Ukraine’s sovietisation in the 1920s, with particular focus on nationalities policies and the 
relationship between arts and politics.52 
During the 1920s, Soviet Ukraine experienced an unprecedented cultural revival, 
enabled largely by the all-Soviet nationalities policy of korenizatsiia, introduced in 1923, 
                                                 
49 The exception in this totalitarian school is Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism 
and Nationalism 1917-1923. (New York: Atheneum, 1980). 
50 Per A. Rudling, The Fall and Rise of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh UP, 
2015); Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: the Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006); 
Grigol Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia. The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2016); G. Hosking, Rulers and Victims: the Russians in the Soviet Union 
(Cambridge, MA: London: Belknap Press; Harvard UP, 2006); Donald J. Raleigh, (ed.) Provincial 
Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh UP, 2001). A 
comprehensive review on the post-1991 Soviet scholarship: Stephen Kotkin, “1991 and the Russian 
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(1998), 384-425. 
51 Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine (New 
Heaven: Yale UP, 2005). 
52 Similar approach to look at local actors executed in the study on the Soviet Republics in Central Asia, Arne 
Haugen, The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2003). The 
example of negating the role of local elites: Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building. 
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and Ukrainizatsiia known as its local variant. Korenizatsiia contributed significantly to 
increasing the number of ethnic Ukrainians in the party rank-and-file, introducing the 
Ukrainian language into all spheres of public life, institutionalising Ukrainian culture, and 
finally creating a habit for the Ukrainian language in urban centres. In turn, this preferential 
policy led to strengthening the national opposition in the KP(b)U. Nonetheless, this period 
merited relatively little attention from scholars of the Soviet Union;53 whereas for national 
historians (both in Ukraine and émigré) this decade became one of the most significant 
periods of Ukrainian history, discussed, however, retrospectively in connection with 
Stalin’s terror of the 1930s.54 
There are different approaches to studying the early Soviet nationalities policy. 
Western Soviet, East European, and native Ukrainian and Russian historiographies 
highlight different domestic and international issues leading to the introduction of 
korenizatsiia. In the Western scholarship, the discussion of the establishment of Soviet 
Ukraine, with its unique cultural revival during the interwar period, was regarded as a by-
product either of an intentional Soviet strategy to present an affirmative national outlook of 
the Soviet Union or of the “state-sponsored evolutionism” and sovietisation by means of 
“double assimilation”.55 Korenizatsiia was also studied through Bolshevik ethnic 
                                                 
53 The only comprehensive account of Ukrainizatsiia in Western Historiography is Terry Martin, The 
Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, Cornell UP, 
2001). Scholarships dealing with separate aspects of Ukrainizatsiia: J. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas 
of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 
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54 E.g., Iurii Shapoval, Ukraїna 20-50-h Rokiv (Storinky Nenapysanoї Istoriї) (Kyiv, Naukova Dumka, 1993); 
Kul'chyts'kyi, Komunism v Ukraїni; Hryhorii Kostiuk, Stalinism v Ukraїni: Henesa i Naslidky (Kyiv: Osnovy, 
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particularism.56 In contrast, within native Ukrainian historiography, the 1920s are discussed 
as a product of the internal evolution of the national elite towards cooperation with the 
Bolshevik party as an attempt to continue a nation-building project, initiated by the UNR.57 
The limitations of these two approaches are obvious: the first approach disregards the 
active role of the local intellectuals in establishing Soviet Ukraine, seeing local party 
leaders mostly as executors of the central directives. The national approach ignores the all-
Union character of Bolshevik nationalities policy, placing the emphasis on grassroots 
cultural revival and its subsequent repression by the party’s order. From the popular 
perspective of victimhood, the experience of the 1920s is seen only as a stage leading to 
‘the Ukrainian tragedy of holodomor’ [the famine of 1932-33] and the final violent 
suppression of Ukrainian statehood. An attempt to bridge the gap between Western 
scholarship and native Ukrainian historiographies was made by a Russian historian, Elena 
Borisenok, in 2006.58 The historian claimed that the study of the nationalities policy should 
go hand in hand with an examination of Soviet geopolitical goals, design to ensure the 
national outlook of Soviet republics.59 Borisenok also brought into discussion the active 
role of the Ukrainian communists in the implementation of Soviet policies in the republic. 
The present study highlights a number of problematic issues which Soviet Ukraine 
experienced during the 1920s and which were directly linked to the implementation of 
korenizatsiia. Firstly, as it will be shown in Section One, there were constant disagreements 
between the party elites centrally and in the KP(b)U about defining the scope and rationale 
                                                 
56 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism,” Slavic Review, 53, 2 (1994): 414–52; Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, 
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of the nationalities policy. The implementation of korenizatsiia had therefore always been 
impeded by the constant rivalry between the elites. Secondly, various Soviet policies in 
Ukraine were often contradictory to each other, resulting in their limited implementation. 
As it will be shown, the national based persecutions were launched as early as 1926, the 
year when Ukrainizatsiia only started to gain momentum. Thirdly, for Ukrainizatsiia to be 
successful, the Ukrainians as an ethno-national category needed to be constructed first. 
Hence, the 1920s experienced not only the development of national languages and cultures, 
but the creation of the audience, people who would identify themselves as Ukrainians and 
demand the cultural product in their language. Needless to say, the construction of the 
Ukrainian nation often adversely affected other ethnic groups in this multi-ethnic 
republic.60 Lastly, Ukrainizatsiia had a direct link to sovietisation and cementing the 
provincial status of Soviet Ukraine. As discussed in Section Three, one of the outcomes of 
Ukrainizatsiia, which had been neglected in the historiography, was the creation of Soviet 
Ukrainian mass culture, contributing to provincialism and the subservient role of the 
Ukrainian language in the republic.61 
Another important aspect for the thesis is the relationship between power and art, 
especially the evolution of literary politics in Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian literature during 
the 1920s arguably underwent the same metamorphoses as Russian literature, gradually 
moving towards the unification of various utopian revolutionary projects into a single 
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socialist realism.62 Literary life in Ukraine was subjected to the same all-Union directives 
and regulations, with the Resolutions “On Party Policy in the Sphere of Literature” from 
1925 and ‘On the Reconstruction of Literary and Artistic Organizations’ from 1932 being 
its milestones.63 Broad scholarship on Russian literature of the period, however, can only 
provide a partial framework for the present study.64 In line with the argument, Soviet 
Ukrainian literature presents a separate case and should be studied with regards to the 
specifics of political and cultural development in Soviet Ukraine.  
The present study builds upon George S. N. Luckyi’s Literary Politics in the Soviet 
Ukraine, 1917–1934 (1956)65 and Myroslav Shkandrij’s Modernists, Marxists and the 
Nation: the Ukrainian Literary Discussion of the 1920s (1992).66 However, these studies of 
literary politics in Soviet Ukraine rest on a rather exclusive approach towards Ukrainian 
writers and cultural tendencies of that time. The studies execute the “either …or” paradigm 
to evaluating literature in Ukraine, according to which the writers with a genuine pro-
Ukrainian orientation are set against those with a pro-centralist, pro-Moscow one. This 
approach does not identify the category of Soviet Ukrainian culture. Other currents in 
Ukrainian literature in the 1920s were studied by Oleh S. Ilnytzkyi (the study of Ukrainian 
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Futurism)67 and Valentyna Harhun (the reappraisal of socialist realism in Ukrainian 
literature).68 The present study aims to enrich our understanding of different currents and 
undercurrents in Ukrainian literature during the 1920s by power and its rivalry with the all-
Soviet cultural model. 
The existing secondary literature on Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna offers a variety of 
ideologically loaded assessments of their personas, literary activity or public engagement. 
Often, the way the writers are evaluated depended on the personal convictions of the 
interpreter, or an uncritical interpretation of the entire period of the 1920s both in the 
Soviet, diaspora and in the national historiography. Khvyl'ovyi, acclaimed in the early 
1920s as “one of the most outstanding writers of the proletarian age,”69 fell out of the 
narrative of Soviet culture after his suicide in 1933.70 In the Soviet Union, within a short 
period of time, his life-long activity was labelled counter-revolutionary, his writings were 
removed from libraries, and his name disappeared from official literary criticism. Until the 
early 1980s, Khvyl'ovyi’s name in the Soviet Union could only be used in connection with 
‘khvyl'ovizm’ – a general term to define class enemies. The same approach was used for the 
entry on the writer in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (1935).71 Moreover, the image of a 
leader of a “national deviationist group of writers” was introduced outside the Soviet 
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Ukraine: in the English edition of a reference volume about the Soviet Ukraine (1969) 
Khvyl'ovyi was mentioned only through his “manifestation of local nationalism.”72 
Tychyna, in contrast, became a part of the Soviet literary canon and was abundantly 
studied in Soviet Ukraine. From the late 1920s onwards the poet was the focus of critics’ 
attention, who in eager rivalry lauded Tychyna’s joining the ranks of Soviet poets.73 
Among the major scholars of the later period were Leonid Novychynko, Semen 
Shakhovs'kyi and Stanislav Tel'niuk, whose studies combined a biographical approach with 
literary criticism.74 Needless to say, the scholarship of the period portrayed Tychyna as a 
staunch communist poet and a devoted state official. The reappraisal of Tychyna’s literary 
and ideological evolution was first attempted by Vasyl' Stus in his censored study 
“Fenomen Doby (Skhodzhennia na Holhofu Slavy)” [The Phenomenon of the Age 
(Ascending to the Golgotha of Fame)], 1970-71. According to Stus, himself a poet at odds 
with the regime, “in the history of world literature perhaps there is no other example of a 
poet who devoted half of his life to high poetry and another half – to a relentless fight with 
his own genius.”75 
Both protagonists yet merited varied receptions among the Ukrainian diaspora. The 
debates about the writers’ contribution to Ukrainian literature and politics flourished since 
the early 1930s. Not surprisingly, the main discussion point became their collaboration with 
the Bolshevik party, which was presented either as 1) something they were compelled to do 
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in order to pursue their literary activity, or 2) a voluntary one with all of the negative 
connotations of their betrayal and cooperation with the enemy. The way these writers were 
evaluated within the diaspora depended significantly on the ideological background of the 
observer. For some émigrés, the Bolsheviks represented the enemy who had crushed the 
idea of Ukrainian independence by a military offensive. However, there were many others 
who, due to their earlier socialist orientation as well as successful political and cultural 
shifts in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1920s, tended towards reconciliation with the 
Bolsheviks, seeing the latter as defenders of the idea of a sovereign Ukraine (the so-called 
zminovikhivtsi).76 
The writers earned differing appraisals by Ukrainian right-wing groups abroad. In 
their eyes, Khvyl'ovyi represented an on-going national opposition to the Bolshevik 
authorities. One such evaluation was voiced by the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists in 
Western Ukraine Dmytro Dontsov, who claimed that Khvyl'ovyi was one of those “divided 
souls that were unable to cope with the problem: to what extent they are Ukrainians, and to 
what extent they are subject to Russia.”77 In particular, Khvyl'ovyi was praised for his 
repeated calls to distance Ukraine from the Russian Communist party and Moscow. As a 
result of this, he was seen as a leader of a “modern nationalism of the 1930s”,78 as 
khvyl'ovizm was defined. On the contrary, Tychyna’s post-1933 literary and political 
activity was seen as a definite and, more importantly, sudden break with his literary 
genius;79 a betrayal of his earlier beliefs and a disreputable surrender to the Party. At 
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around the same time, attempts were made to excuse Tychyna’s degeneration into a 
“grapho-maniac” and a “party fool” by introducing the idea of his histrionic “shields” and 
“masks”, put on by the poet in order to rescue himself from terror and purges. 
Consequently, an attempt was made to re-read Tychyna’s post-1933 poetic contribution to 
discern “grains of truth” behind alleged allegories and metaphors.80 
Appraisals of the Ukrainian communists also depended heavily on the general 
ideological orientation of Ukrainian emigrants. The third post-World War II wave of 
Ukrainian emigration strengthened the nationalistic attitude of the diaspora. This 
ideological “turn to the right”81 consolidated the idea of a united, independent Ukrainian 
state as the ultimate goal of the national struggle, which, consequently, rejected leftist 
sentiments of any kind. The re-orientation of the way in which the whole generation of the 
1920s was regarded had, nevertheless, a dual outcome. On the one hand, Ukrainian 
communists or artists who cooperated with the regime after the October revolution were 
seen as definite and inexcusable traitors to the nationalist cause, leading to an undermining 
of their overall contribution to Ukraine’s history, politics and culture.82  
On the other hand, this reorientation brought about a significant development in the 
historiography of the 1920s. A new paradigm of the ‘executed renaissance,’ was 
introduced, according to which the 1920s were a unique period of cultural flourishing in 
Ukraine, which, if it had not been violently interrupted by the Stalinist terror, would have 
evolved into the highest levels of national cultural development. This approach was applied 
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perhaps for the first time by Viktor Petrov, pen-name Domontovych, a prominent writer, 
scholar and literary critic, in his manuscript Ukraїns'ka Intelihentsiia - Zhertva 
Bol'shevyts'koho Teroru [Ukrainian intelligentsia – a martyr of the Bolshevik terror], first 
published in 1949.83 The paradigm was later refined by Iurii Lavrinenko in the late 1950s.84 
Undoubtedly, the post-revolutionary decade revealed the greatest creative potential of 
Ukrainian artists. Years of the revolutions, the civil wars, political instability, and the 
ideological pluralism of the early Soviet years along with the policy of Ukrainizatsiia 
encouraged unprecedented developments in all spheres of national cultural life. 
Nonetheless, this approach of lumping together the entire generation of the 1920s is 
doubtful. Firstly, the main problem of such a martyrological cast, according to Halyna 
Hryn, was the idea that “national and moral criteria can be brought to bear in the evaluation 
of authors and their works.”85 Those who chose to view the entire generation of Ukrainian 
artists and cultural workers of the 1920s-1930s as martyrs of the Soviet regime basically 
praised intellectuals based not on their merit but on the year of their death. Secondly, the 
moral right of those Ukrainian intellectuals, who one way or another survived the terror, to 
continue their creative or public activity after the majority of their peers had been executed 
was questioned. For example, Tychyna or Maksym Ryl's'kyi, who not only survived the 
terror but also attained privileged positions in Soviet cultural and political life, became 
targets for this sort of criticism for decades to come. 
After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the ‘executed renaissance’ paradigm, 
along with the national communist perspective, merged with another approach - to 
“nationalise” Ukrainian early Soviet intellectuals, and present them as part of a national 
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opposition to the Communist regime.86 This contributed to the utopian view that the whole 
history of Ukraine should be seen as a struggle to build an independent and united country. 
As Mark von Hagen put it,87 the narrative of history in independent Ukraine replaced the 
familiar dogmatic approach of Marxism-Leninism and dialectical materialism with a 
national teleology. Accordingly, the intellectual and political history of Ukraine was 
rewritten in a way that made nationalists and separatists out of nearly all prominent 
Ukrainians. Among modern Ukrainian historians and literary scholars, Khvyl'ovyi has 
become one of the most researched Ukrainian writers, whose life and writings have been 
adjusted to the “new dogma of an eternal and unchained nation, whose history was defined 
by the struggle against a ‘national oppressor’ for Ukrainian independence and unity.”88 
This nationalistic approach attempts to rehabilitate and to excuse both protagonists 
for being communists by finding reasons for their decisions to serve the party. In order to 
cope with the obvious dilemma of Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi being a talented poet and writer 
in spite of their affiliation with the party, an attempt was made to push the concept of 
Khvyl'ovyi’s “permanent inner ambivalence”, which originated partly from his romantic 
nature and partly from his idealistic belief in Bolshevik populism;89 and Tychyna’s “genius 
histrionics.”90 Native Ukrainian historiography and literary criticism, thereby, promotes 
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further the “either… or” paradigm, with little or no reference to the complicated process of 
inner ideological evolution, which each and every representative of the 1920s generation 
underwent.91 Similarly, there is no attempt to trace the evolution of Ukrainian modernism 
(the most important literary current since the end of the nineteenth century) into socialist 
realism. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis consists of four main sections, dedicated to different aspects, as well as different 
actors, of the gradual sovietisation of Ukraine. Section One examines the political debates 
between the representatives of different communist parties in Ukraine in the early 1920s. 
Different projects of a Soviet Ukraine, elaborated by various communist forces, are in the 
centre of the discussion. After the merger with the KP(b)U, the former members of the 
Ukrainian communist parties contributed to the strength of the Ukrainian horizon in the 
Bolshevik party. It is argued that the nationalities policy of korenizatsiia, the cultural-
political relationship and the literary politics of the time were significantly shaped or 
altered due to the power struggle between the local and central elites. Much attention is 
paid to korenizatsiia, seen as a result of the amalgamation of different agendas of different 
interest groups in the republic. Korenizatsiia, as seen from the party centrally, aimed 
primarily at indigenisation and party entrenchment (korenizatsiia literary means “rooting 
itself”). At the same time, for national intellectuals and Ukraine-minded communists in the 
party, korenizatsiia predominantly meant Ukrainizatsiia, the continuation of the pre-
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revolutionary initiative of a forced nation-building. For both groups, linguistic 
Ukrainizatsiia, aimed at accelerated de-Russification of the population, became a necessary 
and yet subordinate objective. Section One sets the scene for the discussion of the project 
of Soviet Ukrainian culture and the cultural alternatives lost by the decade’s end. 
Section Two of the thesis explores the concept of Soviet Ukrainian culture. Two 
aspects of this separatist cultural project are discussed based on the two case studies of 
Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi. This is the most substantial section of the thesis; it comprises of 
two chapters and four subchapters. Chapter 2.1 is dedicated to the poet Tychyna, discussing 
his gradual submission to the Soviet cultural canon after being widely recognised as a poet 
of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. His poetry (especially, his 1920 collection “Zamist' 
Sonetiv i Oktav” [Instead of Sonnets and Octaves]) is analysed to pinpoint the poet’s 
ideological shifts towards accepting the new cultural orientation and political authorities. 
Through the example of Tychyna, the link between Ukrainian Modernism and socialist 
realism is highlighted. Tychyna exemplifies the lost alternatives of Modernism in Soviet 
literature. 
Based on a case study of Khvyl'ovyi, Chapter 2.2 investigates the complex process of 
elaborating and implementing the project of Soviet Ukrainian culture. In two subchapters, 
the writer’s early prose is discussed to show the potential of revolutionary literature and 
Soviet Ukrainian culture. His numerous contributions during the Literary Discussion in 
1925-28 highlight the political aspect of the separatist cultural project. The Discussion 
exposed different sides in the debates around Soviet Ukrainian literature and its orientation. 
The case study of Khvyl'ovyi presents those alternative visions of revolutionary, proletarian 
and Soviet culture lost during the 1920s. The Literary Discussion also suggests the reasons 
for the decline of political autonomism and cultural nationalism in Soviet Ukraine. 
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Section Three investigates the audience of Soviet Ukrainian literature. Studied from 
this angle, the potential of Soviet Ukrainian literature is juxtaposed with the readers’ 
demands for and expectations from the literary products. The analysis of the readership 
allows to evaluate the ability of Soviet Ukrainian writers to satisfy their audience. Hence, 
readers’ reports and reviews offer important insight into the writers’ trajectory towards a 
simplification of their style and manner since the mid-1920s. In addition, social 
conservatism suggests another possible reason for the languishing of the separatist cultural 
project. This chapter also highlights another important aspect of korenizatsiia: the creation 
of mass audience with a clear demand for literature in the Ukrainian language. 
Section Four brings together three main factors of the sovietisation of Ukrainian 
literature during the years of the first Five-Year Plan (1928-32): the political centralisation, 
readers’ aesthetic expectations and writers’ own evolution. The period of the “cultural 
revolution” became decisive in defining the future vision of Soviet culture in Ukraine. It is 
argued that between 1928 and 1932 the artistic map of the Soviet Union had been changed 
and Ukraine became politically peripheral and culturally provincial. Social and political 
changes in the republic during 1928-32 are highlighted to present the impact of the ‘class 
war’ on intellectual life in Ukraine. Through the activities of Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi, the 
last attempts of Ukrainian intellectuals to preserve the autonomy of Soviet Ukrainian 
culture are analysed. The chapter also gives an account of the creative and political role of 
the protagonists in the 1930s, leading to the year 1933, the pinnacle of the decade-long 
political battle on the cultural front in Soviet Ukraine. 
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Section One: Debating the Projects of a Soviet Ukraine: Political 
Alternatives in 1917-1926  
During the revolutionary period 1917–1920 Ukraine found itself in an ideological and 
political cauldron. Through a series of revolutionary movements of different political 
orientations, Ukrainian elites started to develop and implement various, often contradictory 
and mutually exclusive, projects of state-building. These opposing visions often manifested 
under the same socialist banner and the Ukraine’s political history since the revolutionary 
event of 1905-1907 was defined by a socialist orientation. The socialist movement in 
Ukraine became significantly diversified after the February Revolution of 1917, when 
national aspirations and political separatist currents gained strength at the margins of the 
Russian Empire.92 Parallel projects of a socialist Ukraine had been developed. The main 
difference between these competing visions was the attitude towards Ukraine’s sovereignty 
and political autonomy. Based on this, two different political cultures can be distinguished. 
For the first group, pan-imperial attitudes remained dominant even after the downfall of the 
Romanovs. Ideologists and members of the RSDRP(b) (and later the RKP(b) and partially 
the KP(b)U), the Mensheviks, and the Russian SRs supported the idea of unchanged 
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political borders and, as before, a centralist government.93 Another group of socialists, 
consisting of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party (USDRP), the Ukrainian SRs 
(UPSR), and later the Borot'bysty and the Nezalezhnyky, adopted a separatist orientation, 
advocating Ukraine’s autonomy in political, economic and cultural matters. During the civil 
wars the boundaries between these two political cultures became fluid. None of the above 
mentioned parties could claim to have a rigid political agenda at the time, so adherents of 
the Marxist ideas in Ukraine often easily changed their institutional affiliation, bringing 
their attitudes and beliefs with them. This ideological and institutional fluidness makes it 
hard to differentiate separate ideological currents or political movements of the time. 
Instead, one can talk about two different horizons within the Ukrainian socialist movement: 
the centralist one, with clear orientation towards an all-Russian political space, and a 
separatist Ukrainian one, focusing on the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation within its ethnic 
boundaries. 
 
A National and/or Social Revolution: the Civil War in Ukraine, 1917-1921 
In the aftermath of the February Revolution, a national legislative authority – the Ukrainian 
Central Council (Tsentral'na Rada) was formed with Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, a famous 
Ukrainian academic and public activist as a president of the presidium of the Rada. During 
the first months, the demands of the Rada leaders did not go beyond Ukraine’s autonomy 
and its loose cooperation with other democratic republics within the Russian Empire. On 23 
(O.S. 10) June 191794 the Rada issued its First Universal, a legal act-declaration, 
proclaiming Ukraine’s autonomy: “without seceding from all of Russia [...] let the 
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Ukrainian people have the right to manage its own life on its own soil”.95 The First 
Universal also envisaged the creation of a democratically elected all-Ukrainian people’s 
assembly, which would have the sole right to draft laws to be confirmed later by the All-
Russian Constituent Assembly. The Second Universal, issued on 16 (3) July 1917 reassured 
Ukraine’s non-separation from Russia “in order that we and all her peoples might jointly 
strive toward the development and welfare of all Russia and toward the unity of her 
democratic forces”.96 Given such moderate demands, the establishment of the Rada was 
met with unprecedented enthusiasm. Important decisions for the newly proclaimed 
Ukrainian state were made at that time. Ukraine gained state authorities and governmental 
institutions; official national symbols were adopted; and the first steps in the international 
arena were taken. The Rada promised cultural autonomy to Jews, Poles, and Russians to 
encourage the representatives of these minorities to support Ukraine’s statehood. 
Nonetheless, the Rada had failed to establish a viable state apparatus or create reliable 
armed forces.97 
The mainstream autonomous orientation was changed after the October Revolution, 
when the Bolsheviks took power in Petrograd and started elaborating plans on how to 
broaden their authority over the former Russian Empire. Quickly drawing their attention to 
Ukraine, Bolshevik activists on 8 November (26 October) 1917 attempted a workers’ 
uprising on the biggest Kyiv factory ‘Arsenal’, which, however, was promptly defeated by 
the supporters of the Provisional Government and the forces of the Tsentral'na Rada. These 
events instigated the local elites to take drastic measures in order to keep control in their 
hands: on 20 (7) November “without separating ourselves from the Russian Republic and 
                                                 
95 The First Universal in Hunczak, Ukraine, 382. 
96 The Second Universal, in Hunczak, Ukraine, 382. 
97 Serhii Plokhy, the Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 207. 
  
54 
 
maintaining its unity […] in order that our strength may aid all of Russia, so that the whole 
Russian Republic may become a federation of equal and free peoples”,98 the Rada 
established the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukraїns'ka Narodna Respublika, UNR). The 
defeat of the Bolshevik coup in Kyiv exposed how little public support the Russian-led 
Communist party had in Ukraine at the time: according to the elections to the Russian 
Constituent Assembly held on 25 (12) November 1917, the Bolshevik party gained 10% of 
votes (compared to 24% across the empire).99 And yet, in less than a year, in April 1918 the 
regional organisation of the RSDRP(b), established in December 1917, was transformed 
into a self-standing separate Communist Party of the Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U), and 
a Provisional Workers’-Peasants’ Government was formed, which proclaimed the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (10 March 1919).100 
The UNR could not offer any feasible alternative. The Tsental'na Rada, being unable 
to resist the Red Army, turned to the Central Powers for military support. By the end of 
February 1918 there were 450,000 German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the territory 
of Ukraine, who by the end of April of the same year succeeded in occupying its entire 
territory. In return, the Ukrainian government took upon itself substantial liabilities, 
including deliveries of grain, food and raw materials.101 Furthermore, with the support of 
German commands, the coup d'état against the UNR was organised, replacing the Rada 
with the new Ukrainian State, the Hetmanate (Het'manat) headed by Pavlo 
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Skoropads'kyi.102 The new regime had a clear conservative and anti-Bolshevik orientation; 
all socialist oriented political parties were outlawed and continued their underground 
struggle against Hetman Skoropads'kyi. Subsequently, in late December 1918 the merged 
forces of the UNR and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR, established in 
November 1918) overthrew the conservative government of Skoropads'kyi and once again 
consolidated their position in Kyiv, the period and government known as the Directory 
(Dyrektoriia) of the UNR. The Dyrektoriia could not control the capital for long, however: 
the Ukrainian government was forced to surrender Kyiv on 5 February 1919, when the 
Bolshevik troops entered the city during the second Bolshevik attempts to occupy Ukraine, 
known also as the Second Soviet-Ukrainian war. 
The Bolshevik advance brought about a brief stabilisation of political matters in 
Ukraine. The expansion of Soviet Ukraine westwards initiated further debates within the 
Ukraine’s socialist camp about possible cooperation with the Bolsheviks. Amidst constant 
political reversals, a large number of Ukrainian leftists regarded the Bolshevik regime as a 
possible framework for an independent Socialist Ukraine. Already in early 1918, the 
splinter group within the UPSR voiced their support to the Bolshevik project. The split was 
legalised during the IV Congress of the UPSR (13-16 May 1918), when the leftist wing of 
the party formed a new political organisation, later known as the party of Borot'bysty. 
Among its founders, and most famous representatives, were Hnat Mykhailychenko, 
Oleksandr Shums'kyi, Vasyl' Ellans'kyi (Blakytnyi), Andrii Zalyvchyi and Panas 
Liubchenko, all of whom would soon play a prominent part in the political life of Soviet 
Ukraine. The establishment of the Soviet regime in February 1919 opened the room for 
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cooperation between the Moscow-led Bolsheviks and Ukraine-minded communists. This 
cooperation had proven to be mutually beneficial: whereas the Bolsheviks were focused on 
consolidating their authority in Ukraine, the Borot'bysty concentrated mainly on promoting 
communist ideology among the peasantry and developing the cultural sphere, erroneously 
forgotten by the former. 
Nonetheless, the Bolshevik stabilisation of political matters was once again 
interrupted, when General Denikin’s White Army entered Kyiv on 31 August 1919.103 The 
Soviet order was re-established on 16 December 1919, when the Red Army re-took Kyiv. 
However, the struggle for Ukraine did not finish. In May 1920, a united UNR-Polish Army 
entered Kyiv as a part of the offensive against Soviet Russia during the Soviet-Polish war, 
launched in February 1919. Yet, this military campaign did not gain significant public 
support, and the general anti-Bolshevik uprising failed despite the hopes and efforts of 
Symon Petliura, the head of the Ukrainian military units and the Directory.104 By the end of 
1921, the Soviet regime was established on almost entire territory of Ukraine. Although 
many Ukrainian historians argue that the Red Army played a decisive role in the 
establishment of the Soviet regime,105 the process of sovietisation of Ukraine was far more 
complicated. It required the use of such methods as propaganda, engagement with local 
intellectuals and political activists, as well as readiness to compromises, especially in the 
national and agrarian questions. 
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By the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks, in contrast to the gradually weakening UNR, 
came forward with a clear social orientation and strong party organisation (‘democratic 
centralism’). In addition, at the time the affiliation with Russia was seen temporary, needed 
to fight the “bourgeois influence” of Germany and Entente.106 One of the first decrees 
passed by the Bolsheviks was the “Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia” which 
proclaimed the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, including secession 
and formation of a separate state.107 This decree resumed the key points from the RSDRP 
program of 1903 and Stalin’s essay “Marxism and the National question”108 published in 
1913. As Jurij Borys aptly noted, “the victory of the Soviet system in the Ukraine was a 
victory for the Russian solution of the Ukrainian national problem.”109 The main slogan, 
‘free federation of the democratic Socialist states’ was the idea in which almost all 
Ukrainian socialists had believed. Yet, what was seen by the Ukrainian socialists as a long-
awaited mechanism of gaining sovereignty, was used by its authors as a tactical move, 
suggested by the logic of political struggle. The early Bolshevik affirmative attitude 
towards a separate Soviet Ukraine was a necessary concession to secure support of the 
Ukrainian socialists in the Bolshevik struggle against the German army, which had 
occupied Ukraine since February 1918. 
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Similarly, there was no unanimity on the status of Ukraine in the Bolshevik party. In 
1918, two different positions on the republican status of Ukraine were debated. On the one 
hand, the Katerynoslav group advocated the idea of numerous separate Soviet republics 
corresponding to social and economic conditions of Ukraine.110 The Katerynoslav group’s 
idea was to remove the Russified industrial areas from rural Ukrainian areas and to join 
them to central Russian provinces. The Kyiv group, on the other hand, argued that 
Ukraine’s scant working class could not advance without the help of the peasantry, whose 
strong national aspirations must be taken into account. Despite advocated by the minority 
in the KP(b)U, the central leadership conceded to the Kyiv group and supported a unified 
Ukrainian republic. On 7 March 1918 during the Red Army retreat from Kyiv, Mykola 
Skrypnyk, Lenin’s close ally, who was sent to Ukraine in December 1917 to help the 
Bolsheviks develop their organisation there, proclaimed the liquidation of all the 
independent Soviet republics on Ukraine’s territory, i.e., “Donbas-Kryvyi Rih, Odesa and 
Crimean republics” and their unification with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the 
name for the first time used to define Soviet Ukraine.111 This move was, however, a tactical 
one: the Russian Bolsheviks, bound by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, could not declare a war 
against Germany, an ally of Petliura in his anti-Bolshevik campaign. Hence, the declaration 
of the Ukrainian SSR at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (March 1918), enabled the 
Bolsheviks to enter the open war with the German occupying armies through the Ukrainian 
Soviet government. 
Nonetheless, the creation of the autonomous Soviet republic at the margins of the 
former Russian Empire was balanced by centralised and unified system of government. On 
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19-20 April 1918 the creation of an All-Ukrainian Bolsheviks Party organisation was 
discussed in Taganrog. Emanuil Kviring, the leader of the Bolsheviks’ Katerynoslav group, 
promoted the idea of a partially autonomous party with direct subordination to the TsK 
RKP(b). As opposed to this, a number of Ukrainian Bolsheviks, headed by Skrypnyk, 
defended the idea of a separate communist party, which would cooperate with the RKP(b) 
through the envisaged Third International. Skrypnyk’s motion of an independent Bolshevik 
party was supported by 35 votes against 21. However, the separate status of the Ukraine’s 
Bolshevik party, as adopted in April 1918, was significantly undermined by the fact that the 
organisational bureau of the KP(b)U was situated in Moscow. Eventually, the resolution of 
the Taganrog Conference on the independent status of the KP(b)U from April 1918 was 
cancelled by the First Congress of the KP(b)U, held in Moscow on 2-12 July 1918. At the 
Congress, another resolution was passed, which made the KP(b)U an integral, although 
autonomous, part of the RKP(b); the Central Committee of the KP(b)U acknowledged the 
authority of the Central Committee of the RKP(b).112 
The program of the RKP(b), adopted by the Eighth Party Congress, held in Moscow 
on 18-23 March 1919, made the centralist claims of the central Bolshevik leadership 
unambiguous. It was stated that a separate status granted to the Soviet republics did not 
mean that the Party would as well be reorganised as a federation of independent 
Communist parties: “There must exist a single centralised Communist Party with a single 
Central Committee leading all the Party work in all sections of the RSFSR. All decisions of 
the RCP and its directing organs are un-conditionally binding on all branches of the party, 
regardless of their national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, 
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Latvian, and Lithuanian Communists enjoy the rights of the regional committees of the 
party, and are entirely subordinated to the Central Committee of the RKP.”113 
Clearly, the actual sovereignty in all Soviet republics belonged to the TsK RKP(b). 
This subordinate status was also reflected in the composition of the Soviet government in 
Ukraine. The first Ukrainian Soviet government, the Provisional Workers-Peasants 
Government of Ukraine, formed on 28 November 1918 in Kursk, was headed by the 
Russian revolutionary Grigorii Piatakov and predominantly comprised of the Russian 
Bolsheviks. The second government led by Khrystian Rakovskiy (in place until July 1923) 
at later stages involved ethnic Ukrainian commissars taking posts in education, justice and 
communication. 
The predominance of the Moscow-oriented vision gave impetus to shaping national 
deviations within the KP(b)U. Perhaps the earliest attempt to theorise a national opposition 
inside the Bolshevik Party belonged to the Ukrainian Bolshevik Vasyl' Shakhrai, 
Commissar for Military Affairs in the first Ukrainian Soviet government. In his pamphlet 
Revoliutsiia na Ukraine [The Revolution in Ukraine],114 Shakhrai summarised the 
experience of Soviet state-building in Ukraine, highlighting the national component of the 
socialist revolution in the republic. In January 1919, Shakhrai in co-authorship with another 
KP(b)U member Serhii Mazlakh published a brochure Do Khvyli: Shcho Diiet'sia na 
Ukraїni i z Ukraїnoiu? [Concerning the Moment: What is Happening in and to Ukraine], 
the contents of which soon became part of the Ukrainian national communist program.115 
Primarily, the pamphlet touched upon the discordance between Lenin’s claims for nations’ 
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right to self-determination (realised, as believed, in the creation of Soviet Ukraine) and the 
inferior position of the republic’s Bolshevik party. 
In Do Khvyli, the RKP(b)’s position towards Ukraine was scrutinised. The authors 
supported the idea of an independent Soviet Ukraine and a separate Communist party, 
equal in its authorities to the RKP(b). It is noteworthy that during the April 1918 Congress 
in Taganrog, Shakhrai advocated the creation of a Ukrainian Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks (UKP(b), modelled on the RKP(b), rather than KP(b)R (Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks of Russia as in KP(b)U). The idea was, however, declined at the Congress in 
order to avoid ambiguity: “Ukrainian” could both mean ‘of Ukraine’ and ‘of Ukrainians’; 
the latter could hardly be used to characterise the Bolshevik party at the time116). For 
Shakhrai and Mazlakh, the socialist orientation of Ukraine was unchallengeable. The 
question of the republic’s sovereignty, defined by the status of its leading party, remained, 
however, open. In this, the authors clearly made a reference to the decision of the First 
KP(b)U Congress (July 1918), according to which the status of the KP(b)U was reduced to 
a mere regional section. Instead, the pamphlet pushed forward the idea of establishing a 
self-standing independent Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks (UKP(b), which 
would affirm the Ukrainian language, culture and independent statehood.117 
Shakhrai and Mazlakh concluded their pamphlet with a list of demands, addressed to 
“Comrade Lenin”. These declarations encapsulated the key standpoints of the Ukrainian 
communists. The list included: 
- Ukraine and Ukrainian people had defined themselves as a nation and proclaimed 
their independence; 
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- Ukraine will fight for its independence till the end. Sooner or later, in a hard and 
bloody way by armed struggle, or in a democratic way by compromise with 
neighbouring countries, - but Ukraine will indeed be independent and sovereign; 
- Ukrainian reunion with Russia is progressive only for Russian great-power. In 
practice, Ukrainian sovereignty benefits not only Ukraine. The fewer national 
struggles we have, the better it is for the economic, political, social and cultural life of 
Ukraine; the bigger contribution it will be for world culture; 
- Unless the independence of Ukraine is assured, unless the Ukrainian worker is 
nationally discriminated, to be “nationalist” and “chauvinist” for Ukrainians is not 
only a historical right, but an obligation. Our “chauvinism” depends on your 
“internationalism”, but you hide behind words and we don’t want to hide any more.118 
The demands, expressed in Do Khvyli, were indirectly answered by Lenin in his late 1919 
resolution “On the question of the attitude towards the working people of Ukraine, now 
liberating themselves from temporary occupation by the Denikin bands”.119 Lenin reassured 
that the RKP(b) had no intention to limit the independence of the Ukrainian SSR. As for 
relations between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR, it was stated that it was “self-evident 
and generally recognised that only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can and 
will decide at their All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets whether the Ukraine shall amalgamate 
with Russia, or whether she shall remain a separate and independent republic, and, in the 
latter case, what federal ties shall be established between that republic and Russia.”120 In 
this evasive way, Lenin shifted the emphasis from national to class struggle (since it was 
the task of the national proletariat to decide on the republic’s sovereignty). There was yet 
another important implication of Lenin’s address to the Ukraine’s toiling masses: due to the 
precarious position of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine (the lack of public support in addition to 
the military threat from General Denikin’s army) and the lack of a well-developed plan as 
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for Ukraine on Lenin’s part, the activity of different socialist pro-soviet parties was 
tolerated and sanctioned. 
 
1919-1925: Debating the Projects of a Socialist Ukraine 
The major non-Bolshevik communist party in Ukraine was the Borot'bysty [derived from 
the party newspaper Borot'ba, Ukrainian for ‘struggle’]. The party was formed after the 
split in the UPSR in the summer of 1918. The newly-established party adopted the name of 
the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (Communists) (Ukraїnis'ka Partiia 
Sotsialistiv-Revoliutsioneriv (Komunistiv), which was used parallel to the Ukrainian Party 
of Socialists-Revolutionaries (Communists-Borot'bysty) (Ukraїnis'ka Partiia Sotsialistiv-
Revoliutsioneriv (Komunistiv-Borot'bystiv). In August 1919, after the merger with the 
radical leftist faction of the USDRP (the Nezalezhnyky group), the party acquired its final 
name, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borot'bysty) (Ukraїnis'ka Komunistychna Partiia 
(Borot'bystiv)). The evolution of the party name reflected the evolution of its ideology: 
from a socialist-revolutionary party to a communist one.121 
At the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, the Borot'bysty changed their attitude 
towards the October Revolution: whereas earlier the revolution was seen as a reflection of 
deep social challenges and a preliminary step to socialism, in 1919 it was already regarded 
as a necessary constituent of the world communist revolution, to which the Ukrainian 
working class had contributed equally. From this perspective, although the Russian 
revolution was considered a useful example for Ukraine, it could not be copied blindly. The 
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Borot'bysty, who enjoyed broad public support among the Ukrainian population, rejected 
the idea of a messianic role of the proletariat from one particular country. Instead, they 
advocated the need to “translate a revolutionary struggle into the language of local 
conditions”.122 Hence, the revolution in Ukraine was both social and national, and had its 
own social bases: urban and rural proletariats along with semi-proletarian and poor 
peasantry. The latter was seen pivotal for the success of the socialist revolution in Ukraine. 
The orientation towards the Ukrainian countryside defined the Borot'bysty’s attitude 
to the Bolsheviks. The Moscow-led party - supported by Russified industrial workers in 
eastern Ukraine (those Ukrainian by origin but Russian speaking) - was regarded as an 
occupying force. Russian communists, according to the Borot'bysty, persistently neglected 
the social, economic and cultural peculiarities of Ukraine.123 In addition, their exclusive 
class focus and disregard for national aspirations alienated the majority of the Ukrainian 
population. The Bolsheviks could therefore not deliver the concept of a world proletarian 
revolution to the Ukrainians. Overall, as seen from the Borot'bysty’s perspective, the 
Bolshevik efforts to Russify the republic were detrimental for the entire communist 
endeavour in Ukraine.124 It was argued that attempts to create a unified national working 
class would be doomed without recognising the national aspirations of the Ukrainian 
people. The sovietisation of Ukraine could only succeed if the persistent antagonism 
between urban Russian-speaking workers and the Ukrainian peasantry would be ceased. To 
achieve this goal, a new communist party was needed, one which could unify different 
social groups under a single ideology. The envisaged communist party would unite all local 
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communist forces, including the KP(b)U, and join the Third International as a separate 
territorial section.125 
The national question was an intrinsic part of the Borot'bysty program. It was 
believed that “the best solution to the national question would be to reach socialism; thus 
the primary goal of each and every revolutionary socialist party [in Ukraine], despite their 
national affiliation, should be strengthening the achievements of the socialist revolution, 
which will necessarily result in national emancipation.”126 Hence, social emancipation 
preceded a national one. Once achieved, national emancipation would lead to the creation 
of a national state, which eventually would become a part of the Universal Federation of 
Socialist Republics.127 The future Federation would exist within the borders of the former 
Russian Empire and gradually expand by accepting new socialist republics. For the 
Borot'bysty, the independence of Ukraine, albeit considered only as a preliminary step 
before joining the Universal Federation, was immensely significant: Soviet Ukraine should 
join the Federation as an equal member and not through Russia, as suggested by the 
Moscow Bolsheviks. 
In December 1918, a splinter group in the USDRP, the Nezalezhnyky 
(independentists) also declared their support to Soviet power.128 The faction, officially 
named the Organising Committee of the USDRP Nezalezhnyky, included a number of 
prominent political figures of the time: its main theorists were Mykhailo Tkachenko, 
Minister of Internal Affairs of the Rada, and Andrii Richyts'kyi, one of the editors of the 
USDRP central organ Robitnycha Gazeta. The Nezalezhnyky did not form their own party, 
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nevertheless, they emphasised their difference from both the USDRP and the KP(b)U and 
elaborated a radical program of socio-economic and political transformation of Ukraine. 
The group argued the necessity of recognising the profound socio-economic character of 
the revolution in Ukraine with the proletariat and the toiling peasantry being its main 
engine. The group adopted a rather critical stand against any form of parliamentarianism 
(called ‘demokratyzm’129), which had failed to provide a strong organised power, a 
prerequisite of a socialist revolution. As it was stated in the Declaration of the Faction 
adopted on 12 January 1919, the Nezalezhnyky did not accept the “confused” USDRP 
position over the form of government through which to pursue the socialist revolution.130 
For the dissenters, soviets of workers’ and peasants’ deputies were the only possible form 
of governance. According to Richyts'kyi, the main features of soviets were their activity, 
combat-readiness, elasticity, mobility, and most importantly, close ties with the people.131 
The group as a part of the USDRP, participated in the Directory of the UNR and even 
entered the government. Nonetheless, as declared, they reserved the right to resign if their 
demands for giving power to the workers’ and peasants’ councils had not been met. 
Similarly, the Declaration stated the unbridgeable differences between the 
Nezalezhnyky and the KP(b)U.132 The latter were seen as subordinates of the RKP(b) and 
promoters of the imperialist Russian ideology. Like the Borot'bysty, the Nezalezhnyky 
rejected the Bolshevik idea of proletarian dictatorship which did not correspond to the 
Ukraine’s social structure. The Bolshevik party was seen as “a party that aims not for the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the revolutionary peasantry, but for the dictatorship of a 
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section of the proletariat and of its own party. It is, therefore, profoundly violent and it will 
replace proletarian dictatorial violence against the bourgeois order with the violence of a 
small group.”133 And yet the main reason for the disagreements with the Bolsheviks was 
their position in the national question. The Bolshevik party, according to the Nezalezhnyky, 
had proven itself “a hypocritical party which continually violates its own principles” and, 
therefore, “cannot be trusted until it is transformed organisationally and merges with the 
interests of the Ukrainian toiling people”.134 
The Nezalezhnyky promoted the idea of Ukraine’s independence. For them, the 
success of the socialist revolution heavily depended on the right to form separate 
independent socialist republics. Their argumentation posited on the conviction that there 
was no national question in a sovereign state and, on the contrary, it was most urgent when 
a state’s independence was under threat. The national self-determination was similarly 
justified in class terms: “only in a sovereign national state, the struggle with bourgeoisie 
could not be overshadowed; under any other circumstances, this struggle automatically 
becomes the national struggle.”135 Subsequently, at the Sixth Congress of the USDRP held 
on 10-12 January 1919 a motion was put forward to transform “the sovereign and 
independent Ukrainian People’s Republic into the sovereign and independent Ukrainian 
Socialist Republic”.136  
The Nezalezhnyky admitted the possibility for their envisaged Ukrainian Socialist 
Republic to unite with other independent republics. The reasons for this could be fighting 
imperialism; supporting other socialist republics; and improving economic relations. This 
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cooperation, nonetheless, could only be temporary and mutually beneficial. Other forms of 
cooperation, especially with the RSFSR, were rejected: “The reconciliation with the 
Russian Soviet Republic was only possible on the basis of mutual recognition of the 
sovereignty of both socialist republics, complete and mutual non-interference in either’s 
internal affairs, the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the 
Ukrainian Socialist Republic and the improvement of economic relations.”137 The current 
state of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship was inadmissible. The Nezalezhnyky continued 
to oppose the Rakovskiy government, which, according to the group, was composed of “all 
sorts of Russian nationalist elements from the Black Hundreds to the revolutionary 
intelligentsia in Ukraine […] joining forces with the Bolsheviks to help reconstruct a 
“united and indivisible Russia.”138 They condemned the early Bolshevik practices in 
Ukraine, stating that there was neither true soviet power nor a dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Instead there was only “a dictatorship of the communist party”.139 
Thus, since early 1919, the leaders of the Nezalezhnyky started discussing the 
possibility of forming a separate Ukrainian Communist Party to implement their vision of a 
socialist Ukraine. This idea was, however, forcedly crushed by the KP(b)U in spring 1919, 
when the Nezalezhnyky leaders were arrested and their organs of press (Chervonyi Prapor 
in Kyiv and Kharkivs'kyi Proletar in Kharkiv) were closed down. 
In 1919, there was another pro-soviet party in place in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Party 
of Left Socialist-Revolutionists (Ukraїnis'ka Partiia Livykh Sotsialistiv-Revoliutsioneriv, 
UPLSR). Initially, this was a left fraction of the All-Russian SR Party in Ukraine. 
Subsequently, the group united around the Bor'ba [Russian for ‘struggle’] newspaper, 
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acquiring the name the UPLSR (Bor'bistiv). The Bor'bisty at the time were the third (after 
the KP(b)U and the Borot'bysty) most influential pro-soviet party in Ukraine.140 Its 
members supported the Bolshevik party and considered Soviet power to be “a pure form of 
proletarian dictatorship”.141 Nonetheless, they conceded to Ukraine’s autonomy to help 
wage revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie and capitalism. The Bor'bisty 
anticipated the world socialist revolution and, therefore, saw a separate Ukraine only as a 
temporary stage in this process. Due to its Russian roots, pro-Russian orientation and 
internationalist position, other Ukrainian communist parties saw the Bor'bisty as a party 
which “only tries to become a national Ukrainian party”.142 
The Borot'bysty, the Nezalezhnyky and the Bor'bisty demanded to be included in the 
Second Soviet Government in Ukraine. Nonetheless, the Third Congress of the KP(b)U 
held in Kharkiv (1-6 March 1919) confirmed the party stand against cooperation with other 
pro-soviet parties, and refused their representatives to hold responsible posts in the 
Ukrainian Soviet Government.143 The Borot’bysty were allowed into secondary ministerial 
offices. Nonetheless, Lenin instructed his subordinates to rigorously control those “little 
shits” [merzotnyky].144 
The dismissal led to the radicalisation of the non-Bolshevik communist parties. In 
summer 1919, the Borot'bysty established the Council of Chief Revolutionary Emissaries 
(Rada Holovnykh Revoliutsiinykh Emisariv) aimed to unite all leftist parties in the struggle 
against “the bourgeois-nationalistic power” of the Dyrektoriia. The method was further 
used by the Nezalezhnyky in their struggle against both the Directory and the Soviet 
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Government of Rakovskiy. The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (Tsentrevkom) 
opposed “the betrayers of the working masses”, the “occupation government of Rakovskiy” 
and the “traitorous Directory, which is negotiating with the French and other 
imperialists”.145 The Tsentrevkom initiated the uprising against the Bolsheviks; and issue 
an ultimatum to the head of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The ultimatum of 25 June 
1919 read: 
In the name of the insurgent Ukrainian working people I announce to you that the workers and 
peasants of Ukraine have risen in arms against you, as the government of the Russian conquerors, 
which, having draped itself in slogans that are sacred to us: 1. a government of soviets of workers 
and peasants, 2. The self-determination of nations, including secession, and 3. the struggle against 
imperialist conquerors and plunderers of the toiling masses, desecrates not only these sacred mottoes 
and ruining the true power of the workers and impoverished peasants of in the neighbouring country, 
but also uses them for aims that are remote from any socialist order.146 
However, the Nezalezhnyky’s initiative was not supported by other political actors in 
Ukraine. Moreover, in view of the advancing Russian Volunteer Army of Denikin, the 
uprising was abandoned. Subsequently, the threat of Denikin’s Army encouraged the 
Ukrainian leftist parties to seek unification and to broaden their cooperation with the 
Bolshevik party. The same rationale was adopted by the Bolsheviks: the advance of 
Denikin, continuous uprisings led by atamans Matvii Hryhoriv and Nestor Makhno,147 and 
the struggle with the Directory, forced the Bolsheviks to seek compromise with the pro-
soviet Ukrainian parties and to invite their representatives to join the Soviet government. 
On the VUTsVK Plenum on 12 May 1919, the leaders of the Borot'bysty and the 
Bor'bisty expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and to share 
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government responsibilities.148 In August 1919, the left wing of the Nezalezhnyky group 
joined the Borot'bysty to form a unified Ukrainian Communist Party (Borot'bystiv), 
affirming its allegiance to the KP(b)U. The Bolsheviks, in turn, did not trust these parties. 
The attitude towards the non-Bolshevik communists was expressed by Lenin in his Draft 
Resolution on the Ukrainian Borot'bysty Party, dated from 6 February 1920. In the draft 
resolution, the Borot'bysty were considered “as a party, which, by its propaganda aimed at 
splitting the military forces and supporting banditism, is violating the basic principles of 
communism, thereby playing directly into the hands of the Whites and of international 
imperialism.”149 It was concluded that the KP(b)U “must be systematically and steadily 
aimed at the dissolution of the Borot'bysty in the near future. To this end, not a single 
misdeed on the part of the Borot'bysty should be allowed to pass without being 
immediately and strictly punished. In particular, information should be collected 
concerning the non-proletarian and most disloyal nature of the majority of their party 
members.”150 
The last word in the conflict came from the Third International. At the beginning of 
August 1919, the Borot'bysty passed their Memorandum to the Executive Committee with 
demands to accept the party to the organisation based on their status of a leading 
communist party in Ukraine.151 Similarly, at the end of October 1919, TsK UPLSR 
submitted their application for joining the Communist International. These parties naively 
regarded the Third International as an international forum for self-standing national 
communist parties and as an ultimate authority in questions of the future communist 
movement, whose decisions were decisive. However, this platform, established by the 
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Bolsheviks to promote their own causes, had little autonomy in determining disputes 
between local communist parties. In January 1920, the session of the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International devoted to the Ukrainian question passed the resolution that 
“Ukraine was represented at the First Congress of the Communist International solely by 
the KPU (Bolshevik), which the Congress recognized as the authorized representative of 
the Ukrainian proletariat.”152 As for the admission of the Borot'bysty party to the 
Communist International “the Executive Committee believes that it has the duty of raising 
the question of the unification of all communist forces in Ukraine in one party […] in order 
to eliminate disagreements between both parties and to help them towards 
amalgamation.”153 As for the UPLSR application, it had never even been discussed by the 
Executive Committee.154 
The rejection of the Executive Committee of the Third International made it almost 
impossible for the Borot'bysty to function separately. Regarding themselves communists by 
conviction, the party members could barely disobey the Comintern. Moreover, the 
competition with the Bolsheviks was becoming much harder. The recommendation for 
merger, instead, was seen as a possibility to continue promoting the party’s vision within 
the KP(b)U. As a result, the party conference, held on 14-29 March 1920, voted for the 
self-liquidation of the Borot'bysty party and its merger with the Bolshevik party. 
Subsequently, 4000 former Borot'bysty, according to Skrypnyk’s account, were admitted to 
the KP(b)U in 1920.155 Similar path was taken by the Bor'bisty, who after the Borot'bysty 
self-liquidation were constantly tackled as “a centre of legal counterrevolutionary 
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organisation”.156 The Party Conference, held in Kharkiv on 16 July 1920, passed the 
resolution encouraging merger with the KP(b)U. 
Open opposition to the Bolshevik party was not abandoned entirely, however. The 
right group of the Nezalezhnyky initiated the creation of a separate Ukrainian Communist 
Party (Ukraїns'ka Komunistychna Partiia, UKP). The first Congress of the UKP, held on 
22-25 January 1920, adopted the program of the party, in which the urgency to unify all the 
communist parties in Ukraine was reiterated.157 From the beginning, the UKP had a very 
small membership; right after its inaugural meeting, it numbered around 250 members. 
Nonetheless, the party discarded all offers for merger and even continued to grow in 
numbers at the expense of former Bolsheviks. In July 1920, the “federalist group” of the 
KP(b)U joined the KPU. 
The organisational bureau of the federalist group in the KP(b)U was formed in 
summer 1919 by Hryhorii Lapchyns'kyi. The opposition to the KP(b)U was justified by the 
centralist attitude of the latter, which Lapchyns'kyi dabbed “rusotiapstvo”.158 Lapchyns'kyi 
urged that a communist party could not be the same for Ukraine and Russia, since the two 
republics had different economic and social bases and, therefore, different interests and 
needs. Similarly, Ukraine should be connected to the other soviet republics only within a 
loose federation, established to provide cooperation in political and economic spheres. The 
RKP(b) was continuously criticised for its chauvinistic policy and its desire to conserve the 
Moscow dominant position and the annexation of Ukraine. Lapchyns'kyi, like other 
Ukrainian communists, envisaged the union of all Ukrainian communist parties into a 
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separate body, which would become an equal member of the Communist International.159 
Not surprisingly, Lapchyns'kyi and his followers were soon expelled from the KP(b)U and 
joined the UKP in May, 1920. 
Until 1925, the UKP remained the only legal opposition to the KP(b)U in Ukraine, 
but their activities remained marginal. Already after the first party congress in 1920, the 
UKP attempted to use the influence of the Third International to be recognised as a separate 
communist party of Ukraine; a Memorandum was sent to the Executive Committee of the 
Third Communist International, justifying the position of the UKP leadership.160 In August 
1924, the TsK UKP applied for admission again. This time, however, the Third 
International was used as a means to save the party face. The 1924 Memorandum stated 
that the Party would self-dissolve if the Executive Committee acknowledged the 
independence of the Ukrainian SSR and the right of Ukraine’s communists to be 
represented in the Comintern by a separate party. Not surprisingly, the Executive 
Committee assured the UKP that the Ukrainian SSR was a sovereign state and that 
Ukrainian communists already had their own party, the KP(b)U.161 Being unable to 
continue their separate activity, on 1 March 1925 the UKP Congress voted self-liquidation. 
Many of its members joined the KP(b)U.162 
A number of factors enabled the political pluralism of the early 1920s. The unstable 
position of the KP(b)U was, however, a decisive one. Due to a lack of public support, low 
party membership and underrepresentation of locals within its ranks, the Bolsheviks were 
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still unable to impose their monopoly outright. At the end of 1918, out of a total 
membership of 4,364 only 7% of the KB(b)U’s members were Ukrainian by origin.163 This 
lack of political influence on the territory of Ukraine was substituted by the military force 
of the Red Army (the Ukrainian–Soviet war continued in Ukraine until November 1921), 
manipulation by the Communist International in order to unify the Ukrainian communist 
parties, and, what Martin called, an affirmative nationalities policy.164 Undoubtedly, the 
most successful method to win over the representatives and supporters of the Ukrainian 
communist parties was the implementation of the Bolshevik’s new nationalities policy, 
korenizatsiia, launched in April 1923. 
The all-Soviet policy of korenizatsiia, with its Ukrainian variant known as 
Ukrainizatsiia, became one of the most successful yet ambiguous endeavours of the 
Bolshevik party in Soviet Ukraine. Korenizatsiia, as seen from the party centrally, was 
designed to break the isolation of the Bolsheviks in the border republics. It was aimed 
primarily at indigenisation, party entrenchment (korenizatsiia literary means “rooting 
itself”), and securing Soviet rule in the republic. At the same time, for national intellectuals 
and Ukraine-minded communists in the party, korenizatsiia predominantly meant 
Ukrainizatsiia, the continuation of the UNR initiative of forced nation-building. For both 
groups, linguistic Ukrainizatsiia, aimed at accelerated de-Russification of the population, 
became a necessary and yet subordinate objective. Whereas the central party leadership 
aimed to create a Ukrainian-speaking community as a step towards further assimilation of 
Ukrainians into a homogeneous Soviet people,165 national intellectuals, including those in 
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the party, saw the formation of the Ukrainian nation as an end in itself. These two views on 
korenizatsiia are discussed below. 
 
Korenizatsiia: the Centralist Perspective 
Korenizatsiia was adopted at the Twelfth RKP(b) Congress in April 1923. In his Theses 
entitled “National Factors in Party and State Affairs”, Stalin, the main speaker at the 
Congress, called for reorganising the Soviet Union “in such a way as fully to reflect not 
only the common needs and requirements of all the nationalities of the Union, but also the 
special needs and requirements of each individual nationality.”166 In the Theses, Stalin 
condemned Great-Russian chauvinism, which, according to him, led to an underestimation 
of specifically national features and languages in the Party and to an arrogant and disdainful 
attitude towards those differences. The new nationalities policy, korenizatsiia, was 
designed, therefore, to fight both “Great-Russian chauvinism” and any manifestations of 
local nationalism. 
The underlying motives of korenizatsiia were more complex: the need to root the 
predominantly Russian revolution at the margins of the former empire; to make the 
Bolshevik party, with its small percentage of locals in regional party organisations, the 
embodiment and the implementers of the revolutionary ideals for all Soviet republics; to 
overcome the tsarist legacy of alienation between the Russian centre and non-Russian 
peripheries; and to address the hostility between the cities (often Russified) and the 
countryside. The success of korenizatsiia in Ukraine had critical importance. Firstly, the 
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Ukrainians composed the largest non-Russian group in the Soviet Union, accounting for 
nearly 29 million people out of a total of 147 million in 1926. Secondly, the Bolshevik 
experience of the civil war in Ukraine was particularly arduous, with numerous military 
reversals and withdrawals. In addition, the Bolsheviks were challenged not only by their 
political rivals, but also by the majority of the Ukraine’s peasant population.167 Finally, as 
discussed above, the Bolsheviks for some time did not possess a monopoly over the 
socialist movement in Ukraine and needed to compete with other socialist parties and 
groups for the right to represent Marxist ideas and proletarian values in Ukraine. 
In the early 1920s, the difficulty for the Bolshevik party in Soviet Ukraine was not 
only the need to win acceptance for their urban-based revolution in predominantly 
agricultural regions (a common all-Union problem), but to legitimise an urban-based 
revolution nationally alien to the Ukrainian countryside.168 This situation made the 
Bolshevik attempts to prevent the creation of Russian urban islands in Ukraine well 
justified. On the one hand, efforts to industrialise and modernise the country required a 
continuous influx of workers, which in the case of Soviet Ukraine originated predominantly 
from the countryside. The party, in Zatons'kyi’s words, “need[ed] to create an environment 
where the peasant gets used to seeing Ukrainian signs, announcements, and posters”.169 On 
the other hand, such affirmative actions towards the ‘proletarian neophytes’ had clear 
strategic goals. The Communist Party in Ukraine, even in the mid-1920s, lacked general 
public support and the majority of the peasantry viewed the Bolsheviks as alien both in 
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class and national terms. The arrival of these ‘hostile elements’ to the cities could cause 
further alienation from the party, this time also on the part of proletariat, in whose name it 
claimed to exercise its dictatorship. There was an urgent need to bring the spontaneous 
demographic Ukrainizatsiia (caused by party-initiated industrialisation and urban growth) 
under control by means of party-sponsored and party-controlled preferential policies, 
framed as korenizatsiia. 
Another important factor for the implementation of the new nationalities policy was 
the international factor. After the First World War a significant number of Ukrainians 
remained on the territories of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. In addition, after the 
Polish-Soviet war, four million ethnic Ukrainians were left in the territories ceded to 
Poland by the 1921 Treaty of Riga. A successful solution to the national question, 
therefore, was designed to counterbalance the strongly anti-Soviet attitude of the 
Ukrainians abroad, stirred up by a significant political emigration.170 The Soviet strategy 
behind the implementation of affirmative actions in the national sphere was based on the 
idea that generous treatment of Ukrainians within the Soviet Union would appear attractive 
to the large Ukrainian population from abroad. As Skrypnyk put it, Soviet Ukraine should 
be regarded as a twentieth-century Piedmont that would serve as a centre to unite the 
divided Ukrainian populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania.171 
The adoption of korenizatsiia was also linked to the failure of the Soviet expectations 
for immediate world revolution. The Bolsheviks were forced to take a more sober look at 
things after the defeat of the German Communist uprising scheduled on 23 October 
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1923.172 A radical shift towards advocating the possibility of building socialism in one 
country was declared by the TsK VKP(b) Conference in April 1925.173 Yet, the intention to 
be the beacon for the proletariat of other countries did not fade away. The re-orientation to 
the East and the adoption of the Comintern’s position on the national and colonial 
question174 required that the Soviet leadership serve as a forefront of a peaceful and 
comprehensive solution to the national question. In this regard, Ukraine was seen as, in 
Lazar Kaganovich’s words, “a pattern and an example of a solution which the proletariat 
can offer to the problem of national liberation for the oppressed masses, of a state-building 
for national republics within the borders of the Soviet Union.”175 
The 1923 resolution went in line with the Party’s previous intentions. Throughout the 
civil war years, attempts were made to address the Russification and to enhance the role of 
the Ukrainian language, which often took the form of promoting the equality of the 
Ukrainian and Russian languages in the republic. For instance, the adverse consequences of 
“forced Russification” were addressed in the draft constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, 
adopted by the III All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in March 1919.176 In addition, the 
Commissariat for Education adopted a resolution according to which the official state 
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language was abolished in favour of free development of local, commonly spoken 
languages.177 Moreover, adherence to the Ukrainian language was highlighted in the 
Resolution of the TsK RKP(b) “On the Soviet Rule in Ukraine,” adopted on 4 December 
1919. It was stated that the Ukrainian language should be regarded as “an instrument for 
the communist education of the working people” and therefore proficiency in the Ukrainian 
language for civil servants and party workers was desired.178 Similarly, in 1920 Stalin, the 
Commissar for Nationalities at the time, made a speech stating the need to introduce 
national languages into schooling, the judicial system, public administration and executive 
authorities. The same points were reiterated by the Commissar for Nationalities at the 
Tenth Party congress in March 1921.179 
The RKP(b) Resolutions on korenizatsiia were followed by similar decrees in 
Ukraine, passed by the TsK KP(b)U Plenum in June 1923. These decrees concerned the 
status of the Ukrainian language (attempts to proclaim it as the second official language 
failed due to the opposition of pro-Russian party members, insisting to make it another 
commonly-used language), schooling (the Ukrainian Radnarkom Decree “On Measures for 
Ukrainizatsiia of Schools, Educational and Cultural Institutions”180) and the major task of 
regulating political education and propaganda in the countryside.181 The most decisive 
decree on Ukrainizatsiia, “On Measures for Guaranteeing the Equality of Languages and on 
the Equal Development of the Ukrainian Language,” was issued on 1 August 1923. It was 
stated that 
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the formal equality [of languages] […] is not sufficient. […] the Russian language has, in fact, 
become the dominant one. In order to destroy this inequality, the Workers’-Peasants’ Government 
hereby adopts a number of practical measures which, while affirming the equality of languages of all 
nationalities on the Ukrainian territory, will guarantee a place for the Ukrainian language 
corresponding to the numerical superiority of the Ukrainian people on the territory of the Ukrainian 
SSR.182 
Nonetheless, the implementation of korenizatsiia did not start in earnest in 1923. Despite 
being officially declared, this policy met with stubborn passive resistance. For party 
officials, such declarations did not seem important or obligatory. A number of initiatives, 
such as attending language courses or examinations in language proficiency for government 
employees, were prescribed, but never enforced. Such an attitude can be ascribed to the fact 
that the national question and the nationalities policy were regarded as soft-line policies, 
minor in comparison to the core Bolshevik tasks.183 In addition, in 1923 the KP(b)U did not 
simply possess enough resources to implement such optimistic goals. Unsurprisingly, the 
lack of resources and disregard from the centre resulted in a certain level of cynicism on the 
ground, with the lower ranks not taking these policies at all serious. However, the 
significance of korenizatsiia increased in December 1925, when the official course on 
industrialisation had been declared by the Fourteenth VKP(b) Congress.184 Meeting the 
needs of the republic’s peasantry became key not only for securing the uninterrupted food 
supply to the cities, but also for nurturing the future workforce. 
On 26 March 1925, Kaganovich, Stalin’s protégé was appointed the First Secretary of 
the KP(b)U. Kaganovich was selected to implement korenizatsiia using the mechanisms of 
hard-line policies: direct leadership, constant control over its implementation, use of 
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pressure and force as its methods, and restricting disapproving public discussion around 
this project.185 The decision to assign Kaganovich to Ukraine and to upgrade the status of 
korenizatsiia was linked to low impact of the policy on party membership since 1923;186 the 
adopting of projects aimed at modernising the country; and the need to secure Stalin’s 
position in Ukraine at the time of fierce inner-party struggle with Trotsky and the left 
opposition. 
With the appointment of Kaganovich, the Party had finally acquired direct control 
over korenizatsiia, which allowed it to tackle passive resistance within its rank-and-file, a 
major impediment in the previous years. A call for comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia of the 
party, issued at the April 1925 plenum, focused on two different agendas: the nativisation 
of the party apparatus, meaning engagement of locals in party activities, and linguistic 
Ukrainizatsiia, requiring language proficiency from civil servants, carrying out all 
paperwork in the national language, and publishing all major party newspapers in 
Ukrainian.187  
In the following years, the greatest achievement of these policies was the change they 
effected in the national composition of the KP(b)U’s membership. The percentage of ethnic 
Ukrainians in the party organs grew from 23.6% in 1922 to 47.0% in 1927 and rose to 
53.0% in 1930;188 the number of Ukrainians in VUTsVK amounted 56.5% in 1926.189 This 
advance was attained by a massive campaign to engage “local cadres” in party and 
governmental service. Success was recorded in transferring the paperwork and the press 
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into Ukrainian. In 1927, 70% of central government paperwork was conducted in 
Ukrainian;190 the percentage of newspapers published in Ukrainian increased to 68.8% in 
1929, including the Ukrainian TsK’s newspaper Komunist, Visti, Proletar. Subsequently, 
the circulation of these periodicals increased: Komunist – from 28 thousands copies in 1928 
to 122 thousands in 1930; Visti – from 46 thousands in 1928 to 90 thousands in 1929, and 
Proletar – from 11 thousands to 79 thousands.191 
Nonetheless, the implementation of korenizatsiia was met with difficulties. There was 
constant passive resistance to linguistic Ukrainizatsiia. The deadline for its comprehensive 
institutionalisation among governmental employees, for example, was never met with the 
official declaration of its completion on 1 January 1926.192 For most the governmental 
employees, the imposition of the Ukrainian language held limited appeal and did not go 
beyond paperwork and obligatory language classes. Ultimately, the methods to force civil 
servants to speak Ukrainian beyond their offices failed; indeed, there were cases of low 
rank-and-file being fired for opposing the Ukrainian language, but these penalties never 
touched high ranking officials or skilled workers.193 In fact, of the 1,898 top-ranking 
Bolsheviks in Ukraine in 1926 only 345 knew Ukrainian (71 of them were fired because of 
their reluctance to learn Ukrainian).194 
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Ukrainizatsiia: the Ukrainian Perspective 
In 1923, the first historian of the KP(b)U Moisei Ravich-Cherkasskii suggested that the 
history of the KP(b)U was “a sum of two histories: that of the Ukrainian proletariat and that 
of the Russian proletariat in Ukraine”.195 Accordingly, there were two distinct ideological 
roots in the KP(b)U, one extending from the Russian Revolutionary movement and another 
from the Ukrainian socialist movement. The idea of the ‘two distinct ancestral roots’ helps 
understand not only the origins of the party, but also the way certain policies were 
developed and implemented in Ukraine, especially, in our case, the Soviet nationalities 
policy of korenizatsiia. At the time, “the Ukrainian root” comprised of the ‘old’ Bolsheviks 
with distinct national orientation, former members of the Ukrainian communist parties and 
new party members, enrolled in the party from among local activists in the 1920s. 
As said earlier, at the end of 1918, there were only 130 Ukrainians out of a total of 
4,364 KP(b)U members. However, this number steadily increased on account of members 
of other political parties, joining the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution. For instance, 
in summer 1918, the left wing group of the USDRP, headed by Panas Butsenko, Petro 
Slyn'ko, Ievhen Kasianenko, joined the KP(b)U.196 Later on, indigenous representation 
within the party’s rank-and-file increased mainly due to the rapid growth in membership.197 
This was mostly due to the absorption of other parties into the KP(b)U. At the time of 
their dissolution in 1920, there were about 5,000 Borot'bysty members and 3,000 UPLSR 
members, the majority of whom joined the KP(b)U. It is hard to estimate exactly how many 
former Ukrainian communists joined the Bolshevik party, since there was a clear interest 
                                                 
195 Ravich-Cherkasskii, Istoria, 5. 
196 Butsenko recalled of 225 members, A. Butsenko, O Raskole USDRP (1917-1918), Letopis' Revoliutsii, 4 
(1923), 121-122. 
197 Frolov, Kompartiino-Radians'ka Elita v USRR; Frolov, Kompartiino-Radians'ka Elita v Ukraїni; M. 
Doroshko, Nomenklatura: Kerivna Verkhivka Radians'koї Ukraїny (1917-1938 rr.) (Kyiv: Nika Tsentr, 
2008). 
  
85 
 
among its propagandists to exaggerate the number of the new-comers. Nevertheless, 
according to the official party statistics, in March 1920, 30.5% out of 11,087 KP(b)U full 
members and 2,439 candidate members had previously belonged to other political parties: 
the USDRP, the RSDRP (Mensheviks), the SRs, and the Borot'bysty (the Bor'bisty merged 
with the KP(b)U in June 1920).198  
However, this new dynamic in party membership did not remain the case for long. 
Statistics on membership shows that during the first half of the 1920s, there was a gradual 
decline of the share of the former members of other parties. For instance, in spring 1921, 
the share of the KP(b)U members, who came from other parties, shrank to 18% (7,560 
members) and to 8.9% (4,647 members) in 1922.199 It is worth noting that only 197 
previously belonged to the Borot'bysty, the Bor'bisty and the Nezalezhnyky.200 At the 
beginning of 1926, this share had already decreased to only 3.2%.201 The decline in 
numbers can be explained in several ways. Firstly, during the first Soviet years, party 
membership constantly grew on account of the rank-and-files, who arrived from the RSFSR 
with the Red Army: during the first half of the 1920, according to the TsK RKP(b)’s 
official data, 1,232 RKP(b) members were sent to the Ukrainian SSR from Russia.202 
Secondly, those ‘less reliable’ KP(b)U members were subjected to party purges. This 
dynamic occurred mainly due to the fact that the Bolshevik party succeeded in recruiting 
new members to its ranks. The first general party purge was launched in the aftermath of 
the Tenth RKP(b) Congress (8-16 March 1921), that announced a purge of ‘petty 
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bourgeois’ elements “not trained in the Communist spirit”.203 The preliminary results of the 
purge were tallied in December 1921 at the Sixth Conference of the KP(b)U: as reported, 
21,430 party members (or 22.5%) out of the 97,321 members checked, were expelled.204 
Whilst the share of the KP(b)U members from other parties was decreasing, the 
number of new party members, conscripted and promoted from the local population grew 
steadily. The Tenth RKP(b) Congress called for the recruitment of more non-Russian 
members in order to strengthen party influence in the countryside as part of the NEP. In 
addition, the national composition of the party was significantly influenced by the rapid 
social and economic developments in Soviet Ukraine: due to urbanisation and 
industrialisation, more rural Ukrainians were joining the working class and subsequently 
the ranks of the KP(b)U.205 As a result, the 1927 party census showed that out of 182,396 
full and candidate members, 52% called themselves Ukrainians, and almost 70% gave 
Ukrainian as their mother tongue.206 
The rise of national awareness was equally characteristic among both the rank-and-
file and the leadership of the KP(b)U. Whereas the KP(b)U’s national composition was 
influenced significantly by the social and economic developments in the republic, the level 
of national awareness within its leadership directly depended on the Moscow attitude 
towards Soviet Ukraine. The negotiations around the question of the formal relationship 
between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR intensified the national opposition inside the 
KP(b)U. The Treaty of Workers’ and Peasants’ Alliance between the RSFSR and the 
Ukrainian SSR, signed on 30 December 1920, granted de jure recognition to the 
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independence and sovereignty of both sides but, nevertheless, established a union “for 
defence purposes as well as in the interests of economic development.”207 To achieve this 
objective, the two republics united certain commissariats: military and naval affairs, foreign 
trade, finance, labour, railways, post and telegraph, and the Supreme Economic Council. 
The Ukrainian republic retained authority over foreign affairs and diplomatic relations. This 
arrangement, however, did not correspond with the status of a sovereign republic. In reality, 
the status of Soviet Ukraine was reduced to a Russian autonomous region. On the Twelfth 
RKP(b) Congress (17-25 April 1923), Skrypnyk accused Stalin of practicing “double book-
keeping on the nationalities question.”208 In the same year, at a meeting of the leaders of the 
non-Russian republics called to discuss the case of Sultan-Galiev,209 Skrypnyk assumed 
that it was Russian chauvinism encouraged from Moscow that created preconditions for 
nationalist opposition in the Soviet republics.210 Skrypnyk’s position on the national 
question and the relationship between Soviet Ukraine and Russia were shared by such 
prominent ‘old’ Bolsheviks as Shakhrai, Vlas Chubar, Iurii Kotsiubyns'kyi, and Khvyl'ovyi. 
However, despite the fact that the majority of members from other Ukrainian parties 
were purged from the KP(b)U, it was not the quantity that made the influence of the 
Ukrainian communists so significant. After its merger, the Borot'bysty’s main leaders were 
admitted to important positions in the KP(b)U. Blakytnyi and Shums'kyi entered the TsK 
KP(b)U, the former also acquired a seat on the Politburo. Liubchenko became the TsK 
KP(b)U’s Secretary for Culture and the editor-in-chief of the TsK KP(b)U newspaper 
Komunist. Already in May 1919, the Borot'bysty gained control over the Ukraine’s 
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Commissariat for Education and the All-Ukrainian Literary Committee, (Vseukrains'kyi 
Literaturnyi Komitet, Vseukrlitkom). The Commissariat for Education, headed officially by 
a Bolshevik Volodymyr Zatons'kyi between January 1919 and April 1920, was de facto 
since May 1919 controlled by the Borot'bysty leader and the poet Mykhailychenko, 
succeeded by the Borot'bysty Mykhailo Panchenko, Shums'kyi and Hryhorii Hryn'ko.211 A 
State Publishing House of Ukraine (Vsevydav) was opened under the auspices of the 
Commissariat for Education. At the same time, the Borot'bysty also launched the first 
Soviet-sponsored Ukrainian-language literary journal Mystetstvo [Art]. Former Borot'bysty 
had gradually taken control of cultural and intellectual life in the republic. 
Of course, one cannot assert that all the Ukrainian elements in the party leadership 
possessed distinctive national orientation. As Andrii Khvylia put it in 1932, the KP(b)U 
“derives its origin from the Social Democratic Bolshevik organisations … [and] if the 
former Borot'bysty, Ukapisty, Bundisty entered the KP(b)U, they did so not with their old 
petty-bourgeois views, but after having condemned [and] rejected them”.212 Among those 
former Borot'bysty, who had definitely condemned and rejected their earlier ‘nationalistic’ 
views were Khvylia himself and Panas Liubchenko, who soon after joining the KP(b)U 
completely accepted the ‘centralist’ perspective of the relationship between the all-Union 
centre and Soviet Ukraine. 
As mentioned, the Ukrainian-minded leaders of the KP(b)U had distinct views on the 
goals of korenizatsiia. For them korenizatsiia predominantly meant Ukrainizatsiia, with the 
main objectives to be de-Russification of all spheres of public life and the accelerated 
development of national identity. In this way, the Soviet policy of Ukrainizatsiia was seen 
as a continuation of the initiatives of accelerated nation-building, elaborated and partially 
                                                 
211 In 1922-24, the Bolshevik Volodymyr Zatons'kyi occupied the post to be replaced again by Shums'kyi. 
212 A. Khvylia, KP(b)U v Borot'bi Za Lenins'ku Nacional'nu Polityku (Kharkiv: DVU, 1933), 80-81. 
  
89 
 
introduced by different Ukrainian governments during the civil war. In one of its first 
decrees dated from April 22 1917, for example, the Tsentral'na Rada declared its course on 
the sweeping Ukrainizatsiia of the republic, yet focusing mainly on the army and 
schooling.213 For all the haphazard revolutionary changes on the territory of Ukraine during 
1917-1920, Ukrainizatsiia continued to be on the agenda of different political authorities. In 
the case of national developments, the most significant of these was the conservative 
regime of the Ukrainian State. Led by Skoropads'kyi, this government in a short period 
between April and December 1918 managed to expand a number of Ukrainian schools and 
state universities, to establish the State Ukrainian Archive, the National Art Gallery, the 
Ukrainian History Museum, the Ukrainian National Library, the Ukrainian National 
Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian State Publishing House etc.214 Steps were also taken to 
expand Ukrainian-language book publishing and the Ukrainian press.215 Similarly, during 
the civil war years, Ukrainizatsiia was one of the programme demands of the Ukrainian 
socialist and non-Bolshevik communist parties, discussed above. For Ukrainian 
communists, especially the Borot'bysty, de-Russification of the cities and the promotion of 
the Ukrainian language were seen as prerequisites for creating a separate Ukrainian 
socialist republic. After 1923, korenizatsiia and the KP(b)U were seen as possible 
mechanisms to continue introducing those previously tested ideas in public life. 
Not surprisingly, their vision of Ukrainizatsiia clashed with what was expected from 
the nationalities policy to achieve by the KP(b)U centrally. As mentioned, the April 1925 
TsK KP(b)U Plenum called for comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia, aimed at establishing 
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Ukrainian as the dominant language within the public sphere including the industrial 
proletariat, higher education, all-Union institutions and the government bureaucracy.216 The 
resolution exposed inherent differences on the rationale of Ukrainizatsiia between the two 
political cultures in the KP(b)U, those oriented towards Moscow and the representatives of 
the Ukrainian faction in the party leadership. The disagreements occurred mainly over the 
speed in which this policy should be implemented, cadres policy (especially in regards to 
high ranking officials) and the republic’s proletariat as the policy’s main target. In 1925, 
the results of Ukrainizatsiia were considered unsatisfactory. This was not surprising since 
the targets from the beginning were unrealistic, such as the VUTsVK decree form 1 August 
1923 calling for complete linguistic Ukrainizatsiia of the entire government bureaucracy at 
all levels in the course of one year.217 At the Plenum, Shums'kyi, the Commissar for 
Education, attacked the achievements of Ukrainizatsiia, ascribing the lack of success in its 
implementation to the fact that the policy was carried out by Russians with little interest in 
developing Ukrainian culture.  
Shums'kyi brought his concerns on Ukrainizatsiia to Stalin’s attention at their 
meeting in Moscow in late 1925. To Shums'kyi, the successful implementation of 
Ukrainizatsiia was constrained by the fact that political elites could not keep up with the 
development of Ukrainian culture and the rapid growth of Ukrainian intelligentsia. 
Consequently, the anti-Ukrainian attitude, prevailing among the leadership of the party and 
trade unions, was leading to the masses further alienation from the Soviet regime. For the 
program to succeed, changes in the party leadership would be necessary: Shums'kyi 
proposed to replace Kaganovich, the First Secretary of the KP(b)U since 1925, with 
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Chubar, Skrypnyk or another Ukrainian who would ensure proper implementation of 
Ukrainizatsiia.218 In the same manner, Shums'kyi pushed for accelerated Ukrainizatsiia of 
the working class and their conversion to Ukrainian culture, including those workers who 
were not ethnically Ukrainian or did not identify themselves as Ukrainians, the so called 
Russified Ukrainians (Ukrainians by origin yet Russian speakers). 
Stalin indirectly responded to Shums'kyi criticisms in a letter to Kaganovich on 26 
April 1926.219 According to Stalin, the Commissar for Education had misinterpreted the 
very concept of Ukrainizatsiia confusing Ukrainizatsiia of the party and other apparatus (a 
declared objective of the policy) with Ukrainizatsiia of the republic’s proletariat. Stalin 
noted that Ukrainizatsiia of the working class was supposed to be a natural and gradual 
process whereas Shums'kyi was attempting to impose Ukrainizatsiia ‘from above’ and 
believed it would be wrong to force the Russian working masses to renounce their Russian 
language and culture. This, according to the leader, “contradict[ed] the principle of the free 
development of nationalities [...] and [was] equal to national oppression”. Stalin predicted 
that forced Ukrainizatsiia from above could provoke “an outbreak of anti-Ukrainian 
chauvinism among non-Ukrainian proletariat” as well as “a struggle for the alienation of 
Ukrainian culture from the All-Soviet culture, a struggle against ‘Moscow’, against 
Russians, against the Russian culture and its greatest achievement, Leninism, 
altogether.”220 Shums'kyi was reproached for miscalculating the speed at which 
Ukrainizatsiia could safely be implemented. The Commissar for Education, in Stalin’s 
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words, overlooked how weak the indigenous communist cadres in Ukraine were and how 
dangerous the influence of the non-Communist intelligentsia in such situations could be. 
These ‘oversights’ quickly led to Shums'kyi’s demotion in 1926. The ‘Shums'kyi 
affair’ signalled a radical shift in the party. The KP(b)U, despite its previous visible 
divergence of opinions on the national question and the level of autonomy of the republic, 
gradually sided with the centralist vision of the place and role of the Ukrainian SSR. Robert 
S. Sullivant has claimed that during the Shums'kyi affair a fundamental compromise 
between Ukrainian and Russian leaders was met, according to which Russian Bolsheviks 
were to accept a localisation program for Ukraine and a measure of independence for the 
KP(b)U while the party would support Stalin against opposition groups and would accept 
central leadership on questions of high policy and on matters of all-Union importance.221 
Consequently, Shums'kyi was withdrawn from Ukraine to a third-rate position in Moscow. 
The important post of the People’s Commissar for Education was assigned to Skrypnyk, 
who, it was believed, would implement the Party’s vision on controlled Ukrainizatsiia. 
By the late 1920s, Ukrainizatsiia had proven successful in all the spheres concerned. 
One of the biggest advances were seen in the Ukrainizatsiia of the school system. By 1933, 
teaching in 88.5% of elementary schools was conducted in Ukrainian (against 50.4% in 
1922).222 Similar albeit slower, tendencies were reported in professional and higher 
education. In 1929/30, 40% of institutes of higher education conducted teaching in 
Ukrainian; 39.5% of academic and teaching stuff and 62.8% of enrolled students were 
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Ukrainians.223 All these advances resulted in increased literacy rates among the population 
with illiteracy dropping from 47% in 1926 to 8% in 1934.224 Similar strides were observed 
in Ukrainian-language press and book publishing. In 1932, 87.5% of the republic’s press 
was in Ukrainian.225 In 1929, the share of Ukrainian books published in Soviet Ukraine 
reached 70% in titles and 77% in copies against those in Russian.226 Ukrainizatsiia also 
reached theatre, film making and radio-broadcasting; in 1931, for example, the Ukrainian 
SSR boasted 66 Ukrainian, 12 Yiddish and 9 Russian stationary theatres. The 1920s were 
also the most productive years for the cinematographic arts, with the All-Ukrainian Photo-
Cinema Administration (Vseukraїns'ke Foto-Kino Upravlinnia, VUFKU), subordinated to 
the Narkompros, in charge of the national film production. Four films were produced in 
1924, 16 in 1927, 36 in 1928 and 31 in 1929.227 Ukrainian radio-broadcasting was launched 
in 1924-25. Concerts, amateur choirs and literary evenings, popularising Ukrainian culture, 
became the norm in industrial areas. Thus, the national intelligentsia for the first time 
gained wide access to the proletariat. The response of the proletariat to the Ukrainiser’s 
attempts will be discussed in Section Three. 
Skrypnyk’s tenure coincided with the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan, 
which made provisions for the forced industrialisation of the Soviet Union. Under the Five-
Year Plan, drives for uniformity became more frequent. The State Planning Commission 
(Gosplan) with its greater power became a leading all-Union agency in economic planning; 
a number of the republic’s social and cultural institutions, e.g., higher education, which 
became closely bounded to the needs of industrialisation, also came under central control. 
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There were frequent voices of dissent from both the KP(b)U officials and Ukrainian 
intellectuals, opposed to the transformation of the Ukrainian SSR into a “Soviet colony.” At 
the Fifteenth VKP(b) Congress in December 1927 Kaganovich publicised the position of 
the KP(b)U leadership stating that Ukraine “with its mineral wealth” should be given more 
weight in national economic planning.228 
This approach towards industrialisation and centralisation intensified the party’s 
autonomist horizon. It was understood that for the Ukrainizatsiia program to succeed, a 
strong socio-economic foundation was required. This economic platform for national 
communism was articulated by Hryn'ko and Mykhailo Volobuiev, who continuously 
expressed the dangers central planning posed for Ukraine.229 Two main aspects were 
highlighted: the share of total Soviet investment in industry and Ukraine’s agricultural 
significance. As a head of the Ukraine’s Gosplan (1924-26), Hryn'ko repeatedly voiced his 
disagreement with the way the republic was treated centrally, advocating against 
regionalism, when Ukraine was considered an administrative extension of Russia.230 The 
Ukrainian economist Volobuiev was more precise with the critique of Soviet economic 
centralisation. In his article “On the problem of Ukrainian Economics,” published in 1928 
in the Party journal Bil'shovyk Ukraїny, he signalled the exploitative approach towards 
Ukraine carried out by the RSFSR. Volobuiev called for broadening the republic’s 
budgetary powers, stating that Ukraine was capable of maintaining its own independent 
economic life and, therefore, should be treated on a par with Russia.231 The economist 
observed that “when it [the Ukrainian economy] has grown stronger, Ukrainian society will 
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not accept its de facto, if not de jure, decreed leader – its Russian competitor”.232 He also 
advocated the need to recognise Ukraine as “an historically-formed national-economic 
organism”.233 
The idea of Ukraine as of a colony was fiercely repudiated in the national press. 
Khvyl'ovyi warned about the loss of Ukrainian sovereignty in his censored pamphlet 
“Ukraine or Little Russia” [Ukraїna chy Malorossia]: 
We are indeed an independent state whose republican organism is a part of the Soviet Union. And 
Ukraine is independent not because we, communists, desire this, but because the iron and irresistible 
will of the laws of history demands it, because only in this way shall we hasten class differentiation 
in Ukraine.234 
Mace somewhat optimistically suggested that “Skrypnyk temporarily achieved what 
Ukrainian communists had advocated since Mazlakh and Shakhrai, recognition that 
Ukraine was a country in its own right, ruled by a regime which was clearly Ukrainian in 
its policies and goals.”235 Since 1918, different possible alternatives of a Soviet Ukraine 
were elaborated and debated by Ukrainian communists. The unification of political life, 
achieved by the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, did not necessarily mean the liquidation of 
ideological pluralism in the KP(b)U. As shown in this section, the implementation of 
Ukrainizatsiia reinforced the significance of the Ukrainian horizon in the party, as defined 
earlier. The Ukrainian fraction in the KP(b)U, although the minority, promoted their project 
of Ukrainizatsiia and were able to carry it out alongside centrally defined initiatives. The 
vision of Ukrainizatsiia, enforced by the Ukrainian element in the KP(b)U, enabled cultural 
and ideological debates in Soviet Ukraine and for some time kept the illusion of potential 
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political alternatives. The strength of the Ukrainian horizon in the party was realised both in 
sustaining the autonomy of Ukraine and in challenging the central party leadership. 
The present discussion provides the background for the thesis; the political genealogy 
of national communism is the key to understanding the cultural discourse of the decade. 
The legacy of the independent communist movement in Ukraine’s ideological sphere, 
despite all constrains, provided grounds for a separatist political horizon in the KP(b)U and, 
consequently, for the autonomous project of Soviet Ukrainian culture. The active 
engagement of the Borot'bysty in the cultural management of Soviet Ukraine allowed 
gradual transition, or even blending of the pre-revolutionary and Europe-oriented modernist 
aesthetics with the new proletarian ethos and Soviet principles of artistic work. 
This section also examined the Ukrainizatsiia policy, the key prerequisite for a 
cultural flowering during the twenties. As shown, Ukrainizatsiia was a multi-faceted and 
far-reaching project. Firstly, it triggered political, cultural and ideological pluralism in 
Ukraine in the 1920s, exemplified by Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna. It will be shown that these 
two protagonists played the key role in defining Ukrainian Soviet literature, seen as a form 
of opposition to the state intervention in the cultural sphere. Secondly, Ukrainizatsiia led to 
important social changes in the republic, contributing to the emergence of a national 
audience for cultural products in the Ukrainian language. Hence, this thesis also examines 
the role of the mass audience in shaping cultural alternatives. Finally, the following 
chapters will explore further the contradictions in the way the Soviet nationalities policy 
was defined centrally and by the local Ukrainisers, especially during the first Five-Year 
Plan. In general, the political pluralism of the early 1920s defined the entire decade, 
regarded as one of the most complex period in recent Ukrainian history. 
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Section Two: Defining Soviet Ukrainian Culture: Cultural 
Alternatives of the 1920s 
 
Chapter 2.1: Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967) 
Tychyna is conventionally regarded one of Ukraine’s supremely gifted poets. His oeuvre 
consists of multiple volumes of poetry written between 1912 and 1967. However, if one 
refers to his literary genius, only his early collections (up until 1920) and a few examples of 
his later poetry are considered. Tychyna glorified the national revolutionary upheaval of 
1917-1918; he represented Ukrainian Modernism and with time, he became the leading 
Symbolist poet. In the years to follow, the poet experienced all the hardships and political 
reversals of the civil wars. Later on, he needed to adapt to the post-revolutionary reality and 
to accept the only political power, which gained its victory over the territory of Ukraine. 
Tychyna, as a fellow-travellers, agreed to cease their public opposition to the regime whose 
ideology they did not necessarily share. As the years ensued, the poet became a 
representative of socialist realism and a mouthpiece for the regime. The following chapters 
discuss the process of gradual evolution of Tychyna towards the Soviet canon, highlighting 
different options available for revolutionaries and fellow-travellers to continue their 
activities in Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s. Examples, such as Tychyna, suggest what 
kind of literature Soviet Ukraine had lost once ideological and aesthetic pluralism became 
curtailed. 
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2.1.1. “Black Wings over the Doves and Sun”: Poetry of the Revolution(s) 
“Be damned together with war! Raven-black wind…”: the Poet amidst the Civil 
Wars 
Tychyna, registered at birth as Tychynin, was born on January 23, 1891 in Chernihiv 
region. His father, a village acolyte [diak, a priest-assistant] and a literacy teacher, 
descended from Cossack nobility. After completing his primary education, Tychyna moved 
to Chernihiv, where he studied in a local religious school and sang in a monastery choir. In 
1907-1913 Tychyna continued his education in Chernihiv theological seminary. Creatively 
gifted, besides singing in a choir, he wrote poetry and studied drawing with the famous 
modernist painter Mykhailo Zhuk, who at the time lived and worked in Chernihiv. It was 
Zhuk, who introduced the talented young seminarian to the leading literary figure Mykhailo 
Kotsiubyns'kyi, who hosted weekly literary meetings for local talented youth. 
To Kotsiubyns'kyi, Tychyna was indebted for discerning his talent and making his 
early poetry public. One of his first poems Vy Znaiete Iak Lypa Shelestyt'? [You Know 
How Linden Rustle?] under Kotsiubyns'kyi’s recommendation was published in 1912 in the 
All-Ukrainian literary journal Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk [The Literary-Scientific 
Herald].236 During those regular meetings in Kotsiubyns'kyi’s house, the young poet was 
able to make valuable contacts. Among frequent visitors there was, for example, a leading 
Modernist poet Mykola Voronyi, who influenced Tychyna’s literary style and shaped his 
adherence to Symbolism.237 Kotsiubyns'kyi also recommended Tychyna to Hrushevs'kyi 
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and Maksim Gorky.238 Tychyna would benefit greatly from their acquaintance in the years 
to come. 
In 1913, Tychyna, having abandoned his singing career, moved to Kyiv to commence 
his study at the Kyiv Commercial Institute, which, however, he never finished. To 
financially support himself, the poet worked in the editorial offices of Ukrainian 
periodicals; such as a daily paper Rada, edited and financed by the Ukrainian conservative 
activist Ievhen Chykalenko, and the monthly pedagogical journal Svitlo. In 1914, however, 
all Ukrainian-language periodicals were banned as a temporary censorship measure during 
the First World War. So Tychyna, now unemployed, moved to Chernihiv to occupy clerical 
posts there. Nevertheless, the unprecedented revolutionary upheaval in Ukraine’s capital, 
awaken by the Petrograd events in February 1917, brought him back to Kyiv, where he got 
actively involved in state-building endeavours of the Tsentral'na Rada. During the 
subsequent years, Tychyna, although not affiliated with any political party, worked in the 
editorial boards of the periodicals associated with the UNR: the daily newspaper Nova 
Rada (in 1917), a publishing body of the Ukrainian Party of Socialists Federalists headed 
by Andrii Nikovs'kyi and Serhii Iefremov, and Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk (in 1917-
1919), edited at the time by Hrushevs'kyi. Inspired by the pace of the national revolution, 
the young poet in a letter to his brother Ievhen dated from 15 April 1917 asked for a reply 
addressed to “Tychyna, not Tychynin” [a Ukrainian variant of the surname].239 
Tychyna stepped into the limelight amidst the chaotic political developments in Kyiv. 
On 22 (9) March 1917 the Tsentral'na Rada, Ukraine’s revolutionary parliament, issued its 
first declaration, “To the Ukrainian People,” in support of the Russian Provisional 
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Government and democratic transformation of the Russian state. In less than a week, 
Hrushevs'kyi, who was elected the head of the body at the first Rada’s meeting, returned 
from Moscow and assumed his duties. Tychyna echoed those events in his highly patriotic 
poem Hei, Vdarte v Struny, Kobzari [Hey, Strike the Strings, Kobza Players!], published on 
30 (17) March on the pages of Nova Rada. The poem conveyed the general enthusiastic 
attitude, patriotism and anticipation, which permeated Kyiv in those early days of the 
national revolution. It also lauded the first fallen fighters for the Ukrainian state: 
Гей, вдарте в струни, кобзарі, 
Натхніть серця піснями! 
Вкраїнські прапори вгорі — 
Мов сонце над степами... […] 
Hey, strike the strings, kobza players!  
Inspire hearts with songs!  
Ukrainian flags are overhead 
Like sun above the steppes… […] (O.P.) 
One of Tychyna’s greatest poems, Zolotyi Homin [The Golden Harmony], was dedicated to 
the declaration of Ukraine’s autonomy on 23 (10) June 1917. Zolotyi Homin presents the 
overwhelming enthusiasm and joy of Kyivans welcoming national autonomy. This poem, 
rightly regarded a hymn of the national revolution, is an eulogy to the new-born country 
and its nation, who “heaps of rocks crashing down on my chest, I took them off so easily 
like eider down…”, exclaiming “I am the unquenchable Beautiful Fire, The Spirit 
Eternal. […] I am young! Young!”240 Tychyna’s early poetry is imbricated with folklore 
songs, legends and religious symbolism. Thus, when the poet mentions Apostle Andrew on 
the hills of Kyiv, it is an allusion to a legend according to which the Apostle came to preach 
Christianity and blessed those hills with God’s grace for the future majesty. The national 
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revolution, hence, was meant to approach the anticipated glory of the republic. Tychyna 
echoed the long-awaiting advances in the national state-building: 
Над Києвом — золотий гомін. 
І голуби, і сонце! […] 
 
То Україну 
За всі роки неслави благословляв хрестом 
Опромінений 
Ласкою Божою в серце зранений 
Андрій Первозванний. 
Above Kyiv there is a golden hum, 
Both doves and the sun! 
 […] 
It was the Apostle Andrew, 
Illuminated, 
Wounded in the heart with God’s 
grace, 
Blessing Ukraine with a cross 
For all the years disgrace. 
For the poet the events of 1917 symbolised, in Sherekh words, the “awakening of the inner 
music of the world, which until that time had slumbered in the Ukrainian nation.”241 Not 
surprisingly, the author enthusiastically responded to every new step in national state-
building. In another patriotic poem, the ode Oi, shcho v Sofiis'komu Zahraly Dzvony [Oh in 
Sophia the bells struck], published in Nova Rada on 23 (10) November, the poet portrayed 
the crowds cheering a military parade on Sophia Square in Kyiv, gathered to celebrate the 
proclamation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic on 20 (7) November. The bliss of the 
promise that “from now on - there will be no master in free Ukraine”242 was transmitted by 
the rings of the Kyivan churches and, as described in the poem, echoed in the soul of every 
Ukrainian. Similar mood permeated the early 1917 Duma pro Triokh Vitriv [A Duma on 
Three Winds], in which the revolutionary upheaval was associated with the long anticipated 
sun in early spring and the winds of change for the country. 
These poems were included into the first collection of poetry Soniachni Klarnety 
[The Clarinets of the Sun], published at the end of 1918. According to Lavrinenko, the 
collection was a “congenial aesthetic universal of the country, which in the tellurian 
[teliurychnyi] mass upheavals of the national revolution of 1917 woke up to overcoming 
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the internal and external slavery, to a new life.”243 Tychyna’s early poetry was significantly 
influenced by the Symbolist school, the current within broader Ukrainian Modernism, 
represented before the revolution by such masters as Oleksandr Oles', Voronyi, Hryhorii 
Chuprynka.244 Yet, it was Soniachni Klarnety, with its unique “fusion of folksongs and 
poetry, or rather the transformation of folksongs into poetry,”245 which brought a new 
sounding into Ukrainian Symbolism. In fact, as admitted by the diaspora literary critic Ivan 
Koshelivets' in the 1960s, Tychyna had actually initiated genuine Ukrainian Modernism, 
enhancing Ukrainian poetry with a new quality, of which nobody had ever suspected 
before.246 
The highly acclaimed collection declared the genius of young Tychyna, who was 
subsequently considered the most prominent Ukrainian poet of the twenties247 or even the 
entire twentieth century.248 A contemporary literary critic Iefremov noted that the collection 
opened a new, “fresh, exciting, and deep” page in Ukrainian literature.249 It was said that 
Tychyna’s talent refuted all those “grumbling at inherent crudity of the Ukrainian 
language.”250 Most importantly, as evaluated by Iurii Sherekh, Tychyna’s poetry brought 
the Ukrainian language up to a new standard, showing that it could be used not only for 
realistic novels, but also for highly symbolic modernist poetry.251 Later on, Novychynko, a 
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Soviet official biographer and an expert on Tychyna, observed that the poet, “seemed had 
never been a pupil, a novice poet.”252 
Yet, in the long run, the high merit of the first collection to a certain extent was used 
against the author. In 1926, Zerov observed that Tychyna already in 1918 had used his 
trump card and reached the summit of his creative potential.253 Similarly, in 1930, the 
Kharkiv literary critic Myron Stepniak argued that Tychyna in Soniachni Klarnety had 
developed a “complete system of Ukrainian symbolism,” and there was nothing more to 
achieve thereafter.254 Hence, every new poetic contribution was compared to Soniachni 
Klarnety, and every new poem was regarded as a step back. In retrospect, his entire literary 
career started to be seen as lowering of his genius, a journey from the literary Parnassus 
into the abyss of “court poetry.” 
Given the political and military situation of the civil war period, Tychyna’s patriotic 
poetry, apart from enthusiasm and anticipation, was infused with disturbance and 
trepidation. Already in Zolotyi Homin, Tychyna apprehended: “Black wings over the doves 
and sun – Black wings.”255 The rapture of the national awakening did not last long. After 
having seized power in Russia, the Bolsheviks strated their advance onto Ukraine,  plotting 
the overthrow of the Ukrainian government. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to 
repeat their coup in Kyiv, the Sovnarkom’s Ultimatum from 17 (4) December declared the 
war on the People’s Republic. Under the Bolshevik fire, the Tsentral'na Rada by its Fourth 
Universal ventured to proclaim Ukraine’s independence. The escalation of the war revealed 
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how unprepared Ukraine was for such reversals. The Rada, which since its formation had 
been pushing for a leaner military, was caught in unequal fight with the Bolsheviks. 
On numerous occasions, Tychyna reflected on those turbulent years. The most 
revealing testimony of the violence committed by the Bolsheviks in Ukraine is presented in 
a poem, written to commemorate the thirty young cadets captured and later executed after 
the unequal battle of Kruty. The combat took place on 29-30 January 1918, when around 
five hundred students tried to stop the offensive of four thousand soldiers headed by 
Mikhail Muraviev near a railway station 130 km north-east from Kyiv. The poem Pam''iaty 
Trydtsiaty [In Memory of the Thirty] was published in Nova Rada on March 21 
immediately after the ceremonial funeral of those thirty in Kyiv. 
На Аскольдовій могилі 
Поховали їх — 
Тридцять мучнів-українців, 
Славних молодих... 
На Аскольдовій могилі 
Український цвіт! — 
По кривавій по дорозі 
Нам іти у світ. 
Deep in the Mound of Askold 
Their bodies have been laid –  
Thirty staunch Ukrainians,  
Young, glorious, unafraid… 
Here in the Mound of Askold 
The bloom of the Ukraine! –  
Our fate it was by bloody paths 
This destiny to gain.256 
Within a few months, Ukraine’s capital witnessed astounding military and political 
reversals. On 8 February (26 January) 1918 the Bolsheviks succeeded in occupying Kyiv 
only to retreat already on 1 March, pushed back by the UNR forces, headed by Petliura and 
assisted by German and Austrian troops. In April 1918 the UNR was replaced by a the 
Ukrainian State, headed by Skoropads'kyi and backed by the Germans. For a poet, who 
lived in Kyiv through the succession of those bloody reversals, everyday reality became a 
painful experience of rejecting the earlier anticipated revolutionary values. The majority of 
Kyivans perceived the 1918 events as a failure of the national revolution. Until 1921, as 
shown in Section One, Kyiv experienced thirteen changes of rulers, each of which 
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contrived new rules and persecuted alleged dissenters. Caught amidst this chaos, Tychyna, 
venturing to “find an herb to heal human madness” (Viina II [War II]),257 exclaimed: “Be 
damned together with war! Raven-black wind…” (Po Blakytnomu Stepu [Along the azure 
steppe…]).258 
Presumably, the everyday life in Kyiv was by far harder than in Kharkiv, the capital 
of Soviet Ukraine, which experienced less political and military turbulence during those 
years. In Kyiv, it seemed the civil war brought to naught all the promises of the UNR 
leaders. The discrepancy between the expectations and the outcomes of the national 
revolutionary upheaval, which, instead of sovereignty, for the years to follow brought 
hatred and fratricidal wars, were captured in a short poem Odchyniaite Dveri… [Open the 
Doors…]: 
Одчиняйте двері — 
Наречена йде! 
[…] 
Одчинились двері — 
Горобина ніч! 
Одчинились двері — 
Всі шляхи в крові! 
Open the door –  
The bride is coming!  
[…] 
The door was opened –  
A dark, stormy night!  
The door was open –  
All the roads in blood! 
Consequently, Tychyna foresaw, “There will never be paradise In this blood-spattered 
land” (Skorbotna Maty III [Sorrowful Mother III]).259 
At the time of the publication of Soniachni Klarnety, the “blood-spattered land” had 
yet no chance for rejuvenation. In late December 1918, the merged forces of the UNR and 
the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR) overthrew Skoropods'kyi’s conservative 
government and once again, albeit for only some months, consolidated their position in 
Kyiv. Amidst the constant reversals, writers, among those who still remained in the capital, 
tended to search for accommodation with every new government. As a result, although the 
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literature could not keep pace with constant change of leadership, the creative life in Kyiv 
did not vanish altogether. There were a number of literary journals, such as Shliakh [The 
Way], Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk, and Knyhar [Bookseller], and some newspapers which 
continued to appear with relative frequency. 
At the same time, a number of literary groupings were collecting their forces to 
resuscitate the world of letters. In Kyiv, there were two main literary trends at the time, 
originating in the pre-war years: the Futurists and the Symbolists. The Futurists, 
championed by Mykhail' Semenko, continued their attempts to diversify the hibernating 
literary life, organising literary events and venturing publication of almanacs and literary 
journals. Similarly, in January 1919 the Symbolists, gathered in a literary and artistic group 
by the name of Muzahet, with the political and promised financial support of the Directory 
made daring plans for the group’s literary journal. The defeat of the Directory, however, 
adjusted their objectives and the overdue issue of Muzahet appeared only in May, 
backdated for months of January, February and March. This first issue, which also became 
the last that the group managed to publish, was opened with three poems of Tychyna 
(Mizhplanetni Intervaly [Interplanetary Intervals], Pluh [The Plough], and I Bielyi, i Blok 
[And Bely and Blok]).260 
 
“A Party Member or Not?”: Coming to Terms with the Victor 
Meanwhile, the authorities in Ukraine continued to change rapidly. The Ukrainian 
government was forced once again to surrender Kyiv on 5 February 1919, when the 
Bolshevik troops entered the city. The Bolshevik advance became the heyday for the 
Borot'bysty Party (see Section One), a newly reorganised party, which had united non-
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Bolshevik leftist activists with a strong national agenda. After 1919, Tychyna, a recent 
herald of the national revolution, was becoming closely linked to the Borot'bysty. This 
bond was not merely ideological, although it is hard to judge about Tychyna’s convictions 
due to the scarcity of primary sources and the prudence, with which the poet omitted any 
public expression of his views. Possibly, this cooperation was instigated by Ellan-
Blakytnyi, an UPSR activist, a future Borot'bysty leader, and a close friend of Tychyna 
from their study in Chernihiv theological seminary and Kyiv Commercial Institute. 
Throughout the civil wars, Blakytnyi on repeated occasions helped Tychyna to live through 
those difficult years, offering him various placements and procuring financial support from 
the Soviet government.  
In his recollections from 1918 (or 1919, not clear in the source), Blakytnyi 
complained that Tychyna lacked revolutionary temper and stamina; he had nervous 
disposition and could not endure moments of extreme tension of that struggle.261 
Nonetheless, he used every opportunity to engage Tychyna with the Communist agenda 
and proletarian literary corpus. In 1918, Tychyna joined the literary group “Borot'ba,” 
formed by the Borot'bysty members Mykhailychenko, Vasyl' Chumak, Zalyvchyi and 
Ellan-Blakytnyi, and was invited to contribute to its collections Zshytky Borot'by 
[Chapbooks of Struggle] and Chervonyi Vinok [The Red Wreath]. On 20 and 23 February 
1919, two of his poems Iak Upav… [He fell…] and Na Maidani… [On the Square...] were 
published in the Borot'bysty periodical Borot'ba. 
Besides attempting to make Tychyna’s poetry public, Blakytnyi through the channels 
of “ideologically correct periodicals” validated, so to speak, his poems for the years to 
come. The two verses, published in Borot'ba, and later included to the 1920 collection Pluh 
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[The Plough], with time became widely cited to provide an image of the October 
Revolution in Ukrainian Soviet literature. Nonetheless, by analysing the wording of these 
verses, another contextualisation is suggested. For example, Na Maidani… opens up with a 
stanza:  
На майдані коло церкви  
революція іде, 
- Хай чабан! – усі гукнули, -  
за отамана буде. 
In front of the church on the square, 
The Great Revolution is on. 
“Hey, shepherd!” cries shatter the air. 
“For leader, you’ve enough brawn.” 
Iak Upav…, in turn, depicts the death of a revolutionary during the consequent war: 
Як упав же він з коня 
Тай на білий сніг. 
- Слава! Слава! – докотилось 
І лягло до ніг 
He fell from his horse 
Onto the white snow 
“Hurrah! Hurrah!” Rolled up to him  
and lay at his feet. 
Despite proper revolutionary mood, these two stanzas include allusions to the national 
Ukrainian revolution: the usage of words “otaman,” and exclamation “Slava!” suggests that 
the events depicted were connected to the UNR history (there were no such words as 
‘otaman’ or ‘slava’ in the Bolshevik revolutionary vocabulary and they both have clear 
national connotations, hard to render in English translation).262 
In early 1919, Blakytnyi along with other fellow party members was rapidly 
promoted to senior positions. The Borot'bysty won control over Ukraine’s Commissariat 
for Education and the All-Ukrainian Literary Committee, Vseukrlitkom. The Borot'bysty, 
now being in charge of the republic’s cultural matters, tried to provide possible institutional 
support for cultural figures. Tychyna became a head of the literary subdivision in Vsevydav 
and the head of the special Ukrainian section. Also, the Borot'bysty launched the first state-
sponsored Ukrainian-language literary journal Mystetstvo [Art]. Headed by the Futurist 
leader Semenko, the journal united a large circle of Ukrainian writers providing a forum for 
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contributors from different ideological currents. The journal evenly presented works of 
Futurists, Symbolists and the proletarian writers, associated with the Borot'bysty. 
This brief stabilisation of political and cultural matters was once again interrupted by 
another military reversal, when Denikin’s White Army took Kyiv on 31 August 1919. 
Denikin detested both the ideas of a Ukrainian national state and a Soviet order, forcing 
those similarly endangered associates to go underground. In addition, the White Army 
started conscripting Ukrainians, and call-up papers were delivered to Tychyna. To avoid 
persecution for his affiliation either with either UNR or the Bolsheviks, as well as to escape 
the conscription, Tychyna along with other Borot'bysty for months took cover in the crypts 
on Baikove cemetery in Kyiv.263 His verse Palit' Universaly [Burn the Universals], 
referring to all the governments trying to establish their authority during the years, was 
widely circulated among Kyivans to support public resistance to the White forces. 
The Denikin regime, although short-lived, had a heavy toll on Ukrainian cultural 
affairs. Among those brutally executed were the Borot'byst poet Chumak and the 
Commissar for Education Mykhailychenko. To the death of the latter Tychyna dedicated a 
verse calling for people to rally under the Socialist banner for the common victory: “We 
take an oath: in the hour of victory – to fight till the death – but we’ll vanquish the 
enemy!”264 On 16 December 1919 the Red Army re-took Kyiv and re-established the 
Soviet order. Tychyna once again responded to this change of authorities with the verse 
anticipating the new era, approached by the fallen heroes and red martyrs:  
Надійтеся…Ховайте правду у своїй матні. 
Над Україною – Тарасова рука... 
Вже зайнялися в Києві нові дні, -  
То дні Михайличенка й Чумака. 
Do hope… Hide the truth in your purse. 
Above Ukraine – the hand of Taras… 
New days are at dawn in Kyiv, -  
These are the days of Mykhailychenko and Chumak (O.P.) 
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As mentioned, it is hard to evaluate Tychyna’s ideological convictions of the time. His 
diaries or personal documents reveal little on the poet’s early life.265 His association with 
the Borot'bysty, on the one hand, was linked to his friendship with Blakytnyi. On the other 
hand, the public support he expressed to the Soviet regime could be explained by the 
simple fact that the Bolsheviks, supported at the time by the Ukrainian communists, 
remained the only power able to withstand other rivals, especially the Whites with their 
imperialist and anti-national ideology. Nonetheless, it is hard to assert that the poet already 
during the civil war years had decided to side with one political actor. Probably, Tychyna, 
as many others at the time, was guided not by ideology, but a simply desire for stability and 
long awaited peace. Instead of definite answers, the poetry of the time reflected the general 
confusion of the immediate post-revolutionary years. 
The civil war was coming to an end with the Bolsheviks celebrating their victory over 
the territory of Ukraine. Kharkiv was proclaimed the capital of Soviet Ukraine; 
governmental and administrative bodies, including those institutional setting for national 
culture, had been moved out of Kyiv. As a result, Kyivan writers lost even their meagre 
state support, which they had secured with the Borot'bysty on board.266 Everyday life also 
did not become easier once the Bolshevik regime was in place. The political and military 
situation, even after the Whites had been ousted from Ukraine, was tense. In May 1920, a 
united UNR-Polish Army entered Kyiv as a part of the offensive against Soviet Russia 
during the Soviet-Polish war. Ironically, Tychyna’s poetry, which in March-November 
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1917 called for safeguarding the People’s Republic, in summer 1920, was anonymously 
distributed from the Soviet agitation trains during their anti-Polish and anti-UNR campaign. 
His agitation verse Rondeli [Rondels] called for mobilisation and unification of the world 
proletariat against the common enemy: 
Гукнем же в світ про наші болі! 
Щоб од планети й до зорі –  
Почули скрізь пролетарі, 
За що ми б’ємось тут у полі! 
Мобілізуються тополі… 
We’ll shout to the world about our pain! 
So that from our planet to the stars –  
All the proletarians everywhere would hearken 
To what we fight for, here, in the field! 
The poplars mobilise… 
By the end of 1920, the haphazard change of authorities seemed to be over, with the 
Bolsheviks the only power to remain. Yet, the country was devastated. In the situation 
when, as described by Lynn Viola, “three of the four horsemen of apocalypse – war, famine 
and disease – stalked the Russian [and the Ukrainian] land in an all too literal orgy of death 
and destruction,”267 public figures were still expected to manifest their civic stand and side 
with one of the feuding parties. Those captured in irresolution were no longer tolerated and 
terror became the means of each and every authority, claiming their ultimate right to govern 
the country. Literature could not enjoy the privilege of autonomy. It was often used, even at 
times without an author’s concern, to defend and to cleanse those in power. At the same 
time, men of letters were using their only tool, their muse, to justify the situation which 
befell the country, and the ideas conventionally leading to it. Presumably, a lot had been 
written at that time, yet, as described, “writers [were] writing, but they publish[ed] little 
because there [was] no one and nowhere to publish.”268 
In such unfavourable conditions, Tychyna still managed to publish two collections of 
poetry, Zamist' Sonetiv i Octav [Instead of Sonnets and Octaves] and Pluh [The Plough]. 
Overall, the two collections reflected the ideological hesitations within himself caused by 
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York: Oxford UP, 1999), 48. 
268Quoted in Ilnytzkyj, Ukrainian Futurism, 38. 
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the disastrous turmoil of the civil wars in Ukraine, and challenged the idea(s), in the name 
of which those brutalities were committed. The collections were inspired by the 
multifaceted experience of the civil war years in Kyiv. On the one hand, the poet focused 
on the humanitarian side of the catastrophe of 1917-1920. On the other, his poetry signified 
the poet’s preoccupation with the social aspects of the revolution. Notably, Pluh peaked at 
glorifying “the beauty of the dawning day” approached by “a million millions muscular 
arms”. For this very matter, the collection was regarded in the Soviet historiography as 
Tychyna’s “decisive ‘yes’ to the Socialist revolution.”269 Conversely, the collection of 
aphoristic poetry in prose Zamist' Sonetiv i Octav, exposing how complicated it was to 
come to terms with the regime, was censored after the first edition and republish only in the 
late 1980s. 
Generally, the period of 1919-1920 was not about making decisive choices; it was the 
time to accept and reconcile the idea, which made the terror and cruelty of the civil war 
possible. Tychyna’s anguish was caused primarily by the fact that he himself used to 
glorify a revolution, which, however, had revealed the worst side of human beings. Thus, 
his revolutionary dreams crumbled: 
Ждали ми героя, а став свинопас, —  
Хто ж так люто кинув на поталу нас? 
We expected a hero, but the swineherd has come, -  
Who then made a victim so brutally out of us? (O.P.) 
 
He questioned:  
Хто ж це так із тебе насміятись смів?  
Хто у твоє серце ніж загородив? […] 
Хто ж тобі зготовив цей кривавий час?  
Хто ж так люто кинув на поталу нас? 
Who then brought you to such derision?  
Who has stabbed you with a knife in your heart?” […]  
Who has brought this bloody trial on you?  
Who then made a victim so brutally out of us?” (O.P.) 
 
Those, who promised to lead, brought knives and fratricidal war with them:  
                                                 
269Novychenko, Poeziia, 14. 
  
113 
 
То ж сокири брали, щоб в крові погріть,  
І йшли брат на брата однімать, ділить...  
І взялися кров’ю поле і гаї,  
Бо рубались, бились ріднії, свої 
They took axes to warm them up in blood, 
and brother stepped against brother to bereave, to share…  
And blood was shed over the fields and groves,  
because those who slashed were kin and our own.270 (O.P.) 
The poet is confused, he embodied his tormented country:  
Стоїть сторозтерзаний Київ 
І двісті розіп’ятий я. 
There stands Kyiv tormented a hundredfold and I, 
crucified two hundred times 
But still he believed that “Ukraine will raise its own Moses - it has to be.”271 Humanity 
and patriotism laid the foundation to this aspiration: “poet, to love your homeland isn’t a 
crime when you do it for the good of all.”272 
“The beauty of the dawning day,” glorified in Pluh, was still gruesome. As for many 
revolutionary writers, the idea of a revolution consequently became devalued; it was 
compromised by all the crimes that people had committed in its name. More painfully, all 
the contemporaries shared the guilt, especially those poets, who had cherished the idea and 
translated it to the masses. Tychyna explained: “the creators of the revolution are, for the 
most part, lyric poets.”273 But those who came to preach were useless since “the one who 
said ‘to kill is a sin’ the next morning lies with a bullet in his head.”274 Tychyna deprecated 
any possible explanation of such terror. He challenged: “The great idea demands sacrifices. 
But is it a sacrifice when a beast eats a beast?”275 Tychyna condemned all the sides leading 
to that chaos, an encompassing ‘red terror’: “Damnation to all, damnation to all, who’ve 
become beasts!”276 
Whereas Pluh, it may seem, suggested the author’s decisiveness to come to terms 
with the new order, Zamist' Sonetiv i Octav reflected the cost of achieving this 
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271Воздвигне Вкраїна свойого Мойсея, -не може ж так буть! 
272Поете, любити свій край не є злочин, коли це для всіх! (І Бєлий, і Блок… 1919) 
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determination. In Pluh, Tychyna glorified locomotives and advances of techniques, while 
in another collection he questioned: “airplanes and the perfection of technology – what 
good is it when people don’t look each other straight in the eye?”277 He concluded: 
“Everything can be justified by a lofty purpose – but not the emptiness of the soul.”278 
Similarly, while affirming that every village should have its ‘Marseillaise’, the author 
opposed that “they shoot the heart, they shoot the soul – they pity nothing.”279 Hence, the 
revolution was doomed, that universal idea had lost its purity and was smeared with blood. 
The poet stung: “without music socialism can’t be established by any cannons.”280 
The two collections of 1920 are seen as antipodes. In the Soviet historiography they 
were seen as “pro and contra of the [October] revolution.”281 However, in both collections 
the poet is torn apart; he is inconsistent, full of dissociations and contradictions. Even Pluh 
with its traces of appreciation for the “new dawning day” was ambiguous. Alongside the 
decisive social themes (Pluh, Siite, Lysty do Poeta, Psalom Zalizu, Rondeli II, Hnatovi 
Mykhailychenku), the collection is adorned by philosophical poems (Mesiia, Iz Zyklu 
Sotvorinnia Svitu, Madonno Moia) and deeply psychological dialogues with the author’s 
self (Ia znaiu, 26-II (11-II)). Nevertheless, the new collection marked Tychyna’s implicit 
departure from his previous devotion to folklore, religious motifs, deep symbolism, 
musicality and manifold sounding of the Ukrainian word. In the collection, new heroes, 
new values were emerging. One of the central poems of the collection, the quadriptych 
Psalom Zalizu [Psalm to Iron], cemented the change of the poet’s poetic self. In one of the 
verses, the author portrayed a devastated Ukrainian city in the wake of the new communist 
                                                 
277 Аероплани й усе довершенство техніки - до чого це, коли люди одне другому в вічі не дивляться? 
(Антистрофа) 
278Все можна виправдати високою метою - та тільки не порожнечу душі. (Антистрофа) 
279Стріляють серце, стріляють душу - нічого їм не жаль. (Кукіль) 
280 Соціалізмбез музики ніякими гарматами не встановити (Антистрофа) 
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order. The new authorities required new morals: instead of Apostle Andrew blessing the 
Kyivan hills and a sorrowful mother mourning her hasty sons (the images of Tychyna’s 
early poetry), the communists (mentioned for the very first time in this poem), marched to 
summon workers “to smash the capitalists.” 
The “new renaissance” came to glorify steel, iron and a factory whistle, whereas 
Tychyna’s “Madonna of Mine, Immaculate Virgin, exalted in eternity”282 became 
superfluous. Thus, in 1919-1920, the poet bid the “farewell to his Madonna”283: 
Схились, Мадонно, на причілок 
Останньої хати в селі. 
Усміхнись – і пійди собі геть по ріллі, 
Одганяючись од куль, як од пчілок 
Lean over, Madonna, against the side 
Of the last house in the village. 
Smile – and then leave through the ploughed 
fields, 
Flicking away bullets like bees 
 
The ambiguity reflected in the two collections in full corresponded to the author’s personal 
confusion about the social and political developments of the time. The entry of 1 August 
1920 from the poet’s diary read: “In the recent days I have been thinking quite often: a 
party member or not.”284 He was hesitant, he questioned the party (perhaps, ironically): 
“Join the party, where they look upon a human being as a world treasure, and they all are as 
one against the death penalty.”285 The concluding piece from Zamist' Sonetiv i Octav best 
accounted on the author’s satiation with all the discredited ideas, with the revolution as 
such, with all the sham slogans and symbols: 
Грати Скрябіна тюремним наглядачам – це 
ще не революція. 
Орел, Тризубець, Серп і Молот.. І кожне 
виступає як своє. 
Своя ж рушниця нас убила.  
Своє на дні душі лежить. 
Хіба й собі поцілувать пантофлю папи? 
It’s still not a revolution just to play 
Scriabin for the prison guards. 
The Eagle, a Trident, a Hammer and 
Sickle… each acts as your own. 
But a rifle has killed our own. 
Our own lies at the bottom of our soul. 
Should I, too, kiss the slipper of the Pope? 
                                                 
282Мадонно моя, Пренепорочна Маріє,прославлена в віках! 
283Ievhen Sverstiuk, “Proshchannia z Madonnoiu,” in Sverstiuk, Bludni Syny Ukraїny (Kyiv: Znannia, 1993). 
284 Tychyna, Tvory, vol.11, 13. 
285Приставайте до партії, де на людину дивляться як на скарб світовий і де всі як один проти кари на 
смерть. (Антистрофа) 
  
116 
 
On the one hand, the concluding line (Should I, too, kiss the slipper of the Pope?) suggested 
that Tychyna started considering options to comply with the ruling party. Lavrinenko 
interpreted it as “a counter-reflex, an instinctive, rather than conscious, fit, […] a headlong 
breakdown” from the highest spire, where the poet was placed after 1918.286 After this 
breakdown, it was a mere decision-making out of the options available: embrace of the 
authorities, submission, suicide, inescapable madness or emigration, the option with which 
so many artists and intellectuals were faced during the civil war. On the other hand, 
however, Tychyna’s rhetorical question revealed the uncertainty about the authorities he 
conceded to side with. In another poem, Na Mohyli Shevchenka II [At Shevchenko’s 
Grave…II], he mourned: “and there was no one to ask: whom should we expect to save 
Ukraine?”287 The time did not offer easy answers though. 
 
“… Good that I am Alive and who Cares about the Rest”: Justifying the Terror 
The two collection of poetry were warmly welcomed by different ideological sides. The 
poet’s genius was reassessed by both the adherents of his Symbolism and those who 
anticipated Tychyna joining the ranks of proletarian literature. Instead of gratification, such 
reception brought confusion to Tychyna, as apparent from his diary entry of 23 August 
1920. The poet wrote: “People show their admiration to my poetry. And this is not for the 
first time. How can I understand this: either I have pleased everyone (then I am not a poet) 
or … (interrupted).”288 Indeed, Tychyna was praised by the critic of the time. In 1921, 
Ellan-Blakytnyi called Tychyna the most talented contemporary poet, calling him “the 
beauty and pride of the new Ukrainian poetry”. However, he regretted that the poet was 
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“not yet a complete Communist”. Nonetheless, as the collection Pluh had shown, Tychyna 
“leaped forward, consciously catching up with the revolution, with the new life.”289  
Indeed, Tychyna was highly admired by the proletarian poets. An example of the 
influence he had on the young writers in Kharkiv can be found in the dedication, printed on 
the cover page of the almanac Zhovten' [October], the first issue of which appeared in 1921. 
Published by the literary group Zhovten', the almanac featured contributions by Khvyl'ovyi, 
Volodymyr Sosiura, Maik Iohansen and Koriak. The dedication read: “To Pavlo Tychyna. 
Dear Comrade, please accept from us this book as a proof of our candour and red respect 
[chervona povaha]. We know You and we love You. We hope and we believe – You are 
with us. With warm and communist greetings, the Kharkiv group of proletarian writers and 
the Vseukrlitkom.”290 Tychyna’s diary entry from around the same time referred to this 
dedication: “How shallow we all are! To regard that signature from Vseurklitkom with the 
communist (October) greetings as an attempt to allure me to their camp – what a narrow-
mindedness! […] What do they want from me?!”291 Despite the warm welcome from the 
proletarian camp, Tychyna was not yet ready to comply with the new ideological 
boundaries. 
By the end of 1920, Tychyna, probably, had come to terms with the revolution and 
the ruling power. But its scale and means, its horrors, were still unfathomable for him. In 
his poetry, Tychyna offered a poetic account of the anxieties of the time. Firstly, he could 
not reconcile the terror, widely used by the new authorities to reaffirm their rule. In January 
1921, Tychyna’s friend, the famous composer Mykola Leontovych, an UNR supporter, was 
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shot dead by a Chekist in his parents’ house in Podillia. Tychyna echoed this event in a 
poem, dedicated to the memory of the great composer. Tychyna urged for peace to his 
worn-out country: “Let this bloody cup pass from Ukraine, let the harmony and equality be 
among the people.”292 Similar to the antistrophes of Zamist' Sonetiv i Oktav, Tychyna 
appealed to humanity, condemning the methods used by the opposing sides to remain in 
power. At the same time, the diary entry, referring to the death of Leontovych, suggested 
the repulsion that the poet felt about his own accord with the regime: “How awful! Awful 
that he was killed and that I am clutching at life. So to say, good that I am alive and who 
cares about the rest. How awful.”293  
Another ordeal of the time was the famine of 1921-23, an expected outcome of the 
lack of centralised power, constant changes of authorities and the years-long civil war. The 
government, which was meant to stay, however, was not effective enough to ease the 
situation. The motif of famine is pervasive in Tychyna’s early poetry. In the poem Holod 
[Famine] (1921), later published in the collection Viter z Ukraїny [The Wind from 
Ukraine], the author depicted a desperate mother questioning the (in)sanity of a 
neighbouring woman who ate her children from hunger. She calls for alleviation for her 
children: “go to sleep, go to sleep, - may you go to sleep forever… Life!”294 In another 
striking poem Zahupalo v Dveri Prykladom [One Banged on the Door with a Riffle Butt] 
the author showed a demented mother who was caught in the act of cooking her son. She 
tried to rationalise her deed: “Am I not his mother? Or didn’t I, tell me, want to eat?”295 
The poet himself suffered during the famine. In his diaries there are multiple entries 
of the poverty and rationing in Kyiv. To escape the hungry capital, Tychyna in late 1920 
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together with Kyrylo Stetsenko, a Ukrainian composer and a conductor, went in a tour on 
the Right-Bank Ukraine with the Ukrainian Republic Capella (choir), a journey of which 
the author left a detailed diary depicting the life of the country during those years in 
turmoil.296 During the most severe years of the famine, the poet, who in addition fell 
seriously ill after his touring of Ukraine, was once again saved by Blakytnyi. With 
Blakytnyi’s assistance, Tychyna fell under Sovnarkom’s scheme, which assisted financially 
to those occupied in ‘liberal professions’ and registered within the first artistic trade union, 
the Union of the Workers of Arts (Profspilka Robitnykiv Mystetstva, Robmys), established 
in January 1921. Under this scheme, the Union’s members, who expressed their loyalty to 
the regime, received a ration card and a protection card assisting them significantly through 
those years. 
The aid of the Bolshevik party, however, came at a cost. Most painfully, the poet 
needed to adjust his poetry to the demands of the day. Already in 1919 Tychyna, as an 
official from Vsevydav, was appointed a jury in the Narkompros competition for a 
revolutionary hymn of Soviet Ukraine. Notably, he did not only evaluate the submissions, 
but also offered his own text for the consideration of the committee. This propaganda piece, 
written in spring 1919, became a complete opposite to Zolotyi Homin, a conventional hymn 
of the national Ukrainian revolution, written by the poet in 1917. Instead of the inner 
musicality and metaphorical abundance, the anthem of the Bolshevik revolution consisted 
of simple agitation rhymes.  
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Все здолаєм, все ми зможем, 
тьму прокляту переможем! 
Із раба зробити брата – 
гасло пролетаріата! 
Розкувать невільний світ – 
наш єдиний заповіт! […] 
 
Будимо, будимо, будим – молот, гудки, 
димарі,  
Єсть ми, були ми і будем, так як то сонце 
вгорі!  
Все прямуєм, все працюєм,  
Буржуазний світ руйнуєм! 
We will overcome everything, we are capable of 
everything,  
The darkness we will turn away!  
To make a brother out of a slave –  
This is a slogan of proletariat!  
To unchain the un-free world –  
This is our behest! […] 
 
We rouse, awaken, call – hammer, whistle and 
funnels,  
We are, we were and we will be, same as the sun 
above us!  
We are striding, we are walking,  
And the bourgeois world we are destroying! (O.P.) 
The question of how sincere the poet was in this propaganda verse remains open. That 
party-minded agitation was balanced by another piece of the time, an intimate poem from 
the Zamist' Sonetiv i Oktav. The poet ironically remarked: 
Найглибший, найвеличніший і разом з тим 
найпростіший зміст, укладений на двох-
трьох нотах, - оце і є справжній гімн. 
Без конкурсів, буз нагород напишіть ви 
сучасне «Христос Воскрес». 
The most profound, the loftiest and at the same 
time, the simplest content is composed of two or 
three notes – that’s a true hymn. 
Not for contests, and not for awards, write a 
contemporary “Christ is Risen” 
These contradictions suggest Tychyna’s lack of determinacy at the time. Obviously, there 
were pieces written for social order or as a pay-off for the party’s assistance in personal or 
career matters. But also there were highly personal, sincere accounts of his everyday 
experiences and observations. The ambivalence was observed by the critics of the time, 
who repeatedly expressed concerns about the political choices made by Tychyna. Although 
not a member of any literary group at the time, he was in the centre of attention of different 
ideological camps. The poet was welcomed to join proletarian literature, but some of the 
verses (propaganda pieces) from Pluh raised concerns about the limits of Tychyna’s 
submission to the regime. 
By contrast, Iefremov, a Kyivan literary scholar and an important old-line 
intellectual, predicted Tychyna’s submission to the party. He feared that the poet “was 
facing the danger of exchanging eternal values for profits [secured by] literary associations 
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and party-mindedness.”297 The party speakers, instead, highly praised the evolution of the 
poet. The prominent critic of the time Oleksandr Bilets'kyi called Pluh a “book of iron 
tunes, a book with a sound of fanfares rather than organs, a book, where a breeze becomes a 
wind and later a storm, unfurled by million millions of muscular hands.”298 Tel'niuk, a 
Soviet official biographer of Tychyna discerned in the collection the poet’s “profession de 
foi (faith statement) of a revolutionary poet, the program of a struggle for genuine 
revolutionary art.”299 According to Soviet critics, Pluh was a leap forward in comparison to 
Soniachni Klarnety, which was called “pre-revolutionary” and unsuitable for 
“revolutionary masses.”300 In this way, perhaps for the first time, Tychyna started to be 
praised not for his literary merit or poetic genius, but for his usefulness for the 
revolutionary cause, for the mobilising effect of his agitations. 
In 1921-24, Tychyna, as if playing into the hands of the central party leadership, 
copiously contributed to Bolshevik propaganda. He repeatedly glorified the party, 
anticipated the future communist order, scathingly criticised its ideological rivals and 
asserted his own adherence to this victorious camp. In Zhyvemo Komunoiu, X [We Live as 
a Commune, X, 1920], he wrote: “Well, what of it that blood has flooded the universe? 
Future generation will arise – the union of bodies and souls. We do what we do, and the 
new world – it will be ours!”301 Similarly, following resolute Prometheus in one of his 
poems written in 1921 (1922?), the poet asserted: 
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Піду життя творить нове - 
Хоч би й по трупах –  
Сам! 
Так мусить буть. 
I will go create the life anew –  
Even if over the corpses –  
Alone! 
This is how it should be. (O.P.) 
Tychyna discerned his future path: the last line in the triptych Lysty do Poeta [Letters to the 
Poet] affirmed: “…You’re quite a force, and someday You’ll make a communist.”302 
Despite not being a party member, the poet, as corroborated by his contributions, in full 
submitted to the expectations of the establishment. Moreover, Tychyna, as many other 
party-minded poets, got engaged in the ideological battle with the representatives of the 
Ukrainian political emigration. The example of Tychyna, the poet who not long before 
glorified the national revolution, was yet exceptional. In the collection V Kosmichnomu 
Orkestri [In Cosmic Orchestra] (1921) the poet, as if trying to strengthen his newly 
acquired position in the new Soviet society, impudently warned ‘Europe’ against the 
advance of the first proletarian state from the East: 
Хто хто засміявся у Європі, 
Кого на кутні узяло, 
Що ми тут з голоду здихаєм,  
а не даємся ворогам, 
[…] 
Так, так, ми пухнемо без хліба. 
Надія наша – діти – мруть. 
Та голод – революції язик. 
А що, як вдарить вам іззаду 
Всесвітній робітник? 
Who are those who began to laugh in Europe, 
Who began to wail 
That here we’re dying of hunger 
but won’t surrender to our enemies? 
[…] 
Yes, yes, we’re bloating without bread. 
Our hope – the children – are dying. 
But hunger is the language of the revolution. 
And what if the workers of the world 
Strike you from behind your back? 
The same collection included a squib on the political emigrants, all those “who duped the 
Republic with lies and unscrupulously escaped abroad.”303 In V Tsariakh Znaishly Svoiu 
Opiku i Ridniu [In Tsars you Found your Support and Kinship] Tychyna put the whole 
blame for the civil war on those former Ukrainian leaders. He addressed the Ukrainian 
émigrés: 
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Надійтесь? Сконайте, здохніть у пивних, 
Щоб ваші й кості перетрухли й поцвіли!.. 
Нащо ви темних піддурили і сліпих,  
Нащо ви брата проти брата підняли? 
 
You still have hope? So perish, die like dogs in 
taverns, 
So your bones putrefy and become mouldy!.. 
Why did you dupe the ignorant and blind? 
Why did you set brother against brother? 
 
Understandably, in those harsh times everybody could submit and produce verses to attain 
the party’s benevolence. And yet, the level of submission can be different. In case of 
Tychyna the depth of falling down from the top of lyricism to the bottom of eulogy was 
striking. The diary entries from the time revealed how complicated the transformation was 
for the poet; but also they emphasised how important it was for him to fit in the new 
setting, hence to survive and to continue writing. The entry from 9 March 1922 read: “I 
don’t want to lie, I cannot. I want to live, live at this moment!”304 A later entry from the 
same year presented the pervasive fear of the poet for his life: “I am getting mad at nights. I 
will still face enough affliction, sorrows, tears and deaths. But now I want to live, because 
only in such a way I can blossom.” As for his new poetical method he added: “I won’t find 
a brave, wise Madonna. And yet the bourgeois (mishchans'ka) one I don’t want.”305 It 
remained unclear, however, whether the ‘proletarian Madonna’ could indeed assist the poet 
in expressing himself. 
In 1921 Tychyna anticipated: “We’ll move forward – history won’t wait. 
Proletarians! Call to each other in the struggle – The Inter-Republic, the Republic is 
approaching!”306 As predicted, in late 1922 the Ukrainian SSR joined the newly created 
Soviet Union. Tychyna responded to this event with another address to all those who did 
not believe in the bright future of the republic of soviets. With the verse Vidpovid' 
Zemliakam [A Reply to my Countrymen] the poet tackled all those, who escaped hard 
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306 ... ми підемо вперед — історія не жде. 
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choices due to their ‘faintheartedness’ and ‘blindness’. Hence, Tychyna made a clear 
distinction between him, as a (already) Soviet poet, and all the ‘nationalist’ poets, let alone 
the émigré ones. All the ‘infidels’ were bundled together in hell: 
Немов той Дант у пеклі,  
Стою серед бандитів і злочинців, 
Серед пузатих, ситих і продажних 
Серед дрібних, помстливих, тупоумних, 
На купі гною жовчного, що всмоктує, 
затягує на дно [...] 
 
Стою – мов скеля непорушний. 
Like Dante in hell, 
I stand among bandits and criminals, 
Among the fat-guts, the gorged, the mercenaries, 
Among the trifling, the vengeful, the dim-witted, 
On a pile of bilious manure that sucks everything 
to the bottom […] 
 
I stand firm – like a cliff. 
In the verse Za Vsikh Skazhu [I will Speak for All] (1922) he reiterated his resoluteness: 
“I’ve reached my height and strength I’ve seen the light in the distance.”307 The more 
positive the poet was in his proclamations, the bigger was the criticism. Tychyna with his 
new persona was often accused of betrayal of the ideals of the national revolution, of his 
lyric self, of his previously highly-acclaimed poetry. For diaspora observers, the latest 
poetry proved that Tychyna had initiated an epic transformation from “a genius poet into an 
excellent grapho-maniac [graphoman]”.308 While the opinion of the diaspora literary critics 
was unambiguous, the critics and writers in Soviet Ukraine refrained from decisive 
evaluations, often ascribing Tychyna’s agitation rhymes to his ideological confusion. 
Kharkiv writers retained their hopes that Tychyna would join the corpus of Soviet 
Ukrainian literature. In 1924, Khvyl'ovyi, a leader of the Kharkiv group of Ukrainian 
writers, in one of his letters to Zerov expressed his concerns about Tychyna’s literary 
evolution. Khvyl'ovyi disagreed with Zerov’s assumption that Tychyna “has come to an 
end” (perevivsia). Instead, the Kharkiv writer believed that the poet was “at his turning 
point.” Indeed, Khvyl'ovyi continued, some of his latest poetry, “especially those which 
smell of agitka” were repelling. But he expressed hopes that it was only a temporary 
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matter, since Tychyna was easily swayed by political agendas. Thus, “we need to be more 
cautious with him, otherwise the result might be not the one we expect.”309 Khvyl’ovyi, 
thus, presumed that Tychyna could easily fall in hands of centralist party propagandists and 
educators, bypassing the attempts of the Kharkiv intellectuals and Ukrainisers.  
Conventionally, 1933, the year of the publication of the verse Partiia Vede [The Party 
Leads] in Moscow newspaper Pravda, is regarded as a radical shift in Tychyna’s conduct 
towards the Soviet regime and Soviet canon. However, it seems more apt to consider 
Tychyna’s submission not as a sudden break but a gradual process of self-sovietisation, of 
adapting his social and lyrical self throughout the 1920s. His self-sovietisation was non-
linear, with continuous change from one ideological extreme to another. Perhaps, this can 
be explained by the lack of ideological or political convictions or as a reaction to haphazard 
implementation of Ukrainizatsiia in the republic. In addition, the poet in Kyiv was detached 
from the current literary trends in Ukrainian literature, centred in Kharkiv. While the poet 
was expected to contribute to the quality of Soviet Ukrainian literature, Tychyna repeatedly 
rejected his poetic autonomy in favour of state vision of literature. 
Perhaps, with a certain purpose in mind, it is possible to present the Tychyna of this 
early period as an adherent of Symbolism and Modernism. One can excuse or even 
reconcile Tychyna’s choices by simply picking up different poems or changing emphases 
while discussing verses written already with the party in mind. But the pieces cited above 
were not marginal and they were published by major publishing houses allowing for all 
sides of Ukraine’s literary life to observe the trajectory of Tychyna’s transformation. The 
critics of the time tried to pull apart Tychyna’s poetry between black and white 
interpretations. Among the Ukrainian diaspora, there were only two sides: “red” (party-
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mindedness) and “blue-and-yellow” (pre-revolutionary Modernism). In Soviet Ukraine, the 
pool of options was far more complicated; the two extremes were mediated by the project 
of Soviet Ukrainian literature, which, however, was itself a process in the making. 
The civil war period enabled the rivalry of different aesthetic movements and schools 
in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the poetry of those turbulent years was defined by social 
themes and ideological hesitations. Despite the common understanding that art should 
preserve its autonomy, creative literature, and especially poetry, was often used by different 
political actors of the time. The post-civil war order, in turn, raised the question of 
stabilisation and governance. The cultural sphere became an important component in the 
process of sovietisation of Ukraine. Although the victory of the Bolshevik party in Ukraine 
ruled out a number of potential alternatives for Ukrainian literature, the debates about 
Soviet Ukrainian literature had only begun. 
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2.1.2. “Kharkiv, Kharkiv, where is your Countenance? For whom is your 
call?”: a Fellow-Traveller in the Soviet Capital 
 
“…this big but not grand city”:310 Kharkiv versus Kyiv 
On 19 December 1919, Kharkiv was proclaimed the capital of the newly established 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. The decision to make Kharkiv, a border provincial 
city in eastern Ukraine, a Bolshevik stronghold was justified by numerous political and 
strategic reasons. From the very early on, the city favoured the Bolsheviks, as seen from the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly (November 1917). Right after the October 
Revolution, the Bolsheviks enjoyed considerable public support in the city. According to 
the elections results, the Bolsheviks were the most popular party with 27.9% (against 10.46 
in Kharkiv district (okruh) and 4.02% in Kyiv district), leaving behind the representatives 
of the Constitutional Democratic Party and SRs.311 Nonetheless, it was not only the level of 
public support, which became decisive for the decision to make Kharkiv the first capital of 
Soviet Ukraine. In comparison to other eastern Ukrainian cities, Kharkiv with its 28% of 
votes had shown considerably less support to the Bolsheviks. For instance, 47.9% of 
electorate in Luhans'k voted for the Bolsheviks and in Iuzovo (later Stalino and Donets'k) 
they gained 47%. Mostly, Kharkiv was chosen for its strategic position and due to 
economic reasons. Since Imperial times, the city had a good rail connection to Russia and 
was the centre of the most industrially developed region in Ukraine. 
The results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Kharkiv suggest yet 
another interpretation. Kharkiv at the time experienced the problem of “double loyalty” to 
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Kyiv and Petrograd,312 with both identities, Ukrainian and all-Russian, being present 
amongst the population. It should be noted that Kharkiv, according to the All-Union Urban 
Census from 1923, had the biggest share of ethnic Ukrainians in the national composition 
of the six largest Ukrainian cities as for 1920, 21.3% (against Mykolaiv (15.3), Kyiv (14.3), 
Iuzovo (11.4) Dnipropetrovsk (4.7) and Odessa (3.9).313 However, the Ukrainians were 
mostly peasants, with little access to officialdom and industries. 
The “third Kharkiv”314 as a capital and a new artistic and cultural centre of Soviet 
Ukraine in 1919-1934 became possible due to an influential current of national 
intellectuals, gathered around Kharkiv University (founded in 1804). These intellectuals 
preserved a strong bond to Kyiv (hence, the UNR statehood initiatives), and developed 
different autonomous projects of regional identity and national state-building. The all-
Soviet policy of korenizatsiia, introduced after 1923, had significant precedent in the region 
since 1917, when Kharkiv intellectuals and academics started advocating distinct national 
(Ukrainian) and regional (Sloboda Ukraine, Slobozhanshchyna) identities and inculcated 
them in the local population.315 For example, in 1917 the decision was made to open 
Ukrainian schools in Kharkiv starting with the new academic year, for which, accordingly, 
a network of training courses and evening classes for teachers was established. On 1 
September 1917 the meeting of the Kharkiv Ukrainian society “Prosvita,” headed by the 
historian, academic and the mayor of Kharkiv (1914-1917) Dmytro Bahalii, took place. The 
regional identity was cemented by Bahalii’s lecture, later published as a book chapter in his 
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well-known “History of Sloboda Ukraine,” entitled “Kharkiv as a Ukrainian city.”316 
Nevertheless, Ukrainian current in Kharkiv could not boast enough strength and was a mere 
invention of the local elites. The matters had changed in autumn 1917, when the 
revolutions raised questions of political loyalties anew.317 
In 1919, Kharkiv became the capital of Soviet Ukraine, which consequently provided 
a new impetus for creative, cultural, social, economic and political advances for this 
formerly provincial city. Its new central status, fully established in 1921 (the end of the 
civil war), became a magnet for young artists, writers, political activist and intellectuals in 
their drive to contribute to the creation of a new Ukraine with only limited reference to the 
past. Its qualitative composition for the following decade differentiated Kharkiv from a 
former capital Kyiv, unable, according to this new generation, to kindle the new proletarian 
art.318 
For around a decade, it seemed that these two cities, the former and the current 
capital, existed parallel to each other with only limited examples of cultural interactions. 
After the capital had been moved eastward, Kyiv was becoming provincial itself. It still had 
its century long cultural traditions, with the Symbolists, the most important literary current, 
being its link between Modernism of the past and revolutionary literature of the present. 
But Kyiv during the revolution, as it was seen from Kharkiv, was becoming the 
“bohemian” centre of a “European country” with its new culture of “coffee houses,” in 
which young artists “[were] having breakfast and lunch together with ministers and 
officials from the Tsentral'na Rada: ones working on state-building, the others on public 
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opinion and nationalist ideology.”319 From the perspective of 1923, Kyiv was seen as rustic 
(selians'kyi), old and historic (staryi ta istorychnyi) with its bygone glory; whereas Kharkiv 
was “the centre and pulse of cultural life of Ukraine, industrial Kharkiv [striding towards] 
modernity, the new capital, the youngest capital of the Universe.”320 
Kharkiv attracted young talented people with its enormous creative potential, which 
came hand in hand with immense social and cultural transformations. In only a decade, 
Kharkiv was transformed from a provincial city in eastern Ukraine into an industrial centre, 
able to flaunt all the benefits of the new regime. A young writer, Iohansen, expressed his 
fascination with Kharkiv in the outline for a future novel: “…Kharkiv theme prevails over 
others mainly because [its development] proves creative and the life-giving potential of the 
proletariat, who has transformed this place from an assemblage of merchants into today’s 
industrial colossus. Instead of an old town with dilapidated shacks and huge junkyards, a 
new and giant city is being built, which stands on a par, or maybe even surpasses, other 
European cities. […] I don’t even mention those grand changes in the way of life, which 
took place during this time.”321 
Despite Kharkiv’s array of opportunities, Kyiv remained an important reference point 
for proletarian writers; to be praised, or even mentioned, by Kyivan ‘old’ masters meant to 
be accepted in the world of letters. The value of such ‘approval from the old school’ can be 
found in the correspondence between Khvyl'ovyi, a young and yet well-established Kharkiv 
proletarian writer, and Zerov, a Kyivan Modernist poet and academic. In his letter from 
1924 Khvyl'ovyi wrote: “Thank you for the offer to publish my works in Slovo [Kyiv 
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publishing house]. At the end of this year I should use my acquaintance with You and 
publish at least something in Kyiv. I need to do this, because Kyiv is Kyiv. And such 
professors as Plevako [an editor of the academic edition of the Reader of the New 
Ukrainian Literature, 1923] etc., I heard, don’t want to acknowledge me as a writer based 
on the fact that I have published everything in Kharkiv, and Kharkiv is only Kharkiv, but 
Kyiv is Kyiv etc. In a word, an unusual explanation; but, to some extent, I agree with it”.322 
With the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime, Kyiv gradually experienced an 
outflow of artists to the new capital. It was partly caused by more favourable social and 
political conditions in the capital, and partly by the opportunities which opened up for the 
young generation in this “tradition-less” city. In addition, the Bolsheviks encouraged in 
every way the creation of the new Ukrainian proletarian culture. The non-interference in 
literary matters and lenient attitude towards the so-called fellow-travellers helped the all-
round development of the arts and literature. Besides, due to the new policy on 
nationalities, the Ukrainian language was being slowly but gradually introduced into the 
cities. The advances in spreading the Ukrainian language helped to erase the language 
barrier for writers from various backgrounds and wipe away the differences in readership 
requirements between Kyiv and Kharkiv. Nonetheless, the distinctive ideological, political 
and cultural differences between the two cultural centres, which seemed unbridgeable in the 
early 1920s, were erased by the Bolshevik grand social engineering project of the first Five-
Year Plan. 
In light of all these changes, Tychyna, a bard of the national revolution and a 
Bolshevik neophyte, also considered moving to the new capital. His motives were not only 
professional, however. The available primary sources disclose his deep inner confusion 
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with the situation in Kyiv. One of the main reasons for Tychyna to consider moving cities 
was the outflow of artistic forces and the impoverishment of the intellectual atmosphere. In 
his diary, the poet confessed how forlorn and lonely he felt on those days: “There is nobody 
I can federate with. Semenko – no, Vasyl' [Blakytnyi] – is far away, hronisty323 want to eat 
me up and benefit from it.”324A diary entry of 29 July 1920 suggested the unbearable 
atmosphere in Kyiv. It read: “I grow rusty in Kyiv. Yet, the hell with it, even with these 
stale forces I should continue doing something, while it is still possible.”325 
In addition, Tychyna found himself in the centre of criticism from all ideological 
sides. His most acclaimed collection Soniachni Klarnety was attacked fiercely by the 
Futurists. Tychyna, with his clear reference to the modernist tradition, was seen as 
“panych” (a noble man),326 a “bard of the Tsentral'na Rada” who, thereof, could not 
represent the new grand-to-be revolutionary literature. Futurist Semenko in 1922 rejected 
the conventional approach to regard the “young Ukrainian poetry” (Tychyna, Iakiv 
Savchenko, Dmytro Zahul) as “a great progressive step.” His attitude towards Tychyna was 
ludicrously presented as follows: “Pavlo Tychyna [meanwhile] sat quietly in his little den, 
content with onanism, translating “beautiful Ukrainian folk songs” into the language of 
poetry, stylising Ukrainian rugs, restoring ancient dumy and other useless things, preparing 
to become “father’s” (or “mother’s”) little boy and the successor to Voronyi, Lesia 
Ukraїnka, and Oles'.”327 Geo [Hryhorii] Koliada in his collection Futur Extra, published in 
Moscow in 1927, in the same critical manner spoke of Tychyna’s bland attempt to make 
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use of the revolution: “You,  deeply lyrical,  “genial” Tychynas, Sosiuras et al.  Hands 
off!  Don’t grasp the wheels of the lokomobili of history.”328 
Later on, Tychyna reflected those last years in Kyiv in his diary: “Ukrainian 
nationalist hated me for my Vidpovid' Zemliakam (1922). From another side I was pressed 
by Ukrainian neo-futurists, who labelled me and made the filthiest comparisons. […] From 
the third side, there were those moderates, preaching for peace and quietness, to whom I 
replied in Velykym Brekhunam [To Big Liars].”329 In addition, Tychyna was attacked by his 
old adherents for his new literary style, developed in Pluh and V Kosmichnomu Orkestri. In 
one of his later letters to Lidiia Paparuk, the woman who would become his wife in 1938, 
the poet referred to those common reproaches: “They cannot forgive [zabuty] me Kharkiv. 
According to them, I should have stayed in Kyiv and reprinted for the fifth time my first 
collection [Soniachni Klarnety].”330 Thus, Kyiv with its constant intrigues and plotting was 
becoming an unbearable place. Kharkiv, instead, could offer some openness and easy-to-fit-
in atmosphere. 
There was another reason for quitting Kyiv in 1923. The city was becoming 
dangerous for former UNR supporters. In Kharkiv, with its various opportunities, it was 
easier to blend than in Kyiv, where people often searched for possible occasions to climb 
the social ladder. An entry from the diary dated already from 10 November 1921 read: 
“Every time when Vasyl' [Blakytnyi] comes to Kyiv he suggests me to move to Kharkiv. 
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There is a big reason for this. One person is especially threatening me.”331 There are no 
records of who this person was. However, according to the recollection of Paparuk, 
Tychyna at the time had a complicated relationship with the Kyiv Cheka.332 This 
assumption was later seconded by Volodymyr P''ianov, an expert on Tychyna and his close 
friend in the later period. P''ianov pointed out that the poet was blackmailed for his former 
UNR ties by Vsevolod Balyts'kyi, a Cheka vice head at the time.333 
Subsequent spread of political arrests made those hypothetical threats more tangible. 
On 11 April 1923 Tychyna’s brother Ievhen, a precentor of a Ukainian autocephaly church, 
was arrested by the Chernihiv Cheka for his alleged attempts to Ukrainianise his parish. 
The investigation file included Tychyna’s poem with a clear anti-Soviet attitude: Do Koho 
Hovoryt'? [To Whom to Talk?], written in 1922. The poem reflected the poet’s despair and 
discordance with the state of affairs, with the situation of “class-less feud,” hypocrisy and 
mustiness of those in power. Tychyna confides in Rabindranath Tagore, his moral 
references: 
Я покажу тобі такії речі 
В однокласовій ворожнечі! 
Я покажу тобі всю фальш, всю цвіль 
Партійноборчих породіль! 
А братні зуби! Дружній зиск! 
Гнучка політика як віск! 
 
Коли б були це генерали — 
Ми б знали, що робить. 
Ах, в тім то й річ, що це кати 
Однокласовії. 
I will show you rare things 
In our class-less feuds! 
I will show you all the hypocrisy and mustiness 
Of those emerged from in-Party struggles! 
And fraternal fangs! And friendly lucre! 
That wax-like pliable policies! 
 
When were they generals –  
We would have known how to act. 
And that’s a thing, that they are hangmen 
From the same class (O.P.) 
Given its political sounding, the poem, although it existed in a number of handwritten 
copies, was never published until 1990. Tychyna was under suspicion. The political 
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periodicals and newspapers of the time [e.g., Nova Rada, Literaturno-Naukovyi Visnyk] 
contained enough proofs of his engagement with the national revolution. In addition, 
Tychyna’s anti-Soviet stand could easily be proven from evidence, already available in the 
Cheka files on his brother. Thus, it was due to the whole complexity of the poet’s 
experience in Kyiv that he finally took Blakytnyi’s advice and moved to Kharkiv. 
 
The Poet at the Crossroads 
In 1923, when Tychyna finally moved to the new capital, it seemed that Kyiv had already 
experienced its final days of glory. The enormous creative upheaval, inspired by the 
national revolution, was terminated with the last hopes to restore the UNR. Tychyna 
became another ‘Kharkiv Kyivan’ adjusting not only to the new post-revolutionary and 
post-civil-war way of life, but also fitting into the new ideological and institutional setup of 
Ukrainian culture. Ukrainian writers in Kharkiv gathered around the only Ukrainian-
language newspaper Visti VUTsVK [VUTsVK News], the major daily newspaper of the 
Soviet Ukrainian government, published in Kharkiv since May 1920. The newspaper 
covered republican, all-Union and world news, publicised official Party pronouncements 
and commentaries. In addition, considerable attention was devoted to cultural issues. Visti 
VUTsVK had weekly cultural supplements Literatura, Nauka, Mystetstvo [Literature, 
Science and Arts], 1923-24 and Kul'tura i Pobut [Culture and the Everyday Life], 1924-28, 
which became a platform for new Ukrainian literature. In summer 1921, Ellan-Blakytnyi 
became the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, turning it into the most influential organ in 
support of Ukrainizatsiia and the forum for Ukrainian writers and public speakers. 
Kharkiv was steadily becoming a centre of new proletarian literature. Unlike Kyiv, 
the faithfulness to the abstract ideological cause was valued here more than consistency of 
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literary manner, the legacy of national tradition or the boundaries of a single school. The 
Kharkiv literary world was ready to include various writers as long as they were ready to 
contribute to “the era of creative proletarian poetry of the real future” (‘Our Manifesto,’ 
Khvyl'ovyi, Sosiura and Iohansen, 1921). Not surprisingly, Tychyna, with his previous 
forays into proletarian poetry, was sincerely accepted in Kharkiv. In April 1923, at the very 
first days of his residence in the new capital, Tychyna for the first time presented his poems 
at the Pluh [Union of Peasant Writers] literary evening in front of the Kharkiv audience. 
Tychyna was widely recognised as the most talented poet of Ukraine. The review of this 
event reported a warm welcome to the Kyivan poet,334 who had long been awaited in the 
proletarian literary ranks. In turn, to offer an example of literary slough in Kyiv, the 
reciprocal visit of the Hart [Union of Proletarian Writers] members to Kyiv in December 
same year ended up with a scandal.335 As reported by Iefremov, “a stretched hand poised in 
mid-air since none of the Kyivans answered their call for the unification of literary 
fronts.”336 
Tychyna, although a new-comer in the proletarian literature, got quickly involved 
with the broad literary arrangements in the capital. He became closely associated with 
proletarian writers. Yet, he remained a circumspect fellow-traveller (Rus. poputchik), 
representing the group of non-proletarian writers, who on various occasions pledged their 
allegiance to the party and proved their readiness to cooperate. Fellow-travellers were 
originally defined by Trotsky as artists, who presented a kind of transitional art which was 
“more or less organically connected with the Revolution, but which is not the art of the 
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Revolution.”337 Due to the lack of Communist cadres and elites, the fellow-travellers were 
not only accepted within the new Soviet order, but often even highly praised for their new 
commitment. The benevolent attitude of the party towards fellow-travellers was well 
justified. Whereas for the artists this cooperation secured the possibility to continue their 
creative activity, the party, used the artists for its far-reaching strategic goals of creating a 
positive image both within the republic and beyond its Western borders. One of these goals 
was the need to win over the political emigration in Eastern Europe. 
The official position in literature was reiterated by the resolution of the Politburo of 
the TsK KP(b)U “Concerning Ukrainian Literary Groupings” issued on 10 May 1925. It 
was stated that “no existing literary organisation […] can claim that it alone represents the 
party in the field of literature, or holds the monopoly in applying the party line in this 
field.”338 Similar approach was executed on the All-Union level with the publication of the 
All-Union resolution “On Party Policy in the Sphere of Literature” on 1 July 1925. It 
asserted that “the hegemony of proletarian writers is, as yet, non-existent, and the Party 
ought to help those writers to earn for themselves the historical right to such a 
hegemony.”339 Since the party refrained from interfering into literary life in the first post-
revolutionary years, none of the existing literary groupings, despite their ideology, enjoyed 
full party support. Both resolutions were intended to seek a compromise between 
proletarian writers and fellow-travellers and to set limits to the party intervention in literary 
matters. Nonetheless, it was made clear that the final say in the cultural domain, as well as 
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in political, belonged to the party, who, as it was explicitly stated was the leader of 
“literature as a whole.”340 
In 1923, Tychyna was among the founders of a new literary mass organisation Hart, 
whose goal was to “unite the proletarian writers of Ukraine, […] who using the Ukrainian 
language as a means of artistic expression, aimed at creating one international, Communist 
culture.”341 Headed by Blakytnyi, the organisation united the most prominent names in 
Ukrainian letters and arts of the time: Khvyl'ovyi, Dovzhenko, Sosiura, Polishchuk, Kulish, 
and Volodymyr Kulyk. Within a short time, Hart became a leading literary organisation in 
Ukraine. To mark the new page, in 1924 Tychyna published a new collection of poetry, 
Viter z Ukraїny [Wind from Ukraine], dedicated to Khvyl'ovyi. This collection offered a 
variety of voices, both idyllic ones, joyful and oversaturated with the anticipated bright 
socialist future of Ukraine (e.g., Nadhodylo Lito [Summer is on the Way]) and tragic ones, 
depicting sorrows and grievances of the civil war years (e.g., Holod [Famine]). In a number 
of landscape, intimate poetry (e.g., Osin' [Autumn], Vesna [Spring], Vulytsia Kuznechna 
[Kuznechna Street]), the poet remained faithful to his former lyrical self. Alongside these 
poems, the collection contained several politically engaged pieces (Vidpovid' Zemliakam, 
Nenavysti Moieї Syla [Oh Strength of my Hate] etc.). 
The collection received mixed response. Firstly, it was admitted that Tychyna 
reached unprecedented heights in mastering a poetic form. Viter z Ukraїny boasted verses 
written in vers libre and hexameter, there were folk quatrains, blank verses, and poetry in 
prose. Tychyna constantly developed his technique, which, nevertheless, came along with 
simplifying the message of his poems. In 1931, for this very reason the poet would be 
accused of formalism. In 1924, however, these experiments with the poetic form and 
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content were defined as “a democratisation of the poet’s muse.”342 Secondly, the critics 
remarked the strengthening of his ideological tune. Iefremov recorded the poet’s evolution 
towards “communist ‘other-worldly’ romanticism, hatred towards communist enemies and 
some weird belief in the ‘Inter-Republic’.”343 
Another Kyivan, Zerov was more cautious with his appraisals. In the review, he 
observed that Tychyna had not only accepted the revolution, but also composed “a 
victorious hymn to the new age, the age of grand social advances”.344 As for the poetic 
style, the critic mentioned that Tychyna’s earlier allusions, metaphors and refined 
reflections were transformed into “cold allegories waiting to be deciphered.”345 A more 
nuanced account on Tychyna’s ideological transitions is presented in the personal 
correspondence between the two. In a private letter, Zerov commented on the mood of V 
Kosmichnomy Orkestri, the poem written in 1921 and included in the 1924 collection. For 
Zerov, the cycle “produces an impression of bastard-ness [ubliudochnost']. Your cosmos is 
a mongrel of two styles: on the one hand, ‘a spirit that had imbued all,’ on the other, 
‘confederations’, ‘aerostats’, ‘socialism.’ There are too many insincere words that float on 
the surface and disturb – they do not correspond to the inward nature of your thinking.”346 
Obviously, former adherents of Tychyna were dissatisfied with the trajectory of his 
transformation. 
In his letter to Mohylians'kyi, a Kyivan academic and a literary critic, Tychyna 
expressed his own account of Viter z Ukraїny: “I am very pleased to hear from you that my 
book leaves its mark, but this, my dear Mykhailo Mykhailovych, is not what I was aiming 
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at. My soul is longing for unknown heights, I want to stand like a monolith and my hands 
are rising upwards. But will I rise? To become a monolith one need knowledge, strength 
and health. Unknown heights require universal blossoming and shine. Marks… in order to 
leave marks on the whole epoch! […] Viter z Ukraїny is only a wind, and a storm is yet to 
come, or maybe not.”347 It is hard to say, what the ‘heights’ implied by Tychyna were. On 
the one hand, with his first collection Soniachni Klarnety he had already reached the 
pinnacle of symbolist poetry. His experiments with the form suggested that Tychyna was 
evolving within the trends of avant-garde. His forays into propagandist rhyming showed 
that the poet did not disdain the role of a party mouthpiece. Perhaps, it was this seeking for 
the right format for his poetry along with the simplification of its message, which gradually 
brought him to the heights of socialist realism, as the theory of ‘natural’ progression from 
avant-garde to “total art of Stalinism” suggests.348 
In the end, Tychyna easily fitted into the new Soviet literary setting. In addition, from 
the early days in Kharkiv, the poet also joined the Soviet officialdom. For a decade, he was 
a co-editor and headed the fiction section of Chervonyi Shliakh, the newly launched state 
sponsored “thick” magazine, which engaged dozens of prominent Ukrainian intellectuals, 
academicians and writers. Shums'kyi, an ex-Borot'byst and a later Commissar for 
Education, occupied the position of its editor-in-chief (1923-27). In Chervonyi Shliakh, 
many literary works, academic texts and book reviews were published for the first time, 
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which made this Ukrainian-language periodical a unique platform for promoting national 
literature and culture in the 1920s.349 
As the editorial to the first issue in 1923 made explicit, the journal, intended to be 
distributed abroad, was established to counterbalance similar endeavours of the Ukrainian 
emigration.350 Primarily, Chervonyi Shliakh was trying to compete with Nova Ukraїna 
[New Ukraine], a periodical, funded and edited by Mykyta Shapoval and Vynnychenko and 
published in Prague in 1922-1928. Needless to say, Chervonyi Shliakh was received 
negatively by the Ukrainian nationally oriented émigrés, for whom the engagement of 
national intellectuals equalled betrayal on their side.351 The Soviet Ukrainian periodical was 
regarded as a “Trojan horse”, launched with the underlying motive of enticing former 
countrymen to return to Soviet Ukraine. Frequency, content as well as a number of 
intellectuals involved in the creation of Chervonyi Shliakh could serve as further evidence 
of the cultural and literary flourishing in Soviet Ukraine. 
Not surprisingly, Tychyna fitted well with the magazine’s profile. A son of an 
acolyte, a former seminarist, and a speaker of the national revolution, the poet could be 
regarded a model of a former social enemy re-forged into a true Bolshevik. As Koriak 
remarked in 1927, Tychyna was a symbol of self-rejection and self-destruction of 
Ukrainian nationalism: “He was proclaimed a poet of the whole nation, on whose behalf he 
condemned the yellow-blue emigration and switched to Soviet literature, gaining the place 
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in its first ranks.”352 Overall, Tychyna was highly praised for his ideological determination 
and the ways the party could capitalise on his name. The article in Komunist, dated from 21 
February 1924, asserted that the fact that Tychyna had joined the ranks of the proletarian 
poets was a sign of the Bolsheviks’ victory in the republic.353 The same idea was 
promulgated by a literary critic Oleksandr Leites in his brochure “The Renaissance of the 
Ukrainian Literature,” published in 1925 both in Russian and Ukrainian. Leites highlighted 
the value of Tychyna’s commitment to the Soviet order: “The fact that Tychyna, the 
intellectual out of all intellectuals [intelihent z intelihentiv], the lyrist of all the lyrists [liryk 
z lirykiv], became the poet of October is the best evidence to prove that the revolution has 
won in Ukraine not only in material matters, but also in spiritual domain: it won over the 
best of what the old literature could boast of, over the most conservative of what it had – its 
secluded individualistic lyric poetry [lirychna poezia].”354 The need to come to terms and 
embrace the pre-revolutionary cultural trends and elites was necessitated by a weak stand of 
the Bolshevik party, as discussed in Section One. 
The Ukrainian emigration had an opposite perspective on Tychyna’s accord with the 
Bolshevik party. In October 1923, Nova Ukraїna published a review of Tychyna’s poem 
Skovoroda. For the critic, the poem became another proof of a striking political and poetic 
submission of “one of the most talented poets of the new Ukrainian generation towards 
slack Little-Russianism [rozhliabane malorosiistvo], diluted by kvass of Moscow 
internationalism”.355 To prove it wrong and to strengthen the Soviet appeal in the West, 
Tychyna together with Oles' Dosvitnii and Polishchuk, was sent to Prague and Berlin, the 
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very hotbed of émigré criticism. This visit was organised to present an opposite image of 
Soviet writers, determined to contribute to the development of “universal proletarian 
literature, written in the Ukrainian language”.356 In the 1920s, writers were often sent 
abroad in cultural missions in order to convince the emigration of their voluntary decision 
in favour of Soviet literature and to refute all those views of a violent character of the 
Soviet regime. Also, the involvement of cultural figures of Tychyna’s level contributed 
greatly towards an affirmative outlook of the Soviet regime and suggested a significant 
level of local support, including from those former ‘enemies’. 
There are no official records about this trip, which took place at the end of 1924. 
Some details can be found in the memoirs of the diaspora. In Prague, Tychyna organised 
meetings with Ievhen Malaniuk and Oles', his former revolutionary fellows in Kyiv and 
contemporary speakers of the Ukrainian emigration. The latter was reluctant to meet “what 
was left of the real Tychyna,” whereas Malaniuk still kept the warmest feelings towards his 
former revolutionary comrade, saying that Tychyna was “like the first love, something that 
one cannot forget.”357 The memoirs of Mykhailo Mukhin, Malaniuk’s companion, first 
published after Tychyna’s death in 1968, described how frightened Tychyna was, how 
paranoid he behaved, constantly looking back to check whether someone was listening or 
watching. The observer concluded that Tychyna had “unconditionally and irreversibly” 
surrendered to “the Russian occupant”: “It was a shame to talk and to see him”.358 The 
meeting with Oles' did not even take place. Dosvitnii and Polishchuk harassed Tychyna for 
his attempts to arrange this get-together, and reproached him in the “contacts with the 
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political emigration.”359 More insights can be found in Tychyna’s letters to Paparuk and 
Arkadii Liubchenko. He confessed how irritated and angry he was with those “imposed 
companions”.360 As a result, Tychyna left his colleagues behind and for another couple of 
months continued his European journey alone. 
During his first years in Kharkiv, Tychyna continued shaping his Soviet persona. The 
contributions of the time, although sparse, show how little coherence there was in his poetic 
evolution. Numerous examples of poetry written in these years, suggest that Tychyna was 
successfully adapting to his new role of a state poet, was becoming a poet laureate, who 
was eager to use his rhyming skills to reflect on every milestone of the Soviet state-
building. As earlier shown, Tychyna had abundantly engaged in Soviet propaganda. What 
Soviet Ukrainian writers regarded as an ideological confusion, with every new contribution 
more often resembled a conviction. In 1924, Tychyna published two verses, dedicated to 
the death of Lenin. In Nenavysti Moieї Syla he expressed the disarray, which permeated the 
republic after the death of the “Titan”: 
Я б не кричав так, я б не кликав –  
Не можна крику втамувать. 
Бо головного в нас титана 
Уже нема, нема...  
I wouldn’t scream so, I wouldn’t call out –  
But you can’t stifle a shout. 
For our supreme titan 
Has already gone, has already gone… 
Another verse, “Lenin,” written on the same occasion, was often read on public literary 
evenings and was later published in the 1931 collection Chernihiv. The verse offered 
another example of a propagandistic poetry with a clear mobilising message: 
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ЛЕНІН! 
Одне тільки слово, 
а ми вже як буря: 
Готово! 
[…] 
ЛЕНІН! 
Всього лиш п’ять літер, 
А скільки енергій 
LENIN! 
That sole word, just one, 
And we are like a Storm –  
Turned on! 
[…] 
LENIN! 
Just five letters in it, 
But oh, what power to tear! 
At the same time, a short collection Kryms'kyi Tsykl [The Crimean Cycle], published in 
1924 provided an impression that the poet “for the last time gasped for some ozone of high 
poetry.”361 The cycle includes an inner dialogue-contemplation of the poet about the 
choices, available for his ‘muse’ (Proryv [Breakthrough], 1926): 
Ти знов. А як же дух і форма?  
А як же вічне битіє?  
Невже отак без сліду жорма  
і пожере мене?  
 
Чи, може, зовсім не питати? —  
Мовчатиму. Мовчу.  
Уже і Всесвіту не чуть —  
лиш тиша ллє і ллє...  
You again. And what about a spirit, and a form?  
And an eternal being?  
Will it devour me without even a trace  
of a grindstone?  
 
Or maybe I shouldn’t even ask? –  
I shall keep silent. I am silent.  
I cannot hear a Universe any more –  
Only silence is pouring, is pouring… (O.P.) 
 
One may agree with Leites’ account that Tychyna was not simply a poputchik [a fellow-
traveller], but a pereputchik [the one at the crossroads].362 Although he had clearly accepted 
the path of proletarian literature and adapted to its institutional settings, his indecisiveness 
could hardly satisfy his audience and those who closely followed his poetic evolution. After 
Viter z Ukraїny, Tychyna hardly published anything new. The letter to Mohylians'kyi from 
1925 suggested reasons for his silence: “In times when I am thinking something over, I am 
always silent. I am silent, because so much is being written and said at the moment. You 
know, external chaos comes along with internal confusion. The passion [horinnia] is gone 
but writers insist on writing. […] I cannot be superficial, I don’t want to, because this will 
be the end of me. This is why I keep silent.”363 
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Instead, Tychyna pursued with editorial work and translations. Especially he was 
interested in languages and literatures of the so-called ‘fraternal peoples’. His special 
interest was in Armenian literature. The poet frequently corresponded with the Armenian 
poet and translator Hovhannes Hovhannisyan, discussing translations of his poetry into 
Ukrainian and the intention to prepare an anthology of Armenian poets. Similarly, Tychyna 
had plans for preparing an anthology of Turkish poetry, the materials for which he gathered 
during his two months stay in Turkey in November 1928-January 1929. Tychyna visited 
this country together with the All-Ukrainian Scientific Association of Oriental Studies, an 
organisation formed under the Commissariat for Education in January 1926. Tychyna 
headed the literary section of the Association and was in the editorial board of Skhidnyi Svit 
[Oriental World] (later, Chervonyi Skhid [Red Orient], 1927-1931). In total, throughout his 
life Tychyna prepared poetic translations (based on previous word-for-word translation) 
from fifteen languages. This fact underscores his poetic genius rather than unique language 
skills. In a questionnaire, filled in in 1946 as a part of his Party membership application, 
Tychyna entered only Ukrainian and Russian as the languages he had a good command of. 
French, German, Turkish were mentioned as languages with which the poet was merely 
acquainted (supposedly having basic knowledge).364 
 
“Even to Peel a Potato one Should Have a Skill”: the Poet at Odds with the Party 
In one of the official Soviet biographies, it was admitted that during the second half of the 
1920s, Tychyna was struggling with his poetry, “a lot of the written materials did not 
satisfy him.”365 Shakhovs'kyi by this suggested self-censorship. But also, the silence could 
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be caused by crucial changes in the literary politics at the time. Despite officially declared 
non-interference into literature, guaranteed by the TsK resolutions from 1925, the party on 
numerous occasions violated its assertions. The autonomy of literature and the ideological 
pluralism, realised through the existence of various literary groupings, was challenged by 
the party endorsement for the unification of literary corpus. Apart from seeking more 
control in the cultural sphere, the change of the official agenda was caused by the 
unprecedented turbulence of literary affairs in Soviet Ukraine in the mid-1920s, shaped in 
the form of the Literary Discussion. The unfolding Literary Discussion, examined in length 
in the next chapter, directly confronted two different visions of Soviet literature in Ukraine. 
The newly organised literary association, the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature 
(VAPLITE), became the main promoter of the debate, defending the autonomy of the 
cultural sphere and advocating for high quality literature. Its opponents defended the 
utilitarian vision on arts and its overall usefulness for the bigger cause, consolidating the 
Soviet regime in Ukraine. Tychyna, as a member of the VAPLITE, unwittingly found 
himself amidst the on-going power struggle between the local and central elites. 
In 1926, Tychyna published an abstract from his unfinished poem in the first issue of 
the Vaplite almanac. A piece, entitled Chystyla Maty Kartopliu [Mother Peeled the 
Potatoes], presented a peasant family in the early years after the revolution, torn apart along 
ideological lines. A son, who had joined the ranks of the Bolsheviks, was set against a 
traditional mode of life, represented by his mother. For the woman, the Bolshevik regime 
became an intrusion into her habitual life; the Communist party represented an enemy, who 
had caused total devastation and destruction of the Ukrainian countryside. In the time of 
despair, the woman addresses her son, a personification of that enemy: “Tell me, what is 
left to do? Knife me, beat me, and push me into the grave with my little children. Let me be 
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smothered by your knee, same as Ukraine.”366 For the peasant mother, the Bolshevik 
victory in 1921 was a bad omen. She exclaimed: “Lenin-Antichrist has appeared, my son. 
[…] We need to fight back: antichrist has come.”367 
Not surprisingly, the party officials picked up on the poem. The piece, although 
without mentioning its authorship, was addressed at the Kharkiv District Party Conference 
by Chubar, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of the People’s Commissars. As seen 
from the meeting’s final reports, published in newspaper Komunist on 15 January 1927, 
Chubar evasively mentioned one “yet a non-party” poet, whose works suggested 
involuntary sovietisation of the republic. The poet was openly accused of “peddling a 
nationalist opiate under the banner of proletarian literature”. From the party perspective, 
Tychyna’s image of Soviet Ukraine (as represented by the protagonists) was “a subtle 
reference to a glaring fact,” namely the alleged subordinate status of Ukraine in the Soviet 
Union.368 
Shortly after, Tychyna addressed the accusation in his open letter to Komunist. The 
poet tried to explain his intentions and defend the poem, the fragment of which was 
misinterpreted by the party leadership. According to the poet, the excerpts, cited by Chubar, 
were taken out of the context and contributed to a distorted view on his characters and the 
poem overall. The purpose of the poem, as explained, was to contrast the two opposing 
forces in post-revolutionary Ukraine: “the old and obsolete one, unable to catch up with the 
new realities (represented by the mother) and the new one, a revolutionary and victorious 
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force, embodied in the communist son.” The poem, he continued, in hindsight reflected the 
state of affairs in the countryside during the civil war, exhausted by war communism, 
poverty and the famine, when Lenin indeed was considered “an antichrist” by many 
“retrograde” peasants. Tychyna outright rejected any similarities between his own views 
and those of the mother. Instead, his sympathy, as the note read, was with the son, hence 
with the new Ukraine.369 This open letter was followed by a short editorial note. It read that 
Tychyna had deliberately confused the readership: the author should have published a 
bigger piece at once instead of presenting the fragment and causing those 
misunderstandings.370 
The unrepentant letter of Tychyna appeared on the sixth page of the issue. The 
priority in the issue, as well as in the debate, was given to another Party official, Zatons'kyi, 
the editor-in-chief of Komunist at the time. The front page of the same issue featured a 
column with a meaningful title Dumky pro Te, Iak Treba Chystyty Kartopliu [Thoughts on 
How to Peel the Potatoes], in which Zatons'kyi reiterated the position of the party in this 
debate. The concluding paragraph of the column openly accused ‘quasi’-proletarian poets 
in disregarding the tastes of the working-class audience. It read: “Even to peel a potato one 
should have a skill. Especially when we speak about our proletarian poets tasked to peel a 
potato of truth with the knife of their own talent; they ought to present facts of life not to 
gourmets, who, because of their bourgeois and Europe-inspired psychologism, at times turn 
up their noses from native sauerkraut and a salty joke, but for the masses, who require 
simple but healthy truth.”371 In such a way, the editor-in-chief of the main party newspaper 
and the former Commissar for Education, restated the task of proletarian writers to offer 
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simple and useful literature for the mass audience. Given the broader context of the Literary 
Discussion, Zatons'kyi recapitulated the party’s agenda on proletarian literature and its 
necessary social grounding. 
Tychyna, despite his involvement in nothing but literary affairs, was put on the spot 
and criticised at the highest republican level. Although his name was not mentioned in the 
final report of the KP(b)U Conference, later on he was repeatedly tackled in the debates 
featured on the pages of the republic’s press. Primarily, his non-affiliation with the 
Bolshevik party was emphasised. From Chubar’s account, this non-party status was a 
mitigating factor, since certain mistakes could be forgiven for poets of non-proletarian and 
non-party origin. However, at the time of strengthening the party grip over literature, the 
lack of proletarian consciousness was becoming a serious accusation for numerous fellow-
travellers and those ‘frivolous’ Ukrainian writers, challenging the party vision for Soviet 
letters. The exchange between Tychyna and the KP(b)U leaders suggests that the writers 
were constantly under surveillance; the party was well aware of the literary tendencies of 
the time and was constantly updating its records about cultural figures. Tychyna, highly 
praised for his ideological reorientation and usefulness for the Soviet cause, was closely 
guided in the process of his transition into a Soviet poet. 
During the 1920s, there were various options available for cultural figures of pre-
revolutionary origin to join the ranks of the Soviet poets. The exclusive Soviet model rested 
on unquestionable allegiance and the ideological purity of proletarian and later Soviet 
writers. The party enticed fellow-travellers towards the Soviet regime by offering benefits, 
various career opportunities and possibilities to improve their financial and social status. 
The miserable situation, in which intelligentsia found itself during and shortly after the civil 
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wars, contributed to the effectiveness of their tactics.372 Those previous non-supporters 
were granted important offices in the Soviet state, they were trusted and their ‘hostile’ past 
was forgotten (at least for a time). In return, the party expected much: those fellow-
travellers were to speak up on behalf of the Soviet authorities often against their own 
convictions or friendships. In addition, accepting the party line often meant drastic 
simplification of one’s artistic style and manner. One did not only accept the terms of the 
party control, but also implement its didactic and socially useful view into their writings. 
This path of conformism was well justified. The Bolsheviks in their all-Union scope 
persistently waged an uncompromising struggle against intelligentsia in its old traditional 
meaning. With the abolishment of private property and the campaign against private 
publishing houses, the only option available for intelligentsia was either to enter service or 
to submit to the guidance of state publishing houses. This turned them into a body of 
salaried, professional civil servants, depending on the state and, therefore, supporting its 
policies.373 Understandably, in the situation when the party-state became the only manager, 
publisher and distributor of the printed materials, neutrality or opposition would necessarily 
mean finding oneself at the margins of literature. So, writers were eager to acquire this 
“formal” (kasennyi) status in order to alleviate their everyday life.374  
Tychyna’s accord with the Communist party was often explained in terms of 
conformism. According to Iefremov, Tychyna was “a prominent shkurnyk” (a profiteer). He 
best represented the group of cowards, careerists and dishonest people, serving the regime 
for mere benefits. Tychyna, thus, was “a sincere Ukrainian who, having found himself in 
the Soviet atmosphere, was tempted by offices and benefits and subsequently turned into a 
                                                 
372See: Koliastruk, Intelihentsiia USRR; Chapter 3. Realii zhyttia intelihentsii USRR 1920-kh rr.: vid 
normatyvnoї do ekstremal'noї povsiakdennosti. 
373 Richard Pipes, “The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia,” in Russian Intelligentsia, 51-52. 
374 Roman Donets', “Suchasne Mystetstvo Ukraїny.” Nova Ukraїna, 10-11 (1922), 30-31. 
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Soviet man, breaking his ties with former representatives of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet 
public.” Whereas in Kyiv Tychyna was a nationalist, in Kharkiv he suddenly made himself 
into a Soviet poet.375 Shkurnyky were opposed by the “tactical” [taktychnyi] ones (a group 
Iefremov belonged himself), who simply agreed to live parallel lives with the Bolsheviks, 
regarding this tacit agreement as a possibility to continue their pre-revolutionary activities. 
The distinction, however, was a vague one. 
In 1926, Malaniuk, an émigré poet, dedicated his poem, entitled Poslanie [Epistle] to 
Tychyna and Ryl's'kyi, the two poets, who, as said, fell for material promises and defected 
to the Soviet camp. Malaniuk generalised: 
Ви — син самої серцевини  
Слабої нації, якій  
Понад майбутнє України  
Дорожче теплий супокій —  
[…] 
І мудрість — „моя хата з краю “ —  
Вся фільософія її. 
You are a mere son of a 
Weak nation, for which 
Above the future of Ukraine 
a warm routine is more important – […] 
And wisdom – “that this has nothing to do with 
me” –  
is its philosophy (O.P.) 
 
It is interesting that Tychyna became the main target of the émigré criticism. Obviously, he 
was not the only one who had joined the ranks of proletarian writers and offered his support 
to the Bolsheviks. However, Tychyna did not only stand against his reputation of a leading 
national poet, but also discarded any attempts to negotiate his past “nationalism” and 
present “communism” within the framework of Soviet Ukrainian culture, broadly 
elaborated by Ukrainian public intellectuals at the time. As the thesis argues, the more 
inclusive project of Soviet Ukrainian literature offered non-proletarian writers yet another 
path for self-sovietisation. This model combined the ideological adherence to the ideas of 
the October revolution and the dedication to the national cause. At first glance, this model 
could be most appropriate for Tychyna, a renowned poet of the national revolution, who 
                                                 
375 SBU Archive, F.13, spr.370, t.13, ark.310; Nadiia Myronets', “Ukraїns'ka Revoliutsiia v Doli i Tvorchosti 
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had shortly after reconciled the October revolution and found channels to contribute to 
proletarian literature. Tychyna’s path into Soviet literature lay through the Borot'bysty 
party, the most eager proponents of the Soviet Ukrainian political and cultural projects. 
And yet, Tychyna, despite all the preconditions, did not champion the ideological 
fight for Soviet Ukrainian culture. Indeed, he joined the literary associations, which 
defended the autonomous cultural path for Ukraine, especially the VAPLITE. However, he 
was never a public intellectual. The reasons for this withdrawal could be different. The 
central one was, perhaps, his personal characteristics, frequently commented on by his 
contemporaries. Tychyna represented that extinct intelligentsia in its traditional 
understanding (“intelihent z intelihentiv”, as defined by Leites), whose genius required 
quiescence and autonomy. He lacked political or social activism, a dominant feature of 
public intellectuals of the new Soviet kind. He lacked strong ideological convictions. So, he 
was easily swayed by different sides of the ideological debates, as remarked by Khvyl'ovyi 
in 1924. Most importantly, many choices or moves of the poet were conditioned by fear, as 
repeatedly certified by his contemporaries and biographers. For instance, Bilets'kyi 
aphoristically asserted that Tychyna above all feared the Soviet power.376 Ironically, this 
fear guided him all the way up to the summit of the Soviet politics and literature. 
Tychyna’s transition from a poet of the national revolution, a fellow-traveller into a 
fully-fledged Soviet poet was non-linear. His reversals from one tune to another are hard to 
trace or explain. Perhaps, by engaging with Soviet propaganda, the poet tried to 
compensate for his ‘uncertain’ past or his ‘true lyrical self’. The hegemonic character of the 
Soviet regime and its ideology forced many public figures to renounce their pre-
revolutionary activities and come to terms with the ruling party. Tychyna for a long time 
                                                 
376 Quoted in Volodymyr Panchenko, “Dyptykh pro Vtrachenu Svobodu,” Naukovi Zapysky NaUKMA. 
Filolohichni Nauky, 150 (2013), 59. 
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tried to find a place “above the struggles”, as defined by a Soviet critic Koriak. Fortunately 
for the party, Tychyna, who “could not endure this soulless Olimpianism [bezdushne 
olimpiistvo, reference to highbrow literature]” threw himself “into the waves of reality.”377 
As said by a Russian academic Igor Shaitanov, “you compromise when you adapt 
your choice, whereas you conform when you adapt to what has been chosen for you.”378 
Thus, the 1920s for Tychyna became a period of such adaptation, whereas 1933 became a 
year of his final subjugation. The years 1919-1922, discussed in this chapter, were the 
initial breakdown of the poet, when he first started to consider the need to adapt and to fit 
into the system. Throughout the 1920s, Tychyna was moving from an outsider (a poet of 
the national Ukrainian revolution, a fellow traveller) towards a trusted insider (a proletarian 
poet and a party poet during the years following the first Five-Year Plan), often omitting 
other intermediary forms of self-sovietisation. This process required not only shaping one’s 
revolutionary persona, but also adapting to the newspeak, accepting the hegemonic 
discourse.379 Yet, since the formation of this discourse was itself a process, finalised in 
1932-1934, writers, whatever their nationality or ideological standpoint, were gradually 
approaching the world of Soviet literature by their own trial and error. 
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Chapter 2.2: Mykola Khvyl'ovyi (1891-1933) 
Khvyl'ovyi was the most prominent Ukrainian writer and the leader of the entire artistic 
generation of the 1920s. His name came into the limelight in 1923-1924, when his first 
prose collections received general positive acknowledgements. During the early 1920s, 
Khvyl'ovyi initiated and perfected a new literary genre, which he himself called “romantic 
vitaism” or revolutionary romanticism. In his early prose, Khvyl'ovyi developed a heroic 
myth of the revolution and the civil war. He presented a palette of charismatic personalities, 
born of and later betrayed by the revolutionary element. Later on, however, Khvyl'ovyi 
deconstructed the myth by means of political satire and pervasive irony. But it was not only 
his literary merit which made Khvyl'ovyi one of the most significant public intellectuals of 
the decade. Between 1925 and 1928, Khvyl'ovyi became the spokesman of the cultural 
opposition in Ukraine, and led the literary discussion, which gradually evolved into 
becoming a political debate. These debates became the last legal platform to assert a 
different vision of a Soviet Ukraine, which had been elaborated by the Ukrainian 
communists and leftist intellectuals since 1917. This chapter focuses on the potential of 
Ukrainian revolutionary writers and public intellectuals to deliver a distinct vision of a 
Soviet Ukrainian culture and politics in the 1920s and their attempts to negotiate it with the 
central party leadership. 
 
2.2.1. In Search of “a blue Savoy”: Revolutionary Literature in Ukraine 
Khvyl'ovyi (real name Fitil'ov) was born on 14 December, 1893 in Kharkiv (now Sumy) 
region to a teacher’s family. Having received a modicum of education, Khvyl'ovyi moved 
to Donbas to become a worker. In 1914 he joined the Russian Imperial Army and a year 
later was sent to the front, which he recalled as “three years of marches, hunger, terrible 
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horror that I would not dare to describe; three years of squared Golgotha on the distant 
fields of Galicia, Carpathians, Romania and so on and so forth.”380 It was during his 
military service that Khvyl'ovyi got engaged in revolutionary activity, and became 
associated with the Ukrainian SRs; the leading group in the Tsentral'na Rada. Until the end 
of the war, Khvyl'ovyi, together with other party sympathisers, participated in organising 
prosvity (enlightenment societies for literacy, cultural and basic political education) and 
various peasants’ unions in demanding land socialisation.381 In April 1919, Khvyl'ovyi 
joined the KP(b)U and became a member of the Bohodukhiv executive committee.382 
Khvyl'ovyi’s decision to join the Bolshevik party in April 1919 was most probably 
accidental or caused by his romantic view of the communists and the civil war. According 
to his autobiography, the Bolshevik party at the time was only one of the communist parties 
in Ukraine that a “non-party dreamer”, as Khvyl'ovyi called himself, could get affiliated 
with. In addition, the declared Bolshevik position on the national question seemed not to 
run counter to the agenda of other communist parties. As seen from his autobiography, his 
predisposition to the KP(b)U was defined by the fact that firstly, “the Bolsheviks went hand 
in hand with the Ukrainian parties seeking Ukraine’s independence”, and, secondly, he 
associated it with “decentralised power of soviets”.383 In 1924, the writer mentioned, 
however, that “with more certainty I can call myself a communard rather than a 
communist”.384 O. Gan, one of the first biographers of the writer, suggested that the 
KP(b)U membership was perceived by the writer as a possible answer to both his national 
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and social concerns. According to the biographer, “with distinct expansive ardour, 
[Khvyl'ovyi] threw himself into the abyss of political struggle, which was seething in 
Ukraine. An enthusiast of the Ukrainian national affairs [...], full of political extremism, he 
became an ardent adherent of a future Ukrainian state, in which questions of national and 
social emancipation would be finally resolved.”385 Symbolically, in early 1917, Khvyl'ovyi, 
a combatant and a member of the army council, arrived to the congress of soldiers’ councils 
in Romania with two ribbons pinned to his collar: a red and a yellow-and-blue one. He 
offered a simple explanation for his dual political views: “I wanted to be a Ukrainian 
Bolshevik.”386 The party membership could as well be a form of survival during the civil 
war. As recorded from Khvyl'ovyi’s words, although ambiguous, “one should be simpler 
with these things; the party membership nowadays is the most convenient form of 
[unreadable in the file].”387 
Khvyl'ovyi’s early life is surrounded by rumours and speculation. Among his alleged 
achievements were his holding of high ranking positions in the Red Army388 or even 
serving in the Cheka.389 Nonetheless, these revolutionary accomplishments were rebutted 
by Khvyl'ovyi’s contemporaries. For example, his fellow writer Hryhorii Kostiuk stated in 
his recollections that “all those hints and allegations about the active connection of the 
young Khvyl'ovyi with the revolutionary underground, […] his unique heroism and 
‘devilism,’ - all these are only inventions and legends.”390 Moreover, Kostiuk claimed that 
while being a member of Khvyl'ovyi’s narrow circle between 1929 and 1933 (years of 
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particularly intense persecution of Khvyl'ovyi) he never heard any claims of Khvyl'ovyi’s 
heroic biography even though such claims (if true) could have saved his reputation with the 
Party leadership. A similar account is presented in the memoirs of Khvyl'ovyi’s friend from 
Bohodukhiv Petro Shygymaga: “I would testify that until Khvyl'ovyi had moved to 
Kharkiv in 1921, in any way was he engaged in politics. He had never spoken of any 
meetings, Bolshevik or non-Bolshevik gatherings, neither did he participate in any of them. 
He quietly worked in the department of people’s education and in the editorial board of a 
local newspaper, wrote his essays and published them.”391 
In 1922, after having served “seven-plus years in the Imperial and the Red 
Armies”,392 Khvyl'ovyi found himself demobilised in Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet 
Ukraine. The same year, he joined the circle of Ellan-Blakytnyi, the former Borot'byst and 
the editor-in-chief of the Kharkiv government newspaper Visti VUTsVK, who introduced 
the young writer to the artistic and intellectual milieu. In the following years, Khvyl'ovyi 
completed two collections of poetry, Molodist' [Youth], 1921 and Dosvitni Symfoniї 
[Symphonies of the Dawn], 1922. These, however, went almost unnoticed. One of the 
poems was dedicated to Tychyna, the renowned poet and the model for young writers at the 
time. On the other hand, the first collection of Khvyl'ovyi’s short stories Syni Etiudy [Blue 
Etudes], published in 1923, brought him immediate fame. Koriak, a well-known critic of 
the time, responded to this first collection as follows: “Genuinely: Khvyl'ovyi.393 He is 
excited and excites all of us, he intoxicates and disquiets, irritates, weakens, captivates and 
fascinates. […] He scourges anything that is corrupt in the revolution, seeks after it 
everywhere in the name of his beloved idea: communism, which he had accepted as an 
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ascetic and a romanticist”.394 The publication of his second collection Osin' [Autumn] in 
1924 established him as “one of the most outstanding writers of the proletarian age.”395  
The two highly acclaimed collections exposed the potential of new revolutionary 
literature in Ukraine. Immediately after the revolution, there were at least two camps in 
Ukrainian proletarian literature: the followers of the Moscow-led Proletkult (an acronym 
for ‘proletarian culture’ in Russian) and Ukrainian leftist writers. The rivalry between these 
two camps brought to the forefront the important ideological component of Ukrainian 
literature. The Proletkult was a mass movement, resulting from the Bolshevik Revolution. 
It aimed at creating a new proletarian art by forced interference in artistic creativity.396 The 
idea of a ‘mechanical artist’, ‘the highest value of amateur work’ and ‘collective art’ 
attracted Ukrainian revolutionary writers. Based on the Marxist formula that “being 
determines consciousness,” the Proletkul'tivtsi believed that art had an ability to construct a 
new reality, which would match post-revolutionary social advances. These were the views, 
shared by many young writers in Ukraine, who welcomed the revolution and glorified its 
purifying potential. And yet, the Proletkult movement did not gain strength in Ukraine. 
Writers were repelled by the Proletkult’s apparent Russian orientation, since the 
organisation “not only failed to acknowledge Ukrainian national art, culture or language, 
but referred to the [Ukrainian] Soviet Republic as a ‘region’ [krai].”397 In May 1919, 
Mykhailychenko, a newly appointed People’s Commissar for Education, reported at the 
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Vseukrlitkom’s meeting that “proletarian art can reach its international goal only through 
channels national both in content and form.”398 
Apart from the language, Ukrainian social structure became another stumbling block 
between Ukrainian writers and the Proletkul'tivtsi. The Proletkult excluded the peasantry 
from its activities due to its presumed reactionary and bourgeois character. In turn, for 
Ukrainian proletarian writers it was of primary importance to engage the peasantry; seen as 
a source of the republic’s working class. The questions of the language and social basis for 
the revolutionary art were addressed in Nash Universal [Our Manifesto], published in the 
end of 1921 by three young revolutionary writers, Khvyl'ovyi, Sosiura and Iohansen. The 
Ukrainian language was seen a prerequisite of a future organisation of Ukrainian 
revolutionary writers, since it linked the workers with “their thousand-year-long history and 
their ancestors, the Ukrainian peasantry.”399 Similar demands were voiced by a short-lived 
All-Ukrainian Federation of Proletarian Writers and Artists (Vseukraїns'ka Federatsiia 
Proletars'kykh Pys'mennykiv ta Myttsiv), established in 1922. The declaration, signed by 
Khvyl'ovyi as the group’s leader, admitted their orientation towards the Ukrainian 
peasantry as the source for the republic’s proletariat. It also affirmed the Ukrainian 
language as a means of cultural development.400 
Within this debate, a peculiar artistic and literary current, ‘romantic vitaism’, or 
revolutionary romanticism, was developed. Khvyl'ovyi coined this term to designate 
literature of the immediate post-revolutionary years, used for celebrating the times and its 
heroes: 
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Hence, the time of Romantic vitaism, the epoch of civil wars. Hence, its artistic nature is 
militant “idealism” (in parentheses) of the young class, the proletariat. Hence, its 
perspectives are to play the role of a field marshal in the future battles on the barricades.401 
Romantic vitaism directly opposed realism, a widely accepted method of proletarian 
literature. Firstly, Khvyl'ovyi believed that proletarian literature was not yet ready for 
realism, since the goals of the revolution (the complete awakening of proletariat and its 
creative potential) had not been achieved. Secondly, the post-revolutionary reality was seen 
as a retreat from the revolutionary goals and could not be depicted as it was. Within this 
current, as outlined by the critic of the time Bilets'kyi, three main themes were developed: 
“1) glorification of the revolution; 2) revolutionary satire on eternal ‘philistines’, who have 
adjusted to the new social conditions; 3) elegiac depiction of the loss of illusions among 
former revolutionary activists, leading to despondency, confusion, to moral decay”.402 
These themes were represented in full in Khvyl'ovyi’s early prose. The writer created a 
palette of characters of revolutionary heralds and ordinary people, party functionaries and 
bureaucrats, both in times of the revolutionary upheaval and post-revolutionary 
everydayness. Most of his characters, however, are placed in limbo between the revolution 
and communist utopia, which is yet to come. There was a constant reference to the heroic 
past in his writings. In addition, Khvyl'ovyi had a different understanding of time. In his 
creative writing a repellent contemporaneity was contrasted with desired future or the 
romanticised past.403 Hence, melancholy and alienation became characteristics of his 
heroes. This chapter offers a textual analysis of Khvyl'ovyi’s prose, focusing on the heroic 
                                                 
401 Khvyl'ovyi, Quo Vadis, In Khvylovy, Cultural Renaissance, 70. 
402 O. Bilets'ky, Pro Prozu Vzagalii i pro Nashu Prozu 1925 Roku, quoted in Khvyl'ovyi, Tvory u p'iat'okh 
tomakh, vol. 2, 21-22. 
403 Vira Ageeva, “Mykola Khvyl'ovyi”, in Istoriia Ukraїns'koї Literatury XX Stolittia, V. Donchyk (ed.) 
(Kyiv: Lybid', 1998), 284-292; Tamara Gundorova, “Mykola Khvyl'ovyi i Ruinuvannia Romantychnoї 
Metafizyky,” in Slovo i Chas, 11 (1993), 23. 
  
162 
 
myth of the revolution and the civil war, as created by the writer, and accounts for its 
deconstruction in Khvyl'ovyi’s later writing. 
 
“New unknown outset is coming”: the Glorification of the Revolution 
Khvyl'ovyi’s oeuvre consists of two collections of short stories (Syni Etiudy (1923) and 
Osin' (1924), a novelette (Povist' pro Sanatoriinu Zonu (1924404), two unfinished novels 
(Val'dshnepy, (1927) and Iraїda, (1925), rare short stories written in the second half of the 
1920s (e.g., Ivan Ivanovych (1929), Schaslyvyi Sekretar (1931), Opovidannia Skhvyl'ovanoi 
Hanky (1933), and some journalist-style sketches from his travelling around Ukraine (e.g., 
Po Barvins'komu Raionu (1930). Khvyl'ovyi’s early prose, with its metaphorical tone and 
symbolic language, romantic characters and revolutionary themes, is the best example of 
the revolutionary prose in Ukrainian literature. His contributions of the later period, in 
contrast, incorporated political satire, ideologically-loaded language and journalistic style 
of writing. 
In the early prose, Khvyl'ovyi presented in full the complicated process of ideological 
adaptation to the post-revolutionary realities of an entire generation of revolutionary youth 
and civil war activists.405 Khvyl'ovyi, a long-standing party member, an activist of the Red 
Army and member of a Bolshevik executive committee, became an inventor and promoter 
of a heroic myth of the Revolution and the civil wars in Ukrainian literature. For this 
reason, Khvyl'ovyi with his early writings was placed on a par with his Russian 
contemporary Boris Pil'niak (1884-1938), the author of the unorthodox chronicles of the 
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Bolshevik Revolution “Golyi God” [Naked Year, 1922].406 Similarly to Pil'niak’s most 
common metaphor for a revolution as a blizzard, an unplanned, uncontrollable element 
valued for its purgative function),407 Khvyl'ovyi depicts the revolution as a cardinal shift, a 
rebellion against triviality, a call for action and purification from the old false morality. It is 
described as being “without buttons, with elbow room, room to stretch oneself, to draw a 
lung-filling breath in the wide open spaces.”408 Khvyl'ovyi’s expectations from those 
turbulent years are condensed in metaphors of a “blue Savoy,” an “intangible Commune,” 
or a “Commune behind the hills.” In general, the revolution acquires universal, boundless 
meaning and scale. For instance,  
In ‘Synii Lystopad’ [Blue November] (1923):  
Tomorrow we will open a blue book of eternal lyrics – universal, blue. 
This is the revolution. 
Could the communards forget about this day? Isn’t it a majestic poetry? We plunge into a 
blue anxious night, our reflections disperse […]  
And we are hovering above the earth full of dreams, distant.409  
In Chumakivs'ka Komuna [Chumak’s Commune] (1923): 
Do broadcast further: Chumak’s commune is saluting into the frost: Long live the World 
Revolution. 
And the frost replies: Hurrah! Hurray! Hurrah!410  
In Syluety [Silhouettes] (1923): 
The boyans of the unknown communes are on the road under the glow of the downing sun 
singing an evening prayer. 
- … Glory to the revolutionary peaks and joy to the earth.411 
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The same optimism and admiration is granted to socialist Ukraine. For Khvyl'ovyi, as for 
many revolutionary contemporaries, the Bolshevik revolution had a potential of universal 
equality and fraternity, urbanisation, new perspectives for national and cultural 
development. Those expectations were put into words in Khvyl'ovyi’s short stories through 
the first-person voice: 
And Ukraine is striving upwards… And I love her – Bolshevik Ukraine – brightly, 
violently…412 
My beloved socialist Ukraine! Steppes, a black kite, and summer sun is moving off 
the skyline, and right behind, a milky path is singing white, or maybe, crimson 
songs, cows are mooing, plodding from the pastures – farther and farther. Farms, 
electric ploughs… cars, factories, plants… Ah! And farther and farther…413 
and through the words of his characters as, for instance, in ‘Liliuli’ (1923): 
[…] amidst traffic noise someone opened his sentimental eyes and shouted noiseless 
– in despair or in madness, - one cannot tell: 
… - o my beautiful land beyond the horizon!  
I believe! I believe so profoundly, so unbearably […]. I believe!..414 
In his early prose, Khvyl'ovyi elaborated a variety of characters of revolutionary activists 
and war heroes, snapshotted amidst zealous struggle for a “new unknown.” The majority of 
the short stories are psychological sketches, emphasising individual experience of the 
events. For Khvyl'ovyi, it seems, there was no insignificant life experience during that 
turbulent time. Yet, these stories are more than simple biographical sketches from an 
eyewitness. Through separate characters, Khvyl'ovyi reflected particular social features and 
people’s types. As stated by Volodymyr Iurynets', a literary critic of the time, the key to 
understanding Khvyl'ovyi’s perception of social (dis)order is his “adoration of the 
intemperate, vigorous, mass, ahistorical people’s element […] which, while bursting the 
banks of triviality, should be considered primarily as biological and physiological 
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experience and not as a mere social fact”.415 Thus, not the revolution itself, but heroes 
(characters) of that revolution are in the centre of Khvyl'ovyi’s attention. 
The myth of the revolution originates in the chaotic, heroic and promissory ambience 
of the civil wars. In addition, Khvyl'ovyi had a first-hand military experience. The irrational 
belief in the glorious future becomes the attribute of Khvyl'ovyi’s romanticists. Same as 
Sten'ka, the main character of the folklore-style story Lehenda [The Legend] (1923), 
revolutionaries were ready to abandon triviality, join the revolutionary struggle and 
sacrifice their lives in the name of a better future: 
Listen! Listen! I am dying in the name of freedom. I appeal to you: sharpen the 
knives. Look, look at the glow: that is our liberation blazing; new unknown outset is 
coming!416  
Khvyl'ovyi offers an extensive typology of the heralds of that ‘new unknown’. Personal 
motives to join the revolution or to become the party rank-and-files drove most of his 
characters. In sarcastic manner or with earnest sympathy, the writer shows different reasons 
for a future communist affiliation. Here, however, ideology does not play a significant part. 
Except for certain cases (like Vadym (Synii Lystopad), Mariana (Zaulok), or Kark 
(Redactor Kark), the decision to support the Bolsheviks seems irrational, stipulated, or even 
personally loaded. Among the drivers to enter the political struggle were, for example, a 
revenge desire of a deacon from a poor parish, whose seminary was closed because of the 
lack of state funding (Bandyty, [Bandits], 1930), or the influence of propaganda on ‘herself 
resembling a motley placard’ Veronica (Syluety), or sincere adherence to a commune and 
admiration to ‘un-poetised proletariat’ (Synii Lystopad). Full of irony, Khvyl'ovyi depicts 
the motives of some female characters. Oksana, a main character of Zhyttia [Life] (1922) 
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“did not like communists, the whole village did not like them, but in Myshko’s eyes there 
was love, and she started loving communists”.417 Another example can be found in the 
anecdote from Liluli:  
A spinster is sitting on the veranda, crying. ‘Why are you crying?’ – then she 
complains, that she, so to say, until forty was innocent, like a tear, but now she was 
seduced by a doctor from one health resort (on this very veranda!) and he spoiled her 
forever. How horrible! Do you hear: forever! So she decided to head to the capital 
city and to learn the kapebeu [KP(b)U] programme, because who will take her 
now…ah? Who needs her?418  
Whatever the reasons, this “wild and anxious” time of the revolution and the civil war had 
transformed all those “naked and hungry” people into “titans and gods”.419 This 
transformation was summarised by Comrade Uliana, one of the characters of the 
Sentymental'na Istoriia [Sentimental Tale] (1928): 
Heavens! You cannot imagine what a wonderful country it was. Under its sun, not 
only the inner world of each one of us was transformed and we were made ideal, but 
we were physically born anew. I swear to you! Even physically we were ideal men 
and women.420  
Each and every romanticist in Khvyl'ovyi’s prose was capable of mastering the 
revolutionary element, because it was close, it felt feasible, it was right there, “behind the 
hills”. But as the days ensued, that “blue Savoy” did not become any closer. With time, the 
rapture of the revolutionary struggle faded away, and the revolutionary heralds woke up 
into the day when the cannons fell silent. With time, the “commune behind the hills” 
became a phantom and the victors suddenly noticed that their hands were covered in blood. 
Khvyl'ovyi’s most famous short story Ia (Romantyka) [My self (Romantica)] (1924) 
presents this particular moment of realising that feats of the revolution were nothing more 
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than violence committed in the name of an illusion. In the short story, the author alludes to 
a complicated process of ideological transformation of a revolutionary and a member of the 
local Cheka, who had carried out a death sentence on his own mother. 
The story dwells on the activities of a provincial Cheka, “the dark tribunal of the 
commune”,421 in Eastern Ukraine the night before the Soviet regime was ousted by another 
military power. The local Cheka consisted of a nameless story-teller Ia; an “evil genius, my 
evil will”, doctor Tahabat; an “unhappy communard” Andriusha; and a “faithful guard of 
the Revolution”, a degenerate. In the most turbulent period, the Cheka was authorised to 
‘administer justice’ not only over the military enemies, but also over non-supporters and 
non-collaborators. In the centre of the story is a nameless story-teller, the Chekist. Ia, the 
head of the revolutionary ‘troika’, of a “new Sanhedrin”, became perhaps the most tragic 
character of Khvyl'ovyi’s prose. His personality was split: “I am a Chekist, but still I 
remain a human being”.422 He was torn between the fanaticism of the civil war, and his 
humanity, the very essence of his human being. This said, Ia embodied the entire 
generation. He stood for countless “rebellious sons” hence, nameless, who were about to 
bring the revolution “from a distant misty regions, from the calm lakes of the intangible 
Commune”. But, “everything disappears [...] and the day darkens.”423 
The Chekist constantly questions the rightness of his duty, which involved sentencing 
to death all kinds of ‘heterodoxies’: “I, a complete stranger, a bandit, according to one 
terminology, an insurgent, according to another”.424 He was looking for a way out of this 
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‘bacchanal’ – “But I see no way out”.425 After another night of sombre decisions, the 
Chekist recalls the lives taken away that night:  
Six on my conscience? 
No, it is not true. Six hundred, six thousands, six millions – numberless hosts are on 
my conscience! 
Numberless hosts?!426  
At the beginning, the Chekist manages to retain his sanity thanks to his mother, “the 
prototype incarnate of that extraordinary Maria”.427 The memory of his mother – 
“simplicity, silent grief, and boundless kindness”,428 keeps the Chekist form complete 
vanishing in revolutionary fanaticism. Eventually, however, Ia subdues his weak will and 
hesitation. The next night, in “an extraordinary ecstasy”, the Chekist is to decide on the fate 
of a group of nuns, accused of agitating against the commune. He needs to decide quickly 
because “the cellar is filled to capacity”.429 But he turns and sees “straight in front of me, 
my mother, my sorrowing mother with the eyes of Maria”.430 Nevertheless, the decision 
must be made and Doctor Tahabat agitates: “Not so loud, you, traitor to the Commune! See 
that you arrange matters with ‘mother’, even as you have with others.”431 Thus, the decision 
is not only about his mother; his loyalty to the commune was at stake. But, in the place 
“where sadism presides”,432 the choice seemed obvious: Ia is already possessed with his 
“evil genius” and he leads his mother to the execution: “Mother! Come to me, I tell you; for 
I must kill you!”433  
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On the surface, the main conflict in the novel lies between a professional duty and a 
personal attachments. The main character is to decide what price he is willing to pay for the 
sake of those revolutionary ideals, in which he once ardently believed, for those “peaceful 
lakes of the Commune behind the hills”. The image of Ia offers a painful confession of a 
revolutionary, whose “the intangible distance” had been transformed beyond recognition: 
“Once more, painfully, I feel like falling to my knees and looking pleadingly at the crude 
silhouette of the dark tribunal of the Commune”.434 Enforcing the death penalty on his own 
mother is not only a duty. It means accepting the new reality, being able to represent that 
‘Commune behind the hills’, to join the ranks of other ‘degenerates’, to build the socialist 
future in the time, when every revolutionary idea became compromised, discredited and 
devalued. 
Khvyl'ovyi’s prose, as literary critics observed, was highly self-referential, or 
autothematic.435 Due to this, the fictional world he created seems “an objectification of the 
narrator’s internal world, of his feelings and perceptions, forming a vaguely internal 
landscape and bestowing a lyrical dimension upon most of Khvyl'ovyi's early stories”.436 
This self-referenciality erased boundaries between the author and his characters. So, the 
most sincere claims or emotions of the characters may as well be ascribed to the author 
himself. This feature of Khvyl'ovyi’s prose has often been used to compensate the paucity 
of primary sources on the writer, ascribing plots from Khvyl'ovyi’s imaginary writings to 
his own biography. For instance, the plot of “Ia (Romantyka)”, and a lesser known 
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“Podiaka Pryvatnoho Likaria” [Gratitude of the Private Doctor, 1932437] are often referred 
to in order to claim that the writer was a Chekist himself, and that he had contributed to the 
all-pervading violence of the civil war years.438 In such a way, a symbolic biography of 
Khvyl'ovyi is being constructed, where imaginary characters and conflicts are being used 
for interpreting Khvyl'ovyi’s actual personality. 
  
“The Revolution is Ours but Words are Not” 439: the Experience of Alienation 
The revolution initiated a profound change; it smashed the old order and set the 
preconditions for a new social order, which rejected the traditional values. Instead, during 
the peacetime reconstruction, these goals were withheld and the old customs reinforced. So, 
for the majority of revolutionary romanticists and young militants, the golden age remained 
in those turbulent years of the civil war, while the years of NEP presented all together a 
different kind of communism that demanded new virtues and skills. As stated by Nikolai 
Bukharin at the Third Congress of the Komsomol in late 1920, while the party still needed 
“conscious Communists who have both a fiery heart and a burning revolutionary passion,” 
it was now especially important to develop young Communists “who have calm heads, who 
know what they want, who can stop when necessary, retreat when necessary, take a step to 
the side when necessary, move cautiously weighing and calculating each step.”440 This new 
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understanding of communism made those recently privileged activists, as Fitzpatrick noted, 
outsiders, whose values started to be seen as alien within the society they struggled for.441 
To a certain extent, Khvyl'ovyi’s prose reflected the dissatisfaction of those 
revolutionaries for whom the NEP period with its retreats in economic sphere, party 
centralisation and ideological pluralism signified the end of the golden age of the civil wars 
and heroic social revolution. Thus, the mood of his early prose can be compared to a 
general tendency to oppose the post-civil war developments, often voiced by the 
representatives of the left opposition in the communist party. In general, the idea of a 
revolution, valued for its spontaneity and experimentalism, was challenged. Its extremes 
were compromised for the need to reconstruct and govern the country. It required discipline 
and moderation, – the new virtues, inculcated into and promoted within the society. 
Khvyl'ovyi observed: “Maybe this is the end; those sons of a bitch have swallowed our 
revolution” (1923).442 The revolution “had slipped into the lavatory bowl filled with 
excrement” (1926).443 Similarly, the promissory idea of a commune had vanished. Instead 
of being a founding principle for a new socialist society, it became a relic of the old times. 
Ironically, Khvyl'ovyi in Chumakivs'ka komuna described the way that inspiring idea was 
realised: in a quiet seclusion of a small town, drinking tea from a samovar and dreaming of 
a future well-being, members of the Chumak commune are saluting communism and the 
world revolution over a telephone … without a cord.444 
The abstract idea of a socialist Ukraine, that ‘blue Savoy’, longed for and anticipated 
by numerous revolutionary romanticists, seemed to be transformed beyond recognition. As 
                                                 
441 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Legacy of the Civil War,” in Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War, 
ed. Diane P. Koenker et al. (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989), 393. 
442 Khvyl'ovyi, Na Hlukhim Shliakhu, vol. 1, 183 
443 Khvylovy, Woodcocks in Before the Storm: Soviet Ukrainian Fiction of the 1920s, Luckyj, (ed.) (Ann 
Arbor: Ardis, 1986), 19. 
444 Khvyl'ovyi, Chumakivs'ka Komuna, 244. 
  
172 
 
the 1920s had shown, the workers’ democracy became corrupted with the rise of 
bureaucracy. The revolutionary slogan “All power to the soviets” was quickly forgotten. 
Instead, a centralist bureaucratic institution, Radnarkom, a cabinet of ministers (people’s 
commissars) was created. From the perspective of those young militants, the Bolshevik 
party had gradually being transformed from a vanguard party, established to steer the fight 
for emancipating the working class, to “Your state party” (1923),445 an autocratic 
institution. Moreover, a cherished and just socialist order started more often to resemble the 
arbitrary rule of those in power. The occasional episodes of despotism became the norm, as 
Khvyl'ovyi portrayed: 
I do not understand, father Polikarp, what is the matter. My forest, and my meadows, and 
my land were taken away. Is there a law? 
The person emptied a glass and loudly, to be heard outside the window, to be heard by 
everyone: 
- The law, grandpa. The Bolshevik law. 
And then, he leaned forward the grandpa’s ear and, looking around, murmured: 
- Babel pandemonium. Time of Trouble in Rus. That is it. Do you understand? That 
is it (Shliakhetne hnizdo, 1923).446 
Khvyl'ovyi’s dissatisfaction with the post-revolutionary reality was not a rare example. The 
representatives of the Russian left opposition continuously voiced their disagreement with 
the party politics and its evolution. However, Khvyl'ovyi was not a mere mouthpiece of the 
Russian opposition in Ukraine. In his prose and later in his pamphlets he constantly 
addressed the political status of Soviet Ukraine and its autonomy. The writer reflected on 
the violation of the national and autonomous vision of a socialist Ukraine which he had 
cherished since the beginning of the revolution. The transition to NEP also involved 
important political and economic changes. The continuous discussion about the status of 
the soviet republics and their relationship with the Russian SFSR came to an end on 28 
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December 1922, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed. For numerous 
nationally-oriented communists the establishment of the Soviet Union signalled the end of 
Ukraine’s political autonomy. Moreover, the subordination of the KP(b)U to the TsK 
RKP(b) exhausted the intensive debates about the role and the authorities of the KP(b)U in 
Ukraine and the nature of its relationship with the RKP(b). 
The national theme is omnipresent in Khvyl'ovyi’s prose. One of the aspects, 
highlighted by the author, was the question of why the communist party membership 
started to contradict the national affiliation of its members. A journalist Kark (Redaktor 
Kark [Editor Kark] (1923) embodied this frustration of numerous Ukrainian communists 
within the ranks of the KP(b)U. Kark repeatedly questioned: “Am I really superfluous 
because I love Ukraine madly?”447 He was one of those errant dreamers, who could not 
conceive of the discrepancy between the slogans of national free self-determination and the 
realities of the Soviet nationalities policy. He could not harmonise his nationalism within 
the frameworks of ‘international solidarity’. According to Lavrinenko, Redaktor Kark 
introduced in Ukrainian literature the motive of ‘hangover’ after the civil wars of 1917-
1922.448 For Kark, the only possible solution to the contradiction between his national 
aspirations and political affiliation started to be embodied in his Browning. The realisation 
that one could not be simultaneously a Communist and a Ukrainian became common for 
many KP(b)U members in the mid-1920s. The need to choose between the two became 
prophetical for the writer himself. The entanglement of both the national and the social in 
the revolution and post-revolutionary state-building became the most important strand in 
Khvyl'ovyi’s romanticism. The inability (and perhaps impossibility in the then state of 
affairs) to fully achieve both of them led to growing unresolved frustration of the 
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generation of the Ukrainian communists, represented by Khvyl'ovyi and embodied by his 
fictional characters. 
In numerous short stories, Khvyl'ovyi accounted for the fates of the revolutionary 
romanticists during NEP. Those enthusiasts, adherents and believers in socialist utopia in 
post-revolutionary everyday life were set aside; they were excluded from the process of 
socialist state-building. At the time of reversed morals and ethics, death became the way to 
prove loyalty to former integrity, and suicide became a means to protest against the betrayal 
of the revolution. The epidemic of suicides among military youth and party members 
widely recorded in NEP years449 was also echoed in Khvyl'ovyi’s novels. Some of his 
characters in the post-revolutionary hangover mood were portrayed on the verge of taking 
their lives (e.g., the Editor Kark with his Browning or Mar''iana, who decided to hasten her 
death by getting infected with syphilis (Zaulok, [A Back Street], 1923); others are presented 
on their deathbeds, happy to be dying in the name of the idea (like, Vadym (Synii 
Lystopad), who asks “what are our tragedies against this great symphony towards the 
future?”450); or simply pushed to suicide being unable to break a cynical cycle of everyday 
existence (e.g., Khlonia, a former Communist idealist, who understood that “Lenin repeats 
only once in five hundred years”451 (Povist' pro Sanatoriinu Zonu [A Novel about a 
Sanatorium], 1924). 
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The feeling of those betrayed and neglected enthusiasts, unable to compromise and to 
adapt to the post-revolutionary routine is expressed in Sentymental'na Istoriia: 
The thing is that you never played Eva’s part and you cannot long for paradise, as myself or 
as thousands of those broken down by the civil war, do. […] You have never been on the 
other side, and you do not know a thing. Only we and only we were driven away from there. 
That is why we are living in longing.452 
Khvyl'ovyi’s romanticists were possessed with melancholy. This feeling was provoked by 
the idealised remembrance of the past and its unbridgeable distance from the present. 
Khvyl'ovyi’s heroes did not belong to reality since it does not correspond to their ideals. 
Similarly, the new reality did not need those dreamers. Hence, the revolutionary 
romanticists became alienated from their reality; they were groundless, disconnected from 
time and space. Most painfully, their lost paradise was nothing more than “a mirage of the 
past that [they] will never be able to recover“.453 
Symbolically, Khvyl'ovyi gathered all those uprooted revolutionary romanticists in a 
sanatorium for ‘patients with mental disorder’ (Povist' pro Sanatoriinu Zonu). The topos of 
a ‘sanatorium’ was used ambiguously. On the one hand, its inmates were seen as almost 
deviants, phantoms, hardly recognisable in ‘the real world’. In the ‘sanatorium’, in this 
Foucault’s panopticon, they were constantly observed; even their interactions with the 
outer world were controlled to prevent the negative influence of their ‘false idealism’ on the 
new Soviet citizens. On the other hand, however, this confined space can be regarded as an 
experiment, a model of the socialist society, of a Soviet state itself, where each character 
presented a type, every interaction contained a statement, and every decision had universal 
meaning.  
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The sanatorium inmates had similar ‘symptoms’: their idealisation of the civil war did 
not allow them to accept the post-revolutionary normalisation; their extremism could not be 
channelled within the expected moderation and discipline of the new social order. In the 
NEP society, they became socially superfluous, incompatible or even harmful. Since their 
pessimism could not be reconciled with the prevalent optimism of the decade, they were 
isolated from ‘healthy’ Soviet citizens. The main ‘patients’ of the ‘sanatorium’ were: the 
anarkh, an anarchist with a ‘hairy nature’, a former leader of a Ukrainian peasant revolt 
who “burned a black banner and bravely unfurled a red-crimson one”;454 Khlonia, a 
betrayed Communist idealist; and a typesetter (metranpazh) Karno, a mysterious figure, 
“provincial Mephistopheles”,455 wild and violent, who was incarcerated (how trivial!) for 
the murder of his wife’s lover. They are supervised by Katria, a sanatorium nurse, herself 
an idealist who dreams of escaping that “grey sanatorium everydayness” somewhere in 
Siberia, “in a remote taiga, at the end of the earth”;456 and Maiia, a secret police officer, 
who “gave all she could to that secret police and then not only began to love this job, but 
cannot even live without it”.457 Although, Katria and Maiia are presented as superior to the 
inmates, they were similarly trapped in the sanatorium, being unable to fit-in in the outside 
world. 
The former revolutionaries, the anarkh and Klonia, could not reconcile their past and 
the reality that they had left behind the sanatorium’s walls. They were sent to the 
sanatorium to find a rational explanation for their frustration. However, the melancholy 
took them over. Metaphorically, Khlonia, who had admitted that he “[would] not see Lenin 
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again”,458 in despair, committed suicide. The anarkh was forced into the same impasse. He 
wrote a letter to his sister confessing his alienation and disillusionment. The reply was, 
however, straightforward. The sister, as depicted, was one of those builders of socialism, 
for whom in the age of industrialisation there could be no place for mental disorder or 
“slobbery symbolists”.459 The sister advised to accept the new society: “to live, to read 
newspapers, magazine ‘Ogoniok’ etc., to enjoy picturesque view from the hill, to eat 
borshch and meatballs […] and not to recall his past”.460 Symbolically, having read the 
letter, the anarkh felt thirsty. He tried to quench his thirst, but instead followed Khlonia to 
“another side of reality”.461 These suicides, nonetheless, did not provide an easy 
explanation. Were they evidence of the characters’ accepting or rejecting the new reality? 
Had they attempted to leave the sanatorium and join those in ‘the real world’ or had they 
simply given up any hope to fit in the society which had already rejected them once? 
Dolly Ferguson placed all the characters in the novel within one ‘circle of 
cynicism’,462 where Katria, Khlonia and the anarkh represented the initial idealism of the 
revolution (“And only I, restless Don Quixote, am still in search of new illusions of new 
unknown shores”463) in contrast to cynicism and the materialistic interest of Karno and 
Maiia. The rule for the circle of cynicism is easy: “the greater his idealism, the less satisfied 
he is with his cynical era and the more prone he is to be torn between his ideals and reality. 
Conversely, the more modified his idealism, the less likely he is to give up in despair”.464 
Accordingly, Khlonia and the anarkh, incapable of compromise, took their own lives; 
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Maiia and Katria, unable to face the reality, decided for the safety of the sanatorium; 
whereas Karno embraced the decade of an absolute cynicism and eventually was set free. 
It must be admitted that Khvyl'ovyi himself could have easily become one of the 
inmates in a sanatorium not only because of his superfluous ideological convictions, but his 
mental health. The experiences of the First World War, the Revolution and the civil wars 
influenced Khvyl'ovyi’s state of mind. In the letter to Mohylians'kyi dated from June 1924, 
the writer confessed that his neurasthenia had got worsened: “fits of hysterics sometimes 
were so intense that I hit my head against the wall.”465 In other letters, Khvyl'ovyi 
mentioned his hallucinations; he continuously spoke of suicide. In his letters to Zerov, he 
spoke of his intention to take his life: “In a word, it is a Dostoevsky style, pathology, but 
there is no way I can shoot myself. I went to the field already twice but came back safe and 
sound both times: evidently I'm a big coward and good for nothing”.466 According to the 
writer, doctors found thinking dangerous for his health.467 Perhaps, these mental health 
issues had influenced the way the writer responded to the current events both in his creative 
writings and journalist contributions. 
Nonetheless, subsequently all the unsuitable revolutionaries were substituted by the 
myriads of submissive and obsequious ‘timeservers’, those philistines, bureaucrats “serving 
only to that class, which is in power”.468 The class of “respectful people” (“there was a time 
when our circle produced chaste apostles and saintly preachers”469) was transformed into a 
group of dishonourable opportunists: “now every former giant is nothing more than a nasty 
intellectual (inteligentishka), parvenu, scum who impudently bridles up and even more 
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impudently avouches ‘we’ (‘we’ to define not those who struggled, but those who are in 
‘power’)”.470 In the 1920s, those opportunists, dubbed by Daniels as rootless quasi-
intelligentsia,471 systematically took revenge on the “former” people (byvshi liudy), among 
whom one could often encounter those dissenting revolutionary romanticists. The decade-
long transformation of the Soviet society was eventually completed during the first Five-
Year Plan.  
The NEP years witnessed not only banishing of the old heroes but they also set the 
stage for a new pantheon. With the rise of bureaucracy, loyalty to the party no longer 
required idealistic sacrifices; loyalty started to be defined through unquestionable service 
and submission. Those newly promoted to power wished to gain immediate benefits rather 
than wait for a socialist utopia to come true. Stefan (Syliuety) embodied those new virtues 
and expectations. He managed easily to adapt to the new realities: his life became 
comfortable, quiet, and well-organised: office work, agitation among factory youth, 
lecturing, reading newspapers. All this he achieved because he learned how “to understand 
things profoundly”,472 that was not to dissent but to adjust to the situation. Similar 
transformation occurred to a former Ukrainian SR Shkits (Redaktor Kark). With time, Skits 
“began to dress up better, even too much”; he wished to implement socialist slogans in 
practice: “he was organising a trust and already does not speak about Ukraine, only 
sometimes, a little”.473 
In his prose, Khvyl'ovyi reflected and reported on the social developments of the 
decade, on the predominant attitudes and the atmosphere of the growing mismatch between 
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the ideals of the revolution and the post-civil war reconstruction. However, his prose can 
hardly be used as evidence of his own ideological evolution. In his letter to Mohylians'kyi 
written some time in April-May, 1924 Khvyl'ovyi critically addressed his early prose: “I 
want to share my thoughts about my second book ‘Syni Etiudy’ […] I am sure that my ‘Syni 
Etiudy’ were “out-voiced” (perekrychaly), they were not worth that great (indeed, great) 
attention. This book includes pieces that I wouldn’t have acknowledged now. Honestly, I 
am ashamed to reread such things as “Baraky, shcho za mistom” etc. This is a literary 
scandal! If I were a critic, I would have taken the book apart so that only bits and pieces 
have remained. But this is not what I’d like to say. I assume, at the time there was a need 
for those short stories, and there was a need to shout about them. But you see how I feel? 
Suddenly, I feel such a huge responsibility hanging over me and I feel my little talent will 
never be able to handle it. […] In a word: by the virtue of fate and due to the generosity of 
my critics I have become ‘the first novelist of Ukraine’, and I am confused. My vanity is 
satisfied. But my mind protests: I don’t have the right to be called this way, my literary 
merit does not live up to those critics’ opinion”.474 Obviously, even for a writer himself 
there was hardly a straight line between him a revolutionary romanticist, and his later, more 
prosaic writings. 
In 1927, Khvyl'ovyi concluded: “to my arabesques – finis”.475 This meant the end of 
his romanticism, to his characters who were full of illusions, to his anxious anticipation of 
the communist future. However, the end to his revolutionary romanticism was determined 
already in 1925, when the writer exhausted his glorification to the civil war years and 
turned to political and social essays. The prose, written during the second half of the 1920s, 
hardly resembled his previous manner and style. Khvyl'ovyi resorted to realism, writing 
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reportage-like stories, observations and political interventions. As it will be shown below, 
the growing political discord between the promoters and managers of Ukraine’s cultural 
affairs influenced Khvyl'ovyi’s evolution from creative writing to journalism and political 
interventions. By mid-1920s, the debates about the status of Soviet Ukraine, the KP(b)U 
and Soviet culture in Ukraine (as discussed in Section One) were gaining momentum and 
literature became a medium to voice political concerns against the growing centralisation of 
the Soviet leadership in the centre. 
In his prose of the late 1920s Khvyl'ovyi became highly critical. Ivan Ivanovych, a 
short story published in 1929, stands out among his later texts. In it, Khvyl'ovyi aptly 
responded to the sectarian concept of the Communist party, which it had acquired by the 
end of the decade, and its growing bureaucratisation. The story reflected the transformation 
of the communist party from a political organisation to a mere distributor and guarantor of 
its members’ status and wealth. Ivan Ivanovych is an example of a deliberate political satire 
on the whole social order as well as its implementers, who, according to Khvyl'ovyi, 
became detached from real life and existed in some parallel world where it seemed, 
communism had already triumphed. As stated by Iurii Boiko, the author “found strength to 
apprehend the Soviet reality as tragicomedy; he depicted the reality, defined by simple 
formulas, covered with masks, and [represented by] people, used on the stage of life as 
marionettes”.476 
With artificial sincerity, Khvyl'ovyi portrayed the lifestyle of an average communist 
cell leader, Ivan Ivanovych, who genuinely lived under communism, symbolically on the 
Thomas More street. Ivan Ivanovych had already witnessed the “new revolutionary 
interpretation” of a social order with asphalt on the pavements, taxis, and flowerbeds in 
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front of each house.477 He ‘courageously’ dealt with the housing crisis: Ivan Ivanovich, 
content only with four rooms, had never demanded a separate bedroom for his cook. Also, 
his financial situation was rather moderate, earning only 250 karbovanets to preserve “the 
feeling of proletarian equality”.478 To complete the picture, Ivan Ivanovych had a model 
family: his wife Comrade Halakta, “love[d] to read Lenin and Marx, though her hand [was] 
stretching involuntarily for a volume of de Maupassant”, a son with a revolutionary name 
Mai and daughter Violeta, brought up by Mademoiselle Lucy, the governess, and a cook, 
Iavdokha. 
In this ‘genuine’ communist atmosphere, Ivan Ivanovych was ardently fighting every 
day for the future of social justice. With revolutionary zeal, Ivan Ivanovych challenged 
‘reactionary’ movements and opposition within the party. Rhetorically, he questioned his 
opponents:  
What do they want from us? Is there a dictatorship of the proletariat? Yes, there is! 
Is the power in our hands? Yes, it is! Have the factories been nationalised? Yes, they 
have! Is there a Red Army? Yes, there is? Is there a Comintern? Yes, there is? […] 
Are we approaching socialism? Yes, we are! […] What else do they want? I simply 
cannot understand.479 
These were the convictions, with which party cell activists gathered to discuss a 
construction of the first Soviet republic. The party meetings were also held in some 
artificial, even surreal atmosphere. The ambience of party cell meetings contradicted 
entirely the atmosphere in which the builders of communism lived: with their shabby 
clothes, “well aware of the transitory nature of the period in which they lived”,480 in a room 
where every corner “is not just an ordinary corner but above all, a “red corner”,481 a ‘noble 
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fight for social justice’ was taking place. That time, the ordinary party cell faced the 
mission of the universal meaning: to find the one sabotaging the socialist building. 
Khvyl'ovyi lampooned this ridiculous ‘witch hunt’: while choosing between a cleaning 
woman and some party activist, the lot unexpectedly fell to a Jewish member of the cell, 
Comrade Leiter.  
The accusation was random, groundless. Hence, reversible. At the next meeting, the 
accusation of sabotage befell the former accusers. Later on, Comrade Leiter was announced 
“not a wrecker or bandit, but a devoted Communist”,482 whereas his opponents, Ivan 
Ivanovych and other members of the presidium, were forced to leave the party. Ivan 
Ivanovych found out that he had betrayed the party not through a public process or a 
hearing, but through an article in ‘Visti’ newspaper: “Betrayal of the Revolution. Clear 
betrayal. Unless the paper is lying? But I always believed in it!”483 Thus, justice became a 
sham, a whim of those who are in charge of issuing orders.  
Similar to Povist' pro Sanatoriinu Zonu, the story Ivan Ivanovych offered another 
example of a confined place. Although the characters were not restrained from the outside 
world by the sanatorium walls, the inhabitants of the Utopia were secluded from ‘the rest’ 
with only occasional interactions with their cook or a weekly travesty before a party cell 
meeting. With the help of satire, Khvyl'ovyi uncovered the pervasive corruption of the long 
anticipated social order, where suddenly every opportunist started to consider himself as 
being protected by a membership card, where the absolute truth existed on the pages of a 
party newspaper, where moral norms were irrelevant or acquired “new revolutionary 
interpretation”, where communism had already flourished, but only for the chosen few. 
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Khvyl'ovyi, with his own revolutionary experience, represented the generation of the 
1920s. It was characterised by the idealistic belief in providence as promised by the 
revolution, and the consequent complete disillusionment after these expectations were 
betrayed. Throughout the 1920s, Khvyl'ovyi was forced to gradually denounce the myth he 
himself had created: the myth of “a revolution without buttons”, of a “blue Savoy”, of an 
“intangible Commune behind the hills”. In his early prose, he provided a set of options on 
how to deal with the total disenchantment of the NEP years, caused by “Thermidorian 
bureaucracy“, degeneration of the workers’ democracy, revisited moral norms and social 
values. His revolutionary romanticists were faced with the necessity to decide either to 
accept the new reality (to compromise or to re-estimate their values and beliefs) or to 
denounce the world after the prophecy did not come true (suicide or seclusion). The writer 
also emphasised another peculiarity of his age: the power, gained through the revolutionary 
struggle by militant youth, romanticists and idealists, was appropriated by state 
functionaries, opportunists, bureaucrats and managers. Whereas those revolutionaries were 
discarded as superfluous, the new elite had already gained their Utopia with an abundance 
of goods and services, not to say a new morality. 
The tragedy of Khvyl'ovyi’s characters is that they, after having zealously dismantled 
one social order, found themselves incapable of introducing another. The social 
construction was, therefore, picked up by pragmatists, who succeeded in establishing a 
social order with only a nominal reference to popular revolutionary slogans. That new 
society appeared for its strugglers a farcical one, a parody on what they had anticipated. 
Instead of bringing the system into correspondence with their beliefs and expectations, 
social norms were re-evaluated. Hence, new ideologems and mythology were elaborated 
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stating that the prophecy, promised by the revolution, could happen only through discipline, 
obedience, loyalty and everyday toiling. 
In his early prose, Khvyl'ovyi exposed the potential of revolutionary literature in 
Ukraine. Obviously, one could not exploit themes and devices of revolutionary 
romanticism for long: the time of post-revolutionary social normalisation, economic 
recovery and political stabilisation required new themes and different attitudes, ethics and 
characters. Nevertheless, the short period, during which revolutionary romanticism 
flourished in Ukraine, brought to the fore a number of important cultural and social issues. 
Khvyl'ovyi and his followers (the Olympians, as will be discussed in the next chapter) 
adhered to high culture and works of distinct literary merit and raised the qualification 
standards for their contemporaries and future writers. Similarly, as the conflict with the 
Proletkult had proven, language became an important issue not to be neglected in literary 
works. To answer these questions, broached with the help of imaginative literature and 
exacerbated during the debates between the representatives of competing literary groups, a 
different forum was required. The Literary Discussion of 1925-1928, discussed in the next 
sub-chapter, offered different sides of the debates a required setting to voice, dispute and 
negotiate their visions of Ukrainian literature and culture.   
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2.2.2. “Ukraine or Little Russia?”: Rethinking Ukraine’s Autonomy during the 
Literary Discussion, 1925-28 
In the 1920s, as in Russia, revolutionary and proletarian literature in Ukraine manifested 
itself almost exclusively through different literary organisations, unions and groupings. 
Such institutional setting of the world of letters shifted the focus from individual 
contributions and their value to organisational structure and ideological purity, emphasising 
intergroup rivalry, rather than quality of work. The existing literary organisations in 
Ukraine presented different, often opposing, visions of proletarian and Soviet literature and 
culture. Their rivalry defined the content of the Literary Discussion of 1925-1928. The 
debates, which had had initially been concerned with cultural issues, soon shifted into the 
political domain. The main opposition was defined as “prosvita vs. Europe”, or mass 
culture vs. the elitist concept of art. 
The need to satisfy the growing expectations of the new readership was advocated by 
the first mass literary movements: the All-Ukrainian Peasant Writers’ Union Pluh (Plough), 
founded by the editor-in-chief of Kharkiv newspaper Sil's'ki Visti (Rural News) Pylypenko 
in April 1922; the Association of the Proletarian Writers Hart (Tempering), initiated by the 
editor-in-chief of the Kharkiv-based governmental newspaper Visti VUTsVK Ellan-
Blakytnyi in January 1923; and the All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers 
(VUAPP, Vseukraїns'ka Asotsiatsiia Proletars'kykh Pys'mennykiv) formed in 1924 under 
the auspices of the All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (VAPP). The concept of 
mass culture, promoted by these literary groupings, was opposed by the Ukrainian writers, 
united around Khvyl'ovyi. Already in 1923, as a protest against Hart enlargement, 
Khvyl'ovyi, Dosvitnyi and Ialovyi, the three members of Hart, the so-called “Olympians,” 
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created a faction with a symbolic name “Urbino,”484 arguing that art could not be used as a 
means of general enlightenment. This group defended the idea that literature should not be 
diminished to suit middle-brow tastes but, on the contrary, should set up certain standards 
to encourage readers to raise their preferences. 
Khvyl'ovyi was probably the most established disputant among the participants of the 
Literary Discussion. His contribution (mostly journalist style pamphlets and political 
polemics) was rather vast: three cycles of essays (Kamo Hriadeshy?485 [Quo Vadis?] 
(April–June 1925), Dumky proty Techiї486 [Thoughts against the Current] (November–
December 1925) and Apologety Pysatysmu487 [Apologists of Scribbling] (February–March 
1926); a censored pamphlet Ukraїna chy Malorossiia488 [Ukraine or Little Russia] (1926); 
single polemic articles, published in the party newspapers; and the editorials in the 
almanacs and journals Vaplite and Literaturnyi Iarmarok, Prolitfront. Khvyl'ovyi and his 
position was supported by his associates and like-minded colleagues, most importantly 
Zerov, a Kyivan poet and academic, who initiated the public debates within the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences in Kyiv.489 At the same time, these essays were written in response to 
his opponents, who mainly represented an official, party-authorised position. The most 
important of them were Khvylia, Pylypenko, and Ievhen Hirchak. The fairly complete 
bibliography of the Literary Discussion (around 600 items in total) can be found in the 
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contemporary study of the literary process in Ukraine by Leites and Iashek.490 This chapter 
examines the key concepts developed by Khvyl'ovyi with sporadic references to other sides 
in the debates.  
The Literary Discussion of 1925-28, regarded here as a process of negotiating 
different visions of Soviet Ukrainian literature, can be studied either chronologically or as a 
corpus of ideas. Luckyj, one of the first Western scholars to study the Soviet literary 
politics in Ukraine,491 defined three main phases in the debates, which corresponded to the 
changes of the party policy in literature: 1) April, 1925 – September, 1926 (the first 
ideological interchanges between Khvyl'ovyi and the party spokesmen); 2) October, 1926 – 
December, 1927 (the climax of the discussion, the use of “khvyl'ovizm” as a label, the 
activity and dissolution of the VAPLITE); 3) January, 1928 – February, 1928 (the official 
termination of the discussion). A similar chronological approach was executed by 
Shevel'ov, Khvyl'ovyi’s contemporary, a well-known Ukrainian émigré philologist and 
literary historian, who examined Khvyl'ovyi’s ideas against historical events and political 
changes in Soviet Ukraine.492 Shkandrij493 and Mace494 focused on the key concepts 
discussed by the sides of the debate. In this chapter, Khvyl'ovyi’s four main concepts: 
prosvita, proletarian art, “Europe”, and the Asiatic Renaissance, are scrutinised. They were 
first introduced in Kamo Hriadeshy? and had by 1926 given rise to a theory of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and messianism. 
Before analysing Khvyl'ovyi’s pamphlets that were written during the period, it is 
important to note that Khvyl'ovyi’s ideas can hardly be studied as a coherent system or 
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well-elaborated theory. His pamphlets are hermetic, often with breaks in logic. The 
pamphlets are rich with free-flowing ideas and highly charged emotional images, which, at 
times, are hard to understand without a reference to current literary debates, existing 
intellectual tradition or Khvyl'ovyi’s broader views. Khvyl'ovyi developed his argument 
while writing the essays and in response to the critics; hence, the definition of his central 
images was not comprehensive and was changing over time. The pamphlets offered 
allusions to Khvyl'ovyi’s prose; it seems that the writer was using different means to 
communicate ideas, which had preoccupied him since the early twenties. So, his pamphlets 
did not depart much from literature, same as his prose contained important political 
messages in them (especially the novel Val'dshnepy [The Woodcocks], 1927). At times, it 
seems as if the author was more preoccupied with the style and the language of his essays 
than with coherence and logic of his arguments. In general, Khvyl'ovyi’s pamphlets are of 
their time and should be read with the awareness of their historical context.495 
The three cycles of pamphlets, published in mainstream periodicals in 1925-1926, 
received wide recognition and initiated a broad discussion about the prospects of artistic 
orientation, quality of literature, audience for the new Soviet culture, cultural and national 
developments, and conflicts underlying Russian-Ukrainian relations. Khvyl'ovyi, with his 
peculiar manner, sophisticated language and rich references to world cultural heritage, 
engaged the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia. According to one Kyivan critic, “The 
impression, after Khvyl'ovyi’s article, was as if in the room so stuffy that breathing was 
difficult, the windows had suddenly been opened, and the lungs felt the air again”.496 Also, 
the ideas of Khvyl'ovyi’s pamphlets reflected the zeitgeist of the 1920s with its on-going 
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negotiations about the amount of autonomy Ukraine could have within the Soviet Union. 
The public debates, initiated by Khvyl'ovyi, continued incessantly for almost three years. 
 
“Prosvita”: Proletarian Writers and their Readers 
The Literary Discussion, the most significant intellectual development of the 1920s, began 
with the squib written by Hryts'ko Iakovenko entitled “On Critics and Criticism in 
Literature” published in Kul'tura i Pobut (Culture and Daily life), a literary supplement to 
governmental newspaper Visti VUTSVK on 30 April 1925. Iakovenko, a Pluh writer, whose 
short story was rejected for a literary competition, accused Khvyl'ovyi and other “grey-
haired Olympians” in restricting young writers with “a proper social origin” to enter 
literature. He used Khvyl'ovyi’s short story Ia (Romantyka) as an example of literature, 
which could only be read by “philistines and degenerates, for whom the revolution was an 
example of acute spiritual sadism”.497 Instead, he argued, that literature should be easily 
understood by everyone: “proletarian literature ought to be elementary and simple, but 
healthy and useful.”498 In the same issue of Kul'tura i Pobut, a reply by Khvyl'ovyi was 
published. His “First Letter to Literary Youth” (“On ‘Satan in a Barrel,’ Graphomaniacs, 
Speculators and Other Prosvita Types”) initiated a long debate between Khvyl'ovyi and his 
associates and their opponents, representing an official party-authorised position. 
The main disagreement between Iakovenko and Khvyl'ovyi was about the definition 
of proletarian literature. Through Iakovenko, Khvyl'ovyi attacked the rhetoric of the 
Russian literary group October (Oktiabr'), which was gaining ground in the Ukrainian 
letters. The Octobrists, a splinter group of Russian writers formed in 1922, aimed at 
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“strengthening the Communist line in proletarian literature”, and included irreconcilable 
attitudes towards fellow travellers and cultivation of literature with limited intellectual 
horizon.499 The association of the peasant writers Pluh copied the main standpoints of 
Oktiabr' in its platform and promoted them in Ukraine.500 Hence, throughout the debate 
Khvyl'ovyi was tackling the all-Union processes of realigning the forces in literature. It 
would be wrong, however, to deny the uniqueness of the Literary Discussion in Ukraine: 
during this last free debate both cultural and political, and especially national, questions 
were raised. 
The first cycle of pamphlets, Kamo Hriadeshy?, published in April–June 1925, was 
concerned mostly with the question of orientation of Ukrainian proletarian literature. In this 
cycle, four main images, widely elaborated later, were sketched. The first image was 
prosvita, the name of the nineteenth-century enlightenment societies, which were used after 
the revolution for providing basic political education and literacy campaigns. In addition, 
prosvity became centres for propaganda work and nurturing future proletarian writers and 
readers. Khvyl'ovyi openly rejected this interference into literary process. For him, 
‘prosvita’ was primarily a psychological category, referring to provincialism, parochial and 
utilitarian attitude towards literature, exemplified in hackwork and mass culture. Prosvity 
were set against high culture and ‘academism’, ‘Olympus’ in Khvyl'ovyi’s vocabulary. This 
opposition also applied to understanding creative writing (a gift or a skill); a writer (a 
talented individual with his own worldview or a trained one, prepared to reproduce ready-
made plots); and a reader (is literature meant to entertain and reflect the objective reality or 
to inspire?). In theory, this dichotomy should not exhaust the options available for readers. 
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During the Soviet twenties, however, literature acquired two-fold meaning: either as a form 
of creative activity (hence, autonomous) or a reflection of the political agenda 
(zaangazhovana (engaged) literature). Khvyl'ovyi relied on the distinction between social 
usefulness and party-mindedness to judge on the quality of literature.  
Nonetheless, Khvyl'ovyi had an elitist approach to art: he called for literature written 
for intelligent readers, and not for semi-educated peasants and newly promoted workers. 
The issue here was about the standards of literary work; Khvyl'ovyi contested demands to 
lower the standards in order to engage the mass audience. Instead, the latter became the 
main focus group of Pluh and Hart. Pluh envisaged creating mass literature using “the 
greatest simplicity and economy of artistic methods.”501 Pylypenko, the Pluh leader, 
enumerated the key components of mass culture in his article “Nashi ‘hrikhy’” [Our ‘sins’], 
published in Pluzhanyn in 1926. These were: orientation towards mass readership; a simple 
and accessible style and language; common topics; priority of content over form; and 
frequent engagement with the readers. In general, literature was regarded as a mass 
movement, composed of “literary forces, from the highest in their quality and talent to the 
lowest, to robsil'kory [worker and peasant correspondents], to contributors to wall 
newspaper and handwritten journals.”502 In contrast, Khvyl'ovyi advocated for “the new art 
[…] created by workers and peasants. On condition, however, that they will be 
intellectually developed, talented, people of genius.”503 
Undoubtedly, the proliferation of prosvity became a by-product of the revolution, 
which had destroyed the established social structures and brought to the fore the lowest as 
well as the least educated social groups. In addition, Ukrainizatsiia exposed a shortage of 
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educated Ukrainian speakers and gave way into literature to writers with little or no 
talent.504 The prosvita-type organisations (such as Pluh and Hart) embraced this post-
revolutionary egalitarianism and encouraged those social activists to learn how to create 
literature. For Khvyl'ovyi, however, these ‘writers’ were nothing more than “pen-
pushers”,505 who called literature “a sign outside the State Publishing House, the aphorism 
on a fence, and the verse on the toilet wall”.506 Against the mainstream developments of the 
age, Khvyl'ovyi defended the idea of a hierarchy, which should be based not on the class, 
but on the level of education and culture. For him, proletarian literature was meant to 
elevate and challenge its readers, but not to descend to mass tastes and appetites. 
‘Proletarian’ literature for Khvyl'ovyi, same as for party officials, meant literature written 
for the working class audience, proletarian in its spirit. However, Khvyl'ovyi had a rather 
idealist vision of the proletariat: highly educated, politically engaged and nationally aware. 
Khvyl'ovyi concluded that the idea of proletarian art was misinterpreted and misused by 
mass literary organisations. So, he attempted to redefine the concept and to draft a program 
of a new literary organisation, tasked not only with promoting revolutionary values, but 
also with creating the environment for young talented writers to produce literary works of 
high-quality. The members of the new literary organisation were supposed to confront 
numerous pseudo-proletarian writers, dubbed by Khvyl'ovyi as ‘red graphomaniacs’. The 
vision of the new literary organisation was further elaborated in the second cycle of essays, 
Dumky proty Techiї (November-December 1925). The organisation was envisaged to 
encourage: 
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novel Misto (1928). 
505 Khvylovy, Quo Vadis, 53. 
506 Khvylovy, Thoughts against the Current, 109. 
  
194 
 
the concentration of creative individuals (critics, publicistic critics, creative writers) who 
would on the one hand satisfy the now rising demands of the worker-peasant masses, and 
whose distinct and clearly visible ranks would on the other hand be capable of counterpoising 
the new world-view of a young class to the old ideology of art.507 
This vision was realised through VAPLITE, the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature 
(Vil'na Akademiia Proletars'koї Literatury), formed in October 1925.508 Khvyl'ovyi was a 
leader of the Academy, the writer Ialovyi (replaced later by a playwright Kulish) was 
elected its President, and Arkadii Liubchenko became a secretary. According to the 
resolution of the first meeting, the organisation aimed “to unite qualified writers […] with a 
[common] ideological basis, while retaining wide autonomy as far as their literary work is 
concerned.”509 In general, the new literary organisation defended the quality of artistic 
activity. According to Khvyl'ovyi, VAPLITE’s mission was to revive artistic criteria, to 
replace the principle ‘give me quantity” by “let’s go for quality”.510 The Academy 
published a literary almanac Vaplite (1926) and a literary journal VAPLITE, five issues of 
which appeared in 1927. On its pages, prose and poetry appeared alongside critical studies, 
book reviews, political and social essays. 
 
“Europe”: the Question of Artistic Orientation 
The call to orientate Ukraine’s art to Western European art, its style and techniques, 
advanced by Khvyl'ovyi in 1925, became, perhaps, the most debatable one. However, the 
idea of Western orientation of Ukrainian culture was not new. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, an independent tradition had been developed, which was based on close ties with 
Western art bypassing Russian mediation. The close relationship between Dnieper and 
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Western Ukraine exposed national art to Polish and Austrian influences. Already in the 
works of Modernist artists one can find reminiscences to predominant European themes 
and style. Also, by the 1920s, due to considerable independent travel and study abroad, 
Ukrainian artists had become rather well acquainted with Europe. For instance, the 
founders of the Ukrainian Avant-Garde, Vasyl' Iermilov, Alexander Bogomazov, Kazimir 
Malevich, David Burliuk, Vladimir Tatlin, and Aleksandra Ekster, who were either by 
birth, education, national tradition or identity connected to Kyiv, as well as Kharkiv, L'viv, 
and Odesa, had been trained and maintained their own studios in different European cities. 
The most famous Ukrainian theatre director of the 1920s Les' [Oleksandr] Kurbas, who was 
influenced by the experimentalism during his studies in Vienna, introduced Western 
traditions into national theatre. Moreover, the Ukrainian Commissariat for Education in the 
second half of the 1920s initiated a campaign to entice émigrés, such as Tatlin, Vasyl' 
Kasiian, and Malevich, to return to Soviet Ukraine.  
It should be admitted that in Ukraine there was a strong intellectual tradition in 
opposing Russian cultural dominance. Before the First World War, there were three 
dominant cultural attitudes: 1) an ambivalent “Little Russia” approach (regarding 
Ukrainians as “little Russians” and Ukraine as a part of Great Russia); 2) search for modus 
vivendi with the progressive side of Russian culture; and 3) cultural nationalism calling for 
complete break from Ukrainian subordinate status. These attitudes had deep roots in 
Ukrainian history and cultural tradition. The first tradition was represented by a Ukrainian-
born Russian writer Nikolai Gogol’ (1809-1852), who in his numerous literary works 
cemented Ukrainian provincialism and its submission to the Great Russian imperial culture 
and its standards. The second camp, led by a Ukrainian philosopher Mykhailo Drahomanov 
(1841-1895), believed in a nationally unbiased imperial Pan-Russian culture, under whose 
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umbrella local Ukrainian and Russian cultures could be developed. On the other hand, the 
third camp, initiated by the activity of a literary journalist, historian and academician 
Iefremov (1876-1939), advocated a complete divorce from Russian imperial culture. This 
approach in 1917 evolved into “cultural nationalism” proclaiming that Russian culture was 
no longer the intellectual currency for Ukrainians.511 Hence, Khvyl'ovyi continued the 
tradition of cultural nationalism in Ukrainian intellectual history, albeit he enhanced it with 
the Marxist dialectics. 
Thus, Khvyl'ovyi’s audacious statement of “storming Europe!”512 expressed in one of 
his pamphlets, was not without a sound basis. Khvyl'ovyi and his fellows had the first-hand 
knowledge of what Europe could offer to the young Soviet Ukrainian republic and its 
cultural development. Nonetheless, Khvyl'ovyi’s concept of ‘Europe’ was hard to define. In 
the first cycle of pamphlets, ‘Europe’ was simply associated with high standards of artistic 
work and set against torrents of low-quality literature, which had inundated the republic’s 
bookstores and libraries during the 1920s. The concept of ‘psychological Europe’ was used 
to counterweight provincialism and epigone art, initiated by the prosvity: 
Europe is the experience of many ages. It is not the Europe that Spengler announced “in 
decline”, not the one that is rotting and which we despise. It is the Europe of a grandiose 
civilisation, the Europe of Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx and so on and so forth.513 
Einsteins, both great and small, are Europeans, and half-baked professors are prosvita-
types.514 
In Dumky proty Techiї, Khvyl'ovyi added further definitions to ‘Europe’:  
You ask: “Which Europe?” Take whichever you like, ‘past or present, bourgeois or 
proletarian, eternal or ever-changing’. Because, to be sure, Hamlets, Don Juans or Tartuffes 
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existed in the past, but they also exist today, they used to be bourgeois, but they are also 
proletarian, you can consider them ‘eternal,’ but they will be ‘ever-changing’.515 
His understanding of ‘psychological Europe’ was not bound to a political system or 
geographical borders. Instead, ‘Europe’ was defined through certain qualities, the total of 
which contributed to the creation of a “grandiose civilisation,” as Europe was regarded. 
This advance was attributed to, firstly: 
the ideal of a civic person, who over the course of many ages has perfected his biological, or 
more accurately his psycho-physiological nature, and who is the property of all classes.516 
The second constituent of ‘psychological Europe’ was an intellectual one as such and the 
value attached to any intellectual activity, as said: 
this is the European intelligent in the best sense of the word. This, if you like, is the sorcerer 
from Wüttemberg who revealed a grandiose civilization to us and opened up limitless vistas 
to our gaze. This is Doctor Faustus, if we conceive of the latter as the inquisitive human 
spirit. 517 
Khvyl'ovyi’s ‘Europe’ was clearly an elitist idea, addressed to those well-aware of 
European intellectual tradition and Western culture. While defining the concept, Khvyl'ovyi 
constantly polemicised with the German philosopher Oswald Spengler and his vision of 
“Europe in decline”. He did not agree with Spengler’s definition of the third cycle of 
cultural development (European-Faustian). For the writer, Europe was the Faustian 
civilisation per se, and “the inquisitive human spirit” was “the property of all classes” and 
all cultural types. Similarly, the pamphlets have abundant references to Sturm und Drang, 
the German late eighteenth-century literary movement, inspired by J. G. Herder and led by 
Goethe. In addition, he alluded to Nietzsche and Wagner. His readers were meant to follow 
his free flow of thoughts and be comfortable with all the references and allusions. 
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Obviously, Khvyl'ovyi’s pamphlets were not targeted at laymen. It was directed 
towards both young intellectuals and the old-line intelligentsia. His image of ‘Europe’ 
became associated with Zerov, the literary critic, a translator of the ancients and an 
outstanding poet. The reference to a particular individual quickly became an abstract idea 
by the use of the plural “Zerovs”, meaning those intellectuals, who resembled the Western 
type of an intellectual: 
[…] we have to use our Zerovs not only for their technical skills, but also in their 
psychological dimension. The single, at first glance insignificant (and, in the opinion 
of some, counter-revolutionary) fact – that they are so resolutely going “against the 
current” in translating the Romans, gives us the right to view them as real 
Europeans.518  
Khvyl'ovyi was well aware of Ukraine’s backwardness. He linked it primarily to the lack of 
a Faustian activist attitude, of that ‘inquisitive human spirit’. He often defined Ukraine as a 
‘Khokhliandia’ (from ‘khokhol’, an exonym to denominate Ukrainians, which dates back to 
the 17th century), ‘classic country of cultural epigonism’, of ‘servile psychology,’519 which 
kept producing ‘a sluggish artist 
capable only of repeating what has already been gone before, of aping. He simply cannot 
grasp that a nation can express its cultural potential only if it discovers its own particular path 
of development. He cannot grasp this, because he is afraid to dare!520 
Eventually, in the most explosive third cycle of pamphlets Apologety Pysarysmu, he openly 
attacked Russian chauvinism and its unfavourable influence on Ukraine as reasons for such 
adverse state of affairs. Still, the writer attempted to separate culture from politics: “one 
should not confuse our political union with literature”.521 His primary concern was how to 
make new Soviet Ukrainian literature original, self-sufficient and independent from the 
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‘Russian conductor’.522 His non-political attitude was, of course, a matter of perspective. 
For the central party leadership, communist Khvyl'ovyi was definitely crossing the line and 
it was simply a matter of time when it would be subdued. 
Khvyl'ovyi questioned: “by which of the world’s literatures should we set our 
course?” and immediately provided a definite and unconditional answer: “On no account by 
the Russian. [...] Ukrainian poetry must flee as quickly as possible from Russian literature 
and its styles.”523 His determination was caused by a number of factors, the combination of 
which made cultural orientation towards Moscow detrimental for the new Soviet Ukrainian 
culture. He admitted the high quality of Russian great literature, but rejected it being a 
mediator for Ukrainian literature in its evolution.524 First of all, as believed, there was 
nothing to learn for young Ukrainian writers from their Russian fellows. Russian great 
literature, written during the nineteenth century, according to Khvyl'ovyi, had no examples 
of an active citizen. A “passive pessimism,” claimed to be an inherent feature of the 
Russian classics, led to producing “cadres of ‘superfluous people’, or to put it simply 
parasites, ‘dreamers’, people ‘without any given responsibility’, ‘whimperers’, ‘grey little 
people’ of the ‘twentieth rank’.”525 Russian literature had already reached its golden age in 
times of “feeble nobility” and feudalism. So, it had approached its limits and stopped on a 
cross-road. Hence, “Death to Dostoevskism! Up with the cultural renaissance!”526 
Similarly, Russian proletarian literature had nothing to offer. For the writer, Moscow 
was a centre of “all-Union Philistinism” that “essentially never saw the October revolution 
                                                 
522 Khvylovy, Apologists of Scribbling, 222. 
523 Ibid, 222. 
524 Ibid, 317. 
525 Khvylovy, Ukraine or Little Russia, 229. 
526 Khvylovy, Apologists of Scribbling, 223-224. 
  
200 
 
and its heroic struggle.”527 Moscow, a new Soviet capital, for Khvyl'ovyi was a centre of 
bureaucracy and perverted revolutionary slogans. Since the new proletarian ethos was 
borrowed, Russian literature was unable to kindle the belief in the ‘commune behind the 
hill’. Overall, Khvyl'ovyi was extremely critical of the Russian Proletkult-type writers (the 
Smithy (Kuznitsa) and the Octobrists, and the Na Postu circle), for whom Soviet Ukraine 
was a mere province of Russia. He opposed the dominant Russian (and often Ukrainian) 
perspective that Ukrainian literature was subservient and hence could not be original. In 
fact, Khvyl'ovyi was tackling, as defined in his pamphlets, the colonial condition of 
Ukraine, exposed at around the same time in economic matters by Volobuiev and in 
political sphere by Shums'kyi. 
For this reason, the relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian writers often 
acquired political undertones. For instance, Khvyl'ovyi took any comparison of Ukrainian 
writers to the Russian ones painfully. Khvyl'ovyi was well aware of the fact that he himself 
was often called a “Ukrainian Pil'niak”. However, he detested this comparison not because 
of Pil'niak’s merit, whose early prose he admired (“where in each line one can see an 
artist”528), but due to the suggested subordinate status of Soviet Ukrainian literature, as seen 
from the Moscow perspective. The visit of Pil'niak to the capital of Soviet Ukraine in 
March 1924 could serve as the best example of how tense the literary liaisons between the 
two Soviet republics were. The literary evening was organised to show both the “urban 
(mishchans'ka) intelligentsia, defined as ‘the patron of the genuine Russian culture’, and to 
Pil'niak that Kharkiv was not a Russian (russkaia) province but a capital of the Soviet 
Ukrainian Republic. The literary evening concluded with a scandal. The Ukrainian writers 
did not appreciate the prose of Pil'niak, presented at the evening. Consequently, Khvyl'ovyi 
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published a scathing review on the event in the literary supplement to Visti VUTsVK, 
calling Pil'niak “a bard of the moribund noble estate”.529 In a private letter to 
Mohylians'kyi, Khvyl'ovyi stated that Kharkiv writers took a militant stand against all “the 
brazen fellows Mayakovskys, who claim that ‘There is no Ukrainian literature’ […] all the 
dandies from the Moscow bohemia”.530 
Khvyl'ovyi believed that the revolution had initiated a distinct current in Ukrainian 
literature, which took a completely separate path from Russian literature. What was 
lacking, however, is civic values offered by the European civilisation. Such re-orientation 
from Russian patterns towards Western techniques and manners was conditional. 
Khvyl'ovyi did not just want to change “the conductor” for young Ukrainian literature; his 
idea was to adopt only those characteristics, which were in short supply among Ukrainians 
(namely an active citizen, value of intellect, intellectual activity, and civil society) and to 
enhance them with romantic vitaism, the current he and his followers had been perfecting. 
His idea was as follows:  
When we steer our course toward Western European literature, it is not with the goal of yoking our 
art to some other wagon bringing up the rear, but with the aim of reviving it after the asphyxiating 
atmosphere of backwardness. We will travel to Europe to study, but with a secret idea – after several 
years to burn with an extraordinary flame.531 
Overall, the pamphlets challenged the intelligent readers and made no concessions to the 
ignorant ones. This elitist perspective, however, ran counter to the main social 
developments and political interests of the time. Khvyl'ovyi denounced the democratisation 
of the Soviet culture, which came hand-in-hand with accommodating mass audience and 
middle-brow tastes. Indeed, the criticism against Khvyl'ovyi exposed the narrow-
mindedness of the majority of Ukraine’s politicians and literary activists, who did not want 
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to be taught or challenged by another “grey-haired old man” and “Olympians”.532 Needless 
to say, an approach elaborated by the card-carrying communist Khvyl'ovyi in the 1920s 
was bizarre, to say the least, within Soviet ideological framework of the time. With the 
course on industrialisation, adopted in 1925, literature was slowly becoming subordinate to 
this envisaged grand social and economic transformation. This view could not tolerate the 
elitist understanding of art, so ardently advocated by Khvyl'ovyi and other Vaplitians. 
The public campaign against Khvyl'ovyi and his supporters exposed the unbridgeable 
differences between the promoters of elitist and mass conceptions of Soviet culture. The 
main concern of the debate was the social role of literature: should art be subordinated to 
political imperatives and be didactic and useful, or should it merely be imagination’s 
plaything, detached from social conditions? A letter from the Kharkiv Institute of Public 
Education (formerly Kharkiv University) dated from May 1925 condemned Khvyl'ovyi’s 
“unpatriotic orientation on literary standards set by Western Europe”. Instead of highbrow 
writing and elitist literature, the Kharkiv Institute’s staff called for “a mass literature 
accessible to and so badly required by workers”.533 A similar opinion was voiced by the 
members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kyiv. On 24 May 1925 the public 
discussion “Paths for the Development of Contemporary Literature” was hosted by this 
authoritative scientific institution. One of the questions submitted was: “Which Europe 
does Khvyl'ovyi want to follow?” The critique was overwhelming; Khvyl'ovyi was accused 
of advocating ‘bourgeois, philistine, and hostile to the goals of Communism’ Europe. As 
one participant questioned: “Should one prefer the Tarzan novel of Edgar Rice Burroughs 
to the poetry of Mayakovsky?”534 
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Among Ukraine’s intellectuals, however, there were those who supported 
Khvyl'ovyi’s stance. Zerov made an attempt to deprive Khvyl'ovyi’s images of political 
implications. According to the literary critic, ‘Europe’ in Khvyl'ovyi’s approach was 
nothing more than a strong cultural tradition. From this point of view, the opposition of 
‘Europe vs. Prosvita’ was framed as kul'tura vs. khaltura, a culture of lasting values vs. 
hackwork.535 In one of his essays, Zerov observed: 
In our literary life there is still very little real culture, little knowledge, little 
education, while our scholarship is at a disadvantage. […] Khvyl'ovyi is right. A 
young writer must get rid of his illiteracy in the field in which he wishes to work. 
[…] Such self-education will be the first step to what Khvyl'ovyi called ‘Europe’. 
We can conquer Europe only when we make their achievement our own”536 
Indeed, Khvyl'ovyi’s abstract idea of ‘Europe’ corresponded to a set of values, which 
would be indisputable in any other social order. The value of education, intellectuality, 
high-quality culture, social activism could only be opposed in a society that had 
experienced and legitimised the revolt of the masses.537 To a certain extent, Khvyl'ovyi was 
a provocateur. Unsurprisingly, his ‘Europe’ was attacked from all sides. Firstly, those least 
educated party members and workers, brought to the fore by the revolution and whose 
status was codified by the Soviet promotion campaigns and nationalities projects, could not 
accept Khvyl'ovyi’s demands. Similarly, his non-political idea of “psychological Europe” 
was doomed by its ideological connotations: one could not expect that the opposition 
‘Moscow vs. Europe’ would not gain political sounding in a country whose entire existence 
was based on this dichotomy. In the end, Khvyl'ovyi, could reflect the position of only a 
minority of the Ukrainian old-line intelligentsia and artists, dedicated to creating high-brow 
culture for the elite and by the elite. Khvyl'ovyi continuously emphasised that his idea of 
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proletarian literature was based not on the class origin or ideology of writers, but on their 
skills and artistic potential. As he explained, “the Soviet inteligent Zerov, who is armed 
with the higher mathematics of art is – hyperbolically speaking – a million times more 
useful than a hundred prosvita-types, who are about as well versed in this art as a pig in 
orange-growing.538 Nonetheless, these single inteligenty could hardly compete with the 
predominance of mass culture, gaining ground in the second half of the 1920s. This 
incompatibility doomed any prospects of a different Soviet literature in Ukraine. 
 
“Asiatic Renaissance”: Ukrainian Messianism 
Another image introduced in Kamo Hriadeshy? was ‘Asiatic renaissance’. This was the 
most illogical and emotional concept, to which the polemicist recurred constantly in all his 
pamphlets. In general terms, Khvyl'ovyi developed the concept of the ‘Asiatic renaissance’ 
as a response to Spengler’s vision of “Europe in decline”. The Ukrainian theorist made a 
daring attempt to challenge Spengler’s theory of three cycles in cultural development (the 
Ancient-Apollonian, the Arab-Magic, and the European-Faustian) and enhance them with 
Marxist principles of causality and historic materialism, adding the fourth, “proletarian” 
cultural-historical type.539 Khvyl'ovyi seconded Spengler that Europe, which had produced 
“feudal” and “bourgeois” cultural types, had exhausted its powers and hence could not 
produce the fourth, “proletarian” cycle. Thus, Khvyl'ovyi agreed with Spengler that Europe 
approached its decline “not, however, as the Faustian culture but as the bourgeois type.”540 
The fourth cultural type, according to Khvyl'ovyi, was to be initiated in Asia, where 
another human energy had started to grow: ‘the yellow peril,’ “symbolising the real force 
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which will solve the problem of Communist society.”541 Attention to Asian countries, 
considered able to approach worldwide socialism was not new. The role of national 
liberation movements in destroying imperialism and capitalism had already been brought 
up by orthodox Marxists and partially implemented by the Comintern.542 Khvyl'ovyi, in 
turn, offered an approach of cultural decolonisation. Hence, the awakening of European 
creative energy was bounded to cultural ‘Asiatic Renaissance’. In the long run, he 
anticipated “the future unheard-of flowering of art among such nations as China, India, and 
so forth [...] because Asia, realising that only Communism will liberate it from economic 
slavery, will utilise art as a factor in the battle.”543 
In the short run, however, Asiatic renaissance was meant to be triggered by the 
cultural revival in the Soviet Union. Khvyl'ovyi predicted that the “mysterious country that 
will solve the great world problem” already existed within the borders of the Soviet Union, 
the first and the only country of ‘victorious socialism.’ Khvyl'ovyi obviously was well-
aware of the Russian intellectual current of Eurasianism, which he, however, treated rather 
flexibly, same as the ideas of Spengler, Lenin or Marx. It is noteworthy that Khvyl'ovyi 
assigned an exceptional part in disclosing this great Asiatic potential to Soviet Ukraine. He 
explained: 
In the fact the spiritual culture of Bolshevism can only express itself clearly in the young Soviet 
republics and in the first place under the azure skies of the South-Eastern republic of the Communes, 
which has always been an arena of civil strife and which has raised on its luxuriant steppes the type 
of the revolutionary conquistador. […] Inasmuch as Eurasia [surprisingly often used by the writer as 
a synonym for Soviet Ukraine] stands on the boundary of two great territories, of two energies, the 
avant-garde of the fourth cultural-historical type is constituted by us.544 
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The new art that Europe is awaiting will issue from the South-Eastern republic of the communes, 
from none other than Soviet Ukraine.545 
The messianic role of Ukraine, as predicted by Khvyl'ovyi, suggests at least one main 
question: why Russia, the country which possessed the same necessary attributes as 
Ukraine, was unable to spark this great cultural revival of the West? For contemporaries, 
the reason was irrational, Khvyl'ovyi simply did not like Russia,546 which he once defined 
“the old mother Kaluga”.547 Khvyl'ovyi’s partiality was well-known. In one of the reviews, 
Skrypnyk provocatively asked: “Is he [Khvyl'ovyi] against Russian literary trends and their 
forms because the latter are bad or because they are Russian?”548 Clearly, Khvyl'ovyi’s 
argumentation did not stand up to criticism and rational explanation. 
Khvyl'ovyi bound the messianic role of Ukraine with the optimistic belief in the 
grand potential of Soviet Ukrainian literature and the new proletarian elites in Ukraine. As 
mentioned above, he was sceptical about the potential of Russian Soviet literature, which 
itself could “only find the magical balm for its revival beneath the luxuriant, vital tree of 
the renaissance of young national republics, in the atmosphere of the springtime of once 
oppressed nations”.549 So, 
Romantic vitaism [...] is the art of the first period of the Asiatic renaissance. From Ukraine it 
must flow forth to all parts of the world and play there not a local, limited role but one of the 
significance for humanity in general.550 
Another question, which suggests itself, however, is whether in Ukraine in 1926 there were 
any prerequisites to claim such predestination. Khvyl'ovyi somewhat optimistically 
believed that all the necessary components for Soviet Ukraine to steer the process of world 
socialist liberation were about to be in place. Firstly, he believed in the potential of the new 
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Ukrainian proletarian intelligentsia. Similarly to the idea of the Geniezeit (the Age of 
Genius), developed by the Sturm und Drang group,551 Khvyl'ovyi entrusted this task to 
numerous ‘rebellious geniuses’ (m''iatezhni heniï), who went through the revolution and the 
civil wars and used their first-hand experience to create world class literature. The group of 
talented Ukrainian proletarian writers, the Olympians, had already gathered around 
Khvyl'ovyi in the VAPLITE. Khvyl'ovyi explained:  
the powerful Asiatic renaissance in art is approaching and its forerunners are we, the 
‘Olympians.’ Just as Petrarch, Michelangelo, Raphael and others in their time from a tiny 
corner of Italy set Europe afire with the flame of the Renaissance, in the same way the new 
artists from the once oppressed Asiatic countries, the new artistic-communards who are 
travelling with us will climb the peak of Mount Helicon and place there the lamp of 
renaissance, and, under the distant thunder of fighting on the barricades, it will cast the light 
of its fiery purple-blue pentangle over the dark European night.552 
The Vaplitians were to break the centuries-old provincialism of Ukrainian culture and 
initiate the new civilizational cycle, the “proletarian” cultural-historical type. The new 
cultural and political elites and promoters of a distinct Soviet Ukrainian literature were 
tasked to spread the new ethos among Ukraine’s workers. Unfortunately, the VAPLITE 
with its scant membership, personally selected by Khvyl'ovyi,553 could hardly compete for 
the minds of Ukraine’s working class with such mass literary organisations as Pluh and 
VUSPP (All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers (Vseukraїns'ka Spilka Proletars'kyh 
Pys'mennykiv, 1927-1932), who had also secured the support of the establishment. 
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Ukraine or Little Russia: the Political Dimension of the Debate 
With every new cycle of pamphlets, Khvyl'ovyi’s views were becoming more political. 
Already in Apolohety Pysaryzmu, the underlying question of causes for Ukraine’s cultural 
backwardness assumed a political aspect. The question became explicit: whether any 
independent cultural policy in Ukraine was possible while the republic remained politically 
and economically tied to Russia? The last essay of Apolohety Pysaryzmu ‘Moscow’s 
Zadrypanky’ (March 1926), contained an open demand for political autonomy. Khvyl'ovyi 
developed his views in line with the demands of national communists and those KP(b)U 
members who belonged to what was defined as “a separatist Ukrainian horizon”. Hence, 
the politicisation of the literary debate in the beginning of 1926 reflected the aggravation of 
the power struggle between local and central elites and within them. Khvyl'ovyi’s open 
attacks against Russian domination and Ukraine’s subordinate status should be read in line 
with the campaign against Shums'kyi and the conclusions drawn by Volobuiev about the 
economic exploitation of Ukraine (see Section One). Khvyl'ovyi summarised: 
Of course, the development of culture is “dictated by economic relations.” But the point is precisely 
that these relations are not at all “the same in both countries.” […] In a word, the Union nevertheless 
remains a Union and Ukraine is an independent entity. [...] Under the influence of our economy, we 
are applying to our literature not ‘the Slavophile theory of originality,’ but the theory of Communist 
independence. [...] Is Russia an independent state? It is! Well, in that case we too are 
independent.”554 
Later on, Khvyl'ovyi deplored Moscow’s patronising attitude, worded in the dichotomy, 
“Ukraїna chy Malorosiia” [Ukraine or Little Russia]. He pinned his hopes on those young 
communists and state functionaries, who would be “first communards and then 
Ukrainians”, who would challenge Ukraine’s subordinate status and its colonial condition. 
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In his censored pamphlet Ukraїna chy Malorosiia (written in summer 1926), Khvyl'ovyi 
concluded: 
We are indeed an independent state whose republican organism is a part of the Soviet Union. And 
Ukraine is independent not because we, communists, desire this, but because the iron and irresistible 
will of the laws of history demands it, because only in this way shall we hasten class differentiation 
in Ukraine. […] To gloss over independence with a hollow pseudo-Marxism is to fail to understand 
that Ukraine will continue to be an arena for counter-revolution as long as it does not pass through 
the natural stage that Western Europe went through during the formation of nation-states.555 
Primarily, the writer appealed that the national question was not solved in the Soviet Union. 
Soviet Ukraine, perhaps similar to other republics, continued to suffer from Russian 
chauvinism. These blames were directed towards the implementers of the korenizatsiia 
policy, adopted in 1923 ostensibly to fight both the Great-Russian chauvinism as well as 
any manifestations of local nationalism.556 Not surprisingly, the views of Khvyl'ovyi, the 
writer, were likened to those of Shums'kyi, the politician. They were both addressed in the 
letter of Stalin to Kaganovich (26 April 1926). A significant part of the letter, which was 
mainly concerned with the errors of the Commissar for Education Shums'kyi, was devoted 
to the pamphlets of “a noted Communist” Khvyl'ovyi. Stalin pedantically went through 
Khvyl'ovyi’s three cycles of pamphlets (Kamo Hriadeshy, Dumky proty Techiї and 
Apolohety Pysarysmu), highlighting the ideas of distancing Ukrainian literature from 
Russian literature and style, promoting a messianic role of Ukrainian intelligentsia, and 
‘non-Marxist attempts’ to divorce culture from politics. The letter read: 
At a time when the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are in 
sympathy with ‘Moscow,’ this citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of 
Leninism, at a time when the proletarians of Western Europe look with admiration at the flag 
that flies over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvilevoy has nothing better to say in 
favour of ‘Moscow’ than to call on the Ukrainian leaders to get away from ‘Moscow’ ‘as fast 
as possible’. And that is called internationalism! What is to be said of other Ukrainian 
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intellectuals, those of the non-communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only to 
talk but even to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Khvilevoy?557 
The authorities feared the influence of Khvyl'ovyi on Ukraine’s artistic circles. Hence, the 
campaign persisted. In the article published in the newspaper Komunist on 30 May 1926, 
the head of the Ukrainian Radnarkom Chubar attacked Khvyl'ovyi for his views. Further 
on, Khvyl'ovyi was reproached numerously at the June 1926 TsK KP(b)U Plenum, 
dedicated to discussing the results of Ukrainizatsiia. The Thesis on the Results of 
Ukrainizatsiia read: “The slogans of orienting towards Europe, “Away from Moscow”, etc., 
are telling; albeit until now they are limited only to culture and literature. These slogans can 
only be ascribed to the Ukrainian petite intelligentsia, which continues to grow under NEP. 
[They] understand the national revival only as a bourgeois restoration, and under the 
orientation towards Europe they, indeed, see the orientation towards a capitalist Europe and 
[promote] distancing from the fortress of the international revolution, the capital of the 
USSR, Moscow”.558 
Khvyl'ovyi’s alleged ideological errors were continuously linked to the ambiguity of 
the NEP decade. Zatons'kyi voiced his concerns that young communists clearly became 
confused and should be given a helping hand in telling right from wrong. He tried to excuse 
Khvyl'ovyi by emphasising his ambiguity: “one cannot be born a Bolshevik, instead one 
becomes a Bolshevik. Out of Khvyl'ovyi and Khvyl'ovyis we should harden communists 
[…] we should train people, who are useful for the revolution, who would not spread the 
poison of disbelief and liquidationism, but who would instead help the proletariat in its 
arduous everyday battle.”559 
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At the Plenum, Shums'kyi, who was criticised for ignoring Khvyl'ovyi’s 
deviations,560 publicly addressed ideological inconsistency of the latter. He continuously 
defended Khvyl'ovyi, “a Ukrainian communist, “a person with a well-developed Marxist 
and materialist world-view”.561 At the June Plenum Shums'kyi answered the party 
allegations towards the writer: 
If only for a moment I could have imagined that the communist Khvyl'ovyi could promote or 
agitate the idea of Ukraine as a bourgeois republic and her capitalist and nationalist 
renaissance, I would have immediately suggested excluding him from the Party. But I am 
truly convinced that these assumptions are false. […] However, I am also aware that 
Khvyl'ovyi has no clear perspective as for developing Ukraine’s culture and literature. […] 
And this might have been the reason for his confusion.562 
With this comment Shums'kyi also suggested that the project of Soviet Ukrainian culture, 
ardently promoted by Khvyl'ovyi and himself did not yet become a cohesive program. It 
was becoming clear, with the incipient political campaign against the two that the 
ambitious vision of Soviet Ukrainian culture could hardly succeed. On the last day of the 
party session of the Plenum, Khvyl'ovyi was given the floor to justify himself. However, he 
capitulated:  
I concede that there could be some exaggerations in the ideas and concepts I have developed 
[…]. However, overall, I believe there are grains of truth. […] Nonetheless, if the entire 
Plenum agrees on my errors, I should acknowledge them and stop. First of all, I am a 
disciplined member of the Party.563 
After the plenum, Khvyl'ovyi stopped appearing in the national press. His capitulation was 
most probably linked to the overall downfall of the significance of the Ukrainian horizon in 
the party and the lack of support for his critical stand. Amidst the spiralling campaign 
against Shums'kyi, those ‘dissented’ communists needed to declare their loyalty. So, in 
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December 1926, Khvyl'ovyi submitted his first letter of recantation. The repentant 
Declaration of the Group of the Communists and VAPLITE members, signed by 
Khvyl'ovyi, Dosvitnyi and Ialovyi was published in the newspaper Visti VUTsVK on 4 
December 1926. In it, the three VAPLITE leaders repeated all the charges issued against 
Khvyl'ovyi on the June KP(b)U Plenum. They acknowledged their “ideological and 
political errors” and reaffirmed that their activity was in line with the party agenda on 
cultural building.564 Despite the recantation, the writers were dismissed from the Vaplite’s 
editorial board and replaced by candidates who were previously approved by the KP(b)U. 
Further on, in January 1927 all three were unanimously expelled from the VAPLITE in 
order “to negate any harmful effect that those members could have on the entire 
organisation”.565 
Khvyl'ovyi, nevertheless, continued to publish in the VAPLITE periodicals. On its 
pages he proceeded, although in a more moderate manner, with his critique of the literary 
establishment. The three pamphlets, published in the first issues of the VAPLITE journal, 
were directed towards the party-sponsored VUSPP, whose first congress took place on 25-
28 January 1927.566 Similarly, although in a fictional form, his political concerns once 
again were conveyed in the novel Val'dshnepy [The Woodcocks]. Written during summer 
1926, the first part of the novel was published in the fifth issue of the VAPLITE journal in 
1927. In it, the writer addressed the legacy of the revolution, the detrimental changes in 
social and political spheres, provinciality and the cultural backwardness of Soviet Ukraine. 
Consequently, the second part of the novel was confiscated before it reached print and has 
not been found in any of the archives up to now. The excerpts from the second part were 
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quoted in Khvylia’s extensive critical review Vid Ukhylu – u Prirvu [From Deviation into 
Abyss] (1928). 
In the novel, Khvyl'ovyi expressed his concerns through continuous political and 
philosophical debates between Dmytrii Karamazov, a former Ukrainian revolutionary and 
Ahlaia, a young Russian holidaymaker.567 The official critics instantly picked up on an 
alleged alter ego of Khvyl'ovyi, a communist Karamazov, who constantly dreamed of 
Ukraine’s national revival. Indeed, Karamazov was similarly preoccupied with Ukraine’s 
backwardness, the reason for which he saw in a “kobzar-ised psyche” (reference to Taras 
Shevchenko’s Kobzar), which is deeply rooted in Ukrainians: “Wasn’t it he, this serf, who 
taught us to berate the lord behind his back, so to speak, and drink vodka with him and 
grovel before him when he slaps us familiarly on the shoulder.”568 Nevertheless, 
Karamazov was a negative character. As summarised by Ahlaia: “In short, you are an 
‘abortion’ of the thirties [...] for these years will be characterised by historians by this very 
label.”569  
Overall, Karamazov embodied the Ukrainian revolutionary, who “jumped out of his 
grey gymnasium shorts and immediately landed in the era of revolution”, that semi-
educated oppositionary, who “has accepted the events through the prism of his romantic 
view of the world”. Being fascinated by the scope of the social revolution, by social ideals 
emblazoned on its banner, he committed to die “in the name of these ideals and he would 
have been prepared to face a thousand more deaths”.570 But afterwards, when it became 
obvious that nothing had emerged from that social revolution and the communist party 
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“very quietly and gradually was being transformed into an ordinary ‘gatherer of the Russian 
land’ and it had lowered itself, so to speak, on its own initiative to the interest of the 
cunning philistine bourgeois class”, those Karamazovs concluded that there was no way 
out. It was impossible to break ties with the party, because this is not “only a betrayal of the 
party, but of those social ideals for which they so romantically went to their deaths; this 
would be in the end a betrayal of one’s own self”. And, therefore, those revolutionaries 
“stopped at a kind of idiotic crossroads”: being unable to formulate and form new 
ideologies, they are looking for “a good shepherd” or “a safety valve” in another idea, this 
time of the national rebirth.571 
So, through Karamazov, Khvyl'ovyi attacked all those communist party members 
who had simply adjusted to the state of affairs and covered up their opportunism with the 
occasional expressions of moderate dissent or remembrance of their glorious past. Dmitrii 
was not a revolutionary romanticist (a type from Khvyl'ovyi’s early prose); but yet another 
philistine, another Woodcock – a simpleton, a gullible person, who could easily be caught 
with either a new idea or a new illusion. Thus, Karamazov was an embodiment of those 
revolutionaries, who “lack that individual initiative and even the proper terms to create the 
program of their new outlook”.572 By means of the fictional novel, Khvyl'ovyi suggested 
that the failure of an alternative project of a Soviet Ukraine was caused not (or not only) by 
external pressure (the strength of the Russian counterpart), but by the internal weakness and 
ineffectuality of the Ukrainian nation-builders. 
The Soviet critics immediately interpreted the novel as evidence of Khvyl'ovyi’s 
persistence in leaning towards nationalism. As reviewed, the intention of the novel was to 
show that “Soviet Ukraine is not Soviet, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not real, that 
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the nationalities policy is a sham, that the Ukrainian people are backward and will-less, that 
the great rebirth is still to come, and finally, that the party itself is an organisation of 
hypocrites”.573 For Khvylia, the assigned critic of the novel, it was obvious: through the 
fictional form of Val'dshnepy, Khvyl'ovyi tried to repeat the main concepts of his censored 
brochure Ukraїna chy Malorosiia.  
Khvyl'ovyi at the time of the unfolding campaign was living in Vienna and Berlin. In 
the early 1927, the writer was allowed to go abroad with his family allegedly to undergo a 
course of medical treatment for tuberculosis. However, taking into account Khvyl'ovyi’s 
influence in the artistic milieu, his trip could have as well been an exile.574 From Europe, 
the writer could hardly influence or address the flow of criticism. The critique, however, as 
seen from the letter to Ialovyi (dated from 7 February 1928), was received with anger.575 In 
the private correspondence, the writer suggested that only those who wanted to corner him 
would call Karamazov, a completely negative character, his alter ego. He also addressed the 
recurrent persecution against him: “Did we write ‘a recantation’? [the letter to Visti 
VUTsVK form 4.12.1926] We did. What else do they want from us? To lick their butts? If 
there was no Val'dshnepy, they would have found something else to accuse me of”.576 At 
the same time, Khvyl'ovyi refuted any rumours about his political dissent from the KP(b)U: 
“I not only was not thinking of giving back my party card, but I will appeal to Stalin 
himself if anyone should think to take it from me.”577 The letter to his close friend showed 
how ambivalent Khvyl'ovyi was in his views on the party. On the one hand, he opposed 
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their onslaught on the autonomy of the cultural sphere and yet, on the other hand, he 
believed that the change could be introduced only from within. Hence, his party 
membership did not only suggested his ideological preferences (even if the way of its 
implementation started to contradict his vision of Soviet Ukraine), but also ensured his 
ability to influence the politics in the country. 
Eventually, the whole VAPLITE was targeted in connection to Khvyl'ovyi.578 Trying 
to rescue the organisation from further persecutions, Kulish, the president of the Academia, 
publicly recognised his mistakes in managing the group. In his open letter to Komunist, he 
confessed his own oversights: by expelling Khvyl'ovyi and his followers he did not restrain 
them from being published in its periodicals (referring to the publication of Val'dshnepy). 
The open letter was used to reproach Khvyl'ovyi and his influence on the VAPLITE 
writers: “The personal influence of Khvyl'ovyi, the literary authority he had at the time, our 
personal sympathies, the very organisational structure of the VAPLITE […], - all this 
helped khvyl'ovizm to develop and spread out among us.”579 In January 1928, the VAPLITE 
general meeting voted for voluntary liquidation. Its last publication stated that the 
atmosphere created in Soviet Ukraine was “too oppressive for our writings”580 and 
unfavourable for the comprehensive development of national culture. Needless to say, the 
VAPLITE’s dissolution had important political implications, it was deemed generally as a 
protest against Moscow centralisation in Ukraine, since “the authority expected obedience, 
but not this kind of even though harmless resistance.”581 
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After the VAPLITE dissolution, Khvyl'ovyi needed to return to Ukraine to assure his 
fellow-writers that the battle for Soviet Ukrainian literature had not yet been lost. In the 
letter to Liubchenko, dated from 2 March 1928, Khvyl'ovyi assured his colleagues that he 
did not give up: “The Free Academy of Proletarian Literature is dead – long live the State 
Academy of Literature!”582 His return to Ukraine was, however, conditional. The writer 
needed to submit another recantation to assure the party of his loyalty and readiness to 
cooperate. In the Letter to the Editorial Board of Komunist, published on 22 February 1928, 
he responded to the main points of criticism of Val'dshnepy. Khvyl'ovyi conceded on the 
link between the ideas expressed in the novel and his brochure Ukraїna chy Malorosiia.583 
He acknowledged that the ideological errors, found in Val'dshnepy, were caused by the fact 
that he was still under the influence of his earlier ideas. Having recognised his mistakes, the 
writer threw himself upon the mercy of the party and apologised to all his former 
ideological opponents: “This statement is a result of a psychological break. […] What I 
have observed abroad made me finally realise that all this time I was following the wrong 
path, not the one I should have taken as a communist.”584 
The letter of recantation was taken ambiguously. On the one hand, the sincerity of his 
recantation was doubted. As seen from the secret reports, Khvyl'ovyi was suspected of 
being cunning. In the typescript entitled “The New Role of Mykola Khvyl'ovyi” submitted 
to the Secret Services by some “L.S.” it was said that “One should acknowledge that 
Khvyl'ovyi is not only a clever, but a very clever man. Besides, he is an extremely sly and 
diplomatic person. Khvyl’ovyi is a ‘tsar and slave of wiles”.585 For another informer, the 
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letter to Komunist exposed more of Khvyl'ovyi’s “fear or tactics than of his sincere 
recognition of the counter-revolutionary character of nationalism”.586 On the other hand, his 
VAPLITE fellows, as seen from the GPU svodki (reports), accused Khvyl'ovyi of betrayal. 
Oleksandr Kopylenko called Khvyl'ovyi a “hysterical man and a son of a bitch”, who had 
doomed the VAPLITE for decline.587 The informer concluded that Khvyl'ovyi’s recantation 
marked the line under the cultural opposition of the young Ukrainians to the Russians.588 
Despite the ambiguity of his surrender, Khvyl'ovyi was allowed to return to Ukraine. 
As he pledged to his friend Liubchenko, he initiated a new periodical Literaturnyi Iarmarok 
[The Literary Bazaar] straight after his return and organised around it the former VAPLITE 
writers. Despite Khvyl'ovyi’s continuous attempts to oppose the VUSPP, whose claims for 
monopoly in literature became much stronger since the introduction of the first Five-Year 
Plan, the intensity of the Literary Discussion did, however, subside. There were still some 
single essays published in Literaturnyi Iarmarok and Prolitfront (the successor of 
Literaturnyi Iarmarok) journals. Nonetheless, in the later essays neither in style, nor 
manner resembled Khvyl'ovyi’s earlier contributions. 
The Literary Discussion, however, was not only about Khvyl'ovyi and his views on 
Ukraine’s cultural and political development. It is for a good reason that the Literary 
Discussion is called the “last free debate” in Soviet Ukraine. This debate became a climax 
of the on-going negotiations between local elites and the central party establishment over 
the degree of autonomy that the republic could enjoy while being a part of the Soviet 
Union. The position of Khvyl'ovyi, therefore, was made possible not because of his 
personal confusion, the influence from the nationalist camp or the bourgeois West (as 
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perceived by the party589), but was rather a result of a particularly tolerant atmosphere in 
Soviet Ukraine in the first half of the 1920s. 
Khvyl'ovyi’s negative reaction to the party decisions condemning his theories as 
“national bourgeois” or even as a form “of Ukrainian fascism”,590 raise the question of 
whether he himself believed in crossing the line of what was allowed and expected from a 
KP(b)U member. From personal correspondence and official speeches, it is obvious that 
Khvyl'ovyi did not agree with the critical position of the party and was even appalled at the 
possibility of being expelled from the KP(b)U. This, to my mind, suggests that his 
convictions were not necessarily as deviationist as the party leadership was trying to 
present. His position was determined and in line both with the programs of the Ukrainian 
communist parties, who were seeking an independent Soviet Ukraine, and with the KP(b)U 
members who were advocating Ukraine’s autonomy in the broadest sense.591 In the early 
1920s, with all its inconsistences and social experiments, this project of statehood was seen 
as realistic and feasible, as the discussion of national communism in Section One has 
shown. 
Khvyl'ovyi, although a member of the Bolshevik party since 1919, sympathised with 
the former members of the Ukrainian communist parties, a number of whom for example, 
Ellan-Blakytnyi or Shums'kyi were his close friends, colleagues and defenders in the time 
of incipient party criticism in 1926. Thus, the examination of Khvyl'ovyi’s position, 
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developed within the Literary Discussion offers another approach to study Ukrainian 
national communism. So, Khvyl'ovyi was not the only one who at the time could not decide 
to what extent he was a communist and to what extent a Ukrainian. This ambivalence was a 
characteristic of an entire generation of the 1920s in Ukraine, caused by the very nature of 
the relationship between the Moscow centre and the border republics. 
The perspective of ambivalence, however, also seems somewhat patronising whilst 
discussing the convictions of the Ukrainian-minded communists, including those in the 
party. To apply this approach would mean to try to excuse, justify or rehabilitate those 
party members “who would like to be first communards and then Ukrainians” (using 
Khvyl'ovyi’s words). The question is, however, what was the sin they were guilty of that 
should require this sort of justification. So, it was not the inherent contradictions in the 
views of Khvyl'ovyi and his milieu that caused the complications with the party leadership. 
More accurately, the contradiction originated from them being Ukrainian Communists 
within a Russian-dominated Bolshevik Party at the time of gradual centralisation and 
ensuing power struggles. In more general terms, Khvyl'ovyi’s prose and pamphlets of the 
1920s should be regarded as a literary manifestation of a more general confusion among 
those former members of the nationally-oriented Ukrainian socialist parties who were co-
opted by the KP(b)U. The contradiction in this broadest sense lies between their socialist 
vision (capable of being realised through the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and 
their Ukrainian national vision (not capable of being achieved through the all-Union 
Communist Party). 
Overall, this was not the inner ideological ambivalence of every single sympathiser of 
an independent Ukrainian Socialist Republic, but a political struggle for authority, power 
and influence between the two Soviet Republics and the two horizons within the 
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Communist Party of the Bolsheviks. It was accompanied by the struggle in the cultural 
sphere, when Ukrainian artists and intellectuals were trying to define their right to an 
independent path of cultural development against, or parallel to the one sanctioned by 
Moscow. The Literary Discussion of 1925-28 exposed the intellectual potential of a 
separatist Ukrainian horizon in the party. Two different projects of a Soviet Ukraine were 
put to the test at the time. The intensity of the debates and the efforts made by the central 
leadership to discard and to undermine the position of the Ukrainian side both indicates 
how significant this current, and indeed the parallel project of a Soviet Ukraine, became. 
The prospects of another Soviet Ukraine dwindled during the years of the first Five-Year 
Plan. The intensified centralisation of the Soviet Union and the popular opposition, as will 
be presented in the following chapters, influenced the failure of this intellectual project. 
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Section Three: Adjusting Soviet Cultural Projects: the Working-
Class Reader in the 1920s 
In the second half of the 1920s Ukraine experienced accelerated modernisation. The 
republic’s urban population almost doubled between 1920 and 1933 and the working class 
grew rapidly as a result of the Soviet industrialisation drive. Simultaneously, since 1923, 
the Bolsheviks waged an ambitious campaign for eliminating illiteracy (liknep, in 
Ukrainian). By the decade’s end, due to deliberate state measures, literacy among 
Ukrainians skyrocketed: already in 1926 the literacy rate increased by 42% (against 1920) 
amounting to 64% literacy (59% for rural areas).592 The liknep campaign was conducted 
alongside the korenizatsiia project, which meant that various minority groups were 
becoming literate in their own language. This combination resulted in the emergence of a 
reading public with a distinct demand for literature in national languages. Additionally, 
thanks to various initiatives, which aimed at bringing culture to the workers, the creative 
intelligentsia, perhaps for the first time in history, came into contact with their audience. 
This chapter examines the emergence of the Ukraine’s working-class reading public and the 
evolution of its reading appetites. It also accounts for the factors which influenced the 
aesthetic expectations of the mass audience in the 1920s. Thus, the role of the 
Ukrainizatsiia campaign in creating demand for publications in Ukrainian is scrutinised. 
Finally, the chapter looks at the interaction between Ukrainian writers and their readers in 
the 1920s and examines its role in establishing the Soviet cultural canon. 
 
 
                                                 
592 Krawchenko, Social Change, 23. 
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Working Class as a Target of Ukrainizatsiia 
In the 1920s, the social and national composition of the cities and towns in Ukraine 
underwent crucial changes. During the decade, there was a constant need for more workers, 
leading to massive internal migration within the Soviet Union. According to the 1926 
census, migrants accounted for 49% of the all-Union urban population.593 Industrialisation 
changed the migration dynamics of Ukrainians: the pre-war pattern of moving to the Far 
East in search of land was replaced by seeking non-agricultural employment within the 
country.594 These processes were mirrored in the national composition of the republic’s 
urban areas: the 1926 census revealed that ethnic Ukrainians constituted 54.6% of the 
working class (according to the 1897 census, there were only 16% of Ukrainians in the big 
cities in Ukraine).595 In 1927, due to encouraged migration and targeted education, 44% of 
the republic’s skilled workers were of peasant origin.596 Hence, Ukrainizatsiia of the 
republic’s proletariat, one of the key words of the decade, was a gradual and natural 
outcome of rural-to-urban migration.  
Nonetheless, there were other causes contributing to rapid changes in the urban social 
and national composition. Apart from demographic Ukrainizatsiia, the urban landscape in 
Ukraine was significantly transformed by korenizatsiia. Alongside linguistic Ukrainizatsiia 
and party entrenchment, after 1926 this project also included Ukrainizatsiia of the industrial 
proletariat, higher education, all-Union institutions and the government bureaucracy (See 
Section One). Yet, the question of Ukrainizatsiia of the republic’s working class throughout 
                                                 
593 William Leasure, and Robert Lewis, “Internal Migration in the USSR: 1897-1926,” Demography 4, 2 
(1967), 481. 
594 Liber accounts on circa 1.6 million individuals (12.8% of Ukraine’s population) moving to Asiatic Russia 
between 1896 and 1916. See: Liber G., “Urban Growth and Ethnic Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-
1933,” Soviet Studies 41, 4 (1989), 578. 
595 Krawchenko, Social Change, 107; 52. 
596 ibid, 77. 
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the 1920s was one of the most difficult ones to solve, leading to significant disagreements 
between the central party leadership and the local Ukrainisers. 
Despite a common understanding of how important the working class was for 
comprehensive Ukrainizatsiia, the Party was wary of defining proletarians as its immediate 
target since it could make the process appear to be non-voluntary. The key predicament was 
the national heterogeneity of the working class, which at the time consisted of three more 
or less equal groups: 1) Ukrainians, whose national self-identification was the same as their 
native language; 2) non-Ukrainians; and 3) Russified Ukrainians, who identified 
themselves as Ukrainians but whose native language was Russian. The Commissar for 
Education Shums'kyi on numerous occasions highlighted the pivotal importance of 
broadening Ukrainizatsiia to those Russified Ukrainians, seen as a prerequisite for urban 
de-Russification. This perspective, however, ran counter to the vision of Stalin and his 
protégé in Ukraine Kaganovich, for whom the project had mere pragmatic significance. 
Skrypnyk, who succeeded Shums'kyi in the Narkompros in 1927, maintained Stalin’s 
view on the natural Ukrainizatsiia of the working class. His concern, however, was how to 
get workers to identify themselves with Ukrainian culture and language. This was to be 
achieved with great sensitivity. Skrypnyk was appointed in the Commissariat at the wake of 
the first Five-Year Plan, and his steps at the office were conditioned by the atmosphere of 
anti-nationalism and ‘class war’. Thus, Skrypnyk shifted the emphasis towards greater 
ideological conformity, advancing the question of proletarian Ukrainizatsiia. This vision of 
Ukrainizatsiia, stripped of its rigid national connotations, could be implemented in 
compliance with Moscow’s requirements. Skrypnyk’s Ukrainizatsiia was meant to advance 
a new proletarian Ukrainian socialist culture, based on and conducted in favour of the 
industrial proletariat. 
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Skrypnyk developed three different approaches on how to tackle the issue of 
Ukrainizatsiia of the working masses. The first approach was developed for Ukrainian 
workers (both by origin and native language), who were to be promoted within trade 
unions, the party and the bureaucracy in order to overcome the inequality and national 
discrimination left from the tsarist regime. As for the second group of non-Ukrainians, they 
were to be gently introduced to Ukrainian culture without violating their own national 
interests. The third approach was the most complex one and tackled Russified workers of 
Ukrainian origin, for whom Ukrainizatsiia programmes could help to overcome their 
‘ambivalence’ and return them to Ukrainian culture, namely, to ‘re-Ukrainianise’ them.597 
Skrypnyk believed that the ‘re-identification’ of the working class could be achieved 
by combining demographic Ukrainizatsiia with the necessary promotion of Ukrainian 
culture. Since compulsion could not be used in respect of workers (the Ukrainian language 
was obligatory only for government employees), the linguistic Ukrainizatsiia of the 
workers could only be achieved by creating a total Ukrainian urban environment, a 
favourable setting, in which working masses would either convert or became inclined 
towards the Ukrainian language and new proletarian culture. This was to be accomplished 
by 1) increasing the prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture, and 2) bringing 
Ukrainian culture directly to the proletarians, which included evening language and country 
studies courses, public lectures in Ukrainian, distribution of books and periodicals, 
organising reading circles, concerts, theatre performances and film shows. 
                                                 
597 Mykola Skrypnyk, “Dlia Choho Potriben Trymisiachnyk Ukraїns'koї Kul’tury u Donbasi?” in Skrypnyk, 
Statti i Promovy, 151-152; Liber, Nationality Policy, 137-139. 
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Gradual proletarian Ukrainizatsiia did indeed occur in Ukrainian urban centres. The 
changing pattern in language usage among trade union members is evident from the 1929 
all-Ukrainian trade union census (Table 1).598 
 
However, data on language usage are often misleading. The official reports from the 
Donbas area showed that 15% of workers of Ukrainian origin spoke Ukrainian at home. 
However, they spoke “people’s [narodnyi] Ukrainian and did not understand literary 
[literaturnyi] Ukrainian.”599 The peculiarities of urbanisation and industrialisation in 
Ukraine resulted in a certain mixture of languages, hence identities, in the republic. In 
urban industrial centres a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, “Ukrainian-Russian dialect” or 
surzhyk, was commonly in use. In addition, large groups of workers in the South-East of 
Soviet Ukraine regarded themselves as “khokhol”. As one report shows, miners in Luhansk 
considered themselves as “khokhly” and the language they spoke as “khokhliats'ka” and 
were surprised to learn that ‘khokhol’ meant Ukrainian.600 Hence, one of the main 
objectives of Ukrainizatsiia was, firstly, to make people identify themselves as Ukrainians, 
which could be achieved by means of education, enlightenment and cultural work. The 
                                                 
598 The table is from Krawchenko, Social Change, 78. 
599 TsDAGO, F.1, op.20, spr. 2894, ark.104 
600 Holub, F. “LKSMU v Kul'turno-Natsional'nomu Budivnytstvi,” Bil'shovyk Ukraїny, 7-8 (1929), 55. 
Table 1: Nationality Data on Ukraine’s Trade Union Membership, 1926, 1929 
Type of union Total membership 
enumerated 
Ukrainians 
by 
nationality 
(as % of 
total) 
Speak 
Ukrainian at 
home (as % of 
total)  
Read Ukrainian 
(as % of total) 
Write 
Ukrainian (as 
% of total) 
 1926 1929 1926 1929 1926
x 1929 1926 1929 1926 1929 
Agricultural 50 820 205 241 75 80 68 78 66 81 61 80 
Industrial 166 170 226 699 41 48 22 32 22 43 17 38 
Transport and 
communication 
138 394 227 081 65 73 39 50 47 65 39 56 
x 1926 figures refer to mother-tongue 
Source: Trud i Profsoiuzy na Ukraine. Statisticheskii Spravochnik 1921-28 gg. (Kharkiv: DVU, 1928), 110-113; 
Natsional'nyi Perepys Robitnykiv ta Sluzhbovtsiv Ukraїny (zhovten'-lystopad 1929) (Kharkiv: DVU, 1930), xvi, xxv, 
xxix. 
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demand for cultural products in the Ukrainian language could only be created once the 
identity of its consumer was shaped. 
The role of the printed word was decisive in promoting Ukrainian culture and the 
workers’ self-Ukrainizatsiia. Book production in Ukrainian was prioritised already in 1923 
with the first decrees on Ukrainizatsiia. The TsK KP(b)U Resolutions were promptly put 
into action and already in April 1925 the head of the State Publishing House of Ukraine 
(Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukraїny, DVU) Pylypenko reported that the DVU production was 
Ukrainianised by 85% (mainly due to the increase in the publication of “mass, thin books in 
Ukrainian”).601 The book production in Ukrainian grew steadily, as shown in Table 2. 
 
In 1929, the share of Ukrainian books published in Soviet Ukraine reached 70% in titles 
and 77% in copies against those in Russian.602 Similarly, 84.8% of journal production 
(1929) and 68.8% of newspaper production (1930) was Ukrainianised.603  
                                                 
601 ‘Po Vydavnytstvam U.S.S.R’, Nova Knyha, 4-6 (1925), 48. 
602 Skrypnyk, Novi Liniї, 212. 
Table 2. Book Production in the Ukrainian SSR in Ukrainian and Russian 
 Number of titles Per cent of titles Per cent of 
copies 
Copies/titles 
1923 
 
Ukrainian 419 16.3 25.3 6326 
Russian 2069 80.5 60.8 3069 
1925 Ukrainian 1722 43.6 50.7 8713 
Russian 2110 53.4 45.1 6237 
1926 Ukrainian 1719 50.1 60.6 8196 
Russian 1539 44.8 36.5 5506 
1927 Ukrainian 2146 55.9 58.7 5861 
Russian 1575 41.0 39.2 5451 
1928 Ukrainian 2679 60.9 60.2 8019 
Russian 1456 33.1 27.9 6846 
Source: George Liber, Language, Literacy, and Book Publishing in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-
1928,  Slavic Review 41, 4 (1982): 680-81 
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At face value, the statistics look quite optimistic. However, they should be treated 
with caution. Firstly, the announced figures were often inflated to meet the directives issued 
from the centre. Secondly, Ukrainian-language publications mostly comprised of 
agitational literature and teaching material. Russian-language publications continued to 
dominate the field of scholarly, scientific, and documental publication (Table 3). In 
addition, the statistics on book publishing did not necessarily show how many of those 
books published in Ukrainian actually reached their audience (through book trade and 
library distribution). 
Table 3: Types of Books Produced, 1926  
 Number of 
Titles 
(Ukrainian) 
Folios 
(Ukrainian) 
Number of Titles 
(Russian) 
Folios (Russian) 
Popular literature 402 2.580.600 458 3.923.160 
Belles-lettres 267 1.370.450 126 766.650 
Children’s 
Literature 
80 468.500 49 588.500 
Teaching materials 222 7.409.000 78 992.361 
Methodological 
literature 
178 738.381 128 521.300 
Scholarly works 236 460.450 285 711.225 
Official Documents 245 355.110 283 461.315 
Other publications 89 706.950 132 509.280 
       Source: Litopys Ukraїns'koho Druku (Kharkiv: DVU, 1926). 
The outcomes of this state paternalism were, however, ambivalent. On the one hand, these 
advances created a habit of reading Ukrainian literature and a demand for it. As one worker 
from the Donbas mentioned to a Visti reporter: “Often when we see a Ukrainian book 
appear in the factory a mass of these [Russified] workers gravitate to the book and pass it 
around from hand to hand”.604 The Ukrainian writer Antonenko-Davydovych recorded his 
impressions from visiting the Donbas in 1929:  
How beautiful is the rebirth of the country! The Donbas is on the move. From below, from 
the mines, from the factory it draws towards Ukrainian books, towards the Ukrainian 
                                                                                                                                                    
603 Ibid, 211-212. 
604 Quoted in Krawchenko, Social Change, 82. 
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theatre, towards newspapers. Management goes to meet this locomotive of Ukrainizatsiia 
from below under orders … [and] instructions.605  
On the other hand, as noted by the official study of readers’ tastes, the choice of a 
Ukrainian book was often artificially instigated and was linked to the language courses, 
which workers attended at the workplace. To assess Ukrainizatsiia, it is important to look at 
whether it had transformed people’s cultural and language preferences. Since it is almost 
impossible to analyse the language people used in business and home settings (due to lack 
of data on language usage and difficulties with their interpretations), the only feasible way 
to analyse how (and if) Ukraine’s workers had converted to the Ukrainian ways is to 
examine what they read during the period, what motivated their choices, how they 
evaluated the books they had read and what they expected from literature and writers. 
 
Library Holdings and Their Readers 
The distribution of books among the workers was organised primarily through trade union 
libraries, which became the main institution, tasked to convey official resolutions to the 
working masses.606 But first, Ukraine’s libraries needed to be Ukrainianised, since library 
holdings in Ukrainian did not correspond to the share of ethnic Ukrainians in the republic 
(according to the official statistics from 1926, 80% of the people in the republic identified 
themselves as Ukrainians, 9.2% as Russians and 5.4% as Jews.607) Libraries and librarians 
were seen as pivotal in “creating a demand for the Ukrainian book”.608 In the course of the 
1920s, the Ukrainian Scholarly Institute of Book Studies [Ukraїns'kyi Naukovyi Instytut 
Knyhoznavstva, UNIK], a research institute established in 1922 in Kyiv as part of the 
                                                 
605 Antonenko-Davydovych, Zemleiu Ukraїns'koiu (Philadelphia: Kyiv, 1955), 149. 
606 Dobrenko, Making of the State Reader. 
607 Liber, Nationality Policy, 54 (Table 3.3). 
608 “Iak Vesty Bibliohrafichnu Robotu v Zviazku z Ukrainisatsiieiu Bibliotek,” Nova Knyha, 4-6, (1925), 71-
72. 
  
230 
 
National Book Chamber of Ukraine [Knyzhkova Palata Ukraїny], became the main body to 
monitor the process of promoting the Ukrainian language through book publishing and 
distribution. 
In the 1920s, significant attention was devoted to studying the sociological aspect of 
reading. There were a number of library surveys conducted in the second half of the 1920s, 
aimed at accounting for the success of Ukrainizatsiia of the republic’s libraries; and 
providing recommendations for writers and literary groupings on how to reach a wider 
audience. Regional library surveys were conducted in Odessa (October 1926-February 
1927) and Kharkiv (1928). Separate studies were undertaken in Kyiv libraries of political 
education (1926-27), in the National Library of Ukraine (VBU) (1927), in Kharkiv 
Korolenko Central State Library, 1928-29, and in Kyiv libraries (three months in 1929). 
Also, there were two major all-Ukrainian studies. In January-April 1928 (a sample of 
6 days throughout the period), a study of all the republic’s libraries was conducted by the 
UNIK special Department of Reading and Readership Studies [Kabinet Vyvchennia Knyhy i 
Chytacha] in order to examine: 1) the role of librarians in book acquisitions; 2) the quality 
of library services and work with the readers; 3) correspondence between library collections 
and readership demands; 4) the quantitative and qualitative composition of Ukrainian 
readers [ukraїns'kyi chytach]; and 5) methods to study reading and readership in the 
republic’s libraries. One of the objectives of the survey was to offer suggestions on how to 
link readership demands and interests with relevant book production in Soviet Ukraine. The 
report of the Department was based on the data from 22 okruha609 libraries, which 
constituted 54% of all the okruhy in the republic, with broad all-republican 
                                                 
609 Administrative division in 1923-1930. 
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representation.610 Similarly, in March-April 1928 the Central Bureau of Political and 
Educational Work under the Narkompros [Tsentral'nyi Cabinet Politrosvitroboty] carried 
its own survey of the peasant readers in 58 libraries in 12 okruhy.611 The survey was 
intended to examine the evolution of peasants’ reading habits and appetites ten years after 
the establishment of Soviet rule. The outcomes of the Ukrainizatsiia of library work and the 
role of the libraries in implementing Ukrainizatsiia were discussed at the meeting of the 
organisation bureau of TsK KP(b)U in November 1930. 
The above mentioned surveys focused mainly on a ‘real’ reader, possible to record by 
sociological methods. During the period, however, there were also attempts to identify and 
target, borrowing Wolfgang Iser’s terminology, an ‘implied’ reader, and an ‘ideal’ or a 
competent reader.612 While the library studies dealt mainly with ‘real’ readers, the 
interpretation of the data collected often started from an ‘implied’ reader, an imagined 
working-class consumer, with a well-developed set of proletarian values and critical 
thinking. At the same time, the party officials and Ukrainian writers, while preparing their 
directives or publishing their creative works, it seems, had an ‘ideal’ reader in mind. This 
‘ideal’ reader was an envisaged product of Ukrainizatsiia, and the interpretation of this 
concept often depended on what the expected outcomes of the policy were. Skrypnyk 
together with Kost' Dovhan', a key theorist of Ukrainizatsiia in the late 1920s, made an 
attempt to draw together diverse understandings of an ‘ideal’ reader, by advocating the idea 
of a new proletarian Ukrainian socialist culture. This analysis will focus on the evolution of 
‘real’ readers in Ukraine (as corroborated by library surveys) and estimate how close the 
‘real’ reader was from the ‘ideal’ one as envisaged by Ukrainian writers and party officials. 
                                                 
610 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb. 210, 291: Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni. 
611 TsDAVO, F. 166, op. 8, spr. 81; spr. 352, 344, 345. 
612 Wolfgan Iser, The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Banyan to Beckett 
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974); Shkandrii, The Ukrainian Reading Public, 161. 
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The above mentioned surveys can be used to track changes in: 1) the number of 
books in Ukrainian in the republic’s libraries; 2) readership demands and preferences; 3) 
readership expectations from literature and reading. The main lesson of the 1928 all-
Ukrainian surveys was the evident and still unresolved shortage of books in Ukrainian, 
since 83% of library holdings were in Russian and only 9% in Ukrainian.613 According to 
the language of publication, the library holdings were organised as follows (Table 4): 
 
The language distribution of periodicals demonstrated the same pattern: out of the 212 
journal titles, to which libraries subscribed, only 41 were in Ukrainian and 169 in Russian; 
out of 54 newspaper titles, 27 were in Ukrainian and 20 in Russian.614 Such distribution did 
not correspond to readers’ nationality (read, native language): according to the data from 13 
libraries, there were 38.5% of Ukrainian, 39.4% of Russian, and 21.2% of Jewish 
readers.615 The readers were also differentiated due to their class/social origin. The social 
origin of the adult readers registered was as follows (Table 5):616 
Table 5: Class Origin of the Readers in Ukraine’s Libraries, 1928 
Workers 5241 (25 per cent) 
Peasants 1370 
Komnesamx members 125 
                                                 
613 Frid'eva, Tsentral'ni Biblioteky, 68. 
614 ibid, 70-75. 
615 Ibid, 76. 
616 Ibid, 76. 
Table 4: Number of Copies of Books According to the Language of Publication in Ukraine’s 
Libraries, 1928  
 Literature for 
adults 
Literature for 
children 
Together 
Ukrainian 42,116 1,420 43.586 
Russian 386,795 18,653 405,448 
Polish 4,279 43 4,322 
Yiddishx  17,989 523 18,512 
German, English, French 
and in other languages 
13,487 222 13,709 
Total 464,716 20.861 485,577 analysed out of 1,240,181 
copies in total of library holdings 
xIevreis'ka in the document 
Source: Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od. zb. 210, 291. 
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Government employees 9038 (41 per cent) 
Educational workers 560 
Red Army members 808 
Others 4385 
Total 21.742 (data based on the reports from 17 libraries) 
x Committees of the Village Poor, kombedy in Russian (as in the original document) 
Source: N. Fridieva, “Tsentral'ni Okruhovi Biblioteky Ukraїny,” in Biblioteka i Chytach na 
Ukraїni, (Kyiv, Kharkiv: DVU, 1930), 76. 
Interest in and demands for Ukrainian publications were linked to readers’ social/class 
origin. The combined results on social status and language preferences for Ukraine’s library 
readers are presented in Table 6:617  
 
Similar results were shown in Kyiv. In 1926/27 a survey of 22 city libraries and 12 district 
(raion) libraries took place, during which a total of 4247 reader requests were analysed.618 
The demand for books in Ukrainian depended on the social status of the library members 
(Table 7). 
                                                 
617 “Zapys Popytu, iak Metod Vyvchenniaa Chytacha, i Ukraїns'kyi Chytach za Materialamy Popytu 
UNIK’u,” in Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraini, 136. 
618 N. Frid'eva, “Chytach Kyїvs'kykh Politosvitnikh Bibliotek v 1926/27 r.”, Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni, 
181. 
Table 6: Language Preference among the Library Readers in Ukraine’s Libraries according to 
Their Social Status and Sex, 1928 
 In Ukrainian In Russian Translated 
literature 
Total 
Workers Male 96 (11%) 372 (44%) 387 (45%) 855 
Female 15 (8) 93 (44) 101 (48) 209 
Government 
employees 
Male 114 (15) 323 (42) 327 (43) 764 
Female 100 (24) 147 (36) 167 (40) 414 
Students Male  299 (37) 301 (37) 216 (26) 816 
Female 246 (36) 285 (41) 163 (23) 694 
Source: N. Frid'ieva, “Zapys Popytu, iak Metod Vyvchenniaa Chytacha, i Ukraїns'kyi Chytach za Materialamy Popytu 
UNIK’u,” in Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni (Kyiv; Kharkiv: DVU: 1930), 136. 
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As one can see, demand for Ukrainian books in 1928, despite reinforced Ukrainizatsiia 
efforts, remained low among all social groups. Workers steadily opposed Ukrainizatsiia and 
were not interested in Ukrainian literature. Given the underdeveloped level of Ukrainian 
translation at the time, requests for fictional literature in the Ukrainian language among 
workers amounted to 10% against 90% for literature in Russian (original and foreign in 
translation). As explained by a contemporary Kharkiv reporter, such poor results could be 
attributed to 1) little awareness of Ukrainizatsiia policies among the workers; 2) little 
interest among the communist cells’ members and activists in promoting Ukrainizatsiia; 3) 
negligence of the Ukrainizatsiia leaders as for the needs of the worker readers.619 
As shown, demand for Ukrainian publications was higher among government 
employees, students and women. Higher indices among civil servants can be attributed to 
the compulsory language courses as a part of Ukrainizatsiia programmes. As reported by 
the Bila Tserkva regional library, demand for Ukrainian books had increased since 1926, 
but “for the most part it is explained by Ukrainizatsiia.”620 Higher interest among students 
corresponded to the success of targeted education campaigns and vysuvanstvo 
                                                 
619 A. Mykoliuk, “Ukrainizatsiia Proletariatu,” Politosvita, 2-3 (1927), 70-72. 
620 Frid'eva, Tsentral'ni Biblioteky, 79. 
Table 7: Language Preference among the Library Readers in Kyiv Libraries according to 
Their Social Status and Sex, 1928 
 Workers Government 
employees 
Students Others Working 
youth 
Other 
youth 
 In numbers 
Male 134 61 71 66 59 86 
Female 61 46 61 150 34 90 
 In per cent 
Male 12.92 14.35 17.94 11.15 11.73 13.93 
Female 20.74 18.03 23.64 15.15 22.97 15.22 
Source: N. Frid'eva, “Chytach Kyїvs'kykh Politosvitnikh Bibliotek v 1926/27 r.”, Biblioteka i Chytach na Ukraїni 
(Kyiv; Kharkiv: DVU: 1930), 181 
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(vydvizheniie, in Russian) when the priority in higher education was given to students of 
proletarian and peasant origin. Interest of women in Ukrainian language publications 
matched their occupation: most of the female working class women were occupied as 
domestic servants or registered with Narharch (profspilka pratsivnykiv narodnoho 
harchuvannia, trade union of public catering workers), who had only recently moved to 
cities and had not yet lost their connection with their mother tongue. Also, the higher 
interest of female readers in Ukrainian-language publications (category “other” in the chart 
from Kyiv) could be explained by their precarious position in Soviet society: most women 
seeking employment were unskilled and had poor language skills. This also explained their 
active engagement in Ukrainizatsiia courses, seen by many as a possibility to improve their 
employment opportunities.621 
Similar low levels of interest in Ukrainian letters were reported among party 
members and Komsomol activists. The 1928 survey showed that only 10% of KP(b)U and 
Komsomol members chose books in Ukrainian (against 20% of those who requested 
foreign books in translation and 23% of Russian literature).622 As one reporter commented, 
the low percentage of books in Ukrainian read by party activists was “shameful” since it 
showed that “communists and komsomol'tsi were not only not in the forefront in this most 
important sphere, i.e., mastering Ukrainian cultural values, but they even significantly lag 
behind”.623 
It should be admitted, that the reports examined readers’ requests for literature in 
Ukrainian, rather than what was actually issued to the readers. Across Ukraine, only 66% of 
readers’ requests for Ukrainian literature in public libraries were satisfied, against 70% of 
                                                 
621 Kogan, Chto Chitaiut Zhenshchiny. 
622 Kost' Dovgan', “Ukraїns'ka Literatura i Masovyi Chytach,” Krytyka, 8 (1928), 38. 
623 Dovgan', 38. 
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those for original Russian and 73% for foreign literature.624 Lower showings for Ukrainian 
literature were linked to 1) passiveness of librarians in promoting Ukrainian letters; and 2) 
insufficient numbers of book titles and copies in Ukrainian to satisfy the demand. The role 
of a librarian was seen as pivotal in creating popular demand for literature written in 
Ukrainian. Non-specific readers’ requests were regarded as a field for library workers to 
promote the Ukrainian language and culture.625 As seen from the inspection of library 
services, librarians were often reproached for dealing ‘incorrectly’ with requests like “give 
me something interesting to read” or “I’d like to read a novel”, by suggesting most 
frequently some foreign classics. Where librarians actively offered Ukrainian books in 
response to such non-specific requests, this led to an increase of issues of books by 
Ukrainian authors and their variety.626 
In addition to this indifference on the part of librarians, there was also the factor of 
insufficient funding of public and trade union libraries. As a result, there were simply not 
enough books to meet the requirements of Ukrainizatsiia and the needs of Ukrainian 
readers. One of the reports focuses on the shortcomings of Ukrainizatsiia in Kharkiv. The 
majority of Kharkiv workers were Ukrainian by origin, recent new-comers from the 
countryside who spoke a mixed “jargon of Kharkiv margins” (surzhyk).627 The situation 
with providing resources in Ukrainian at the biggest factories in the city, nonetheless, 
according to the reporter, was poor. As the inspection of the holdings in Kharkiv trade 
union libraries had shown, in the library of the VEK factory, out of 7,500 volumes in total 
there were only 200 in Ukrainian (45% of workers were recorded as Ukrainians), in the 
Serp i Molot Factory, 150 out of 3,400 books (with more than 55% of Ukrainian workers), 
                                                 
624 Frid'eva, Zapys Popytu, 137. 
625 Frid'eva, Zapys Popytu, 116-144. 
626 Dovgan', 44. 
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and in the Tyniakov Clothing Factory, 50 books out of 4,000 (28% of Ukrainian 
workers).628 
Ukrainizatsiia had little influence on the Ukrainian academic community. The party 
did everything to introduce and even to force the Ukrainian language in most spheres of 
public life. However, the language was still unsuitable for research, higher education and 
science. The situation can be easily linked to the fact that until 1917, the Ukrainian 
language was hardly used beyond the private sphere and creative writing.629 As shown by 
the survey of the items issued to readers in the National Library of Ukraine (Vsenarodnia 
Biblioteka Ukraїny, VBU), Russian language by far dominated those issued in Ukrainian. In 
three days of February 1925 out of 82% of requests for non-fiction (academic books, 
textbooks and periodicals) there was only 1% of requests for Ukrainian periodicals and 
1.5% for Ukrainian literature studies (literaturna krytyka).630 The situation with forced 
Ukrainizatsiia from above and its clear artificial character in academia was noted by one 
contemporary observer:  
In theory we Ukrainians from the student body should have been pleased. In practice, we 
were as distressed by the innovation as the non-Ukrainian minority. Even those who, like 
myself, had spoken Ukrainian from childhood, were not accustomed to its use as a medium 
of study. Several of our best professors were utterly demoralized by the linguistic switch-
over. Worst of all, our local tongue simply had not caught up with modern knowledge; its 
vocabulary was unsuited to the purposes of electrotechnics, chemistry, aerodynamics, 
physics and most other sciences […]. [We] suffered the new burden, referred to Russian 
textbooks on the sly and in private made fun of the opera bouffe nationalism.631  
As seen from these reports, despite optimistic numbers in book production, the books in 
Ukrainian did not necessarily reach their reader. Readers in general were not interested in 
Ukrainian letters and library holdings did not meet the needs of those who were interested. 
                                                 
628 Mykoliuk, 68. 
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In addition, there was a clear discrepancy between books which could be of interest and use 
for the readers and those which were available on the bookshelves. The majority of the 
reports mentioned that the library holdings were full of books purchased in 1920-1923, 
which “nobody uses”.632 This situation was observed by Khvyl'ovyi who once commented 
that Ukrainizatsiia excelled itself in publishing worthless literature and obliging national 
charity organisations to buy it and “to store it in the basement to feed mice.”633 In total, 
Ukrainizatsiia of Ukraine’s libraries was insufficient: libraries could not meet the needs of 
the readers, and librarians were ineffective, or slow, in creating demand for Ukrainian 
literature. 
 
Preferred Authors 
A study of readership shows what the mass audience liked in literature, what they expected 
from it, what was the horizon of their aesthetic expectations and what aesthetic needs and 
artistic preferences they had. As reported, most readers were interested in belles-lettres, 
memoirs of “former people” [byvshi liudy], new Russian fiction, foreign novels in 
translation and entertaining literature. Based on the 1928 all-Ukrainian survey, there were 
3711 readers’ (workers and governmental employees) requests for fictional literature, 
including 966 (26%) requests for foreign, 931 (25 %) for Russian and 349 (9%) for 
Ukrainian fiction.634 If limited only to the working class readers, the results were 488, 465 
and 111 respectively.635 The comparison of ‘author repertoire’ in these three categories 
reveals how limited the pool of Ukrainian writers was: there were requests for 106 foreign, 
120 Russian and only 40 Ukrainian writers during the period under study. 
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The surveys showed the strong demand for world literature. Among the most popular 
foreign writers were Jack London (70 demands), James Curwood (61), Lewis Sinclair (30), 
Guy de Maupassant (13), Victor Margueritte (13), John Locke (11), Bernhard Kellermann 
(11), Fenimore Cooper (10), Ethel Lilian Voynich (10), Guido da Verona (9), Stefan 
Żeromski (8), Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (8), H. G. Wells (8), Claude Farrère (8),Victor Hugo 
(7), Thomas Mayne Reid (5). Most translations were into Russian. Translations into 
Ukrainian indeed started gradually to appear in the 1920s; however they were not enough 
to satisfy the demand. In Ukraine, there was only one periodical, dedicated to featuring 
foreign literature in Ukrainian translation: an illustrated monthly magazine Vsesvit [The 
Universe], founded in 1925 by Ellan-Blakytnyi, Khvyl'ovyi and Dovzhenko. In 1927-1930, 
the magazine published translations of Henri Barbusse, Jules Vallès, Raymond-Louis 
Lefebvre, Leonhard Frank, Ibáñez, and Moseş Cahana. The circulation of the magazine 
was, however, small, around 10-11 thousand copies.636  
Also, some novels in Ukrainian translations were published, for instance, of Jules 
Verne (translated by Iurii Mezhenko) and of Maupassant, Honoré de Balzac, Anatole 
France (translated by Valer''ian Pidmohyl'nyi). The Ukrainisers were well aware of the 
need for Ukrainian translations. A literary critic Volodymyr Sukhno-Khomenko urged for 
world literature in Ukrainian translations. Only then, he noted, Ukraine would have its 
“Edisons, Einsteins, and Tolstois”.637 Given the small number of translations, it seems, the 
Ukrainisers had missed the possibility to deliverer literature, which was in high demand, in 
the Ukrainian language and by this to meet the objectives of Ukrainizatsiia. 
                                                 
636 Roman Horbyk, “Masky Identychnostei: Sotsiolinhvistychni Aspekty Ukraїnizatsiii na Shpal'takh 
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The all-Ukrainian library survey showed the clear prevalence of Russian 
contemporary writers over pre-revolutionary ones among the worker readers. The list of the 
most requested Russian writers was as follows: Gorky (31), Serafimovych (23), 
Dostoevsky (17), Pushkin (16), Lev Tolstoy (14), Turgenev (13), Malashkin (10), 
Veresaiev (9), Gladkov (9), Seifulina (9), Al. Tolstoy (9), Novikov-Priboi (7), Erenburg 
(8), Gogol (7), Staniukovich (7), Furmanov (6), Kuprin (6), Goncharov (6), Zoshchenko 
(5).638 Out of 465 total requests, there were 378 (81.3%) demands for contemporary writers 
(152 requests featured in the top-list and 226 requests for other contemporaries issued less 
than twice) and only 87 were for pre-revolutionary authors (the question is how to regard 
Gorky with his highest indices: as a pre-revolutionary author or a contemporary one).639 
The results from Odesa libraries corroborated the all-Ukrainian pattern: 75.3% of issues 
(out of 19,719 examined) were for contemporaries. In the report from Odesa, the library 
issues were differentiated according to the ideological/aesthetic affiliation of the authors: 
60.3% were interested in fellow-travellers (out of which Gorky took the absolute majority 
of 770 demands, followed by Ehrenburg (478) and Seifulina (434)); 39.3% for proletarian 
writers (Neverov (505), Gladkov (mainly, Tsement - 432), Novikov-Priboi (404)); and 
0.4% for the LEF writers (almost exclusively Mayakovsky with 21 issues).640 
In comparison to the showings for Russian writers, requests for Ukrainian authors 
presented different patterns. On the republican scale, in 1928 there were only 38 requests 
for contemporary writers out of a total of 334 registered, or 11.4% (for Russian this 
correlation was 81.3%).641 The results for the worker readers were even less diverse: out of 
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111 demands for 25 writers in total there were only 7 contemporaries mentioned (6.3%).642 
The most requested Ukrainian authors are presented in Table 8.  
 
Out of all the contemporary Soviet authors mentioned in the list, only Khvyl'ovyi, Vyshnia, 
Kopylenko and Sosiura were requested more than twice. The dynamics in Kyiv libraries 
was almost the same. During a week-long examination in 1926/27 there were circa 40 
Ukrainian writers requested, 25 of which were asked for less than five times. The most 
popular authors in Kyiv were (out of 4,247 total requests examined): Vynnychenko (104), 
Franko (75), Kotsiubyns'kyi (63), Hrinchenko (61), Nechui-Levyts'kyi (45), Myrnyi (37), 
Vovchok (32), and Shevchenko (28). Among the contemporaries, only Khvyl'ovyi, 
                                                 
642 Fried'eva, Tsentral'ni Biblioteky, 139. 
Table 8: Number of Requests for Ukrainian Writers in Ukraine’s Libraries, 1928 
Volodymyr Vynnychenko 78 Volodymyr Sosiura 3 
Ivan Franko 26 Mykhailo Staryts'kyi 3 
Mykhailo Kotsiubyns'kyi 25 Dmytro Buz'ko 2 
Taras Shevchenko 23 Oleksii Kundzich 2 
Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi 19 Stepan Rudans'kyi 2 
Borys Hrinchenko 18 Arkhyp Teslenko 2 
Panas Myrnyi 16 Hanna Barvinok 1 
Marko Vovchok 14 Sava Bozhko 1 
Ol'ga Kobylians'ka 12 Tymofii Borduliak 1 
Lesia Ukraїnka 12 V. Vil'shanets'ka 1 
Panteleimon Kulish 10 Leonid Hlibov 1 
Mykola Khvyl'ovyi 7 Mykhailo Ivchenko 1 
Stepan Vasyl'chenko 5 Myroslav Irchan 1 
Ostap Vyshnia 5 Pavlo Tychyna 1 
Oleksandr Kopylenko 5 Geo Shkurupii 1 
Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi 5 Arkadii Liubchenko 1 
Andrii Holovko 4 Oleksa Storozhenko 1 
Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnov''ianenko 4 Oleksandr Oles' 1 
Source: Kost' Dovgan', “Ukraїns'ka Literature i Masovyi Chytach,” Krytyka, 8 (1928), 39 
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Vyshnia, Kosynka and Slisarenko were requested four-six times.643 In Odesa, the same 
preference for nineteenth-century authors was recorded: out of 19,719 total requests Franko 
was issued 464 times, Vynnychenko 413, Kotsiubyns'kyi 289, Shevchenko 226, Nechui-
Levyts'kyi 212, Myrnyi 160, Vovchok 120 and Khvyl'ovyi 56. Despite the affirmation of 
the reporter that the interest of Odesa worker readers in Ukrainian writers grew steadily, the 
results show how minor their share still was: only 9.8% out of all demands (which is still 
higher than the all-Ukrainian average).644  
Vynnychenko was the most requested Ukrainian author of the time. Vynnychenko, a 
well-known UNR politician, novelist and a playwright, even after his emigration in 1918, 
remained one of the most popular writers and continued collecting royalties from the Soviet 
government. Notably, half the requests accounted for Soniachna Mashyna [Solar Machine], 
the first science fiction and utopian novel in Ukrainian literature. This novel, written during 
1921-1925, was first published in Ukraine in 1928 and had three editions in the 1930s. 
Despite high demand and inexhaustible interest in the novel, the readers were well-aware of 
its ‘hostile ideology’. In general, the readers considered the novel “interesting even though 
it [did] not correspond to the demands of the day”.645 In the readers’ reviews, one can 
notice the influence of Soviet propaganda on the library borrowers. According to one 
peasant reader, “Soniachna Mashyna is a good thing. It is almost impossible to differentiate 
it from an adventure novel. [It presents] a good description of human psychology. The 
novel is interesting. But it stinks a bit. Yes: I didn’t expect from Vynnychenko that he 
would write such nonsense. I expected more from him.”646 Another peasant reader spoke of 
Soniachna Mashyna “as fictional literature; the book is nice, but it is written too 
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fantastically. The idea is interesting, although hard, unusual. The ending is not nice and not 
serious. The book is permeated with Menshevism.”647 Possibly, the readers enjoyed the 
novels but tried to cover their interest with ideologically-correct reviews. 
As presented, it is hard to say what was prevalent in these reviews: readers’ personal 
tastes or the agenda of Soviet political educators. At the time, reading was often used for 
political purposes. Similarly, readers’ genuine preferences could be easily used against the 
readers. By the decade’s end, ‘trials’ of books and authors frequently took place at the 
workplace. These ‘evenings of workers criticism’ were used to manipulate public taste, 
which often did not correspond to the vision of an ‘ideal’ reader as seen by the party, and to 
pressure writers, who did not conform to the party literary agenda. In 1926, for instance, 
Khvyl'ovyi Ia (Romantyka) was put on trial. To recap, in the short story the chief 
protagonist, a Cheka member, executed his mother as a part of his duty. The initial charge 
of the ‘trial’ was to accuse the Cheka member of not behaving as “true communists”. The 
procurator’s (a party activist) passionate speech, however, influenced the judge and the 
juries in their verdict, and they justified the execution of non-Communists, including the 
Chekist’s mother.648 The book ‘trials’ were often used as methods of political education 
and the expressions of vox populi, especially when the party officials wanted to condemn 
the writer for his writing.649 
The political educators targeted the Ukrainian countryside, seen as the source of the 
working class. In the 1920s promotion of Ukrainian book-publishing went hand in hand 
                                                 
647 ibid, ark. 71. 
648 S. Kokot, “Litsud nad opovid M. Khvyl'ovoho “Ia”, Pluzhanyn, 4-5 (1926), 33. See also: Mykhailo 
Bykovets', “Khudozhnia literatura na sudi u selianstva,” Pluzhanyn, 10 (1926), 31-33; V. Shchepotiev. 
“Literaturni sudy,” Pluzhanyn, 4-5 (1926), 8-10; Shkandrij, The Ukrainian Reading Public, 169-170. 
649 Perhaps, the most well-known example of the ‘discordance’ between a writer and his readers in Soviet 
literature was the case of Boris Pastenak and his Doktor Zhivago (famous “I haven’t read the novel but still I 
condemn it” (1958). 
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with the liknep campaign, meaning that the party could take charge in teaching peasants to 
read in ideologically correct terms.650 At the beginning of 1923, the publishing house of the 
Ukrainian Komsomol sent around rural areas the questionnaire “Which book do we need?” 
The result of this poll was mostly predictable: 96% of peasant readers demanded books in 
Ukrainian. The questionnaire also inquired about the kind of books the countryside 
expected from the government. As shown, Ukrainian peasants were looking forward to (1) 
drama with new revolutionary content, (2) agricultural book-guides, (3) anti-religious 
literature, (4) fine literature and revolutionary poetry, (5) popular educational literature, (6) 
historical literature and (7) agitation literature.651 The results of the survey with certainty 
reflected the influence of Soviet educators and propagandists: the Ukrainian countryside 
throughout the 1920s remained deeply conservative and, despite continuous attempts, 
highly religious.652 Hence, the high demand for anti-religious literature and “drama with 
new revolutionary content” reflected the “desired” outcome of the questionnaire or the 
interests of those enumerators in the field.653 
Instead, the results of the later survey of the peasant library readers, organised by the 
Narkompros in spring 1928, showed 44% of requests for fictional literature, 20% for 
agricultural and 9% for “political and party literature”. Among the pre-revolutionary 
authors, the top-listed were: Shevchenko, Vynnychenko, Franko, Nechui-Levyts'kyi, 
Kotsiubyns'kyi and Vovchok. The category “contemporary writers” was by far dominated 
                                                 
650 Charles E. Clark, “Uprooting Otherness: Bolshevik Attempts to Refashion Rural Russia via the Reading 
Rooms of the 1920s”, Canadian Slavonic Papers /Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, 38, 3/4 (1996), 305-329. 
651 Visti VUTsVK, 19 April, 1923. 
652 The number of religious associations in the countryside had increased two to three times in the course of 
the 1920s. See: Viola, Peasant Rebels, 52; S. Kul'chyts'kyi (ed.) Narysy Povsiakdennoho Zhyttia Radians'koi 
Ukraїny. (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 2009), Part 1, 182-188. 
653 It was changed by the collectivisation and the famine of 1932-33. See: Olesia Stasiuk, Deformatsiia 
Tradytsiinoї Kul'tury Ukraїnstiv v Kintsi 20-h-na Pochatku 30-h Rokiv XX St. PhD Thesis, Kyiv, 2007. 
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by Vyshnia (56%), followed by Smolych, Shymans'kyi, Senchenko, Sosiura and 
Khvyl'ovyi.  
The dominance of the Ukrainian satirist Vyshnia was linked to his down-to-earth 
themes, style and language. His collection of feuilletons and anecdotes Ukraїnizuemos' 
[Let’s Ukrainianise] (with the most famous humoresque Chukhraїntsi, in which he 
described “a peculiar people Chukhraїntsi in an odd country Chukren”) was first published 
in 1926 and had five editions during the three following years. Among his other collections 
were: “Lytsem do Sela” [Facing the Village] and Vyshnevi Usmishky [Vyshnia’s 
Merriment]. One peasant reader explained Vyshnia’s popularity: “how greatly he criticises 
us! It is insulting to some extent, but it is so true”.654 Nonetheless, like other social groups, 
the peasant audience showed little interest in contemporary writers. In the Narkompros 
report, this state of affairs was ascribed to librarians’ indifference and unwillingness to 
promote contemporary proletarian literature. As stated: “All social ‘loading’ of 
contemporary Ukrainian writers, all the vividness of the Ukrainian revolution and the 
construction of Soviet Ukraine went past the countryside”.655 
 
Classical vs. Contemporary Literature in Ukrainian 
All the above-discussed reports presented the same limited number of names of Ukrainian 
writers requested/issued by the republic’s librarians. In Kyiv, there were no more than forty 
names mentioned, in contrast to almost three hundred names of Russian and foreign writers 
requested during the same period.656 This lack of diversity becomes even more surprising if 
compared to the number of members in various literary groupings and unions. The number 
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of people who earned by literary work in the early 1930s was (sic) about four and a half 
thousand: this was the number of applications, submitted for membership in the Union of 
Soviet Writers of Ukraine in June 1934.657 The discrepancy between the amount of men of 
letters paid from the republican budget and those actually known or read (there were circa 
20 names of contemporary authors mentioned in all-republican reports in 1928) raises the 
question of the quality of the Ukrainian letters and their correspondence to the readers’ 
expectations. Indeed, that small pool of contemporaries read or known in the 1920s could 
be easily attributed to the insufficient achievements of Ukrainizatsiia, especially its failure 
to create demand for Ukrainian culture among the urban population. Partially, it could be 
so; however, such an explanation does not help explain the prevalence of nineteenth-
century authors. Hence, it was not the language of the final product, which made the 
working-class readers object to Ukrainian contemporary literature. 
The reports highlighted one peculiarity of the Ukrainian readership: workers and 
peasants were given the power to reconstruct society and reject the past with its traditional 
characteristics and limitations and yet the Ukrainian audience showed an indisputable and 
unshaken preference for the Ukrainian classics (unlike in Russia where contemporary prose 
writers left the ‘old novelists’ far behind), for pre-revolutionary “culture zero”.  Such social 
conservatism can be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, as known, until 1905 book 
publishing and distribution in Ukrainian was banned by the Valuev Circular from 1863 and 
the Ems Secret Decree (ukaz) from 1876.658 Thus, the nineteenth-century authors had 
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become available only shortly before the revolution. This explains the high demand for the 
classics since the readers simply had not yet had a chance to read them, unlike the Russian 
‘old masters’ that had always been available. The balance was also influenced by the 
publishers: the number of published copies of the Ukrainian classics was far bigger than of 
contemporary Soviet Ukrainian authors. In 1927, the print runs for pre-revolutionary 
authors were over three times those for contemporaries.659 
As corroborated by the library reports, the tastes of readers were often conservative 
and escapist. Among the top-listed novels were: Kotsiubyns'kyi’s Fata Morgana (1910), 
describing changes in the Ukrainian countryside before the 1905 revolution, Franko’s Boa 
Constrictor (1878) and Boryslav Smiiet's'a [Boryslav Laughs] (1882), recounting early 
attempts of workers’ revolutionary movements, Nechui-Levyts'kyi’s Mykola Dzheria 
(1878), providing an emotional account of the life of Ukrainian serfs under the tsar. Those 
novels offered Ukrainian readers, consisting predominantly of current or recent peasants 
and newly-emerged workers, something they could easily relate to. Also, the same audience 
indulged reading about “the old people”, as seen from the report on Turgenev’s 
Dvorianskoie Gnezdo [Home of the Gentry]: “I liked it; I like to read about landowners 
(pany), how they lived. I don’t want to read about peasants. Why should I if I know myself 
how is it to be poor? Why should I read about them? Poor and that’s about it”.660 In 
addition, as reported, readers, especially in the first half of the decade, preferred books on 
                                                                                                                                                    
1876): Intention and Practice,’ Canadian Slavonic Papers /Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, 49, 1-2 (2007): 
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660 TsDAVO, F. 166, Op.8, Spr.81, ark. 51. 
  
248 
 
the Romanovs to those on the recent past: “Why should we read about something we have 
experienced ourselves?”661 
Secondly, Russian was widely recognised as a lingua franca and was more useful for 
social mobility. This led to the higher prestige of Russian authors and Russian literature in 
general. The surveys proved that readers preferred “serious” (solidna) literature: big novels, 
thick books with realistic, well-developed plots. Instead, Ukrainian contemporary writers 
preferred short literary genres. The shortage of “thick novels” led to the conclusion that 
Ukrainian contemporary literature was underdeveloped and could not yet compete with the 
Russian one. On the other hand, this “serious” literature was not often understood and 
accepted by the readers with little or no education. The All-Union best-read novel Tsement 
by Gladkov received the following review: “The book doesn’t work for the peasant readers, 
it’s written not as it’s supposed to be: the book doesn’t collect thoughts, for us to 
understand and learn, but scatters them around. It is long-winded, hence boring to read; the 
book is good and describes the age. It is suitable for a completely literate urban reader, but 
is unfit for peasant reader.”662 
Finally, the popularity of the Ukrainian classics was fuelled by Ukrainizatsiia. In 
numerous evening courses and language sessions, the students were required to learn the 
language based, as believed, on its best examples. The readers reports are inundated with 
comments like “I read Kvitka-Osnov''ianenko in order to learn the Ukrainian language, did 
not find anything interesting otherwise”.663 Or [in Russian about Hrinchenko’s Short 
Stories] “I reckon that the library needs such books so far as to introduce its readers to the 
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works of Ukrainian writers. There is no other use for them”.664 So, the interest in “old 
writers” was involuntarily promoted by 1) course leaders with their low awareness of 
contemporary proletarian literature (in addition to sometimes their poor qualification) and 
2) librarians with their unwillingness to promote recent works in response to indefinite 
requests (e.g., “give me something in Ukrainian”). 
The readers’ reports clearly demonstrated that the Ukrainian audience was not 
satisfied with what Ukrainian contemporary writers had to offer. The majority of readers’ 
reviews concurred that contemporary literature was 1) “boring” with its limited choice of 
topics; 2) “schematic” with no real plot and storyline; 3) “too naturalistic” and complicated 
in its language. Khvyl'ovyi’s Osin' [Autumn] was “not understandable”, his Pudel' [Poodle] 
was “no good”, his Etudes “only kill the interest in reading”; Kundzich’s Chervonoiu 
Dorohoiu [On the Red Path] was “something… I haven’t understood a thing”665; 
Smolych’s Nedili i Ponedilky [Sundays and Mondays] “left the impression of being 
translated from Russian, it is hard to read”;666 Dniprovs'kyi’s Zarady Neї [For the Sake of 
Her] “is hard to understand, it has no theme, its ideology is completely alien to us”;667 
Ianovs'kyi’s Krov Zemli [Blood of the Earth] “I don’t like, it is very hard to read, I cannot 
understand it at all.”668 The generalised attitudes towards contemporary literature were as 
followed: 
I prefer fiction, because it captures our life. I personally like all books by Nechui-Levyts'kyi, 
especially Khiba revut' voly, Borys Hrinchenko. These authors are true Ukrainians. […] 
                                                 
664 ibid, ark. 398. 
665 TsDAVO, F. 166, Op.8, Spr.81, ark.61. 
666 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od. zb 215, ark. 161. 
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From new novels I have read only a few. I don’t like them because they write mostly about 
politics and industry.669 
There are no books now like we had before: travelings, adventures, or scary fairy-tails. When 
I was a bachelor, we had such books. Now everything is “revolution-revolution”. We are fed 
up with it, we saw it ourselves. Of course there are some interesting books about the 
revolution, but a lot of words there are illiterate, or even obscene. I cannot read it at home as 
a father.670 
Thereby, the 1920s had shown not simply that readers preferred Ukrainian classics, but also 
that they were repelled by Ukrainian contemporary literature, which was not able to satisfy 
the demands of the ever largest Ukrainian readership. As concluded by one contemporary 
observer, “the failure of Ukrainian current literature [was] not only in its youth and 
primitiveness of techniques, not only in the scant distribution of Ukrainian books in the 
cities, not only in small amount of copies, but in the fact that an author hasn’t yet learned 
how to write books from the Ukrainian readers”.671 The main recommendation provided by 
the surveys for writers and publishers was to develop literature, pioneered by proletarian 
writers who would be able to awake the interest of a mass reader with its down-to-earth 
topics and language. 
Indeed, ‘real’ readers, as presented by the library surveys, did not correspond to the 
envisaged image of many sophisticated and avant-garde contemporaries. Khvyl'ovyi and 
his Olympians anticipated that the revolution would transform the proletariat into 
‘intellectual communards’. He advocated “the new art […] created by workers and 
peasants. On condition, however, that they will be intellectually developed, talented, people 
of genius.”672 For the writer, literature was meant to inspire, to instigate its readers to 
become more intelligent, critical, and cultured. Instead, as shown, Khvyl'ovyi and the like 
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were among the most criticised authors by the mass audience, who could comprehend 
neither their themes, nor the language.  
Similarly, the ‘real’ reader did not resemble an activist and ideologically advanced 
reader, as imagined by the party officials. Despite all the manipulations, the readers, even 
by the end of the 1920s, still preferred Vynnychenko to Gladkov, even though they covered 
up their interest under ideologically correct reviews. In addition, the reader of the 1920s did 
not match the expectations of the Ukrainisers. After 1927, Skrypnyk promoted the idea of 
Ukrainian proletarian culture, aimed at urban, proletarian, competent, well-educated and 
nationally aware consumers. In turn, the readers were conservative and escapist, with a 
strong preference for entertaining literature and plots they could easily relate to. 
The above-discussed surveys and book reviews suggest the constant interaction 
between writer and reader. Mass readers expected that a book should be useful, didactic or 
instructive; it should be accessible to the reader, with clear ideas and guidance; literature 
should be realistic and yet heroic, optimistic, novels should be thick with an interesting plot 
and conflict, heroes should be positive, exemplary to and resembling the real life; the book 
should highlight the role of the collective, the working class and the party in building the 
new society; literature should not be obscene and its language should be understandable 
and simple. These expectations were voiced from below; they represented the tastes and 
preferences of broad masses of the new Soviet readers. The readers could voice their 
demands for and evaluations of literature they read not only through library reviews. There 
were numerous fora available for activist readers at the time. Every periodical reserved 
space for readers’ letters, numerous literary evenings were organised at the workplace. 
Hence, the authors, if they wanted to be published and read, needed to take these requests 
into account. 
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Krawchenko argues in favour of an unprecedented workers’ movement for Ukrainian 
culture, developed due to the fact that national intellectuals for the first time had wide 
access to worker consumers.673 Indeed, the implementation of Ukrainizatsiia policies 
strengthened the ties between the working class and the local Ukrainian intelligentsia. The 
question is where this meeting point between the aspirations of the creative intelligentsia 
and the demands of the working masses was and what type of culture this bond between the 
intelligentsia and workers brought about. Undoubtedly, both cultural activists and 
consumers played an important role in shaping Soviet Ukrainian culture. Certainly, the 
final product became a mixture between the “horizons of expectations” of the working-
class readers, proletarian writers and the authorities. 
The resultant Soviet culture of the 1930s differed significantly from the project 
initially envisaged by the avant-garde of the Ukrainian horizon in the KP(b)U. Within the 
equation of the Ukrainian proletarian writers, audience and the authorities, it was those 
writers of distinct autonomist and elitist orientation, who with time found themselves in a 
complete minority, if not to say, isolation. The republic’s audience, deliberately created and 
shaped by the mechanisms of social engineering, clearly favoured the dominant party 
vision of Soviet culture and literature, seen as a necessary complement to the social and 
economic advances of the late 1920s. The working class, the new dominant social force, 
did not want to be insolently treated by the old-line intelligentsia or those, as believed, who 
pursued the elitist concept of art. In fact, the working class was now empowered to dictate 
its own vision of Soviet culture. In fact, according to the new Soviet vocabulary, the 
workers were becoming Soviet intelligentsia themselves, gradually substituting that 
nineteenth-century “dedicated order, almost a secular priesthood, devoted to the spreading 
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of a specific attitude to life, something like a gospel,” as the Russian intelligentsia was 
defined by Isaiah Berlin.674 So, the new Soviet canon became a product of a hybrid, of what 
Dobrenko called the “power-masses,” functioning as a single creator.675 During the years 
of the first Five-Year plan the “power-masses” triumphed against the sectarian elitist vision 
of Soviet Ukrainian culture, negated by both the party leadership and the audience. The 
next chapter will explore the last stage of the sovietisation of Ukraine in 1928-1932 and 
account for the meeting point of the three main components of cultural development, as 
defined in the thesis: 1) centralist and unification initiatives of the party; 2) middle-brow 
readers’ tastes and appetites; and 3) gradual adaptation of the writers in view of the two 
components. 
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Section Four: Fitting in the Soviet Canon: State Appropriation of 
Literature during the First Five-Year Plan 
By 1932, the process of the full-scale social and political transformation of the Soviet 
Union, kick-started by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd on 6-7 November 1917, was arguably 
completed. During the years of the first Five-Year Plan, the two visions of a new Soviet 
society had finally met, the one gradually introduced from above by the authorities, and the 
one, anticipated by the new working class, brought up by Komsomol and educated in the 
1920s.676 Hence, the Soviet socio-political revolution was introduced and influenced both 
“from above” and “from below”. As Robert C. Tucker put it, “masses of ordinary people 
participate in the process, while the new political leadership which the revolution has 
brought to power espouses the transformation of the society as a program and actively 
promotes it as a policy.”677 The period between 1928 and 1932 determined the complete 
sovietisation of Ukraine’s society, politics and culture. This chapter explores the role of 
Ukraine’s creative intellectuals during this final stage of the socio-political transformation. 
In particular, it examines the process of state appropriation of literature and its impact on 
the literary scene in Ukraine. This concluding chapter investigates the results of the writers’ 
evolution towards accepting and/or establishing the Soviet canon with regards to political 
consolidation and social transformation. Thus, this chapter brings together all three 
constituents of the cultural sovietisation of Ukraine discussed in the thesis (intentions of the 
authorities, the writers’ evolution and the emergence of national audience), and looks at 
how the convergence of these three factors impacted the intellectual and artistic autonomy 
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in Ukraine. In addition, the chapter explores the ways, in which the writers reacted to the 
resultant political, social and aesthetic uniformity, which came into being after 1932-1934. 
 
Modernisation by Means of Class War 
In the second half of the 1920s, the Soviet leadership centrally initiated a grand campaign 
of modernisation, based on rapid industrialisation and increase of production. There were 
multiple reasons for this initiative. Firstly, the Soviet Union, which had already reached its 
pre-war levels of production by 1927, still lagged far behind other major economic powers. 
Secondly, the need of state-initiated and state-controlled modernisation was conditioned by 
the ‘war scare’ and hence the need not only to modernise but also to militarise the national 
economy in case of an attack or a future European war, in which the Soviet Union did not 
plan to play a subordinate role.678 Also, there were important ideological prerequisites: the 
success of modernisation could provide substance to Stalin’s theory of ‘socialism in one 
country’, i.e., proving that the Soviet Union with its industrial base and military might 
could become a model for a successful proletarian revolution before exporting it abroad. 
Finally, it had political significance. After having defeated the left wing opposition, Stalin 
initiated the campaign against his previous supporters from the right wing, using the Soviet 
economy as a trump card against his new opponents. 
Stalin’s far-reaching plans of economic and social modernisation required 
unquestioning social support, especially from the working class and ‘toiling intelligentsia’. 
This was not easy to achieve in Ukraine, where, for instance, in 1928, 35% of engineering 
and technical personnel, 40% of agricultural specialists, 75% of scientists and academics 
                                                 
678 John P. Sontag, “The Soviet War Scare of 1926-27,” The Russian Review 34, 1 (1975): 66-77; Lennart 
Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military Economic Planning, 1925-1941. 
(Basingstoke; London: Macmillan Press, 2000). 
  
256 
 
were of pre-revolutionary origin.679 To tackle the situation, specialised education and 
training for the need of industrialisation was prioritised in the Resolution On the Five-Year 
Long-Term Plan of Development of the National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR, adopted 
at the Second KP(b)U Conference (April 1929).680 As a result of a controlled class-based 
admission to higher education and worker promotion (Ukr. vysuvanstvo, Rus. vydvizheniie), 
in 1933 already 46.4% of all the specialists occupied in national economy were educated 
and trained after 1928, out of which 37.4% were of worker origin.681 
The rapid changes in the level of education and promotion possibilities available for 
workers changed social dynamics. The new ‘revolutionary classes’, imbued with political 
propaganda, eagerly embraced the values of the socialist construction and bright 
communist future. For them, any privileges provided to the ‘old intelligentsia’ were seen as 
a betrayal of the revolutionary cause.682 So, those newly educated and promoted workers 
and peasants disseminated an intolerant attitude towards alleged class enemies, as defined 
by the official channels. Hence, a peremptory attitude towards ‘class enemies’ of the time 
was fuelled both by centrally initiated political campaigns and social grievances of the new 
Soviet working class. This ‘class war’ became a defining feature of the first Five-Year Plan 
and it left noticeable traces in every domain, including the cultural sphere. 
For the soviet state modernisation programme to succeed, the party needed to take all 
sectors of social and political life under its direct control. After the course on accelerated 
industrialisation was officially declared in December 1925, many previously semi-
autonomous spheres started to be regarded as necessary components of the Soviet 
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industrialisation effort. The campaign required centralisation of power; resulting in a 
change of dynamics between political elites in the republics and centrally. As it was already 
mentioned in Section One, the course on industrialisation changed the way the korenizatsiia 
policy in Ukraine was defined and carried out. Since 1926, the project gained new impetus, 
since the republic’s Ukrainian speaking peasantry became the main source of workforce for 
the modernisation campaign. The objectives of korenizatsiia, however, were interpreted 
differently in Kharkiv and in Moscow. In 1926, Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine tasked with 
hastening the implementation of korenizatsiia. His view on the project contradicted the 
vision of the Ukrainian faction in the party, which included the former Borot'bysty. In April 
1926, the chief Ukrainiser Shums'kyi was publicly accused of misinterpreting the aims of 
the policy, having confused the Ukrainizatsiia of the party and its apparatus with 
Ukrainizatsiia of the republic’s proletariat. The ‘Shums'kyi affair’ triggered a sweeping 
campaign against the Ukrainian communists, intellectuals and public activists. 
On 4 September 1926, amidst this power struggle, the top secret report “Ob 
Ukrainskom Separatisme” [On Ukrainian Separatism] was issued by the GPU, outlining the 
activities, allegedly used by the counterrevolution to pursue the goals of Ukraine’s 
independence. The report targeted mostly those activists, who had supported Shums'kyi’s 
vision of Ukrainizatsiia, and those, who had returned from abroad to help carry it out 
(zminovikhivtsi683). It was stated that “the fact that Ukrainian nationalists ceased the open 
struggle with the Soviet regime and formally acknowledged it, [did] not mean that they 
[had] definitively reconciled themselves with the present state of affairs and [had] truly 
given up their hostile plans.”684 The directive called for comprehensive surveillance over 
Ukrainian artists and intellectuals, suspected in being involved in the anti-Soviet ‘cultural 
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struggle’. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs), and the All-Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences (VUAN) were seen as the most dangerous centres of ‘Ukrainian 
separatism’. According to the GPU officials, these institutions “collected around 
themselves the dense mass of former eminent figures of the UNR”.685 The last document is 
extremely important for understanding the inherent contradictions around the 
implementation of the korenizatsiia policy in Ukraine. With its anti-Ukrainian character the 
document contradicted presumably affirmative objectives of the Soviet nationalities policy. 
It suggests how various policies worked at cross-purposes to each other: the top secret 
report was issued and its recommendations started to be implemented at the time when 
Ukrainizatsiia had only started to gain its momentum. 
The secret GPU document encouraged informing on Ukrainian intellectuals who have 
“changed their tactics but not their ideology.”686 The results of their meticulous work can 
be found, among others, in the collection of weekly top secret reports (svodki), drafted by 
the GPU Secret Department from 1927 to 1929. These were the reports on actions deemed 
to be of counter-revolutionary or even anti-Soviet character. Among numerous activists, the 
names of Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi were repeatedly featured. The entries ranged from 
simple mentions of the writers’ negative attitude towards the Soviet literary politics in 
Ukraine687 up to open accusations of separatism. For instance, Tychyna was called a 
speaker of the counter-revolution, and accused of preparing an uprising against the Soviet 
regime.688 The evidence compiled by the secret services in 1926-29 suggests that in 
Ukraine the persecution based on political affiliation, often defined by national orientation, 
had long preceded the class-based discrimination, employed during Stalin’s ‘great break’. 
                                                 
685 ibid, 293. 
686 ibid, 293. 
687 Danylenko, Ukraїns'ka Inteligentsia, 119. 
688 ibid, 164. 
  
259 
 
Conventionally, the ‘hard line’ campaign against class enemies within the Soviet 
Union was introduced during the Shakhty trial in 1928, when a large group of mining 
engineers and technicians from the Donbas area in Ukraine were charged with conspiracy 
and sabotage. The trial marked the beginning of a political confrontation between 
‘proletarian’ communists and the old ‘bourgeois’ intelligentsia and it set the pattern for 
anti-intelligentsia actions in other areas.689 In Ukraine, the Shakhty trial was followed by 
several major national conspiracies and terrorist plots ‘unmasked’ between 1929 and 1934. 
The most important trials of the early 1930s were those over the conspiratorial ‘nationalist’ 
organisations the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukraїny, SVU), 
the Ukrainian National Centre (Ukraїns'kyi Natsional'nyi Tsentr, UNTs) and the Ukrainian 
Military Organisation (Ukraїns'ka Viis'kova Organisatsiia, UVO). Many of these cases 
were fabricated by the secret police.690 These trials mostly targeted the “old intelligentsia” 
and zminovikhivtsi, Ukrainian communists and political activists who disagreed with 
political centralisation and the vision of a Soviet Ukraine imposed centrally. The scope of 
these trials was immense. Only in connection to the SVU, some thirty thousand educators 
and schoolteachers were arrested all over Ukraine.691 
The trial over the alleged SVU leaders was the major show trial of the period. The 
persecution of the forty-five Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and theologians, former 
politicians and activists, and the VUAN leading members had serious repercussions. 
Firstly, by eliminating the VUAN leadership, the autonomous status of this academic 
institution, granted in the early 1920s, was abolished. By this, the Academy, the main 
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promoter of academic research, was subjugated to the political agenda of the Communist 
Party. In addition, the SVU trial brought to an end the lenient attitude towards 
zminovikhivtsi and fellow-travellers; this change of perspective signalled the process of 
accelerated monopolisation of the artistic and cultural spheres. Matthew Pauly has argued 
that the SVU trial was a signal that the Ukrainizatsiia policy had been reconsidered: “By 
tarring Ukrainian literature with the slander of nationalism, conflating it with counter-
revolutionary reaction, the SVU trial and its reporting also undermined the public’s faith in 
Ukrainization and pre-revolutionary cultural elites”.692 
The SVU trial drew a line under the whole period of national communist opposition 
in the KP(b)U. Although no party members were arrested, many were targeted by the 
official press and some, like Khvyl'ovyi, became actively engaged in the process of public 
denunciations and unmasking alleged Soviet enemies. In the course of the trial, Khvyl'ovyi 
prepared two articles, “Who else sits among the indicted?” and “After Iefremov’s diary...”, 
published at the time of the trial in the newspaper Kharkivs'kyi Proletar [Kharkiv 
Proletariat].693 Those contributions were used both to castigate those accused and as a form 
of self-criticism. Firstly, Khvyl'ovyi openly supported the party campaign against national 
deviations and applauded the GPU’s success in uncovering “the main headquarters of the 
Ukrainian military counter-revolutionary organisation”.694 Secondly, he called for further 
actions against another “militant deviation” in the KP(b)U, namely khvyl'ovizm.695  
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Undoubtedly, through these newspaper articles the writer once again attempted to 
swear allegiance to the party and to denounce his previous ‘faults’, for which he was 
continuously reproached in the official press and during party meetings. Under the guise of 
the trial reports, Khvyl'ovyi, possibly as in his first open letter in the newspaper Komunist 
in 1928, tried to display that he acknowledged his mistakes, realised the importance of the 
party membership and was ready to cooperate. His repentance reached its intended 
addressee. During the XI KP(b)U Congress, Stanislav Kosior, General Secretary of the TsK 
KP(b)U, reported: “In the fight against shums'kizm and khvyl'ovizm […] the Party has won. 
We defeated the deviationists to the last, we inflicted a crushing blow. […] I reckon that the 
SVU trial became the most merciless conviction to shums'kizm and to entire Ukrainian 
chauvinism. Comrade Khvyl'ovyi, who during the process published an article entitled 
“Who else sits among the indicted?” raised a pertinent question. Hereby I must admit that 
the time has come to stop baiting Comrade Khvyl'ovyi for his old sins.”696 
Although the communist Khvyl'ovyi avoided persecution, other communists of 
national orientation were called to account for their alleged deviations. In the following 
years, a number of prominent Ukrainian politicians, party members and public activists 
were charged in connection to the Ukrainian National Centre and the Ukrainian Military 
Organisation. The most prominent convicts of the UNTs case were the two Galicia-born 
Ukrainian academics and recent returnees to Soviet Ukraine Hrushevs'kyi and Matvii 
Iavors'kyi,697 whereas the UVO trial tackled the representatives of the higher political 
echelons. In 1933, Shums'kyi, demoted in 1927 from the Commissariat for Education and 
reassigned to Moscow, was accused of organising a fascist coup and consequently 
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sentenced to ten years of labour camps. The UVO trial also had repercussions for 
Skrypnyk, heavily criticised for his activity as a Commissar for Education.698 The 
campaign against Skrypnyk, ‘skrypnykivshchyna’, led to official curtailing of Ukrainizatsiia 
in 1933. 
Undoubtedly, those political show trials were intended to prevent the crystallisation 
of the possible political opposition in Ukraine, strengthened as a by-product of 
Ukrainizatsiia. Campaigns against Ukrainian politicians and public intellectuals after 1928 
signalled the decline of the separatist horizon in the party, as it was defined in Section One. 
At the same time, it was a watershed in the process of sovietisation of Ukraine. After 1932, 
in Ukraine it was hardly possible to find an activist or an intellectual, who was not checked, 
who did not repent or concede to the party agenda. The ‘class war’ of the 1928-1932 
became, in its own way, a threshold for those who would define the cultural and ideological 
scene in Ukraine in the decades to follow. 
 
The Methods of the ‘Class War’ in Literature 
Until the late 1920s, literature enjoyed relative autonomy, as assured by the resolutions of 
the TsK KP(b)U and TsK VKP(b) from 1925. It was recognised that there was no 
hegemony of proletarian writers as of yet; hence, the party observed the autonomy of 
literature, and did not engage in the literary debates of the time.699 The course on rapid 
industrialisation, however, challenged this semi-autonomous status and led to re-examining 
the party view on literature and re-defining the limits of its intervention in cultural matters. 
In a short while, the process of institutional unification was initiated. It was supervised by 
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semi-official associations of proletarian writers, created all over the Soviet Union after the 
example of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), established in January 
1925. 
In Ukraine, the All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers (Vseukraїns'ka Spilka 
Proletars'kyh Pys'mennykiv, VUSPP) became the main agent for achieving institutional and 
ideological unification. The VUSPP members, as declared in the Manifesto from January 
1927, were determined to wage a “decisive struggle for an international-class union of 
Ukraine’s literature against ‘bourgeois nationalism’ and creating a ‘proletarian constructive 
realism’”.700 Those audacious claims at the time were, however, premature. The VUSPP 
had important rivals in Ukraine’s literary settings, namely the VAPLITE and the Futurists. 
It was the public campaign against Khvyl'ovyi and the VAPLITE in 1927-28, which 
brought the VUSPP to the fore. After the dissolution of the VAPLITE, this association 
became the major literary organisation in the republic and a mouthpiece of the official 
propaganda. 
The party intervention in the cultural sphere reaffirmed the social purpose of 
literature. After 1928, literature was recognised as a medium used to promote certain class-
defined values and morals to young workers and future communists. Those party initiatives 
were eagerly accepted by the literary corpus. The idea of the ‘the first Five-Year Plan of 
art’, aimed at raising the mass consciousness and organising mass will, mind, and 
enthusiasm for socialist construction and the great social reforms (as defined by the RAPP 
leader Leopold Averbakh701) found substantial support in Ukraine. Apart from the VUSPP, 
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Literaturnyi Iarmarok [Literary Bazaar] (in its last periodicals) and the Prolitfront 
[Proletarian Literary Front], two literary organisations established by Khvyl'ovyi after the 
dissolution of the VAPLITE, and the Futurists also got engaged in the process of socialist 
construction. 
Literaturnyi Iarmarok was a literary almanac, initiated by Khvyl'ovyi in late 1928 to 
unite the former VAPLITE members. Literaturnyi Iarmarok, of which twelve issues were 
published between December 1928 and February 1930, was an attempt to preserve some 
elements of autonomy of literature against the monopolising tendencies of the VUSPP. The 
journal featured some of the most ironic, humorous and mystifying texts of the 1920s. To a 
certain degree, the periodical became the culmination of the extremely creative literary 
decade of the twenties. The critic of the time Bilets'kyi highly praised Khvyl'ovyi’s new 
initiative: “by virtue of its external appearance which was created by the most prominent 
artists of the day, by its content, particularly the literary prose, by its refined language and 
the subtle melding of humour together with a respect for ideas and form, [it] surpassed by 
far anything that had been done in Ukraine before.”702 
Not surprisingly, the publications in Literaturnyi Iarmarok attracted torrents of 
criticism from orthodox critics and the VUSPP members. Nevertheless, as the social and 
political pressure toughened, the contributions to the almanac were becoming more 
moderate and in line with the party spirit. Already the last issues merited rather laudable 
official reviews. One of the critics asserted: “today we can say with assurance that […] the 
majority of [these] ‘pessimists’ will become our own troubadours. They have begun to 
speak a different language. If you take Number 10 of Literaturnyi Iarmarok you will see 
that it already signals … a transition to … an organisation [that is part] of the proletarian 
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front.”703 In the preface to the last issue of the almanac, Khvyl'ovyi bid his farewell to the 
readers and invited them to follow the new literary periodical, Prolitfront.704 
The Proletarian Literary Front, Prolitfront, became the last attempt of Khvyl'ovyi and 
his followers to maintain distance from the state-sponsored VUSPP and challenge the 
unification tendencies of the party cultural managers. It was established in April 1930 to 
unite those former Vaplitians, who contributed to Literaturnyi Iarmarok. However, the 
literary organisation followed the same path of accommodating the party vision on 
literature, as its ardent opponent, the VUSPP. In the statute, the group members declared 
themselves in the vanguard of a “fight against bourgeois art, against a hostile ideology […], 
against nationalist manifestations.”705 At the time, when class content and orientation 
towards the masses became the key values for literature, the organisation turned towards 
workers and peasants, looking for themes and readers. The Prolitfront in full accepted the 
party vision on literature as an immediate response to actuality. Its members got engaged in 
various ‘useful activities,’ such as making tours to factories and collective farms, taking 
trips to the construction of new sites to collect material for their poems and stories. Also, 
the Prolitfront declared that their ranks were open for workers who were eager to master 
literary craft and participate in “socialist competition for the best literary results”.706 To 
provide a platform for these voices, the Prolitfront initiated the bimonthly journal 
Literaturnyi Tsekh [Literary Guild], also targeting young members of various literary 
studios opened in Kharkiv factories. Although seen as a last retreat for ‘independent’ 
                                                 
703 Quoted in Ilynytskyi, Ukrainian Futurism, 157. 
704 Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, “Proloh do Knyhy Sto Sorok Druhoi,” in Khvyl’ovyi, Tvory u p'iat'okh tomakh, vol.4, 
447. 
705 “Do Chytacha,” in Khvyl'ovyi, Tvory u p'iat'okh tomakh, vol. 4, 595-599. 
706 Luckyj, Literary Politics, 158. 
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writers,707 the creation and the activity of the Prolitfront in 1930-31 demonstrated the 
process of gradual and yet irreversible descent of the alternative project of proletarian 
literature in Ukraine. 
The interference of the party in the cultural sphere, however, was not the only factor 
leading to the unification of Ukrainian literature. As argued throughout the thesis, the 
Soviet literary canon was approached equally by the party need to control arts and the 
aesthetic horizon of the readers. Hence, the evolution of the reading appetites among the 
Ukraine’s working youth influenced significantly the trajectory of cultural development in 
Ukraine. During 1928-32, a militant model of the ‘ideal’ reader, as promoted by the party, 
in full started to correspond to the predominant attitudes of the fanatical youth. The change 
in reading models can be analysed based on the reading reports and library surveys 
conducted in Ukraine between 1928 and 1932. 
In 1929, a survey of the working youth library borrowers in Kyiv was conducted. Its 
results differed significantly from those all-Ukrainian surveys undertaken in 1927/28 (as 
discussed in Section Three). In comparison to the previous studies, the 1929 survey showed 
the important shift in preferences as for contemporary proletarian literature in Ukrainian. 
The surveys from 1927/28 recorded 11.4% of requests for contemporary literature in 
Ukrainian and 81.3% in Russian. In comparison, in 1929, there were already 56.3% of 
requests for Soviet Ukrainian and 68% for Russian literature (Table 9).708 
                                                 
707 Kostiuk, Zustrichi i Proshchannia, 251-288; Luckyi, Literary Politics, 156. 
708 Kerekez, Robitnycha Molod'. 
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The results of the study exposed significant changes in the readers’ preferences, if 
compared to both the all-Ukraine survey (1927/28) and the earlier survey of the Kyiv 
library borrowers, conducted in 1926/27. In both cases, one can observe the growing 
preference for contemporary Soviet literature in Ukrainian. As reported in 1926/27, the 
Kyiv library borrowers mostly requested nineteenth-century authors, with very little interest 
in contemporary literature.709 In fact, there were hardly any contemporary writers in the 
top-list in 1926/27. Out of 503 total requests for books in Ukrainian, only four 
contemporary Soviet writers were requested more than twice. These were Khvyl'ovyi, 
Vyshnia, Kosynka, and Slisarenko (4-6 requests). In comparison, the 1929 list already 
included some new names: the most popular Holovko, Panch, and Vyshnia were closely 
followed by Mykytenko, Khvyl'ovyi and Le. The growing popularity of Soviet Ukrainian 
literature, however, can also be attributed to the fact that the book production had increased 
by the end of the decade (Table 2). 
The 1929 survey suggests some important changes in the readership in Ukraine. The 
survey showed that various tactics used by the authorities to manipulate taste succeeded in 
                                                 
709 Frid'eva, Chytach Kyїvs'kykh Bibliotek, 185. 
Table 9: Reader’s Requests on Books Based on Language in Kyiv Libraries, 1929 
 By the author 
 Total names Of them on contemporary 
authors 
In per cents  
Ukrainian 55 31 56.3  
Russian 145 100 68 
Translated 121 -  
 By number of requests  
 Requests in total Of them on contemporary 
authors 
In per cents 
Ukrainian 436 90 20.5 
Russian 510 373 73 
Translated 513 -  
Source: Ia. Kerekez, Robitnycha Molod' i Khudozhnia Literatura. Instytut Rukopysu, F. 74, 
od. zv. 214 
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creating a new normative model of a reader. In the atmosphere of class war, a reader seems 
to become militant, even fanatical. The pervasive intolerant attitude towards alleged 
enemies penetrated book reviews. Along with the growing popularity of the contemporary 
Soviet writers, the attitude towards foreign and non-Soviet authors became more 
condemnatory. Former most-popular authors were reproached for not being ‘suitable’ for 
the new audience. For instance, London’s novels were characterised as full “of defects, 
over-idealisations, and clichéd characters”;710 O. Henry’s short stories were “written not for 
the workers, but for the upper class, since the workers are not interested in the lives of the 
millionaires.”711 Similar negative attitude was recorded towards Vynnychenko’s novels. 
The best-read author of the decade was attacked for the lack of faith in a classless society. 
As reviewed, his Soniachna Mashyna “must be completely destroyed […]. [Vynnychenko] 
wants to prove that the proletariat cannot play the master, that a classless society is 
impossible and that the class hierarchy should remain. Well, the proletarian reader even 
without Vynnychenko knows how things can and should be.”712 
The interest in historical events and their interpretation had increased. Whereas in the 
mid-1920s, readers in general were not interested in the recent past (“Why should we read 
about something we have experienced ourselves”713), by the end of the 1920s there was a 
clear demand for these literary accounts. As noted by a reader reviewing Mariia 
Boretskaia’s Pir Narodnyi (1927), “every young worker should read this novel since he 
hasn’t experienced those events [the revolution and the civil wars] himself”.714 This 
growing interest in the recent past was aptly used for, or even instigated by the party 
                                                 
710 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb. 214, ark. 47. 
711 Ibid, ark. 46. 
712 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb.217, ark. 5. 
713 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb.210, ark. 15. 
714 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb. 214, ark. 36. 
  
269 
 
propagandists and educators. The revolution and the civil wars were appropriated by Soviet 
propaganda; they acquired new, useful and didactic interpretation. These events acquired a 
black-and-white depiction, where positive characters of communists were opposed by 
negative “others”. These new literary representations were successfully used to manipulate 
the reader and to pressure writers.  
Numerous reviews from the 1929 study exposed that the Soviet youth had digested 
Soviet propaganda and started thinking in class-terms; their identity had been transformed 
as a by-product of Soviet modernisation. The book reviews showed that the remembrance 
of the civil wars acquired a very exclusive character, used to glorify communists and 
condemn other sides of the conflict. For instance, Irchan’s Tragediia 1go Travnia was “the 
most frank and honest book about the civil war; the author truthfully depicted the 
revolutionary struggle in Ukraine, where counterrevolutionary gangs, hidden behind the 
ideals of Ukraine’s independence, ruthlessly destroyed and plundered everything on their 
way.”715 Similarly, Panch’s Golubi Eshelony offered “a good depiction of the events after 
October and the corrupted defenders of a “free Ukraine”. Smolych’s Fal'shyva Mel'pomena 
showed “the purposelessness of the Ukrainian counterrevolution and of those who, despite 
their class origin, in a chauvinistic haze became a blind weapon of the real counter-
revolution.”716 Similarly, the rhetoric of ‘class war’ found its place in the reviews. Rusov’s 
Oblomki “unravelled the whole truth about our former enemy, so that we can understand 
our future enemies. […] We need to fight passive residues [in our society] before they 
become active, same as our community fights our class enemy”.717  
                                                 
715 Instytut Rukopysu, F. 47, od.zb. 214, ark.39.  
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Of course, the library reports might not represent general public opinion on the 
matter. It may as well be that respondents were party members or Komsomol activists, 
expected to express their opinion along certain lines. Those activists embodied the ‘ideal’ 
reader of the Soviet propagandists, the one eager to engage in ideological debates, defend 
the value of proletarian literature, and simultaneously pressure writers. And yet, if the 
qualitative element (book reviews and personal comments) could be produced by those 
‘ideal’ readers, the quantitative constituent (the number of books and authors requested) 
supports the conclusion that the change in preferences and appetites of ‘real’ readers did 
indeed occur by the end of the 1920s. Readers expressed their preference for Soviet 
literature written in the Ukrainian language, the one which could satisfy their demands for 
simple realistic plots and positive characters. In addition, these books were a part of the 
obligatory language courses curriculum. As it was observed, “Our writers aim at new plots, 
reflecting the expectations of the new reader”.718 Overall, during the Five-Year Plan the 
‘real’ reader had evolved and started to resemble that ‘ideal’ reader as imagined by state 
propagandists and centrally-oriented Ukrainian writers. The changes in readership model 
became, however, detrimental for inclusive Soviet Ukrainian literature. The vision of 
Khvyl'ovyi was often regarded too demanding, sophisticated or ideologically dubious for 
mass tastes. In general, cultural innovations of the 1920s failed to win the reading public. 
As a result, writers and Soviet authorities alike moved to embrace more conventional forms 
of literary expression. 
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The Old Writers in the New Atmosphere 
The period of the first Five-Year Plan became the most despondent for Ukrainian literature. 
Literary works produced by authors with little or no talent, and evaluated purely in terms of 
ideology and political intent inundated bookshops. The VUSPP members with all their 
claims for monopoly hardly produced any works of high literary merit. Pages of the 
VUSPP’s periodical Hart [Tempering] and its literary fortnightly Literaturna Hazeta 
[Literary Gazette] were predominantly filled with invectives towards perceived enemies, 
other literary groups and currents, especially against the Futurists. To make matters worse, 
the atmosphere of class war demanded from the already established writers to engage in 
polemics and lower their standards in order to meet the expectations of the mass reading 
public. Not surprisingly, many renowned writers attempted to keep silent or withdraw from 
mere ideological debates. These scenarios, however, were not available for Tychyna and 
Khvyl'ovyi, who were continuously reproached for their non-orthodox past. 
Needless to say, Tychyna, same as other intellectuals of pre-revolutionary origin, 
could not feel safe in that atmosphere of class-based intolerance. His name was mentioned 
repeatedly on the pages of those 254 volumes of the SVU trial materials. Indeed, as seen 
from the investigation file of a VUAN member and a literary scholar Oleksandr 
Doroshkevych, Tychyna figured as a member of a secret organisation, which was based at 
the Kyiv department of the Shevchenko Institute of Literature.719 Nonetheless, instead of 
being interrogated and further investigated, Tychyna was promoted. In May 1929, Tychyna 
was nominated for a vacant position of a VUAN academic. The same year, he became a 
VUTsVK candidate. These appointments commenced Tychyna’s career as state official. 
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This path, however, required different virtues; the attuned poetry became a necessary 
attribute of his new role.  
In 1931, after years-long silence (his last collection Viter z Ukraїny appeared in 1924) 
Tychyna published a new collection of poetry, entitled Chernihiv. Eight verses, featured in 
the collection, presented a pathetic sketch of an ordinary day in a Ukrainian city during the 
Five-Year Plan. The poet relayed the conversation between the main character, a nameless 
worker, and his friend, who came to this city, which “regain its youth due to the Soviet 
rule”.720 The book was concluded by a verse, which had a telling title Stara Ukraїna 
Zminytysia Musyt' [Old Ukraine Must Change]. Despite its obvious proletarian orientation, 
the collection was severely censored. Those eight verses in full were republished only once, 
in the 1932 collection of Tychyna’s selected poetry. Thereafter, only two verses from 
Chernivih were allowed: the first verse “Mii Druh Robitnyk Vodyt' Mene po Mistu i 
Khvalyt'sia” [My Friend, a Worker, is Showing Me around the City and is Bragging] and 
Lenin, dedicated to the death of the leader (discussed in Section Two). The main reason for 
this severe censorship, according to one Soviet critic, was formalism. The poet, as 
reviewed, did not convey “the deep ideas, the great historical meaning of Chernihiv […] to 
the reader because the form he chose did not correspond to the content.”721 
For contemporary critics, however, Chernihiv became a sign of Tychyna’s final 
submission to the party line. Stus, a famous literary scholar of the 1970s-1980s, called the 
collection “Tychyna’s way out from the ‘Solovki situation’.”722 For Stus, Chernihiv was 
dictated by fear; with this collection Tychyna attempted to gain favour from the party and 
secure his own place in Soviet literature. Thereafter, a motive of fear and the poet’s weak 
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personality had often been used to explain Tychyna’s rapid submission to the party line.723 
However, this approach rejects the gradual evolution of the poet towards party-mindedness, 
ideological and class content (partiinost', ideinost', klassovost'), the main components of 
socialist realism. As the examples in Section Two have shown, the poet was trying to meet 
the expectations of the party and to attune his poetry to the official agenda even before 
1931. 
Therefore, the collection was not a sudden break, but a mere stop during Tychyna’s 
descent towards simplification of style and techniques and ideological poetry with social 
content. Whereas his earlier forays into propagandistic poetry could be vindicated by the 
obscurity of the civil war period and the concurrent power vacuum, his contributions of the 
early 1930s should already be regarded as attempts to fit in the restrictive literary ambience. 
Generally, Chernihiv is a “missing link” in the non-linear evolution of the poet from 
Soniachni Klarnety and Pluh to Partiia Vede [The Party Leads] and his later poetry. One 
can agree with Grabowicz’s characteristic of the collection: “Chernihiv, in short, highlights 
the various changes that occurred in Tychyna’s poetry – of thematic focus, of prosodic and 
linguistic devices, of the poet’s ideology and his stance with respect to the represented 
world.”724  
Khvyl'ovyi steadily followed the same path of accepting the intolerant mood of the 
period. His literary input suggests that he had settled for the requirements of social 
usefulness and rigid objectivity of literary work. His short stories of the early 1930s 
featured the most desired objects of the Five-Year Plan: workers, peasants, and exemplary 
party activists. At times, however, Khvyl'ovyi departed from official themes. Some of his 
                                                 
723 E.g., Tel'niuk, “Mistyfikatsiia Poeta”; Iarovyi, “Poet na Perehresti Pohliadiv”; Tarnavs'kyi, “T. S. Eliot i 
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characters, although party members, did not correspond to the morals of the builder of 
communism (e.g., Ostannii Den' [The Last Day] or Maibutni Shakhtari [Future Miners] or 
did not submit to the all-pervading optimism of the decade. Apart from some exceptions, a 
devotion to the Soviet duty, loyalty and discipline became the main drivers for the 
characters of his later prose. 
In Shchaslyvyi Sekretar [A Happy Secretary], (1930 or early 1931),725 Khvyl'ovyi 
produced one of the best examples of a positive hero in Ukrainian literature before socialist 
realism. The story depicts a day of the devoted party activist and functionary Comrade 
Stark, who had been recently transferred to a new troublesome district. The Comrade was 
highly valued by the leadership thanks to his excellent managerial skills and compliance 
with any personally inconvenient party directives. In a nutshell, the short story presents the 
conflict between social duty and personal attachments. Comrade Stark, expecting his family 
reunion, suddenly found out that his son had an accident. This terrible news was delivered 
simultaneously with a telegram demanding immediate transfer to another troublesome 
region. Cornered with the necessity to choose, the Comrade decided to follow his duty 
instead of hastening to his family. The decision was presented as understandable for such a 
devoted and loyal communist. However, a reader feels the artifice of this choice, especially 
since throughout the story the Comrade repeatedly confirmed his affection to his family and 
especially to his son. Stark decided to comply with the party directives, a sign that he had 
fully transformed from an individual with a free will to a mere party functionary, an 
executive of central decisions. It must be admitted that Comrade Stark was not only a 
literary character. During the first Five-Year plan, many shock workers prioritised their 
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duty over families, as seen from the memoirs of construction team leader V. Ia. Shidek 
(1929-31), who had forgotten about his ill son “under the pressure of work”.726 
Comrade Stark, same as the constructor team leader Shidek, personified a new ideal 
image of a Soviet citizen, which came to replace those revolutionary romanticists of the 
early 1920s. Khvyl'ovyi, a creator of the romantic myth of the revolution and the civil war, 
now became a promoter of a new myth, of a happy Soviet society, where citizens were full 
of optimism for and devotion to their communist future. The difference between the two 
was obvious. For the characters of Khvyl'ovyi’s early prose, the golden age was far gone. 
Hence pessimism became an attribute of the time. In contrast, for the new builders of 
communism the golden age was due to come and it was up to each and every community 
member to approach it. This participatory model elucidated the predominant optimism and 
enthusiasm of the Soviet times.  
Khvyl'ovyi presented another characteristic of the age, the prevalence of a community 
over an individual. The needs of the community (and the state) were far more important 
than individual needs; hence should be unconditionally pursued for the good of all. This 
understanding of the common good later came to replace the narrow-mindedness of the 
Five-Year period, and the loyalty to the state overweighed sectarian class loyalty. In a way, 
social realism with its loyalty to the state and the party was a relief for many cultural 
figures, which did not fit in the rigid frames of proletarian literature and RAPP sectarianism 
and bigotry. 
Along with attuning his creative writing, Khvyl'ovyi tried to rehabilitate his earlier 
works. In 1932, the first volume of his selected writings was published, consisting of  short 
stories and novels written in 1921-1924. In the introduction, Khvyl'ovyi referred to a 
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review on a German translation of his novels, which stated “Unsuitable for mature readers, 
for youth and public libraries, communist!”727 Questionably, Khvyl'ovyi mentioned this 
negative review as a proof by contradiction to his fellow party members, who kept scolding 
the writer for his alleged deviations. In addition, Khvyl'ovyi accompanied each story in the 
volume with a short introductory note, clarifying his intentions and attuning his earlier 
works to the demands of the time. His efforts did not go unnoticed. Among the GPU secret 
reports, there was an apt characteristic of Khvyl'ovyi’s transformation: “Mykola Khvyl'ovyi 
was almost an Apostle or a Prophet for the Ukrainian people, best compared to a tragic 
prophet Jeremiah. However, he got mistaken and needed to recognise his errors; he had 
been thinking for over half a year, and turn himself into … a buffoon [blasen'].”728 
Nevertheless, Khvyl'ovyi did not take those recuntations seriously. In one of the letters 
intercepted by the secret police he confessed “logically and in my mind I have switched 
over; but emotionally, I have not, and I feel that it will not happen soon. Emotionally I am 
still the same.”729 
 
Khvyl'ovyi: a Suicide 
In 1933, at the height of the famine, Khvyl'ovyi together with Arkadii Liubchenko, his 
close friend and a former VAPLITE secretary, was commissioned to write reports on the 
situation in villages in eastern Ukraine. Later abroad, Liubchenko published his memoirs, 
entitled Iogo Taiemnytsia [His Secret], offering his account of the journey and the last year 
of Khvyl'ovyi’s life. The memoirist rendered Khvyl'ovyi’s views on the famine in Ukraine. 
For Khvyl'ovyi, according to the author, the famine was intentionally organised in order “to 
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provoke resistance and, after having crushed it, to settle once and for all the dangerous 
Ukrainian problem.”730 The partiality of the memoirs, however, is worth noting. Following 
the World War Two, Liubchenko, one of many, ended up in exile and became an architect 
of the glorification narrative of the Ukrainian twenties in the diaspora historiography, later 
shaped within the “executed renaissance” paradigm. The memoirs, first published in 1943, 
could as well be used to adjust Khvyl'ovyi’s persona to the demands of the new ideological 
narrative. 
Nonetheless, the memoirs offer an insight into the last years of Khvyl'ovyi’s life. One 
of the monologues, recorded by Liubchenko, seems especially important for understanding 
Khvyl'ovyi’s decisions leading to his suicide in May 1933. It exposed the writer’s views on 
the role of a public intellectual in Ukraine at the time:  
[Addressing Liubchenko]: What right do you have to die? Who told you can die? Nobody. 
I’m telling you: you must be prepared to live. To die, my friend, is the easiest way out. 
Anybody can do it. But to live – that’s something worth trying. To live and to struggle – 
especially now; that’s highly praiseworthy. It is true, in certain cases death is a better option, 
when through death perhaps one can do more for one’s fellow men than by living. But such 
cases are rare [...]731  
And your death – not of an average man, not of a narrow-minded person – should be 
extremely thought-through. [...] We do not belong only to ourselves. If we are sincerely 
faithful to the idea and to our task, we don’t even have the right to manage our death. 
Everything depends on what our duty decides for us. And this is us, and all those who are 
with us, who should live. To live and to work. In today’ circumstances first of all we should 
survive physically. This is our main task.732 
This long monologue, recorded in April 1933, provides a better understanding of the 
possible motivations for Khvyl'ovyi and his followers, firstly, to try to come to terms with 
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the regime at any costs by adjusting to every political agenda, and, subsequently, to take 
responsibility over their own lives.  
For all that, on 13 May 1933 Khvyl'ovyi committed suicide. The suicide occurred the 
day after the arrest of Ialovyi, the VAPLITE writer and its first president, accused in 
connection to an alleged counter-revolutionary organisation. As is known, on his last day 
Khvyl'ovyi invited his friends over to listen to his new novel. With a short presentation (“I 
was struggling with this novel a lot. However, I learned how a writer in the Stalin age 
should behave. Maybe I could teach you as well”733) the writer withdrew to his study where 
he shot himself a moment later. It is believed that Khvyl'ovyi left two death notes, in which 
he claimed his responsibility over the generation of the 1920s and provided the instructions 
about his literary heritage.734 The first note read: 
Arrest of Ialovyi - this is the murder of an entire generation ... For what? Because we were the 
most sincere Communists? I don't understand. The responsibility for the actions of Ialovyi's 
generation lies with me, Khvyl’ovyi. Today is a beautiful sunny day. I love life - you can't even 
imagine how much. Today is the 13th. Remember I was in love with this number? Terribly 
painful. Long live communism. Long live the socialist construction. Long live the Communist 
Party. 
The second note was addressed to his foster daughter Liubov Umantseva:  
My precious Liubystok! Forgive me, my grey-winged dove, for everything. By the way, 
yesterday I destroyed my unfinished novel not because I didn’t want it to be published, but 
because I needed to convince myself: if I had courage to destroy the novel – then I have found 
enough will to do what I am committed to do. Goodbye, my precious Liubystok. Your father 
M. Khvyl'ovyi.735 
Right after the Party Committee was informed about the incident, Khvyl'ovyi’s study was 
sealed; all his library, personal documentation and correspondence were confiscated. 
                                                 
733 Quoted from the documentary “Tzar i Rab Khytroshchiv” (script writers Iryna Shatokhina, Iurii Shapoval, 
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279 
 
The “shot of Khvyl'ovyi” was interpreted differently by state officials, the secret 
police, and the fellow writers. Already at the funeral, party functionaries attempted to 
dissociate the writer’s decision from the party line, offering an image of a weak, unsteady 
communist. The main message of the official obituary notices and Party representative’s 
speeches was that Khvyl'ovyi lacked revolutionary temper in a time when “every day, 
every hour of our struggle put us closer to the triumph of Socialism all over the world.”736 
Thus, Khvyl'ovyi’s decision was perceived as worthless, tragic, and ridiculous;’ it was 
stated that it had “nothing to do with his membership in the Communist party.”737  
Khvyl'ovyi’s death also played into the hands of the secret police. As declared, his 
decision was linked to the nationalist orientation and prejudices against the Soviet 
government. So, in order not to let those sentiments spread, the party “in cold mind, with 
all the hatred to capitalism, with all the love to socialism of today and communism of 
tomorrow [must] fight those prejudices in everyday life, in Khvyl'ovyi, in ourselves.”738 In 
less than a year, the name of “the fascist writer” Khvyl'ovyi appeared in the list of the 
alleged traitors in the official monthly Chervonyi Shliakh.739 For the decades to follow, 
khvyl'ovizm, along with shums'kizm and skrypnykivshchyna, was a synonym to ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’, used for labelling any form of national deviation in the party, including 
simple divergence of opinions. 
The reaction of the state authorities proved that the accident had far broader 
significance than a mere personal or local event. Khvyl'ovyi’s suicide became decisive for 
the Ukrainian cultural development. For instance, Vynnychenko interpreted the suicides of 
Khvyl'ovyi (13 May 1933) and the then Commissar for Education Skrypnyk (7 July 1933), 
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as a proof of inconsistency in the Soviet nationalities policy.740 Fellow writers read 
Khvyl'ovyi’s suicide in line with tightening centralisation of cultural life in the republic. In 
the corridors of the Slovo apartment building (the building of the writers’ union in Kharkiv) 
it was said that Khvyl'ovyi’s suicide was far more significant than that of Mayakovsky’s; 
while Khvyl'ovyi reacted to the “social discontent of [19]33,” his Russian fellow committed 
suicide only “out of personal discontent in [19]30.”741 In general, for the writers’ guild, the 
decision of their recognised leader signalled that there was no alternative to a centralist 
vision of Soviet Ukrainian literature. The adverse prospects were observed by the writer 
Hryhorii Epik: “You know, Mykola [Kulish], whatever we write now, we will not be 
allowed, that’s our end.”742  
Shortly after the suicide, a new image of an ambivalent irresolute communist 
Khvyl'ovyi, who could not reconcile his ideological standpoints with nationalist sentiments, 
came into prominence. The narrative of the ambivalent writer and communist Khvyl'ovyi 
was conveniently used by the ideological rivals. The party benefited most from this 
perspective. Moreover, the party ideologists were the contributors to such an image of 
Khvyl'ovyi. One of the instruments chosen for this matter was a deliberate manipulation 
with the documents gathered on Khvyl'ovyi by the secret services. Evidence of the party’s 
attempt to create and consolidate a certain image of the communist Khvyl'ovyi can be 
found in a recently published collection of declassified documents from the Sectoral State 
Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine.743 The secret File S-183 was put together 
between 1930 and 1933. The opening year of the file cast doubts on the underlying motive 
                                                 
740 TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.6204, ark.20-30: Lyst V. Vynnychenka Politbiuro TsK KP(b)U, TsK VKP(b) i I. 
Stalinu z Krytykoiu Natsional'noї Polityky Bil'shovykiv v Ukraїni ta Zasterezhenniam shchodo Neobkhidnoї 
Konsolidatsiї Vsih Demokratychnyh Syl na Vypadok Fashysts'koї Agresiї (15.09.1933) 
741 Poliuvannia na “Val'dshnepa”, 190 
742 Kulish A., “Smert' i Pokhoron Khvyl'ovoho,” in Khvylovy, Tvory u p'iat'okh tomakh, Vol.5, 172. 
743 Shapoval and Panchenko (eds.) Poliuvannia na “Val'dshnepa. 
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of the GPU to place the writer under surveillance. In 1930, after several letters of 
recantation, the dissolution of all the literary groups that Khvyl'ovyi was engaged in, and 
almost total silence over the last years, Khvyl'ovyi, as corroborated by one secret report, 
began “to behave more quietly.”744 Presumably, this personal file was created in 
preparation for further purges against Ukrainian intelligentsia, which could be used either 
against Khvyl'ovyi himself or to force him, if need be, to testify against his colleagues. 
Overall, the documents in the File S-183, present an image of the communist Khvyl'ovyi, 
who was dangerously ambivalent in his attitude towards the Soviet authorities. It provided 
sufficient grounds for further actions, which Khvyl'ovyi, however, avoided by committing 
suicide on 13 May 1933. 
On the other hand, the ideological ambivalence of Khvyl'ovyi played into hand of the 
contemporary creators of Khvyl'ovyi’s persona. It is worth mentioning that Khvyl'ovyi was 
not rehabilitated in the course of the ‘Thaw’ liberalisation in the 1950s.745 At the end of the 
1980s, during the so-called glasnost', Ukrainian communist intellectuals started to call for 
“returning Khvyl'ovyi to his readers”.746 This was also the time when both the 
autobiographical notes, whose veracity was discussed in the Introduction, and the copies of 
Khvyl'ovyi’s suicide notes, were made public for the first time. The interpretation of these 
primary sources contributed to a newly emerging narrative of the national communist 
Khvyl'ovyi. The Ukrainian-minded political elites of the 1980s-1990s ‘appropriated’ the 
early Soviet history and used the ambivalence of the epoch to create a historical narrative of 
inherent anti-communist opposition in the KP(b)U, providing legitimacy for their own 
attempts to withstand the central party leadership. 
                                                 
744 GDA SBU, Spr. C-183, ark. 107.  
745 Khvyl'ovyi was rehabilitated in September, 1989. See: TsDAHO, F.39, op.1, spr.819, ark.46-49; 
TsDAHO, F.1, op.11, spr.2224, ark.60. 
746 See, e.g., Mykola Zhulyns'kyi, “Talant nezvychainyi i superechlyvyi,” Vitchyzna, 12 (1987): 144–149 
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Given the intention, modern interpreters eagerly picked up and widely promoted 
thereafter an image of Khvyl'ovyi as a romantic, who became ideologically confused in his 
pursuit of a better social order. The excerpt about Khvyl'ovyi attending a congress of 
soldiers in Romania in October 1917 with two ribbons pinned to his collar: a red and a 
yellow-and-blue one as well as his justification (“I wanted to be, so to say, a Ukrainian 
Bolshevik”747) best served the purpose. Overall, the nationalistic approach attempted to 
rehabilitate and to excuse Khvyl'ovyi for being a communist by finding reasons for his 
decision to join the party and to remain a party member. In order to cope with the obvious 
dilemma of him being a talented writer in spite of his party membership, an attempt was 
made to push the concept of Khvyl'ovyi’s “fatal ambivalence,” which originated partly 
from his romantic nature and partly from his idealistic belief in Bolshevik populism. In this 
manner, in 1990, the literary scholar Mykola Zhulyns'kyi attributed Khvyl'ovyi’s party 
affiliation and later suicide to his naïve infatuation with a revolution: “The Revolution, 
which sparked his talent and got him to fall in love with it, in a short while betrayed its 
chosen one. And he, driven by disappointment and despair, with his own death tried to 
appeal to the Revolution to have mercy for its fanatic knights”.748 Most recent national 
historiography persists with the same interpretation of Khvyl'ovyi, highlighting his 
“permanent inner ambivalence” toward communism, “a game that the writer attempted to 
play with the system and finally with himself”.749 
Indeed, there are only a few assertions about Khvyl'ovyi that cannot be contested. 
Firstly, he was a prominent writer, whose creative manner was defined by his revolutionary 
experience. Moreover, he was a proletarian writer, and this artistic identity Khvyl'ovyi was 
                                                 
747 Khvyl'ovyi, Uryvok z Avtobiohrafїi, 107. 
748 Mykola Zhulyns'kyi, Iz Zabuttia-v Bezsmertia (Storinky Pryzabutoi Spadshchyny) (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1990), 
266. 
749 Shapoval, Fatal'na Ambivalentnist', 12. 
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trying to preserve, not because of the prevailing ideological expectations, but due to his 
personal convictions and beliefs in the potential of the working class to begin world history 
anew. Secondly, he was a member of the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks since 1919 
and even during the most severe persecutions remained faithful to his membership card. 
Yet, Khvyl'ovyi also adhered to an idea of a nationally defined socialist republic, an equal 
partner in a loose federation with other socialist republics. In the 1920s, with all its 
inconsistences and social experiments, this form of statehood could be seen as realistic and 
feasible. Khvyl'ovyi’s views were shared by many Ukraine-minded politicians and public 
intellectuals. This vision of a Soviet Ukraine was enabled by the very nature of the 
relationship between the Moscow centre and the border republics at that time. 
Khvyl'ovyi can represent an entire generation of disillusioned intellectuals, who 
witnessed the discrepancy between the ideals of the revolution and their implementation in 
Soviet Ukraine. Although a Bolshevik party member, Khvyl'ovyi sympathised with the 
Ukrainian communists and promoted a separatist vision of a Soviet Ukraine and a Soviet 
Ukrainian culture. Nonetheless, the attempts of the Ukrainian communists and intellectuals 
to reorganise the power relationship in Soviet Ukraine along with the cultural flourishing of 
the 1920s were crushed by the forcible tendencies aimed at consolidating the Bolshevik 
Party and Stalin’s Great Turn of 1928/29. Consequently, the figure of Khvyl'ovyi returned 
to Ukrainian culture and politics layered with contradictory interpretations. The question is 
how much do we know about Khvyl'ovyi besides those misinterpretations and 
manipulations with the writer’s biography and personality? Yet, Khvyl'ovyi left behind a 
significant literary contribution, exposing his complex development as a proletarian writer, 
a Bolshevik and a Soviet Ukrainian. 
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Tychyna: a Poet Laureate 
“The shot of Khvyl'ovyi” was a watershed in the relationship between the Moscow centre 
and Soviet Ukraine. With the suicides of Khvyl'ovyi and Skrypnyk, the national horizon in 
the KP(b)U was exhausted, and the Moscow leadership was ready to certify their 
undisputable victory over the republic. The sixteenth anniversary of the October Revolution 
was seen as an apt occurrence to brandish the progress of Soviet Ukraine, accomplished 
under the wise leadership of the Communist Party. For this occasion the Moscow 
newspaper Pravda was preparing a special issue dedicated almost entirely to Ukraine. The 
issue had extraordinary importance: Pravda, read worldwide, was meant to debunk 
rumours about the famine in Ukraine, carefully concealed throughout the period. Instead, 
the plan was to present a vivid image of the republic and its citizens enjoying the results of 
the socialist construction, achieved during the Five-Year Plan. 
To support the Moscow perspective on the matter, the editorial suggested engaging 
voices from Ukraine that would corroborate the image and cement the republic’s volition 
for the all-Soviet unity. Given the purpose, the choice of a representative could not be 
accidental. Preferably, it should be a poet able to capture the very gist of the crucial social 
transformation in the republic; who accepted the party control and yet with an “uncertain 
past” (an important moment to prove the re-educating potential of the party); and well-
known or even world-known to gain publicity.  
The lot fell to Tychyna. A Pravda correspondent visited the poet to solicit a verse 
with the necessary tune. Numerous recollections attest how hesitant Tychyna was to 
compose poetry on demand; and even more reluctant to have his verses translated for 
editorial purposes. According to the well-known story, Tychyna at the time had just 
finished a propagandistic verse intended for a Young Pioneers’ periodical. The 
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correspondent, having read through the rhymes with catchy words and slogan-like rhythm, 
snatched the verse and appropriated it for Pravda’s November issue.750 Tychyna’s verse 
Partiia Vede was published in the original version without translation on page six of the 
issue.  
The first stanza read: 
Та нехай собі як знають 
Божеволіють, конають, — 
Нам своє робить: 
Всіх панів до ’дної ями, 
Буржуїв за буржуями 
Будем, будем бить! 
Будем, будем бить! […] 
Let them do what they want,  
Let them go mad, let them agonise, - 
We have our task to do:  
All the lords to the same pit,  
Bourgeois to bourgeois,  
Beat, we will beat!  
Beat, we will beat! (O.P.) 
 
The editorial, written under the same heading “The Party Leads”, praised the “splendid 
triumph of the kolkhoz Ukraine, which in the current year had fulfilled the plans for grain 
deliveries ahead of schedule.”751 Despite the famine, the first page of the Pravda issues 
featured a photo with cheerful kolkhoz members from Odesa, expressing their gratitude to 
the central party leadership, who guided them towards the better communist future. 
Tychyna was also mentioned in the editorial. As it was pointed out, this non-partisan poet 
yet managed to grasp the very gist of socialist construction and discerned the prominent 
role of the party in approaching communism. 
So, Tychyna, with all the controversial past and questionable loyalty, received an 
approval from the highest party quarters. 21 November 1933 (the date of the publication of 
the issue) became Tychyna’s admission to the Soviet canon and, as the following years had 
proved, to the very centre of the all-Soviet politics. Yet, there was a price. From now on 
Tychyna became an intrinsic part of the Soviet politics in Ukraine, a poet laureate who 
                                                 
750 Tel'niuk, Pavlo Tychyna, 189-201 
751 Pravda, November 21, 1933 
  
286 
 
would abuse his muse to report on every development in the republic. This bounding was 
neatly marked by an émigré writer Ivan Bahrianyi in one of his caricatures on Tychyna752: 
Хоч від Києва й руїна, 
Так зате нарком Тичина. 
Хоч й розп'ята Україна, 
Сяє орденом Тичина. 
І радіє Московщина — 
«Україна — це Тичина».  
Even though Kyiv lies in ruins,  
Tychyna is a Narkom,  
Even though Ukraine is crucified,  
Tychyna has got another Order,  
And Moscow is joyful – 
“Ukraine is Tychyna” (O.P.) 
 
On the occasion of the seventeenth party congress (“The Congress of the Victors”, 26 
January–10 February 1934), summoned to summarise the results of the first Five-Year 
Plan, Tychyna was commissioned a collection of poetry under the same title Partiia Vede. 
The first edition, worth mentioning, was published without an author on the cover page, 
suggesting the universal, anonymous victory of socialism. In the thirties, this short 
collection was constantly re-published in millions of printed copies (it had three editions 
only in 1934) and was distributed Union-wide. The titles of the verses, bundled in the 
collection, corresponded to the purpose of the edition: Partiia Vede, Pisnia Chervonoї 
Armiї [Song of the Red Army], Pisnia Komsomol'tsiv [Song of Komsomol Members], 
Pisnia Traktorystky [Song of a Tractor Girl], Pisnia Kuzni [Song of a Smithy], Povitrianyi 
Flot [Air Fleet], Lenin, Narody Idut' [The Peoples are Coming]. The collection, 
unsurprisingly, received the most positive reviews, underlining the great political 
significance of Tychyna’s poetry. A Soviet critic Ivan Kulyk praised Tychyna for 
embracing “actual militant themes”, which testified “a major victory of ours [the Party].”753 
Similarly, Samiilo Shchupak attested the far-reaching ideological evolution of the poet.754 
Perhaps, the poet discerned the ‘purifying’ effect of Partiia Vede. Later in his 
autobiography, Tychyna mentioned that the verse and that brief mentioning in Pravda 
                                                 
752 Na Tychynu, in Ivan Bahrianyi, Poeziii (Zbirka). 
753 I. Kulyk, “Ukraїns'ka Literatura do Z'iizdu”, Za Markso-Lenins'ku Krytyku, 5 (1934), 11. 
754 S. Shchupak, “Podolaty Vidstavannia Krytyky,” Za Markso-Lenins'ku Krytyku, 6 (1934), 4. 
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editorial “helped me loads and loads in my work and in all my subsequent life.”755 In 1935, 
in a short passage called Ia Rostu [I am Growing], written as a preparation for the twentieth 
anniversary of the October Revolution, the poet reflected about his experience during the 
1930s. The main emphasis, understandably, was placed on the role of the party in 
Tychyna’s ideological upbringing. This short contribution, however, included an ironic 
note about the price he had to pay for his future accomplishments: “Thus, I am approaching 
the plenum filled and overfilled [napovnenyi, perepovnenyi]. Hence, at the plenum I will 
stand as checked and double-checked [provirenyi i pereprovirenyi]. I was taken to pieces 
and assembled again. By roentgen of self-criticism I was examined not even once. Why 
should not I be brave now?”756 
In 1937, Tychyna was appointed a Head of the Institute of Ukrainian Literature, the 
post which he occupied throughout the worst years of Stalin’s purges. The purges changed 
the outlook of Ukrainian literature significantly. As tallied by Lavrinenko, out of 259 men 
of letters, who were published in 1930, only 36 stayed active after 1938.757 In these 
circumstances, Tychyna as a head of the academic institution dealt with a constantly 
changing literary environment. The Institute was tasked to prepare a new academic edition 
of the History of Ukrainian Literature. Those mentioned in the reference volume were 
included in the new Soviet literary canon. The new literary canon was championed by 
Tychyna, Ryl's'kyi, and Mykola Bazhan, three prominent poets, who were re-forged during 
the 1920s to early 1930s. It is worth noting that each poet had his own path towards the 
heights of socialist realism. While Tychyna gradually evolved towards his position of a 
                                                 
755 Tychyna, “Avtobiohrafiia,” in Tychyna, Z Mynuloho v Maibutnie (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1973), 24. 
756 Tychyna, “Ia Rostu,” in Tychyna, Tvory, vol. 8.1, 57-58. 
757 Lavrinenko, Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia, 12-13; Luckyj G. S.N., Keeping a Record: Literary Purges in 
Soviet Ukraine (1930s): A Bio-Bibliography, (Edmonton: CIUS, 1988). 
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poet laureate, Ryl's'kyi submitted after a year-long imprisonment in 1931,758 and Bazhan 
adopted the party line in 1934. These poets occupied their distinct position in Soviet culture 
and politics due to their ability to come to terms with the party politics and attune their 
poetry to the demands of the times. The party, however, never trusted them fully. 
Tychyna’s friend recalled how sophisticated this manipulation was. According to P''ianov, 
in Tychyna’s personal file there was a snapshot of Vynnychenko, Petliura and Tychyna 
(with Petliura’s hand on Tychyna’s shoulder). Before a new award or another trip abroad, 
this photo was occasionally presented to the poet with the words: “You as well, Pavlo 
Hryhorovytch?!”759 
In addition to Partiia Vede, in 1938 Tychyna prepared another poetry collection, 
Chuttia Iedynoї Rodyny [Feelings of One Unified Family]. The collection glorified the 
Communist Party, which had enabled the free development and cultural flourishing of 
every republic and nation in the Soviet Union. The collection became almost prophetical: in 
1939, on the basis of a secret clause of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, territories of Eastern 
Galicia with significant population of ethnic Ukrainians were occupied by the Red Army 
and added to the Ukrainian SSR. To celebrate this historical event of the “unification with 
the mainland” (besides Western Ukraine, western parts of Belorussia and Baltic States were 
joined to the Soviet Union), representatives from these countries became among the first to 
be awarded the highest state honour, the newly established Stalin Prize. Tychyna received 
the First Prize for his Chuttia Iedynoї Rodyny, in which he celebrated the historical unity of 
the Slavic people. On 16 March 1941 the Moscow Literaturnaia Gazeta commented on the 
selection of “those most worthy”. The commentator rhetorically questioned: “What unites 
                                                 
758 “Sprava no 272 (Z Arkhivu KDB),” Kyїv, 2 (1991), 79-101; Vira Aheeva, Mystetstvo Rivnovahy: Maksym 
Ryl's'kyi na Tli Epohy (Kyiv: Knyha, 2012). 
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the prose of… the verse of… within the sphere of literature?” And he followed: “This 
works deal with the struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union against foreigners who 
would enslave them… Works telling of how a forgotten and oppressed nation unfurled its 
wings for soaring flight, how a sense of family unity was forged among the nationalities of 
the Soviet Union.”760 
On 16 September 1967 “one of the founders of Ukrainian Soviet literature, a 
prominent poet, academic, journalist, translator, state and civil activist, an academic of the 
Academy of Sciences of the URSR, a corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, Hero of the Socialist Labour”761 passed away. This list, put together by one of the 
experts on Tychyna is not yet complete. In addition, Tychyna also was a head of the 
Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR over the period of two convocations (1953-1959), a 
deputy of the Supreme Council for seven convocations (1938-1967), a Minister for 
Education (1943-1948), Laureate of the Stalin Prize (1941), Laureate of the Shevchenko 
Prize (1962), holder of five Orders of Lenin and holder of two Orders of the Red Banner of 
Labour. Tychyna became a member of the VKP(b) only in May 1944. 
The fates of the two protagonists, although different at first sight, have much in 
common. Conventionally, the literary and public activities of Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna 
during the 1920s–early 1930s in Ukrainian studies are examined within the “executed 
renaissance” approach. Their public significance throughout the 1920s was defined not 
only by their opposition towards the Soviet policies (mostly, Khvyl'ovyi), but also their 
leading status among the artistic generation of the 1920s. According to Lavrinenko, a 
leading proponent of the ‘executed renaissance’ paradigm, Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi 
                                                 
760 Quoted in Alla Latyning, “The Stalin Prize for Literature as the Quintessence of Socialist Realism,” in In 
The Party Spirit, 106-128. 
761 Introduction to Tychyna, Tvory, vol. 1, 5. 
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embodied the new neo-baroque literary current of 1917-1933, labelled Ukrainian 
kliarnetysm, (derives from ‘a clarinet’) or literary vitalism.762 For Lavrinenko, Tychyna and 
Khvyl'ovyi played equal roles in this unique literary current: “while Tychyna was 
descending from the heights of kliarnetysm towards communist social-romanticism, 
Khvyl'ovyi bid his farewell to revolutionary romanticism and was quickly approaching 
those vacant pinnacles of kliarnetysm.”763 As seen, the decisive year for the scholar is 
1924-1925, the publication of Tychyna’s collection Viter z Ukraїny and the beginning of 
the Literary Discussion. 
However, as the analysis of the complicated ideological evolution of the two 
protagonists has shown, the cultural development in Ukraine could hardly be influenced by 
a single external force. The unification of Ukrainian literature became a result of a complex 
and non-linear process. The years of the first Five-Year Plan became the last stage of the 
complex process of political, social and cultural sovietisation of the republic. At the First 
Soviet Writers Congress, held in Moscow in 1934, different visions of revolutionary, 
proletarian and Soviet literature were finally unified under the term ‘socialist realism’. 
Party-mindedness, ideological and class content (partiinost', ideinost', klassovost') became 
the main principles of the new state-approved and state-sanctioned theory of art. It engulfed 
different artistic currents of the 1920s. More importantly, the two projects of Soviet culture 
developed and implemented side by side in Ukraine at the time, merged in one Soviet 
canon of socialist realism. Socialist realism became a culmination of the Bolshevik single, 
long-term “cultural revolution”, aimed at constructing a new proletarian culture and Soviet 
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society.764 In Ukraine, the process of sovietisation was especially multi-faceted, since the 
success of the Bolshevik project in the republic depended on eliminating other political and 
cultural alternatives.  
                                                 
764 Using David-Fox’s understanding of the cultural revolution. See: David-Fox, “What Is Cultural 
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Conclusion 
At the seventeenth VKP(b) congress, known as “The Congress of the Victors” (26 January–
10 February 1934), the results of the first Five-Year Plan were summarised. The central 
party leadership proudly reported on the remarkable achievements in the national economy 
and the levels of production, as well as grand transformations in the social and cultural 
spheres. The results of the first Five-Year Plan, allowed the party leadership to assert the 
ultimate victory of the working masses, in whose name the revolution had been initially 
executed. Given the decisive triumph of the proletariat, the party leaders declared a course 
towards a classless society, subsequently accepted as a slogan for the second Five-Year 
Plan. As stated by Molotov, the main objective for the following years would be the 
transformation of the whole toiling population of the country into conscious and active 
building of a classless socialist society. In such a way, the rigid class-based social structure 
of the first Five-Year Plan had been rejected; the adherence to class was substituted by the 
loyalty to the party-state. 
The new inclusive paradigm required the redefinition of the ideological foundation of 
Soviet culture. The ‘proletarian episode’ in the Union’s literature and art was exhausted 
together with class war of 1928-1931. Instead of narrow-mindedness and sectarian ideology 
of the class struggle, the newly adopted vision promoted the idea of state-oriented partisan 
literature, tasked to accentuate the consolidating role of the party-state. As it was stated in 
the 1932 TsK VKP(b) Resolution “On the Restructuring of Literary and Artistic 
Organisations,” the existing literary-artistic organisations “ha[d] become too narrow and 
[were] slowing the serious sweep of [literary and] artistic creativity.”765 The resolution put 
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to an end institutional and ideological pluralism in the world of letters, as well as any 
contestant visions of Soviet culture in the Soviet republics. In fact, by 1932 the still existing 
institutional diversity became a rudiment, a tribute to earlier diversity in literature. As 
shown in Section Four, any ideological or aesthetic differences between the literary 
organisations and groupings had already faded away under the onslaught of the party-
sponsored VUSPP (and the RAPP in Russia). Instead, the Resolution provided for a single 
Union of Soviet Writers, which would embrace the new aesthetic method of socialist 
realism. At the All-Soviet Congress of Soviet Writers, held in Moscow on 17 August 1934, 
the organisational and ideological setup of Soviet literature was completed. 
At the Congress, the term ‘socialist realism’ was defined by Zhdanov, Stalin’s 
spokesman in cultural affairs. It was presented as “the basic method of Soviet literature and 
literary criticism [which] demands of a sincere writer a historically concrete representation 
of reality in its revolutionary development.”766 This vague formula rested on the didactic 
and socially useful understanding of literature and art in general. The usefulness of writers, 
who became agents of the state and paid employees, derived from their ability to educate 
people in a proper way. Hence, within the method of socialist realism “truth and historical 
completeness of artistic representation must be combined with the task of ideological 
transformation and education of the working man in the spirit of Socialism.”767 
At the 1934 Congress the Soviet cultural canon was cemented; a unified artistic and 
institutional method of socialist realism was authorised centrally and endorsed by the 
creation of the Union of Soviet Writers. It had also marked the decisive end to once heated 
debates about the artistic orientation, the nature and purpose of art, the social role of artists 
and writers in the Soviet state. In other words, in the competition between the two models 
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of Soviet culture in Ukraine, the Soviet culture, as defined centrally, received the complete 
victory over the separatist vision of Soviet Ukrainian culture, ardently promoted by the 
Ukrainian communists and artists since the revolution. Ukrainian writers joined the Union 
of Soviet Writers of Ukraine, a section of the All-Soviet Union. So, Ukraine’s writers 
became executors of the central directives with a limited power to influence the literary 
agenda in the republic. 
However, as the thesis has proven, socialist realism and the Soviet canon can hardly 
be regarded as a mere invention of the party. As it was shown, the question of cultural 
sovietisation of Ukraine has no simple answer. The formation of Ukraine’s Soviet cultural 
canon resulted equally from 1) the oppressive literary politics and constant intervention in 
the cultural sphere; 2) emergence of the national working class and mass audience with 
clear aesthetic demands and expectations; and 3) the inner artistic evolution of the writers 
in view of the two factors. Throughout the 1920s, the party, despite its declared non-
intervention, was gradually acquiring control in literature, mainly by manipulating the 
alignment of forces in the world of letters. Socialist realism and the supremacy of the 
Soviet canon marked the last stage of sovietisation, the endpoint of the decade-long 
‘cultural revolution’ initiated by the Bolsheviks in order to construct a new proletarian 
culture and Soviet society. Hence, the adoption of socialist realism was not sudden; the 
shift in the continuum of Soviet cultural life occurred already during the 1920s. As affirmed 
by Clark “in the mid-1920s, approximately 1924-1926, we can already find the contours of 
those patterns – institutional, ideological and aesthetic – that in the 1930s were to re-
emerge as defining a culture we call ‘Stalinism’.”768 
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The dominance of the Soviet canon was also enabled by the audience. The demands 
for accessible style and language, optimistic and heroic plots, instructive realistic literature, 
didactic messages and positive heroes were repeatedly voiced by the working class readers 
from below. In a way, the simplification and practical orientation of Soviet education 
influenced pragmatic attitude to art and literature; whereas the preferential position of the 
working masses in the Soviet society prioritised their demand and expectations. In addition, 
various educational and cultural organisations (primarily Komsomol) succeeded in creating 
active, politically engaged, and even militant consumers for Soviet culture. Thus, it was the 
authoritative voice of the masses demanding “more heroes like X” that had influenced 
writers in adopting the new aesthetic principles. Hence, the culture of socialist realism was 
a product of a hybrid, the “power-masses,” functioning as a single creator.769 
Lastly, throughout the decade, the writers, by trial and error, were searching for their 
own definition of Soviet Ukrainian (or Soviet) culture. The artistic evolution of Ukraine’s 
writers was heavily influenced by the two above-mentioned factors. Due to the nature of 
their activity, writers significantly depended on both the readers and the state, which by the 
decade’s end had become the only publisher and distributor of the printing word. In 
addition, it was hardly possible to remain self-employed or non-aligned at the time. Hence, 
the state became the guarantor of writers’ financial security. In order to get the approval of 
the party, writers, however, needed to compromise and to adapt to the expectations of the 
“power-masses” hybrid. In addition, especially in the 1930s, aligning with the party vision 
on literature often came together with some assurance of physical survival. 
The two case studies prove the complexity of the cultural transformation in the Soviet 
society. There were at least two turning points in the gradual process of the Bolshevik 
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cultural revolution: the civil war years of 1917-1921 and the year of the great break in 
1928/1929, characterised by the change of the ideal cultural types (as defined in the 
Introduction). During the 1917 revolutions kul'tura odin (the avant-garde and revolutionary 
romanticism) had come into direct conflict with kultura nol' (pre-revolutionary culture); 
while at the turn of the 1920s, kul'tura dva (socialist realism) started to gain prominence. 
As the thesis has proven, there were major internal adjustments in each of the cultural types 
throughout the 1920s. The cultural transformation of the twenties should be defined not as a 
mere replacement of one ideal type by another, but rather a complex transformation of 
kul'tura nol' into kul'tura odin and consequently kul'tura dva. The norms and values of the 
ideal types did not vanish once the one type gave way to another. As shown through the 
examination of Ukraine’s reading audience, social conservatism was an important factor 
often neglected by the literary and cultural managers, pre-revolutionary trends remained 
tangible throughout the decade and were re-introduced into the Soviet cultural canon in the 
1930s onwards.770 
The two case studies demonstrated how complicated the process of self-adjustment 
was for Ukraine’s writers. Both Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna went through a complicated 
process of self-sovietisation. While the revolutionary and a communist Khvyl'ovyi needed 
to adjust his romanticism inspired by the revolution and the civil wars to the post-
revolutionary routine, the Modernist poet and intelihent Tychyna was faced with 
completely new aesthetics, rejecting the autonomy of arts and demanding his engagement 
in both political and cultural affairs. During the twenties, the artistic activity of the two men 
of letters was heavily mediated by politics and the need to take sides in the on-going 
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ideological debates about the concept of Soviet culture in Ukraine. The literary output of 
the writer Khvyl'ovyi and the poet Tychyna was respectively used as evidence for the 
potency of different cultural projects competing for dominance at the time. In spite of 
different levels of public and political engagements, political and aesthetic agendas, 
Tychyna and Khvyl'ovyi both fell victims to the centralisation drive carried out from 
Moscow: in 1933, Khvyl'ovyi took his life with a gunshot whereas Tychyna “ascended the 
Golgotha of Fame”771 and attuned his poetry to the demands of the party. 
Conventionally in the Ukrainian studies, the literary and public activity of Khvyl'ovyi 
and Tychyna during the 1920s-early 1930s is examined within the ‘executed renaissance’ 
paradigm. According to this approach, which prevails national and diaspora 
historiographies, the 1920s exposed the greatest potential of the young artistic generation, 
which was violently interrupted by the Stalinist terror. Following this view, national and 
moral criteria took priority in the evaluation of authors and their works. In many respects, 
the present study challenges the paradigm. In the 1920s, as has been proven, Ukraine 
experienced a complicated and non-linear process of formation of Soviet literature which 
over the decade had gradually absorbed other alternative non-Bolshevik and proletarian 
visions of Ukraine’s literature. The study has shown that, firstly, there was more than one 
current in Ukrainian cultural developments at the time and the literary development of the 
1920s cannot be narrowed to only those highly talented writers, who have subsequently 
constituted the literary canon of the independent Ukraine. Secondly, the ideological and 
aesthetic evolution of those writers, glorified by national historiography, was far more 
complex and there is no simple distinction between ‘martyrs’ and ‘perpetrators’ of the 
regime. Thus, the cultural development of Ukraine did not end in the 1930s, having been 
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‘executed’ by the order from above, but evolved into a distinct Soviet culture. Thereby, 
there is a direct link between the Ukrainian national (rooted in Ukrainian modernism) and 
Soviet (socialist realism, mediated by Soviet Ukrainian) culture. 
As scholars have observed, the doctrine of socialist realism was heavily oriented 
towards literary practice, meaning that the literary canon was formed by a code of specific 
novels, written during the time.772 Thus, every writer, participating in this literary practice, 
by his own effort defined and enriched the concept of Soviet culture. However, the Soviet 
canon was contributed not only by what was written at the time, but also by what was 
deliberately omitted or left aside. In the 1930s, numerous contributions of the Soviet 
Ukrainian authors were generally regarded unfit for the new literary canon, censored both 
from the libraries and public remembrance. So, although different, the case studies of 
Khvyl'ovyi and Tychyna best present the way the discourse of the 1920s decade was 
manipulated and constructed over time. 
Khvyl'ovyi, considered “one of the most outstanding writers of the proletarian 
age,”773 after his suicide in May 1933 fell out of the narrative of Soviet culture. In the 
Soviet Union, his life-long activity was labelled counter-revolutionary, his writings were 
removed from libraries, and his name could only be used in connection with ‘khvyl'ovizm’, 
a general term to define class enemies. In turn, Tychyna, called “the most prominent 
Ukrainian poet of the twenties”,774 ascended to the heights of socialist realism after his 
propagandistic verse Partiia Vede had been published in the Moscow newspaper Pravda in 
November 1933. Nonetheless, the status of a poet laureate required an unblemished 
revolutionary biography. Hence, his poetic oeuvre underwent critical ideological 
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evaluation. Consequently, the collection of his selected poetry, published in 1939, included 
only “neutral” poems from the previous collections. Sixty-three poems, however, did not 
pass the strict censorship: ten poems from Soniachni Klarnety (1918), all twenty-three 
poems of Zamist' Sonetiv i Oktav (1920), thirteen from Pluh (1920), eleven from Viter z 
Ukraїny (1924), and six from Chernihiv (1931). The poems approved for the publication 
underwent strict editing in order to polish them from ‘reprehensible’ religious symbolism, 
references to national history or revolution, allusions to any events which could allow anti-
Soviet interpretation. 
To a certain extent, the two protagonists similarly disappeared from scholarship. 
Khvyl'ovyi fell victim of his “ideological ambiguity,” condemned from both ideological 
sides for being either communist or nationalist. Whereas any objective accounts on 
Tychyna were shadowed by his status of a poet laureate. The reappraisal of the two 
protagonists in Soviet Ukraine started only in the late 1980s during the so-called glasnost'. 
In 1988, after more than a fifty-year ban on his name, Khvyl'ovyi was praised from the high 
Party tribunes of the Ukrainian SSR in connection to his 95th birth and 55th anniversary of 
his death. Moreover, a set of cultural events was organised with the TsK approval to 
commemorate the unjust forgotten Ukrainian writer Khvyl'ovyi.775 Subsequently, in the 
independent Ukraine, Khvyl'ovyi has become one of the most researched Ukrainian writers. 
His prose is widely referred to as an example of the unprecedented cultural flourishing of 
the 1920s and his pamphlets are uncritically used to prove an inherent intellectual 
opposition to the Bolshevik authoritarianism. 
The attitude towards an ‘official’ Tychyna, the one introduced by force after 1933, 
among the literary critics and audience was rather negative. In 1991, one critic asserted that 
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“Ninety per cent of Ukrainians do not like Tychyna’s creative work. No, I think I might be 
mistaken. Not ninety, but nighty nine. Or maybe even more – ninety nine point nine per 
cent”.776 Since the late 1980s, however, the attempt was made to introduce another 
Tychyna, an undeservedly forgotten poet of the early 1920s, who, due to his weak 
personality and constant fear of terror and violence, had surrendered to the Communist 
party. In contemporary literary studies, two personas of Tychyna are distinguished: the 
Symbolist poet of the early 1920s and the Soviet poet laureate. Most of Tychyna’s poetry 
did not stand the test of time. The literary canon of independent Ukraine included poetry of 
the ‘early’ Tychyna (up until 1920) and some rare examples of partisan poetry, written 
during the World War Two (for instance, Pokhoron Druha [Funeral of the Friend]). 
Overall, the unified Soviet canon in Ukraine, cemented in the early 1930s, was an 
amalgamation of at least two different Soviet cultural projects: Soviet Ukrainian culture 
and Soviet culture in the Ukrainian language. The two projects were conditioned by two 
different political cultures, developed parallel to each other within the institutional 
framework of the KP(b)U. The distinct project of Soviet Ukrainian culture was promoted 
by Ukraine-minded communists, advocating Ukraine’s autonomy in political and cultural 
matters. The project of all-Union Soviet culture was based on Moscow’s central place on 
the all-Soviet artistic map and the determinant role of the central leadership in defining 
cultural policies in the Union. The two cultural projects, often implemented simultaneously 
by different groups of interest, came into direct confrontation with each other. The 
subsequent triumph of the all-Soviet project was secured by the accelerated processes of 
economic centralisation and political consolidation Union-wide. Nevertheless, the demise 
of the Soviet Ukrainian cultural project was only partially caused by the external force. The 
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inherent contradictions within the KP(b)U (the irreconcilable ‘two distinct ancestral roots’ 
in the party); constant power struggle between the republic’s and central elites as for the 
amount of authorities the KP(b)U could enjoy, the lack of a single unified vision on what 
the Soviet Ukrainian cultural project was about, resulted in the weakness and perhaps 
inevitable failure of the ambitious project of a Soviet Ukrainian culture. 
Additionally, the failure of a separatist political and cultural project ironically was 
caused by the success of korenizatsiia in Ukraine. This preferential policy, designed by the 
party to pursue multiple often contradictory goals, for a short period of time had created an 
affirmative image of the Soviet authorities in Ukraine. The accomplishments in the cultural 
sphere, the promotion of ethnic Ukrainians and the preferential status of the Ukrainian 
language in the republic made many leftist intellectuals, both in Ukraine and abroad, 
believe in and side with the Bolsheviks, under whose banner, as believed, the elites could 
finally build a nationally defined and socially just Ukrainian state. The failure of a separate 
vision of a Soviet Ukraine, hence, was caused by the support the Ukrainian communists 
had granted to their adversary, overlooking other potential projects of Soviet Ukrainian 
state-building. 
In general, by 1932, the implementation of korenizatsiia was discontinued. In a way, 
the implementation of the policy corroborated Petliura’s observation from 1923: “In 
general, this Ukrainizatsiia looks like a mere tactical move from the Bolshevik side; if it 
does not give positive results, very soon it will be forgotten.”777 Nonetheless, Ukrainizatsiia 
did achieve success. By the end of the first Five-Year Plan, the main goals of the party were 
largely accomplished, enabling full consolidation of Bolshevik power in Ukraine. 
Korenizatsiia, designed to neutralise the emergence of local nationalism, succeeded in 
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gathering all national activists under the KP(b)U’s umbrella. In the 1930s, their services 
were no longer required. The Soviet regime managed to receive the support it needed 
simply by dressing a Moscow-dominated party in national colours: it engaged locals into 
party and governmental work and public administration and promoted Ukrainian leaders to 
the highest posts in the republic. In addition, during the decade the new generation of 
Soviet citizens, educated in the Communist spirit, came into existence. As a result, the 
KP(b)U was transformed into a centralised well-structured organisation with vast 
representation and legitimacy within the union republic. A mutually beneficial compromise 
between Ukrainian and Russian communists was found, according to which the KP(b)U 
could indulge limited autonomy in return for acknowledging the Moscow leadership. 
Similarly, korenizatsiia was adopted to mobilise the population for the upcoming 
transformation of the USSR into a great power. In predominantly rural Ukraine, 
korenizatsiia was needed to come to terms with the countryside. The peasants were to be 
encouraged to take part in local administration and, most importantly, to join the ranks of 
the national proletariat. Nonetheless, korenizatsiia had always been a concession, a soft-
line, which was used to prepare the ground until a hard-line policy would be elaborated. 
Not surprisingly, the curtailment of korenizatsiia concurred with the proclamation of the 
forced collectivisation in 1929. Instead of coming to terms with the peasantry, their latent 
resistance was crushed by, firstly, taking away their strongholds, their land and property, 
and secondly, their physical extermination during the famine of 1932-33. 
In general, korenizatsiia, as envisaged centrally, fulfilled its intended goals. On the 
contrary, the results of Ukrainizatsiia as seen by national intelligentsia were far more 
ambiguous. Ukrainizatsiia was always favoured and endorsed by a minority in the party, 
whose political weight had never been enough to defend the cause of national state-building 
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against the centralist attitude of the majority. Moreover, Ukrainizatsiia did not gain 
necessary social basis, and, in fact, was supported mostly by Ukrainian socialist 
intelligentsia. In addition, the policy of a “double bottom” [podviine dno] applied to 
Ukraine’s cultural and political figures: on the one hand, the policy had provided for vast 
changes in the republic, on the other hand, the enthusiastic intentions of local Ukrainisers 
ran counter to the policies endorsed centrally. The political campaigns against Shums'kyi 
and Khvyl'ovyi, and the nationality-based persecutions initiated already in 1926, proved 
that korenizatsiia had always had its limits and could not be applied to the political sphere. 
In the end, Ukrainizatsiia, paraphrasing the words of a diaspora commentator, “opened the 
window for the agents of the occupying power [the Bolshevik party] to see who would be 
the first to rush to it to catch a breath of fresh air” and “helped the NKVD to make short 
work of Ukrainian cultural and public activists either non-Communist or Ukrainian 
communists.”778 
Undeniably, Ukrainizatsiia resulted in great cultural upheaval, bringing to the fore 
significant potential of Soviet Ukrainian writers, academics, artists etc. The enforced usage 
of the national language and a tolerant attitude towards autonomous artistic currents created 
the preconditions for the fully-fledged cultural flourishing in the republic. Even if we 
disregard the artificial character of book publishing (which corresponded neither to the 
readership’s demands, nor to the alignment of literary forces in the republic) and the forced 
linguistic Ukrainizatsiia (which often remained on the level of changing signs on the streets 
of the cities in eastern Ukraine or collecting certificates from numerous language courses), 
korenizatsiia for the first time created a large number of native-language consumers.  
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Yet, what was the product of this cultural renaissance? Ukrainizatsiia endorsed mass 
production in Ukrainian to satisfy the demands of the audience, aptly manipulated by the 
party educators. The policy was accompanied by enforced proletarisation of Ukrainian 
culture, hence unification of style, themes, and aesthetic devices. Initiated by the great 
examples of high quality artistic and literary works, national culture in the second half of 
the 1920s slowly slid towards mass culture with distinct ideological flavour, albeit created 
in the Ukrainian language. The resultant contributions were Soviet, to warrant its 
propagandistic and ideologically consistent content, and Ukrainian, to ensure its outreach 
up to the remotest village in western Ukraine. Overall, due to industrialisation, middle-
brow tastes in arts and letters started not only to dominate the cultural sphere, but became a 
standard, expected to be followed unconditionally. Party-sponsored Ukrainizatsiia, with its 
orientation towards quantitative objectives, provided for massification of literature, 
lowering the standards of creative activity to the most unsophisticated readers, newly 
proletarised and urbanised peasants, who were learning literacy along with their technical 
skills. 
Cultural and linguistic Ukrainizatsiia, carried alongside modernisation campaigns 
was intended to change Ukraine’s urban identity. Shums'kyi unsuccessfully advocated an 
accelerated de-Russification of Ukraine’s urban centres. After Shums'kyi’s demise, 
Skrypnyk shifted the emphasis towards more ideological compliance. In his view, endorsed 
demographic Ukrainizatsiia should be accompanied by the creation of a totally Ukrainian 
urban environment and increase of prestige of the Ukrainian language. Consequently, not 
only the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians within the working class increased during the 
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1920s (51.7% in 1926, and 59.2% in 1934779), but their identity was shaped during this 
decade. Liber argues that in the 1920s the urban identity was transformed, “reflecting the 
Ukrainian transition from marginality to majority in the urban centres.”780 However, such 
statements were premature. The belief in natural demographic Ukrainizatsiia was naively 
based on the assumption that those millions of peasants, who flooded the cities during the 
Five-Year Plans, would contribute to de-Russification of the proletariat. As anticipated by 
Hrushevs'kyi, “this nationally aware and civilised [natsional'no svidomyi i vykhovanyi] 
class of peasants […] will not fall victim to Russification, but will influence the new 
environment and will lead to the creation of the Ukrainian working class”.781 
Instead, huge migration from the countryside peasantised the working class. Peasants, 
despite misconceptions of some intellectuals, did not possess strong national identity and 
had little connection with Ukrainian elitist urban culture of the time. Industrialisation made 
those peasants move to the cities, Ukrainizatsiia created the façade of a total Ukrainian 
environment, but it did not necessarily transform peasants into Ukrainians with a modern 
urban identity.782 Also, Ukrainizatsiia did not make Ukrainian the everyday language of the 
urban population. The Russian language still dominated economic, industrial, political, and 
academic spheres, whereas Ukrainian was confined to education, propaganda work, and 
partly the cultural sphere. Instead of becoming mono-lingual (Ukrainian), the urban centres 
became bilingual, when Russian culture dominated among the workers and state 
functionaries. The Russian language preserved its superior status and urban citizens, as 
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recalled by the contemporaries, were ashamed of speaking Ukrainian, which could easily 
suggest their social origin.783 
Nonetheless, Ukrainizatsiia had supreme importance for constructing Ukrainian 
identity. In the 1920s the Ukrainian nation was created. Firstly, by means of statistics and 
ethnography, the diverse peoples inhabiting the territory of Ukraine started to associate 
themselves with Ukrainians, contributing to the largest ethnic group in the republic. 
Secondly, the Ukrainian language was codified. The first comprehensive spelling reform, 
adopted in 1929, widely known as ‘skrypnykivka’ (after the then Commissar for Education 
Skrypnyk) or ‘Kharkiv orthography’, was a result of thorough discussions among 
academics and linguists, representing different parts of Ukraine. Hence, in 1929, based on 
the previous experiences of language reforms, different vernaculars and dialects, which 
existed on the territory of Ukraine, were codified under the name of the Ukrainian 
language. Besides, the ‘Kharkiv orthography’ was adopted in western Ukraine, to facilitate 
the cross-border communication and distribution of publications. Also, a single narrative of 
Ukraine’s history had been written, uniting ethnically and linguistically different parts of 
Soviet Ukraine within one discourse. Moreover, the borders of Soviet Ukraine were defined 
and agreed on with the neighbouring countries.784 
Ukrainizatsiia strengthened the distinctiveness of a separatist horizon in the KP(b)U, 
whose representatives elaborated and with varied success implemented an alternative vision 
of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Ukrainian culture. Ukrainian elites were a proactive force in 
the process of the formation of the Soviet Union. The debates and negotiations between 
local actors (intellectuals, politicians, etc.) and the Moscow party leadership over the status 
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of Ukraine shaped the republic and at large accounted for its distinctive status in the Union. 
The experience of political autonomy provided for ideological pluralism and unprecedented 
cultural upheaval in the republic. The success of Ukrainizatsiia campaign resulted from an 
activist position of local Ukrainisers, who had used the centrally-endorsed initiative for 
their own nation-building objectives. Within the power struggle between the local and 
central elites, a distinct and promising current, Soviet Ukrainian culture, was elaborated. 
Despite the defeat, the separatist vision of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Ukrainian culture 
remained tangible throughout the Soviet period in Ukraine.785 
The significance of national communist projects of state-building was re-affirmed 
time and again. In 1949, Vynnychenko, residing in France, published a controversial and 
highly debated Zapovit Bortsiam za Vyzvolennia [Testament to Fighters for Liberation]. In 
it, he asserted that the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian statehood existed in the form of the 
Ukrainian SSR. Hence, the goals of the national revolution of 1917-1921, as seen by the 
UNR leader, were achieved. The Ukrainian state was built by the great potential of the 
Ukrainian nation and sacrifices of national communists, all the “Hrushevs'kyis, Skrypnyks, 
Iefremovs, Khvyl'ovyi’s, even Liubchenkos, and all the conscious Ukrainians, who gave up 
their freedom and life” for the national cause.786 The Ukrainian state, according to the 
former politician, possessed all the attributes of an autonomous and sovereign state. 
Moreover, in 1945 the Ukrainian SSR became a member of the UN, hence internationally 
recognised. The Ukrainian state, however, was under occupation by Moscow. Therefore, 
Vynnychenko called for the liberation of Ukraine and highly praised the commitment of the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA, Ukraїns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia). The merit of the 
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national communists and the UPA fighters was comparable: while the former built the 
Ukrainian state, the UPA was fighting for its liberation. 
In Ukrainian intellectual history, the legacy of national communists did not wither 
away. The ideas first expressed by Mazlakh and Shakhrai in Do Khvyli in 1918 remained 
vital during the entire period of Soviet rule in Ukraine. National communism became the 
form of legal opposition to the Soviet authority that arose from the contradiction between 
the interests of the centralised state (in the Soviet Union as a whole) and claims for national 
self-determination either in cultural, economic or political dimensions (in the union 
republic). Apart from the early 1920s, the ideas of national communism succeeded in 
entering the political scene of Soviet Ukraine at least two more times. In the 1960–1970s, 
nationally oriented communists were the first to voice the strengthening of the authoritarian 
regime and to condemn resumed purges of national intellectuals. Finally, during the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union, sovereign communists legalised the acquisition of 
sovereignty that led to Ukraine’s independence. In both cases, Ukraine-minded political 
elites referred to the experience of the 1920s to provide legacy for their own attempts to 
withstand the centralisation drive of the party leadership.787 
The 1920s decade was perhaps the most complex period in Ukraine’s political, 
cultural and intellectual history. Two concurring revolutions, national and Bolshevik, led to 
exceptionally violent civil wars, when different form of statehoods competed for authority 
on the territory of Ukraine. The Bolsheviks, the only party to remain in power in 1921, 
were faced not only with the economically and socially devastated country, but also with an 
almost totally alien population, which at large did not support either the ideology or the 
political methods introduced by the new authorities. In 1921, the long process of political, 
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economic and cultural sovietisation of Ukraine had begun; a process which took almost a 
decade to be completed. While establishing the Soviet regime in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks 
met with an unexpected rival, the Ukrainian communist movement and the distinct 
Ukraine-minded group in the KP(b)U, who, throughout the decade, challenged and opposed 
the centralising tendencies of the Moscow-led Bolsheviks in the republic. Apart from the 
political sphere, the most intense competition between the two political cultures occurred in 
the cultural sphere, where different projects of Soviet culture were put to the test. The 
triumph of the all-Soviet project was contributed both by the uncompromising stand of the 
central leadership and the lack of solidarity among Ukrainian communist elites. This study 
of cultural sovietisation leads to a better understanding of the complex process of 
establishing and consolidating the Soviet regime in Ukraine, its seventy-year-long history 
and legacy, still tangible in independent Ukraine. 
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